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(영문) 대법원 2013. 2. 28. 선고 2011다103823 판결

[수의매수권양도통지이행][공2013상,561]

Main Issues

Where the person requisitioned or his/her heir is entitled to purchase the requisitioned property from the State by a free contract pursuant to Article 20-2 of the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Requisitioned Property, and where the transferor, etc. notified of sale by the State prior to the issuance of the notification of transfer is deemed to have expressed his/her intent to waive the purchase or to have renounced the purchase, whether the transferor may refuse to comply with the notification of transfer on such grounds (negative)

Summary of Judgment

Article 20-2 of the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Requisitioned Property (hereinafter “Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Requisitioned Property”) provides that the person requisitioned or his/her heir may purchase the requisitioned property from the State through a free contract is merely the potential position to exercise only when the State notifies the sale by a free contract. However, in cases where the status to purchase such property (hereinafter “redemption status”) is transferred, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract of sale, donation or other claims which serves as the cause of transfer, the transferor is obligated to cooperate for the transferee to enjoy full benefit concerning the status of repurchase, which is the cause of transfer. In addition, in order for the transferor to acquire the requisitioned property, it is reasonable to view that the transferor is merely obligated to notify the transferee of the fact that the transferor would be able to purchase the property within three months after receiving the notice of sale from the State in accordance with the provisions of the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Requisitiond Property, and thus, it is reasonable to deem that the transferor has a duty to notify the transferor of the purchase of the status within two months prior to the transfer or assignment.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 20-2 of the Act on Special Measures for Disposal of Requisitioned Property

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 2006Da36836 Delivered on November 23, 2006

Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee

Plaintiff 1 and four others (Attorney Kim Jong-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 1 (Attorney Lee Byung-hee, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Defendant-Appellee

Defendant 2

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 3 (Attorney Lee Byung-hee, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Defendant-Appellee

Defendant 4

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 2010Na115074 decided August 12, 2011

Text

The part of the lower judgment against the Plaintiffs is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. Defendant 1 and 3’s appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal by Defendant 1 and 3 are assessed against the Defendant 1 and 3.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal

Article 20-2 of the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Requisitioned Property (hereinafter "Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Requisitioned Property") provides that where the requisitioned property purchased pursuant to the Act becomes unnecessary for military purposes thereafter, the State may sell it to the requisitioned person or his/her heir at the market price at the time of sale by a negotiated contract, notwithstanding the provisions of the State Property Act. Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that the State shall notify without delay the requisitioned person or his/her heir when the property to be sold pursuant to the provisions of the above Paragraph (1) has occurred, and Paragraph (4) of the same Article provides that if the requisitioned person or his/her heir fails to file an application for purchase within three months from the date of receipt of notification pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (3), he/she shall be deemed to have waived his/her purchase. In addition, the status of the requisitioned person or his/her heir to purchase the requisitioned property by a negotiated contract is merely the potential status of the State only when the State notifies the sale by a negotiated contract (see Supreme Court Decision 203Da63636, Dec. 26, 2006, 2006).

Unless otherwise stipulated in the contract of sale, donation and other claims that form the cause of the transfer (hereinafter “redemption status”), the transferor is obligated to cooperate in order for the transferee to fully enjoy the redemption status, which is the subject-matter of transfer, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract of sale, donation and other claims that form the cause of the transfer. In addition, in order for the transferee to acquire the subject-matter of requisition property, the transferee shall file an application for purchase with the State within three months after receiving notice of sale from the State in accordance with the above provisions, in accordance with the above provisions. As such, it is reasonable to deem that the transferor is obligated to notify the transferee of the fact that the transferee transferred the redemption status to the State so that the transferee may take the procedure

Meanwhile, even if the transferor notified the transferor or his heir (hereinafter “transferor”) of the sale before the notification of the transfer of repurchase status was given, and the transferor notified of the sale to the transferor or his heir (hereinafter “transferor”) or deemed the waiver of the sale pursuant to Article 20-2(4) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Requisitioned Property, which was given earlier, it is merely about whether the State can oppose the assignee’s claim for the acquisition of repurchase status on the ground of the transfer, and it does not affect the transferor’s duty of notification. Thus, the transferor cannot refuse to perform the duty of notification on the ground of such reason.

According to the judgment below and the evidence duly admitted by the court below, the land of this case was originally owned by Nonparty 2 and was requisitioned on March 17, 1971 and the registration of ownership transfer was completed in the Republic of Korea on the same day. Nonparty 2 entered into a repurchase right transfer agreement with Nonparty 1 on April 19, 1982 with the right to repurchase the land of this case and the right to purchase the land of this case from the Republic of Korea to Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 2 died on July 9, 1984 and jointly succeeded to the deceased Nonparty 2's property. Nonparty 2 notified the Defendants and Nonparty 1 of the decision to sell the land of this case under a negotiated contract on February 8, 2010, Defendant 2 notified the purchase within the period prescribed in Article 20-2 (4) of the Act, but did not receive the notice of withdrawal within the above period.

Examining the legal principles as seen earlier in light of the above facts, since the repurchase status of the instant land was transferred to Nonparty 1 pursuant to the transfer agreement between Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 1, the Defendants, the inheritors of Nonparty 2, are obligated to notify the Republic of Korea of the above transfer. This also applies to Defendant 2 and Defendant 4, who did not notify the purchase by legitimate means even after being notified of the sale decision.

Nevertheless, in the case of Defendant 2 and Defendant 4, the lower court rejected the Plaintiffs’ claim on the ground that it did not have a duty to notify the transfer of the land of this case on the ground that it was deemed that it renounced the purchase due to the failure to file an application for purchase within the period pursuant to Article 20-2(4) of the aforementioned Act, and that the status to purchase the land of this case ceases to exist. The lower court erred by misapprehending the relevant legal principles, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of appeal

2. As to Defendant 1 and 3’s grounds of appeal

The allegation in this part of the grounds of appeal is nothing more than the purport of disputing the selection of evidence and fact-finding, which belong to the lower court’s full power as a fact-finding court, and it is difficult to view this part of the judgment below as legitimate grounds of appeal. In light of the records, it cannot be viewed

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiffs is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Defendant 1 and 3's appeal is dismissed, and this part of the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent

Justices Kim Chang-suk (Presiding Justice)