2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. From September 2012, the Plaintiff is operating a camping experience center in the trade name of 'D' from 1,00 Si-si B (hereinafter referred to as 'B') and 3 parcels (hereinafter referred to as 'D'), which are located in the development-restricted zone C.

B. On June 27, 2013 and July 15, 2013, the Defendant conducted a field investigation on the instant land, and confirmed the fact that the instant land cannot be constructed, built, installed, or changed the form and quality of a building without permission pursuant to Article 12(1) of the former Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones (amended by Act No. 12372, Jan. 28, 2014; hereinafter referred to as the “former Development Restriction Zone Act”) as a development restriction zone (hereinafter referred to as the “former Development Restriction Zone Act”), the Plaintiff used the instant land, the land category of which is “C” as a parking lot, and the land category “B” or “E”, “forest” or “F”, or “G land” as a place for installation, etc. (hereinafter referred to as the “land in this case”). < Amended by Act No. 11860, Mar. 28, 2014>

C. Accordingly, the Defendant issued a warning to correct the installation of a parking lot, a bar straw, and a cover for camping on two occasions on October 18, 2013 and October 23, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the “instant disposition”). The Defendant imposed KRW 19,44,00 for non-performance penalty on the Plaintiff, as follows, pursuant to Article 30-2(1) of the former Act on December 5, 2013, following the pre-announcement procedure for the imposition of a non-performance penalty on the Plaintiff, as the Plaintiff did not restore to its original state within the period prescribed by the said corrective order (i.e., the evidence No. 2-1, 200).

A person shall be appointed.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1 to 3, Eul evidence 1 to 1-3, Eul evidence 2-1, 2, Eul evidence 3 to 6, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) Non-existence of grounds for disposition

A) From September 2012, the Plaintiff operated a camping site on the instant land from around September 2012, and even if based on the air carrier’s previous filmed in 201, C was used as a parking lot. Therefore, the Plaintiff did not change the form and quality of the said land.

B) Although the Plaintiff’s installation of a Jke on the instant land cannot be deemed as having changed the form and quality of the land, it is not difficult to restore the land to its original state. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff’s installation of a Jke is an alteration of form and quality

C) Since the instant trailer has a wheels, it is possible to move with a vehicle attached to it, the Plaintiff’s installation of the instant trailer cannot be deemed as “new construction of a building prohibited in a development-restricted zone.”

2) Violation of the principle of equality

In addition to the Plaintiff, other entrepreneurs are also engaged in a business similar to the Plaintiff by installing a set of cream and camping in a group, such as the Gacheon-gun and Pyeongtaek-gun, but there is no charge for compelling the performance as the Plaintiff. The imposition of the charge for compelling the performance only by the Plaintiff goes against the principle of equality.

(iii) deviation from and abuse of discretionary power;

In light of the fact that the parking lot has already been restored to its original state, and that it is easy to restore the parking lot to its original state because the installation, etc. of the instant bar constitutes a change in the form and quality, the instant disposition is unlawful by abusing and abusing discretion.

B. Relevant statutes

Attached Form 3 is as listed in the "relevant Acts and subordinate statutes".

C. Determination on the first argument

1) According to Articles 30(1) and 30-2(1) of the former Development Restriction Zone Act, a Mayor, etc. may take necessary measures where a building is constructed, land is altered, etc. without obtaining permission under the proviso to Article 12(1). The former Development Restriction Zone Act provides that a person who fails to comply with a corrective order within the corrective period after receiving the said corrective order may impose a non-performance penalty on him/her. Meanwhile, Article 30(1) main sentence of the former Development Restriction Zone Act provides that the relevant actor includes an owner, manager, or occupant of a building, structure, or land used in the violation.

2) In full view of the evidence as seen earlier, Eul evidence Nos. 14-2 through 4-4, it is recognized that the plaintiff currently uses the land C as a parking lot in the camping experience site operated by the plaintiff. Therefore, even if a person who changed the form and quality of the land as a parking lot is not the plaintiff, as alleged by the plaintiff, the plaintiff is a "occupier of the land above" and thus, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

D. Judgment on the second argument

1) The alteration of the form and quality of land under Article 12(1) of the former Development Restriction Zone Act refers to the act of changing the form and quality of land by cutting, raising, leveling, or paving, etc. and the reclamation of public waters. As such, it is required that the form and quality of land should be changed in a form and quality of land in a situation where it is difficult to reinstate due to such alteration (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2006Du4875, Feb. 23, 2007; 2004Do8436, Nov. 25, 2005).

