1. As to the assertion that the service supplied by the State constitutes subject to value-added exemption

Article 12(1)17 of the former Value-Added Tax Act (amended by Act No. 9268 of Dec. 26, 2008; hereinafter the same) provides for "goods or services supplied by the State, local governments, and local governments associations (hereinafter referred to as the "State, etc.") as one of the goods eligible for the exemption of value-added tax, which are prescribed by Presidential Decree."

In full view of the language and purport of the above provision, and the fact that Article 106(1)6 of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 8827 of Dec. 31, 2007; hereinafter the same) provides a separate system for the exemption of value-added tax on goods or services supplied by a government agency (hereinafter “government agency”) on behalf of the government agency (hereinafter “government agency”), “goods or services supplied by the State, etc. exempt from value-added tax” under Article 12(1)17 of the former Value-Added Tax Act means goods or services supplied by the State, etc. on its name and account as a supplier by the State, etc., and it does not constitute the supply of goods or services on its own name and on its account by an organization entrusted with the management, etc. of facilities by

However, Articles 2 subparag. 10, 4, proviso of Article 42(1), Articles 44, and 80 of the former Natural Parks Act (amended by Act No. 9313, Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter the same) and Articles 2 subparag. 5, 45(2)2, and 15 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Natural Parks Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21807, Nov. 2, 2009; hereinafter the same), and Article 2 subparag. 5, Article 45(2)2, and 15 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Natural Parks Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21807, Nov. 2, 2009; hereinafter the same) provide that the Minister of Environment, who is the designated and authorized administrator of a national park, may entrust the Plaintiff with the authority to maintain and manage national park facilities, implement park projects, collect park admission fees, and park facilities.

In light of the aforementioned legal principles and the aforementioned relevant provisions, the Plaintiff’s construction and operation of a parking lot in a national park are merely providing services in its name and account by being entrusted with the management of the national park facilities by the State, and cannot be deemed to supply services in its name and account in the position of an affiliated agency of the State. Thus, this cannot be deemed to be subject to the exemption of value-added tax under Article 12(1)17 of the former Value-Adde

The judgment below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to services provided by the State, etc. exempt from value-added tax.

2. As to the assertion that services provided by a government agency organization constitutes subject to value-added tax exemption

Article 106 (1) 6 of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act provides that "goods or services supplied by a government agency and prescribed by Presidential Decree as goods or services" shall be exempted from value-added tax, and Article 106 (8) (hereinafter "Enforcement Decree of this case") of the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20720, Feb. 29, 2008) upon delegation from the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20720, Feb. 29, 2008) provides that "goods or services prescribed by Presidential Decree as goods or services" under Article 106 (1) 6 of the Act means goods or services supplied by a government agency for its own purpose of business prescribed by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance and Economy: Provided, That any of the following business shall be excluded:

In addition, the provision of the instant Enforcement Rule was amended on April 7, 2009, which was after the taxable period of the instant disposition as indicated in the judgment of the court below, and was excluded from the business related to the use of the parking lot.

In regard to this, the lower court determined that the provision of the instant Enforcement Rule, which provides that the “business concerning the use of the national park parking lot” operated by the Plaintiff as a tax-free business of the government agency, is invalid by the amendment to the provisions of the Enforcement Decree of this case, which are superior

However, in a case where it is not clear whether a provision of a subordinate statute conflicts with a superior statute or not, considering the fact that legal instabilitys that may arise when the norm is declared null and void and collisions between norms must be set aside to the maximum extent, it is not impossible to declare invalidation on the ground that the subordinate statute is in violation of a superior statute, unless it is impossible to interpret the meaning of a subordinate statute as being consistent with a superior statute or not (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Du2716, Aug. 24, 2001).

From this point of view, comprehensively considering the contents and amendment history of the Enforcement Decree and the Enforcement Rule provisions of this case, the scope of the government agency business is set by the main text of the Enforcement Decree of this case and the Enforcement Rule by its delegation, and some of them are not specified in the form of exclusion from the scope of the duty-free business pursuant to the proviso of the Enforcement Decree of this case. In such a case, the term “business regarding the use of the national park parking lot” operated by the Plaintiff is included in the scope of the duty-free business pursuant to the main text of the Enforcement Decree of this case and the provisions of the Enforcement Rule of this case, and ultimately, it is deemed that the scope of the “business regarding the use of the national park parking lot” of this case was defined as

Therefore, it is inappropriate for the court below to determine that the provision of the Enforcement Rule of this case is invalid as it violates the superior laws, but it is reasonable to conclude that the business of operating parking lots in the national park operated by the plaintiff does not constitute a tax-free business of the government agency that is exempt from value-added tax. Therefore, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the scope of

In addition, in light of the purport of Article 2(1) of the former Value-Added Tax Act, which provides that the obligation to pay value-added tax arises regardless of the existence of profit-making profit as well as the language and text thereof, “parking lot operation business” under subparagraph 7 of the proviso of the Enforcement Decree of this case, it cannot be deemed that the government agency’s business entity is a private economic entity and for profit-making purposes. Therefore, the allegation in the grounds for

3. On the assertion that the principle of protection of trust is violated

The lower court determined that the instant disposition imposing value-added tax on the Plaintiff’s parking lot operation business does not violate the principle of trust protection even after the instant provision was amended by Presidential Decree No. 19329, Feb. 9, 2006, under Article 106(8) of the Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, even though the instant provision still provides for the Plaintiff’s “parking lot operation business and vehicle towing business” as a tax-free business even after the amendment of Article 106(7) of the Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, excluding the scope of the government agency’s tax exemption business, the said authoritative interpretation does not state the Plaintiff’s opinion on whether to impose value-added tax on the Plaintiff’s parking lot operation business, and the Plaintiff’s aforementioned amendment of the Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act sufficiently known that the Plaintiff’s business in the national park parking lot operation business operated by the Plaintiff was converted to taxation due to the said amendment.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle of trust protection as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal

4. As to the assertion that the principle of equity is violated

The lower court determined that the instant disposition cannot be deemed unlawful solely on the ground that the Plaintiff’s assertion is insufficient in light of the unique characteristics of the two agencies and the fact that a national park is managed by the Mayor/Do Governor, even if there are differences in imposition of value-added tax between the parking lot operation business of a national park managed by the Mayor/Do Governor and the parking lot operation business of a national park managed by the Plaintiff, which is the government agency.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle of equity, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Chang-suk (Presiding Justice)