[2] The case affirming the judgment below which found the Defendants guilty on the ground that the Defendants met with a member of an anti-government organization or a person who received an order from the head of an anti-government organization with the knowledge that the Defendants, who are the executives or members of the South Korean headquarters of the South Korean Unification Republic of Korea, may endanger national existence and security or democratic fundamental order, was prosecuted for violating the National Security Act

[3] Whether the so-called "cket wiretapping" is permitted as a communication-restricting measure on telecommunications under the Protection of Communications Secrets Act (affirmative in principle)

[4] The purport of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of inconsistency with the Constitution as to the extension of the period of communication-restricting measures as to telecommunications under the proviso of Article 6(7) of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act, and in a case where the above provision becomes null and void after the amendment deadline prescribed by the ruling of inconsistency with the Constitution as to the extension of the period of communication-restricting measures becomes null and void, whether the extension of the period of communication

[5] The meaning of "in case of urgency" under the proviso of Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides an exception that prior notice of a suspect, etc. may be omitted when executing a search and seizure warrant, and whether the above provision is unconstitutional against the principle of clarity (negative)

[6] In a case where the act of visiting North Korea under the North Korean visiting certificate issued by the Minister of Unification is not punishable as an act of escape under the National Security Act, whether the act of returning to South Korea cannot be punished as an act of escape under the National Security Act (affirmative), and whether the same legal principle applies to the act of contact with North Korean residents after obtaining approval from the Minister of Unification or receiving prior report from the Minister of Unification (affirmative)

[7] The case affirming the judgment below which acquitted the Defendants on charges of violating the National Security Act (special locked entry and escape) on the ground that the Defendants, who were the executives or members of the South Korean Head Office of the South Korean Unification Korea, escape from the Republic of Korea to receive an order from anti-government organizations or their members or to consult on the accomplishment of purpose, were indicted on charges of violation of the National Security Act

[2] The case affirming the judgment below which found the defendants guilty on the ground that each meeting is highly likely to cause substantial harm to the national existence and security or free democratic fundamental order, in light of the following: in a case where the executives or employees of the South Korean Unification Association (hereinafter “the Republic of Korea”) and the Defendants, who were members of an anti-government organization or members of an anti-government organization with the knowledge of the fact that it may endanger the national existence and security or democratic fundamental order, were indicted for violation of the National Security Act (convening, communication, etc.); in light of the circumstances that the Defendants meet with the members of the North Korean Headquarters at the time of each meeting in violation of the conditions for issuance of the North Korean certificate of visit, approval of North Korean contact, or acceptance of report, in violation of the conditions for the issuance of North Korea certificate of visit, approval of contact with North Korea, and acceptance of order, etc.

[3] Since transmission and receipt through an Internet communication network constitutes “telecommunications” as stipulated in Article 2 subparag. 3 of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act, the so-called “accident wiretapping” that gets through an Internet communication network and becomes aware of the contents thereof, shall be permitted, barring any special circumstances, in a case where the contents thereof meet the requirements as stipulated in Article 5(1) of the same Act. This does not change merely because it is the fact that the content of communication irrelevant to the purpose of investigation or the content of communication by a third party is likely to be wiretapping.

[4] On December 28, 2010, the Constitutional Court declared that the part concerning "the extension of the period of communication-restricting measures" under the proviso of Article 6 (7) of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act (hereinafter "the legal provision of this case") allowing the extension of communication-restricting measures without restricting the total period of communication-restricting measures or the total frequency thereof does not comply with the Constitution on the ground that it infringes on the confidentiality of communication by violating the principle of excessive prohibition. The legal provision of this case has been continuously applied until legislators revised the time limit on December 31, 2011 (hereinafter "the unconstitutionality decision of this case"). In light of the contents and main reasons of the decision of inconsistency with the Constitution of this case, it is clear that the Constitutional Court made a decision of inconsistency with the Constitution that orders provisional application of the provisions of this case is unconstitutional, but it is not clear that the legal provision of this case has become unconstitutional prior to the enactment of the law of this case and thus, it is not possible to completely remove the legal provisions of this case as well as its legal purpose or its validity.

[5] A criminal suspect or his/her defense counsel may participate in the execution of a search and seizure warrant (Articles 219 and 121 of the Criminal Procedure Act), and in principle, the date, time, place, etc. of the execution of a search and seizure warrant may be notified in advance to the criminal suspect, etc. (main sentence of Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Act), but such notification may be omitted in the case of “when urgent” (proviso of Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Act). The term “when urgent” in this context refers to cases where it is difficult to invalidate the search and seizure due to the possibility of concealing evidence if prior notification of the execution of a search and seizure warrant is made. As such, reasonable interpretation is possible, it cannot be deemed that the proviso of Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Act

[6] Since the certificate of visit to North Korea issued by the Minister of Unification permits all the visit to North Korea between South and North Korea, if it is not punishable as an escape under the National Security Act, it is reasonable to view that the visit to North Korea cannot be punished as an escape under the National Security Act. This legal principle also applies to the visit to North Korea after obtaining approval from the Minister of Unification or filing a prior report to the Minister of Unification and making contact with North Korea.

