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(영문) 대법원 2010. 5. 27. 선고 2006다79520 판결

[손해배상(기)][공2010하,1200]

Main Issues

[1] Details of the duty of care borne by a midwife during the course of delivery

[2] In a case where a newborn baby born by a midwife who takes charge of a childbirth at a hospital was in a state of cerebral macy, the case holding that there was medical malpractice on the part of a midwife who did not properly perform cardiopulmonary pulmonary pathy within the extent possible of the midwife by delaying reporting abnormal signs, such as urine color, even though he discovered abnormal signs during the process of delivery, but did not lose the opportunity to take emergency measures by delaying reporting to the pregnant woman, medical specialist, etc.

[3] The case where it can be presumed that cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral Sp

[4] The case holding that it is presumed that the cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral Bribery of a newborn baby was caused by a midwife's medical malpractice

Summary of Judgment

[1] In light of the purport of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the former Medical Service Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8366 of Apr. 11, 2007) and the former Enforcement Rule of the Medical Service Act (wholly amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs No. 11 of Apr. 11, 2008), which classify the qualifications and authority of medical personnel such as a doctor and a midwife according to medical knowledge and ability, etc., and require a midwife to instruct a doctor, and the fact that a medical person in charge of life and health of a human being has the duty to provide the best medical treatment in the given medical environment and conditions, a midwife is obligated to continuously observe whether the condition of a woman and a fetus is normal in the course of delivery and report the status of the woman and the fetus to the public in a timely manner so that the woman and a woman can properly cope with any possible emergency situation, and to take necessary measures within his/her capacity in an emergency.

[2] The case holding that, in a case where a newborn baby born by a midwife who takes charge of a part in a hospital was in a state of cerebral paralysis, the newborn baby lost the opportunity for the newborn baby to take emergency measures, such as her abortion and artificial smoking, in a timely manner from a doctor by delaying reporting abnormal signs such as meconium in the process of delivery, even though he/she discovered abnormal signs such as meconium in the process of delivery, and caused the newborn baby to lose the opportunity for him/her to take emergency measures, such as her meconium and artificial smoking, through inserting the meconium in a timely manner from the doctor, and the newborn baby was in a meconium who does not take part in the meconium in the part of the newborn baby who does not take part in the meconium and the meconium using the meconium

[3] Even though it is difficult to find out most of the causes in cases and the causes during childbirth are merely 6 to 8%, if there are indirect facts showing the damage of low oxygen-cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral Spece, it is reasonable to presume that the causes during childbirth

[4] The case holding that it is presumed that the cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral Bribery of a newborn baby was caused by a midwife's medical malpractice.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Articles 2(2) (see current Article 2(2)), 5 (see current Article 5), 6 (see current Article 6), 30(2) (see current Article 33(2)), 33(7) (see current Article 33(6)), and 32 (see current Article 36) of the former Medical Service Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8366, Apr. 11, 2007); Article 25 (see current Article 31); Article 28-6(1) (see current Article 38(1)); Article 750 of the Civil Act / [2) (see current Article 36(3) of the former Medical Service Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8366, Apr. 11, 2007); Article 750 of the former Medical Service Act / [30 (see current Article 50(2) (2)); Article 78(3) (2) (2) (2) (see current Article 760) of the former Medical Service Act / [2) (see current Article 368(3) of the former Act)

Reference Cases

[3] Supreme Court Decision 2004Da13045 Decided October 28, 2005 (Gong2005Ha, 1854) Supreme Court Decision 2006Da48465 Decided February 14, 2008

Plaintiff-Appellant

Plaintiff 1 and two others (Attorneys Shin Jae-ho et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellee)

Defendant-Appellee

Defendant 1 and one other (Law Firm Cheongn, Attorneys Kim Jong-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Busan High Court Decision 2004Na10749 decided October 26, 2006

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

A. According to Articles 2(2), 5, 6, 30(2) and (7), and 32 of the former Medical Service Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8366 of Apr. 11, 2007), and Articles 25 and 28-6(1) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Medical Service Act (wholly amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs No. 11 of Apr. 1, 2008), a medical doctor’s license shall be granted to a person who has graduated from a university or college majored in medical science and passed an examination so that he/she can be engaged in medical and health guidance. A medical doctor’s license shall be granted to a person who has passed a prescribed procedure, and a doctor may establish a general hospital, hospital, or clinic, but only a midwife may establish a midwifery clinic.

