2. The remaining claims of the Plaintiff A and the claims of the Plaintiff BB are all dismissed.

3. Of the costs of lawsuit, 1/20 of the portion arising between the Plaintiff A and the Defendant E-Mapo Tax Office shall be borne by the Plaintiff E-Ma, and the remainder by the Defendants E-Mapo Tax Office, respectively, and the portion arising between the Plaintiff BB and the Defendants E-Ma Tax Office shall be borne by the Plaintiff B

Cheong-gu Office

The imposition of the gift tax OOO on August 6, 2012 by the Head of E-Mapo Tax Office against the Plaintiff E-A and the imposition of the transfer income tax OOOOO on August 22, 2012 by the Head of E-Mapo Tax Office against the Plaintiff E-B shall be revoked in entirety.

(a) On January 31, 2010, Plaintiff 2: (a) on June 21, 2010, 2010, Plaintiff 2: (b) on the part of the building of this case, Plaintiff 2: (c) on June 21, 2010, 138 DDR 1321 Dong 506 (hereinafter “the instant real estate”); (d) on April 26, 201, Plaintiff 2: (c) on the portion of the site of this case, Plaintiff 2: (d) on the ground of Seoul Central District Court Decision 2010 Ga657, Plaintiff 2: (d) on April 15, 2011, Plaintiff 1: (e) on the acquisition value of the instant real estate, Plaintiff 2: (e) on the OB 2; (e) on the basis of the market value of the instant real estate, Plaintiff 2; (e) on the grounds of imposition of gift tax imposed on Plaintiff 1; (e.g., 201) on the instant real estate.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1 through 4, 6 through 8 (including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul evidence 1 to 3, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

1) The instant real estate was held in title by the Plaintiff LeeB and did not donate to the Plaintiff LeeB, but was bequeathed to the Plaintiff LeeB. Accordingly, each of the instant dispositions based on the premise that the instant real estate was held in title trust with the Plaintiff LeeB, was unlawful.

2) Even if Plaintiff B made a title trust withCC by taking the instant real estate, the Plaintiff did not acquire the ownership of the instant real estate, and thus, the instant real estate cannot be donated to Plaintiff B. Therefore, each of the instant dispositions based on the premise that Plaintiff B donated the instant real estate or any right equivalent thereto to the instant real estate to Plaintiff A, is unlawful.

3) Even if Plaintiff B donated the instant real estate to Plaintiff A, the time when the Plaintiff acquired the instant real estate ought to be deemed as June 21, 2010, for which registration was made on the part of the instant real estate building, not on April 26, 2011, but on which registration was made on the part of the instant real estate. Accordingly, the market price of the instant real estate ought to be assessed as KRW OO, rather than KRW OO.

4) The Plaintiff, as it did not intend to avoid gift tax but paid inheritance tax by mistake, imposing penalty tax on the Plaintiffs goes against the principle of substantial taxation.

B. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Facts of recognition

1) On December 17, 1997, Canada completed the registration of ownership transfer based on sale on October 27, 1997 with respect to the instant real property.

2) On October 27, 1997, Plaintiff B entered into a sales contract with the effect that the instant real estate was purchased from GaE to OO (payment on October 27, 1997) + an intermediate payment OOO(payment on November 14, 1997) + the remainder OOO(payment on December 15, 1997). Plaintiff B paid OOOO on October 27, 1997, and OOOOOO(payment on December 15, 1997) respectively. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 15508, Oct. 14, 1997>

3) On January 24, 2011, Plaintiff Lee Dong-A submitted a written reply to the following purport during the pleadings of the Seoul Central District Court case 2010Kadan497581.

○ The instant real estate was purchased by the Plaintiff BB, but it had no house at the time due to tax disadvantage, such as holding two houses per household, and registered the transfer in the name ofCC with the consent ofCC.

"OB requested CC to return the real estate of this case to the Plaintiff AB, on May 27, 2004, at the time when the date when CC returned back to the next day, because CC did not have inheritance rights as inheritance relations with CC and EF, EG and EG are dual-types, so it may be argued that CC is their own inherited property." On May 27, 2004, ○CC had notarized the contents of the will to transfer the real estate of this case, which was registered under the name of the testator, to the Plaintiff AB, according to the intent of the Plaintiff BB.

Since 1997, Plaintiff B purchased the instant secondaryH and entrusted it under the name ofCC, and had paid property tax every year thereafter, and had concluded a lease contract as agent ofCC immediately before the death ofCC.

Even though ○CC had the FF, EgG, etc., one’s own friendship, it is not reasonable for the Plaintiff, a third party, who is not the inheritor, to leave his pure property to the Plaintiff, who is not the inheritor, with the father’s son’s son and son’s son’s son’s son’

Pursuant to the purport of the Plaintiff BB, which is the actual owner of the instant real estate before the birth, ○○ This was returned to the Plaintiff, who is the father of the Plaintiff BB, without any conditions.