[7] The case affirming the judgment below which found the defendant not guilty on the ground that the visit to North Korea or the visit to North Korea, which the Minister of Unification permitted, actually met the conditions of visit to North Korea and the visit to North Korea, cannot be deemed as merely a nominal room for obtaining the North Korean visiting certificate, etc., and thus, the act of visit or contact to North Korea itself is justified. In case where the defendants, who were the executives or members of the South Korean headquarters, were indicted of violating the National Security Act on the ground that they escaped from Korea to obtain the order of anti-government organizations or members of the South Korean headquarters in order to obtain the order or to consult on the accomplishment of purpose, and went into the Republic of Korea again, were indicted for violation of the National Security Act (special escape and escape)

1. As to the Defendants’ grounds of appeal

A. As to the argument regarding North Korea's anti-government organization

Although North Korea is a partner of dialogue and cooperation for the peaceful unification of South and North Korea, North Korea still has the character of anti-government organization that is bound to adopt our liberal democracy system while enhancing the hostile unification route despite changes in the relationship between South and North Korea, and therefore, it is established by the Supreme Court that the normative power of the National Security Act that regulates anti-government organizations, etc. is still valid (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2010Do189, Jul. 23, 2010, etc.).

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that North Korea still constitutes an anti-government organization, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors of misapprehending the legal principles as to anti-government organization under the National Security

B. As to the assertion regarding the dual organization of the Republic of Korea's Republic of Korea's Republic of Korea's Republic of Korea's Republic of Korea's Republic of Korea's Republic of Korea (hereinafter

In light of the records, the court below's determination that the defendant's South-North Korea headquarters committed an act of praiseing, encouraging, promoting, or aiding and abetting the activities of anti-government organizations or their members or those who received their order, and that the actual activities are also likely to cause substantial harm and harm to the nation's existence and security and free democratic basic order is justifiable (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Do758, Apr. 17, 2008). In so doing, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to dual organizations under the National Security Act, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. As to communications and liaison points (Article 2 of the Criminal facts in the judgment of the court of first instance)

In full view of the adopted evidence, the lower court found that Defendant 1 and 2, who is the co-chairperson of the Republic of Korea or the secretary general of the Republic of Korea’s Joint Secretariat, had sent and contacted with the Nonindicted Party by means of e-mail, facsimile, etc., with the knowledge that the Nonindicted Party, who is the vice-chairperson of the Joint Secretariat of the Republic of Korea, had been aware of the reason for the establishment of North Korea, by means of guidelines on the direction of the activities of the Joint Secretariat of the Republic of Korea, such as military politics, giving and receiving North Korea’s expertise, such as military politics, and preparing various e-mail events. Furthermore, in light of the status of the above Defendants at the South-North Korea Joint Headquarters of the above Defendants, the lower court found the Defendants guilty

In light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law such as finding facts against logical and empirical rules, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

D. As to the fact that there is an immigration control point (paragraphs 3, 7 and 8 of the crime in the judgment of the court of first instance)

The term “act of concert” under Article 7(1) of the National Security Act refers to the act of acting in concert with and joining the activities of an anti-government organization by asserting or complying with the act of an anti-government organization, etc. In addition, the interpretation principle that the National Security Act should be applied narrowly to the act of concert with the activities of an anti-government organization, etc., only in a case where there is an obvious danger that may actually harm the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order. Therefore, the act of concert prohibited under Article 7(1) of the National Security Act should reach the extent that it actively expresses his/her intention to comply with and taxes against the activities of an anti-government organization, etc. to the extent that it is evaluated as being praise, encouraging, and promoting the activities of an anti-government organization (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Do758, Apr. 17, 2008).