In light of the purport of the Act and subordinate statutes that classify the qualifications and authority of medical persons, such as medical doctors and midwifes according to their knowledge, ability, etc., and that medical persons in charge of the life and health of human beings are obligated to provide the best medical treatment under the pertinent medical treatment environment and conditions, etc., a midwife is obligated to continuously observe the state of a mother and fetus in the course of delivery and to timely report the state of the mother and fetus so that they can properly cope with the occurrence of an emergency situation, and to take necessary measures within the scope he/she can take in an emergency.

B. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, the following circumstances are revealed.

(1) On April 18, 199, the plaintiff 3 was hospitalized in ○○ Hospital operated by the defendant 1 on Sundays on April 18, 1999, and around 10:00, the defendant 2, a midwife, provided the plaintiff 3 with an incubation, an induced delivery system, and discovered the salvine color of the transferee in the course of artificially breathing the bals, around 10:15, and around 10:32, the plaintiff 3 provided the plaintiff 1, a 3.2kg of body.

(2) Plaintiff 1 showed serious blue symptoms after birth, did not breathe, did not breathe, did not breathe, and did not 1 minute App score 3 (2 in the heart and 2 in the skin color, 1 in the skin color). Defendant 2 removed sp and absorption for about 4 to 5 minutes, but Plaintiff 1 did not breath, and 5 minute App score was 5 (2 in the heart parallel, 1 in the skin color, 1 in the color color, and 1 in the color color).

(3) After having contacted the Nonparty, who is a medical specialist, Defendant 2 carried out cardiopulmonary resuscitation by putting Plaintiff 1 into a newborn baby room with an oxygen cover. Plaintiff 1 was stable on April 18, 199, but at around 11:00, he was found to have a large number of attitudes on the center of the pulmonary radiation examination conducted around 12:00, and was diagnosed by pulmonary resuscitation and severe pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary pulmonary Elimination.

(4) As a result of the brain self-processed image (MRI) test conducted around April 200, Plaintiff 1 did not observe the structural shape of brain, while there were both sides where he was suffering from low-carbon brain damage in the infant flag, there was a scarcityal disease in the base nuclear, and there was a disease in the vicinity of the brain laboratory, and around that time, he was diagnosed with brain cerebrovascular, which was enforced around August 2005, and even after the brain self-processed image (MRI) test conducted around August 200, there was no change in the disease.

(5) It does not seem that Defendant 2 reported her husband and wife to a medical specialist, etc. on her birth, or immediately dispatched a doctor in an emergency situation immediately after the birth of a newborn baby.

(6) The delivery room of this case did not have an apparatus necessary for artificial smoking, such as mast and white (see, e.g., records). Defendant 2 only worked in the nose of a newborn baby, and Defendant 1 transferred Plaintiff 1, who did not have repulmon after birth, to the newborn baby room, until the artificial smoking was performed (10:32, the birth time of Plaintiff 1 was 10:50, the first active resuscitation test time was 110 times, and 10 minutes after the cardiopulmonary resuscitation test was implemented, and around 11:0 minutes after the cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed, and around 10 minutes after the cardiopulmonary resuscitation was restored to 48 times, and the 11:0 minutes after the pulmonary resuscitation was restored to 10 minutes after the record of 10 minutes after the record.

(7) Apgar score (Apgar), which reflects the condition of a newborn baby, provides 0-2 points for each of 5 signs of cardiopulmonary confinement, respiratory effort, skin color, tension, and stimulative reaction, with 0-3 points added up 10 points for 0-2 points for 0-3 points for 10 points for 10 points for 0-3 points for 10 points for removal of smoking materials inside the future and within the engine, secure a map by inserting the stimuls inside the engine, and implement artificial smoking by connecting a white (mauba) with the pipes inside the engine.