2) In full view of the aforementioned evidence and evidence Nos. 11-7 through 14, the following circumstances, which are acknowledged by comprehensively considering the overall purport of the pleadings, namely, ① all trees are removed, ② the Plaintiff’s land on which the instant rain is installed, ② the Plaintiff’s construction of a steel golf structure with a slope as well as the slope to the Jind Co., Ltd. for this purpose; ③ the Plaintiff installed a rain string; ③ the Plaintiff installed a safety rail, a vertical wall, and a powder, etc. in addition to the said steel golf. In full view of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff’s installation of the instant rain string is de facto changing the form and quality of the land into an outer shape, and it is difficult to restore it to its original state. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion that it does not constitute the foregoing alteration of the form and quality is without merit.

A person shall be appointed.

E. Judgment on the third argument

1) According to Article 2(1)2 of the former Building Act (amended by Act No. 12246, Jan. 14, 2014), “building” means a structure settled on land, which has a roof and columns or walls, and facilities appurtenant thereto, an office, a performance place, a shop, a garage, a warehouse installed on an underground or elevated structure, and other structures prescribed by Presidential Decree. Here, a structure settled on land does not necessarily mean only a structure fixed on the land that is impossible to move, but also includes a situation attached to the land that is physically possible to move separately from the land in a common way, and it does not include cases where the original purpose of use is set up for a considerable period of time, and it is attached to such a structure (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Do945, Jun. 11, 1991).

2) Meanwhile, Article 3(1)2(c) of the Automobile Management Act provides that twitler, such as the instant twitler, as one of the types of automobiles. However, Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the said Act provides that 'automobile' is an instrument manufactured for the purpose of movement on land by a motor or an instrument manufactured for the purpose of movement on land by being towed. Unlike its original type and structure characteristics, twitlers can be used as a residence, office, store, etc. by performing similar functions with a structure and equipment to a certain degree, unlike their original production title, unlike their original production title, and can be used as a dwelling, office, store, etc. If twitlers for camping purposes merely deemed as a motor vehicle, it is likely to break down under the Building Act, in light of the building Act’s purpose of use, installation standard and usage of the site, structure, and structure of a building, and its purpose of use, it is reasonable to comprehensively consider the building’s specific purpose and purpose to improve the building environment, etc. in light of the Building Act’s specific purpose and purpose.

3) In full view of the following circumstances, the aforementioned evidence and evidence No. 11-6, Eul evidence No. 11-1-6, and Eul evidence No. 16, the overall purpose of the pleadings can be comprehensively taken into account: ① the structure with the roof and wall of the instant Tracers, which reaches 8,700 km, and the weight of the structure reaches 8,700 km; ② the plaintiff used the instant Tracler by fixing it on the ground and using it without any movement; ③ the plaintiff installed the instant Tracler with an electric power, water supply system, etc.; ④ the movement of the instant Tracers is limited to the equipment with a considerable power such as large car and truck, etc.; ④ The plaintiff's use of the instant Tracers is not intended to move on the land, but may use the building for the purpose of using it, and thus, it is reasonable to deem that the part of the building of this case constitutes the building as prescribed in Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Building Act.

A person shall be appointed.

F. Judgment on the fourth argument

Although other disposition authorities did not impose enforcement fines on the illegal installation, etc. of wrlers and camping doping by other business entities, the disposition of this case only for the plaintiff is against the principle of equality, which is not included in the subject of protection of equal rights under the Constitution. Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion of violation of the principle of equality under the Constitution is without merit.

G. Judgment on the fifth argument

1) Whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion in light of social norms shall be determined by comparing and balancing the degree of infringement on public interest and the disadvantages suffered by an individual as well as the degree of infringement on public interest by objectively examining the content of the offense, which is the reason for the disposition, and the public interest to be achieved by the relevant disposition, and all the relevant circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Du11779, Apr. 7, 200). If a disposition standard is prescribed by Presidential Decree or Ordinance of the Ministries, such disposition standard itself does not conform with the Constitution or laws, or unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that a punitive administrative disposition in accordance with the above disposition standard is considerably unfair in light of the content of the offense, and the content and purport of the relevant statutes, it shall not be readily determined that the disposition was an abuse of discretion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du6946, Apr. 9, 20

2) The purport of the enforcement fine system is to promote public welfare by continuously imposing the administrative order until the corrective order is implemented in order to ensure the effectiveness of the administrative order in a case where the violator, etc. fails to comply with the corrective order. Thus, the exemption or reduction of the enforcement fine should not be easily allowed for personal reasons. ② The Plaintiff maintains illegal state without changing the form and quality and newly constructing new structures up to the present time despite accusation of the violation from around 2013, and ③ the Defendant calculated the instant disposition in accordance with Article 30-2(9) of the former Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones, Article 41-2(1) [Attachment Table 5] of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Development Restriction Zones, comprehensively taking into account all the circumstances asserted by the Plaintiff, it cannot be deemed that there is an error of deviation or abuse of discretionary authority. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s allegation in this part of this case is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judge B police officer

Judges Kim Yong-nam

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.