The lower court found the Defendants guilty on this part of the charges on the grounds that comprehensively taking account of the following factors: (a) the Defendants’ major contents of the message expressed by the Defendants through a new, common and private theory, etc. were set as a business direction for the Republic of Korea’s Republic of Korea headquarters; and (b) the North Korea and its assertion consistently are consistent with the North Korea, including the closure of the iron of the United States Armed Forces in Korea, the abolition of the National Security Act, the legitimacy of North Korea’s nuclear possession; and (c) the Defendants engaged in the promotion, inducement, and activities of North Korea, which is an anti-government organization, through various resolutions and opinions, the temporary joint council, and the Central Council of Commissioners. Furthermore, the lower court found the Defendants guilty on this part of the charges on the grounds that each act committed by the Defendants in this part of the Republic of Korea, such as the dual nature of the Republic of Korea headquarters, the status, ideology, and activity experience of the Defendants, and the relationship with the North Korean Revolution theory externally

Examining the above legal principles in light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal principles on the crime of aiding and abetting activities under the National Security Act, or by exceeding the bounds of the free evaluation of evidence

E. Regarding the point of meeting and the point of special diving and escape related to the deep-sea meetings on August 2006 (Article 4 of the facts constituting the crime in the first instance judgment)

The crime of meeting and communication as prescribed in Article 8 (1) of the National Security Act shall be committed with a member of an anti-government organization or a person under its order, by meeting, communication, or any other means, knowing that it may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order. In this case, the act of meeting, communication, etc. is established when there is an obvious danger that such assembly, communication, etc. may pose a substantial threat to the national existence

Article 3 of the former Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act (amended by Act No. 7539, May 31, 2005; Act No. 9357, Jan. 30, 2009) provides that the acts for the purpose of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation shall be governed by the same Act in preference to other Acts within the extent recognized as justifiable (or within the scope of the purpose of the same Act). Such acts include the National Security Act under the National Security Act. Whether the acts between South and North Korea are legitimate or within the scope of purposes of the same Act are recognized as acts for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation; whether a certificate of visit was issued in accordance with Article 9(1) of the same Act; whether the specific purpose of the visit falls under trade and cooperation between North Korea; whether the North Korean cooperation and cooperation was actually conducted in North Korea; whether the visit in North Korea; whether the visit in North Korea was conducted in fact before and after the visit in North Korea; thus, whether the visit in North Korea is objectively legitimate or not, should be determined separately during the meeting’s existence and basic order.

The court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance which held that the Defendants’ failure to report to the Minister of Unification in relation to the meeting in August 2006 is merely a mere practical error, in light of the following circumstances: (a) the Defendants’ meeting at the time of the meeting, in violation of the conditions of issuance of the North Korea visiting certificate, approval of contact with North Korea, or acceptance of reports; and (b) the Defendants’ meeting at the time of the meeting with the members of the North Korea headquarters of the North Korea, received orders on the direction of the North Korea headquarters; (c) the abolition of the National Security Act; and (d) the abolition of the Republic of Korea Security Act; and (e) the democratic fundamental order, etc.; and (e) the Defendants’ meeting at the time of the meeting at the time of the meeting at the time of the meeting at issue; and (e) the Defendants’ meeting at the time of the meeting at the time of entry, and (e) the details of the meeting at the meeting at the meeting at the meeting at the South Korea Headquarters of the North Korean Republic of Korea, and found guilty and escape.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the crime of meeting under the National Security Act and the crime of special diving and escape, or in violation of the principle of

F. As to the production, etc. of pro-enemy materials (Article 6 of the Criminal facts in the first instance judgment)

In order to be recognized as pro-enemy contents under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act, the contents must be active and aggressive to threaten the nation’s existence and security and free democratic basic order, which are protected under the legal interest of the National Security Act. Whether there is an objection to the contents of pro-enemy contents should be determined by comprehensively taking into account not only the whole contents of the expressive materials, but also the motive for production, the form and external relation with the expressive act, and the circumstances at the time of expressive act. Meanwhile, the crime under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act is evident that the act constitutes a crime of pro-enemy which requires the pro-enemy act under Article 7(1), (3), and (4) of the same Act. When there is no direct evidence to prove that there is an intention to pro-enemy act, the defendant’s career and status in addition to the various circumstances that are the list of the pro-enemy contents above, the circumstances leading the defendant to commit the act under Article 7(5) in relation to pro-enemy contents, the circumstances leading to joining the pro-enemy organization of the defendant and the defendant, and the actual activities of the organization (see, 2013.