(8) Since it can be the cause of meconium closure, chemical waste, and pulmonary hightension, if a newborn baby is found to have a meconium, the meconium must be removed from the meconium with the meconium or a smoking machine first, and if the newborn baby does not have the meconium, meconium should be inserted into the meconium in the meconium to remove the meconium and supply the meconium. If the signs of meconium are serious, meconium and artificial meconium should be immediately performed through the meconium in the meconium.

C. Examining the above facts in light of the above legal principles, Defendant 2, a midwife, has the duty to immediately report meconium and medical specialists on duty to prepare for emergency situations, such as meconiumless meconium, etc., which may occur in the process of delivery of the newborn baby, and to immediately report meconium such as meconium, etc., and to perform artificial meconium and meconium using meconium and artificial meconium such as Plaintiff 1’s failing to meconium or meconium in the state of meconium in the state of meconium and meconium. Thus, Defendant 2, a midwife, has the duty to take emergency measures using meconium and meconium as a midwife in the state of meconium and meconium, not only inhale the meconium in the meconium of the newborn baby, but also call the doctor to take emergency measures such as inserting the meconium in the meconium, and if emergency measures are delayed through the me in the engine.

However, by delaying reporting to medical specialists, etc., Defendant 2 caused Plaintiff 1 to lose the opportunity to undergo emergency measures, such as artificial re-treatment and artificial re-harming through the insertion in the engine in a timely manner from the doctor, and Defendant 2 was merely a person who discharges the oxygen from the body of Plaintiff 1, who did not perform re-harm in the delivery room, and did not properly perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation within the extent possible by Defendant 2, such as failing to perform artificial re-harming using ske and white. Therefore, Defendant 2 seems to have medical malpractice.

The court below determined that there was no negligence on the part of Defendant 2 with regard to first aid, such as meancy, on the ground that the insertion in the agency of the newborn baby is possible only with meanthy, but it cannot be readily concluded that only a medical specialist with meancy is possible (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Do1348, Apr. 2, 2009). Further, according to the fact-finding on the president of the Korean Medical Association, the court below stated that the meancy could be inserted within the agency of the newborn baby if a general doctor is a doctor (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Do1399, Apr. 2, 2009). Since the meancy could have easily predicted that the me could have been in need of meancy, such as meancy, we need to have experience and knowledge about it, it cannot be viewed that the me could not be exempt from the duty to report the me of the me.

D. Meanwhile, even though it is difficult to find out most of the causes of cerebral cerebral macy in most cases and it is merely 6 to 8% of the causes of cerebral macy, if indirect facts are found to indicate the damage of low oxygen-cerebral cerebral cerebral macy that occurred during the delivery which can be one of the causes of cerebral macy, while no circumstance is found to confirm the existence of other congenital or acquired causes, it is reasonable to presume that cerebral macy has occurred due to cerebral macy damage during the delivery (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2004Da13045, Oct. 28, 2005; 2006Da48465, Feb. 14, 2008).

However, according to the records, if emergency measures, such as obsitation and artificial absorption, are delayed by inserting the obsital cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral cerebral Spece, the result of the test of the test of the brain cerebral Spece (MRI) conducted by Plaintiff 1, and the structural ideal of the brain that appears frequently from congenital cerebral cerebral cerebral Spece, on the other hand, the disease is observed in both both sides and obsital pulmonal Spece, and the cerebral Spece is reached in almost few parts while the cerebral cerebral Spece is proceeding, and there seems to be no particular circumstance to require Plaintiff 1 to confirm the existence of a congenital or congenital other factors. Thus, it is presumed that Plaintiff 1’s cerebral cerebral cerebral Spece is presumed to have occurred due to Defendant 2’s negligence.

E. Nevertheless, the court below's rejection of all plaintiffs' arguments on the grounds that a midwife can handle only a childbirth solely and that a midwife performed all necessary emergency measures as a midwife. In so determining, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the duties of a midwife and the standards for medical malpractice, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

2. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Young-chul (Presiding Justice)

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