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(영문) 대법원 2013. 3. 28. 선고 2012두20892 판결

[교통세등부과처분취소][미간행]

Main Issues

In a case where Company A imposed traffic tax, etc. on the grounds of Article 9(1) of the former Traffic, Energy and Environment Tax Act, etc. upon the head of the competent tax office, etc., upon submitting a forged certificate of supply of tax-free petroleum, etc. to the head of the competent tax office, etc. to whom the refund amount is to be made, on the grounds that the latter is stipulated as “tax base and tax amount,” and Article 9(1) of the former Traffic, Energy and Environment Tax Act does not limit the amount of tax according to the tax base, but does not limit the amount of tax pursuant to the tax return under Article 7 to cases where there are errors or omissions in the details of the return under Article 7, which are the details of the return under Article 9(1).

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 106-2(1)1 and 113(2) and (3) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (Amended by Act No. 8827, Dec. 31, 2007); Articles 7(1) and 9(1) of the former Traffic, Energy and Environment Tax Act (Amended by Act No. 11123, Dec. 31, 201);

Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee

Seoul High Court Decision 201Na14416 decided May 1, 201

Defendant-Appellee-Appellant

Head of Ulsan District Tax Office and one other

Judgment of the lower court

Busan High Court Decision 2011Nu2422 decided August 22, 2012

Text

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

Article 106-2 (1) 1 of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 8146 of Dec. 30, 2006) provides for the exemption of special consumption tax, traffic tax, education tax, and driving tax on the portion taken out from a manufacturing place by June 30, 2007, as prescribed by Presidential Decree, and Article 113 of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 8138 of Dec. 30, 2006) provides that the petroleum products on which the special consumption tax or traffic tax is imposed under paragraph (2) may be refunded from the amount of tax to be exempted, or deducted from the amount of tax to be paid or collected under Article 106-2, and the procedures for refunding or deducting the special consumption tax under paragraph (3) shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree or the Restriction of Special Consumption Tax Act in accordance with the Restriction of Special Consumption Tax Act or the Restriction of Special Consumption Tax Act (amended by Act No. 2013, Mar. 1, 2007>

Meanwhile, Article 7(1) of the former Traffic, Energy and Environment Tax Act (amended by Act No. 81123, Dec. 30, 2006; hereinafter “former Traffic Tax Act”) and Article 7(1) of the former Traffic, Energy and Environment Tax Act (amended by Act No. 11123, Dec. 31, 201; hereinafter “former Traffic Tax Act”) provide that “The person liable to pay traffic tax (or traffic, energy and environment tax) shall submit to the head of the tax office having jurisdiction over the manufacturing place by the end of the following month a return stating the quantity and calculated value of the goods taken out from each manufacturing place and calculated tax amount, the amount of tax unpaid, the amount of tax exempted, the amount of tax refunded, the amount of tax paid, etc.” and Article 9(1) of the same Act provide that “Where a return under Article 7 is not filed or there is an error or omission in the details of the return, the head of the competent tax office or customs office shall determine or correct the tax base and tax amount.”

Based on the adopted evidence, the lower court acknowledged the fact that the Defendants filed a refund on the grounds that the Plaintiff filed a tax refund return by submitting a forged tax-free petroleum supply certificate to the Defendants, even though the Plaintiff was unable to receive traffic tax exemption under Article 106-2(1)1 of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, since the instant petroleum products carried out to the light energy station, etc. were not actually sold to farmers for agricultural purposes, and thus, the Defendants were entitled to refund.

Based on this, the lower court determined that the instant disposition cannot be deemed as contrary to the principle of self-responsibility under the Constitution, on the grounds that Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act only prescribes the subject of the correction of tax base and tax amount as “tax base” and does not limit the tax amount pursuant to the tax base, and that there is an error or omission in the details of the return under Article 7, the head of the competent tax office can make the correction of tax amount pursuant to Article 9(1) of the former Traffic Tax Act in the event of error in the refund tax amount, which is the details of the return under Article 7, the disposition of this case is legitimate, and furthermore, the instant disposition is only the collection of traffic tax, etc. that the Plaintiff should have originally paid.

In light of the above provisions and relevant legal principles and records, such determination by the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the determination of traffic tax refund or the principle of self-responsibility under the Constitution, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

2. As to the Defendants’ grounds of appeal

In full view of the circumstances acknowledged by the adopted evidence, the lower court determined that the disposition of the instant case was unlawful, on the ground that it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff was not liable to pay the traffic tax, etc., on the ground that there is a justifiable ground that the Plaintiff could not have caused the negligence.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to penalty taxes in bad faith and the justifiable grounds for exemption, which are grounds for exemption, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or exceeding the bounds of free evaluation of evidence

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-deok (Presiding Justice)