In full view of the adopted evidence, the lower court determined that each expressive material that the Defendants produced, distributed, and possessed was active and aggressive to threaten the free democratic fundamental order, and that the contents and expressions were committed in concert with the activities of North Korea, which is an anti-government organization, constitutes pro-enemy organization, and that the Defendants were also recognized as the purpose of pro-enemy act in light of the Defendants’ duties and experience at the South-North Korea Headquarters.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors of misapprehending the legal principles regarding pro-enemy contents under the National Security Act, or exceeding the bounds of the free evaluation of evidence

G. Regarding the receipt of money and valuables (Article 6 of the Criminal facts in the judgment of the first instance)

The crime of accepting money and valuables under Article 5 (2) of the National Security Act is established in a case where the money and valuables are received from a member of an anti-government organization or a person who received an order from the member of an anti-government organization, knowing that it may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order, and does not contribute to the value or value of money and valuables or the purpose of receiving money and valuables (see Supreme Court Decision 95Do1624, Sept. 26, 1995

In light of the relationship between Defendant 2 and the Nonindicted Party in North Korea, the background and amount of receiving money and valuables, etc., the lower court found Defendant 2 guilty of this part of the charges on this part on the ground that the sales proceeds of the Korean career, which Defendant 2 received from the Nonindicted Party, have the nature of the consideration for the production and distribution of pro-enemy materials, and thus, there is a clear risk of substantial harm to the national existence and security or free democratic fundamental order, and Defendant 2 was also aware

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the crime of receiving money and valuables under the National Security Act, or in the misapprehension of facts against logical

H. As to the assertion that the "cracker wiretapping" was illegal

(1) According to Article 2 Subparag. 3 of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act, the term “telecommunications” means transmission or reception of all kinds of sounds, words, symbols or images by wire, wireless, optical cable, or other electronic means, such as telephone, e-mail, membership information service, facsimile, radio call, etc. Furthermore, according to Article 5(1) of the same Act, where there are sufficient grounds to suspect that a person plans or has committed a specific crime, such as a violation of the National Security Act, or where it is difficult to arrest an offender or collect evidence, measures restricting communications, such as wiretapping of telecommunications, can be taken upon permission from the court.

As transmission and receipt through Internet communications network constitute “telecommunications” as stipulated in Article 2 subparag. 3 of the same Act, “block wiretapping” that gets through an Internet communications network and becomes aware of the content thereof, shall be permitted unless there are other special circumstances, in cases where the requirements prescribed in Article 5(1) of the same Act are met. This is not merely because the nature of the “block wiretapping” is that the content of communications irrelevant to the investigation purpose or the content of communications by a third party is likely to be wiretapping.

(2) In the same purport, the lower court is justifiable to have determined that it cannot be deemed unlawful as it was lawfully executed after obtaining a written permission for communication-restricting measures from the court. Furthermore, as recognized by the Defendants, the materials derived from the instant container wiretapping were not submitted as evidence, according to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, it cannot be deemed that the materials derived from the instant container wiretapping were submitted as evidence or that it was adopted as evidence of conviction by the lower court. Therefore, the ground of appeal that the admissibility as evidence of illegal collection should be excluded as evidence cannot be accepted.

I. As to the assertion regarding admissibility of evidence acquired through extension of the period of communication-restricting measures

According to the proviso of Article 6(7) of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act, if the requirements for permission for communication-restricting measures exist, an investigative agency may request the extension of the period of communication-restricting measures within the limit of two months

On December 28, 2010, the Constitutional Court rendered a declaration that the part concerning “the extension of the period of communication-restricting measures” in the proviso of Article 6(7) of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act (hereinafter “the instant legal provision”) with respect to telecommunications continues to be extended without limiting the total period of communication-restricting measures or the total frequency of extension thereof does not comply with the Constitution on the ground that it violates the principle of excessive prohibition and infringes on the confidentiality of telecommunications (hereinafter “the instant legal provision”). As such, the Constitutional Court made a decision that the instant legal provision continues to apply until the legislators amended the instant legal provision to December 31, 201 (hereinafter “the instant decision of inconsistency with the Constitution”).

In light of the contents and main reasons of the decision of inconsistency with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, it is clear that the Constitutional Court made a decision of inconsistency with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea to order provisional application despite the unconstitutionality of the provisions of this case. In other words, when a decision of inconsistency with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea is made simply unconstitutional, the validity of the decision of inconsistency with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea should be reviewed as a whole as to the extension of communication-restricting measures or the acquisition of evidence under the provisions of this case as to the effect of the decision of inconsistency with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea as to the extension of communication-restricting measures or the acquisition of evidence under the provisions of this case should not be reviewed as a whole, and in order to avoid this problem, the provisions of this case should be applied provisionally as they are, until the improvement legislation of the unconstitutionality of the provisions of this case is made. Thus, even if the above amendment was made without the unconstitutionality of the provisions of this case and thus the validity or validity of the extension of the communication-restricting measures under the provisions of this case shall not affect the future.