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 7, 9, 10, Eul evidence 5, the purport of the whole pleadings

D. Determination

1) Determination on the first argument

According to the Gap evidence No. 5, it is recognized thatCC prepared a testamentary document with a content to testamentary gift the part of the building of this case to the plaintiff Lee Dong on May 27, 2004.

However, in addition to the above evidence and the purport of the oral argument, the following circumstances are as follows. ① The plaintiff B made a sales contract stating that the plaintiff B would purchase the real estate of this case from the ParkE on October 27, 1997. ② The plaintiff B would pay the above ParkE, the plaintiff OOOO on October 27, 1997, and the OOOOOOO on November 14, 1997. ③ The plaintiff this real estate of this case was purchased from the plaintiff B without the title trust with the plaintiff B, and the plaintiff B could not be seen as having sold the real estate of this case to the plaintiff 2, the plaintiff 1, 201. According to the evidence No. 9-2, the plaintiff 2, who purchased the real estate of this case to the plaintiff 1, 201, and the plaintiff 2, who did not sell the real estate of this case to the plaintiff 1, 200, 5,000, 2,000.

Article 4(1) of the former Act on the Registration of Real Estate under Actual Titleholder’s Name (amended by Act No. 10203, Mar. 31, 2010) provides that “The title trust agreement shall be null and void,” and Article 4(2) of the same Act provides that “any change in the real right to real estate by the registration of title trust shall be null and void,” and Article 4(3) of the same Act provides that “any invalidity of the real right to real estate by the registration of title trust shall not be asserted against any third party”. Therefore, in the case of a so-called three-party title trust or intermediate omission title trust, where a truster purchases real estate by directly entering into a sales contract with the seller, and under agreement with the seller, transfers the registration under the name of the trustee from the seller to the name of the seller, the ownership transfer registration of the real estate still remains to the seller, but since the sale contract between the seller and the truster still becomes effective, the truster may still claim for the registration of ownership transfer of the real estate in the name of the third party.

3) Judgment on the third argument

Article 2 subparag. 6 of the Act on Ownership and Management of Condominium Buildings provides that "the right to use site refers to the right that a sectional owner has against the site of a building in order to own a section for exclusive use," Article 20(1) provides that "the right to use site of a sectional owner shall be disposed of by his/her section for exclusive use," and Article 20(2) provides that "the sectional owner shall not dispose of his/her right to use site separately from his/her section for exclusive use: Provided, That this shall not apply where otherwise prescribed by the regulations." The purport of the above provision is to promote stability in legal relations with aggregate buildings and reasonable regulation by preventing the occurrence of sectional ownership without the right to use site by preventing the separation of the section for exclusive use of aggregate buildings and the right to use site from occurring without the right to use site. Therefore, the act of disposal of land contrary to the unity of the section for exclusive use and the right to use site has no effect (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Da71578, Jan. 17, 2013).

4) Judgment on the fourth argument

Under the tax law, penalty taxes are administrative sanctions imposed in accordance with the law in cases where a taxpayer violates a duty to report and pay taxes without justifiable grounds in order to facilitate the exercise of the right to impose taxes and the realization of a tax claim, and the taxpayer’s intention and negligence is not considered, and the land or mistake of the law does not constitute justifiable grounds (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Du1829, May 23, 2013).

In full view of the following circumstances, including evidence and the overall purport of the arguments as seen earlier, it is insufficient to recognize that, in the course of the argument in this case, Plaintiff A made it difficult to deem that Plaintiff B paid inheritance tax, not gift tax, by mistake, because Plaintiff B made a title trust with Plaintiff B, but with the purport that Plaintiff B did not make a donation to Plaintiff A, the instant real estate at the time of the argument in this case. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that Plaintiff AA paid inheritance tax, not gift tax, by mistake, and ② PlaintiffB appears to have ledCC to make a will in writing a notarial deed, thereby creating the appearance of the instant real estate, which appears to have been bequeathed to Plaintiff A. In full view of the following circumstances: (a) it is insufficient to recognize that Plaintiff B had justifiable grounds for not filing and paying transfer income tax; and (b) there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise. Therefore, this part of the Plaintiffs’ assertion is without merit.

In accordance with the above determination, in cases where the time when Plaintiff A received a donation for the right to acquire the instant real estate on June 21, 2010, and the market price of the instant real estate is assessed as an OOO, the gift tax payable by Plaintiff A shall be an OOO member. Therefore, the portion exceeding the OOOO (including additional OOO won) among the disposition of imposition of OOO (including additional tax) of the instant gift tax, should be revoked in an unlawful manner.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claims are justified within the scope of the above recognition, and they are accepted, and since the remaining claims of the plaintiff Lee A and the claims of the plaintiff Lee B are without merit, they are all dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.