2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasons why this Court has used for this case are as follows. The reasons are as follows: Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

O 5. The following shall be added to the 11th:

(7) The GATT club was audited by an external auditor with respect to its financial statements. From 2004 to 2007, on each of the financial statements prepared by the LAAA by appropriating 2.84 billion won deposited in its financial statements from the Plaintiff as short-term loans received from the Plaintiff, the external auditor expressed his/her adequate opinion. However, on the financial statements of 2008, the 2008 financial statements, after the tax investigation, the LA club revised its items to deposit money from the specially related party loans.

O Parts 5 (d) and 5 (d) and below are as follows:

D. Determination

(1) Although the burden of proof of the fact that a taxation disposition exists in an administrative litigation seeking revocation on the ground that the taxation disposition is unlawful is against the disposition agency, if it is revealed that the facts alleged in the empirical rule in the specific litigation process are inconsistent with the fact, a taxation disposition does not constitute an unlawful disposition that fails to meet the taxation requirements, unless the other party proves that the facts in question are not qualified as being subject to the empirical rule (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Du6604, Feb. 22, 2007).

The imposition of gift tax on money free loans, etc. between persons with a special relationship under Article 41-4(1) of the former Act is due to the transfer of the legal right, such as a right to use money free of charge, and this is the right of economic value that can be realized in money with the property belonging to the donee. Therefore, the loan under the foregoing provision is interpreted to have a wider meaning than the ordinary loan for consumption.

(2) In full view of the aforementioned evidence and the entire purport of the pleading, the following circumstances are revealed.

① On December 30, 2003, the golf club received 2.84 billion won from the Plaintiff, a representative director, was treated as a lump-sum deposit received from the Plaintiff on December 30, 2003, and then appropriated in the accounting document as the Plaintiff’s short-term loan, and then continued to include the financial statements in the short-term loan received from the Plaintiff, and did not state that the deposit was made in connection with the instant previous operation right contract.

② In the course of the tax investigation conducted by the director of the Seoul Regional Tax Office with respect to the Plaintiff, the short-term loans received from the Plaintiff were problematic. However, the Plaintiff asserted that the Plaintiff deposited the deposit in relation to the instant exclusive loan contract, but was erroneously appropriated for the short-term loan received from the Plaintiff due to accounting performance. However, the instant exclusive loan agreement was not concluded in full view of the following: (a) the Plaintiff did not undergo a resolution of the board of directors or review of the appropriate deposit in relation to the instant exclusive loan agreement; (b) at the time of deposit of KRW 2.84 billion, the Plaintiff did not obtain a final approval on the construction of the instant exclusive golf club; and (c) the payment of more than 1/2 of the deposit on the date of the contract, even considering the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff, it is difficult to deem that the instant exclusive loan agreement was concluded, as alleged by the Plaintiff.

③ Around December 2003, the Plaintiff managed a passbook in which the transfer price was deposited at KRW 2.935 million at the time of receiving the deposit of KRW 2.935 million from the light special equipment.

The Plaintiff managed the passbook in which the purchase price of shares was deposited by the LAA. The Plaintiff appropriated the amount of money deposited by the LAAA as a short-term loan from the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff, the representative director of the MAA club, failed to provide reasonable explanation as to the process of the settlement of accounts as above, and did not receive any payment for the use of the above money. Comprehensively taking account of these various circumstances, it is presumed that LAA was loaned to the Plaintiff for free use of the money. The instant disposition that the Plaintiff received 2.84 billion won, transferred to the MAA club on December 30, 2003, by the LAA, from any special relationship provided for in Article 41-4(1) of the former Act, is lawful.

2. Conclusion