In the same purport, the court below is justified in finding the admissibility of the evidence acquired by obtaining permission for extension of the period of communication-restricting measures pursuant to the legal provisions of this case, considering that the legal provisions of this case does not extend to the case, even if the amendment was not made within the time limit for amendment in accordance with the amendment of the original decision of inconsistency with the Constitution, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the binding force of the decision of inconsistency with the Constitution as alleged in the grounds of appeal. The Supreme Court Decision 90Da5450 Decided June 11, 1991 cited in the grounds of appeal

(j) As to the assertion regarding the admissibility of evidence acquired through search and seizure conducted without prior notice

A suspect or defense counsel may participate in the execution of a warrant of search and seizure (Articles 219 and 121 of the Criminal Procedure Act), and, in principle, the date, time, place, etc. of the execution of a warrant of search and seizure may be notified in advance to the suspect, etc. (main sentence of Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Act), but such notification may be omitted in the case of “when urgent” (proviso of Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Act). Here, “when urgent” means “when urgent seizure and seizure is notified in advance of the fact of the execution of a warrant of search and seizure,” and it is reasonable to interpret that it is difficult to invalidate the search and seizure of evidence where it is difficult to interpret that reasonable interpretation is contrary to the principle of clarity, etc.

In the same purport, the court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance that rejected the Defendants’ assertion that the proviso to Article 122 of the Criminal Procedure Act was unconstitutional, or that the investigation agency was in need of urgency when executing the e-mail search and seizure warrant of this case and omitted advance notice was unlawful, is just and acceptable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the enforcement of the search and seizure warrant

C. As to the assertion of unfair sentencing

According to Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not less than ten years has been imposed, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed. Thus, in this case where a more minor sentence has been imposed on the Defendants, the assertion that the amount of punishment is unreasonable is not

2. As to the Prosecutor’s Grounds of Appeal

A. As to the point of special diving and escape (excluding the point of special diving and escape relating to Defendant 3’s meetings in August 2006)

In principle, it is reasonable to view that, when visiting North Korea upon obtaining a certificate of visit from the Minister of Unification for the purpose of visiting North Korea, such visit is justifiable as an act for the purpose of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Furthermore, even if a visitor in North Korea actually performs an act consistent with the purpose of visit permitted by the Minister of Unification, and engaged in any other act that is not legally permitted by law by using the opportunity of visit, it cannot be evaluated separately by dividing the legitimacy of visit into the purpose of visit. Therefore, unless it can be seen that the visitor in North Korea visited North Korea to conduct any other act that is not legally permitted, and the purpose of visit out of the country is only a nominal room for the purpose of obtaining a certificate of visit, it is legitimate to recognize that the visit itself is legitimate. Furthermore, regardless of whether to ask for a crime under Article 14 of the National Security Act regarding other acts, the act of visiting North Korea shall not be punished as an act for the purpose of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation under the National Security Act, which is completely denying the legitimacy of North Korea as an act for escape under the National Security Act (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 20087Do788.).

The lower court found the Defendants not guilty of this part of the facts charged on the ground that the Defendants’ visit and contact themselves are justifiable, on the ground that, although the Defendants were to meet with North Korean personnel in violation of the conditions for issuing a North Korean visiting certificate, approving contact with North Korean residents, or accepting reports in advance, the Defendants actually committed acts complying with the conditions for visit to North Korea and contact with North Korean residents permitted by the Minister of Unification, and the purpose of visit to North Korea, etc. was merely a nominal room for obtaining a visiting certificate

In light of the above legal principles and the records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the crime of special escape or escape under the National Security Act. The Supreme Court Decision 2009Do11875 Decided February 10, 201 cited in the grounds of appeal is inappropriate to be invoked in this case as different cases.

B. As to the production of pro-enemy contents against Defendant 3

The court below held that even if Defendant 3 actively acted in the activities of anti-government organizations, it cannot be viewed as pro-enemy pro-enemy pro-enemy under the National Security Act on the ground that the content of the “plan.hwp” file produced and possessed by Defendant 3 on February 1, 2005, was written in his personal thoughts or future plans, and it could be corrected for a long time, and it could not be viewed that the above file was fixed in the form of a firm document, etc., or that it did not have any intent to allow a third party to peruse it. Further, the court below held that the files held by Defendant 3 cannot be viewed as pro-enemy-state pro-enemy-state organization under the National Security Act, as the campaign speech of North Korean personnel on the part of North Korea, which was published at the joint events held by the government on February 1, 2005.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in comparison with records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to pro-enemy contents, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal

Meanwhile, although the prosecutor submitted a written appeal to the effect that he/she is dissatisfied with the entire judgment of the court below, there is no specific grounds for appeal as to the guilty portion and the remaining acquittal portion in the written appeal or appellate

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ko Young-han (Presiding Justice)