2. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff 5% interest per annum from the day following the day when the judgment of this case became final and conclusive to the day of complete payment.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

Cheong-gu Office

The same shall apply to the order.

A. On December 29, 2005, AA Industry Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "AA Industry Development") obtained approval from the head of the Si/Gu Office of Mine on the O2 District Construction Project, and on April 19, 2007, ordered the Defendant Company to build an apartment in the project district.

B. On May 2007, AA industry development entered into a sales guarantee agreement with BB Guarantee Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “B Guarantee”) on the said housing construction project and agreed to transfer BB guarantee the above project site, its ground and underground buildings, sales rights, and sales rights, and all other rights related to the said project under the condition that B Guarantee is liable to guarantee buyers if BB is unable to continue the business due to default on the development of AA industry, bankruptcy, etc.

C. From around October 2007, AA industry development commenced the sale of apartment units to be newly built within the said project district, but on August 2009, the new construction of apartment units was discontinued due to the bankruptcy in August 2009, and the buyer of the apartment units began to demand the return of the sales price paid after the cancellation of the sale contract.

D. Accordingly, BB guarantee returned the sales price to the buyer according to the sales guarantee contract concluded between AA and AA industrial development, and AA industrial development transferred the right to the said housing construction project to BB around that time.

E. After that, around January 25, 2010, AA industry development applied for the refund of value-added tax to the head of the original tax office under the Plaintiff on the grounds of cancellation of sales related to the sale of apartment units in the 2009 reporting process of the second-stage value-added tax, and the Plaintiff refunded the OOO of value-added tax on the AA industry development around March 9, 2010.

F. AA industry development was refunded by the Plaintiff on March 12, 2010 to a deposit account in the name of the formerCC, the representative director for the development of AA industry, but around March 26, 2010, withdrawn OOO won from the above deposit account and remitted it to the Defendant, thereby repaying KRW AA industry development to the Defendant (hereinafter “the instant repayment”).

G. After that, on October 4, 201, the head of the original tax office under the Plaintiff’s control issued a revised and notified OOO of the value-added tax for the development of AA industry on the ground that the development of AA industry was omitted from the output tax due to the transfer of rights to BB guarantee at the time of filing the return of the second value-added tax in 2009, but the AA industry development did not pay OOO of the value-added tax until now.

[Ground of Recognition] The facts without dispute are as follows: Gap's 1, 2, and 4, and Eul's 1.2 (including each number, hereinafter the same shall apply), and the whole purport of the pleading

2. Determination on this safety defense

A. Summary of the defense

The head of the original tax office under the Plaintiff notified the Defendant Company as the secondary taxpayer for the development of AA industry upon the failure to pay the above value-added tax, and the Defendant Company requested to the Tax Tribunal for a trial seeking the designation of the secondary taxpayer and the revocation of the taxation disposition as the second taxpayer for the development of AA industry, and the Plaintiff becomes aware of the fact that the AA industry development was performed by the Defendant Company through the written reasons for the claim filed by the Defendant, and the lawsuit filed on March 29, 2013, which was later than the first one year after the date of the claim, is unlawful because the Plaintiff becomes aware of the fact that the AA industry development was performed by the Defendant Company through the written reasons for the claim filed by the Defendant.

B. Determination

The "date when the obligee becomes aware of the ground for revocation" in the exercise of the obligee's right of revocation means the date when the obligee became aware of the requirements for the obligee's right of revocation, i.e., the date when the obligee becomes aware of the fact that the obligor committed a fraudulent act with the knowledge that the obligee would prejudice the obligee. Thus, the mere fact that the obligor was aware of the fact that the obligor conducted a disposal of the property is insufficient, that is, the juristic act is an act detrimental to the obligee, that is, the obligor's joint security of the claim is insufficient, that is, the obligor's failure to fully satisfy the claim due to the lack of the joint security of the claim or lack of the existing joint security, and that the obligor had the intention to harm the obligor (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da19435, Jul. 11, 2003). Meanwhile, the repayment according to the nature of the obligation cannot be viewed as a fraudulent act except for the case where the obligor made performance in collusion with some other creditors, and the obligee's claim for restitution.

However, the following circumstances are met, i.e., the head of the original tax office, on November 18, 201, designating the defendant company as the secondary taxpayer for the development of AA industry, notified the defendant company to pay OEM in arrears, and the defendant company filed a request with the Tax Tribunal for a judgment seeking the designation of the secondary taxpayer and cancellation of the taxation disposition by the head of the original tax office around February 8, 2012 (Evidence 2-1). 2, the defendant company submitted the request for reimbursement to the defendant company on March 26, 2010 to the effect that the former taxpayer was reimbursed KRW 10,000,000,000,000,000,000,0000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00,000.

Therefore, the aforementioned defense to the effect that the lawsuit in this case is unlawful as against the intent of the exclusion period is without merit.

3. Judgment on the merits

A. Determination on the cause of the claim

(i)the existence of preserved claims;

In principle, a claim that can be protected by the obligee's right of revocation should have arisen before the obligor performs a juristic act for the purpose of property right with the knowledge that it would prejudice the obligee, but it is highly probable that at the time of the juristic act, there has already been a legal relationship which serves as the basis of the establishment of the claim, and that the claim is created in the near future, and that the probability has actually been realized in the near future, and that claim may also become a preserved claim by the obligee's right of revocation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Da37821, Mar. 23, 200

In light of the above legal principles, even if the Plaintiff issued a notice of payment of value-added tax on AA industrial development after the date of the instant repayment, the value-added tax was not reported at the output tax amount of 2/2009 (from July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009) prior to the date of the instant payment, and thus, around March 26, 2010 when the instant payment was made, it is highly probable that the said value-added tax claim is established in the near future because the legal relationship that forms the basis for establishing the above value-added tax claim has already been established, and as seen earlier, AA industrial development claims are highly probable for the establishment of the said value-added tax claim in the near future without transferring all rights to the housing construction project on BB guarantee and without filing a return of value-added tax pursuant to the return of sale price of BB guarantee, and thus, it should be deemed that the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the said value-added tax was actually accrued to AA development upon the Plaintiff’s entry of the tax claim.

2) The debt excess status of the AA industry development

(4) As of December 31, 2009, the total asset system on the AA industry development balance sheet was OO, while the total debt system exceeded OO on the above balance sheet was 10,000,000,000 OO's OO's 1125,000 OO's 35784.8 square meters and above ground buildings were not reflected in the above balance sheet. However, the defendant asserts that the above AA industry development is not reflected in the value of the above OO's 125,00 OO's 125,000 OO's 125,000,0000 O's 2,000,0000's 1,000,000,000 won and 3, and 1,0000,000,000 won and 2,000 won, it appears that the above OO's 2,01,000.

(iii)the intent to commit fraudulent act and to commit suicide;

As a matter of course, a creditor’s right to demand repayment of a debt does not interfere with it on the ground that there exists another creditor, and the debtor also did not refuse to perform the obligation on the ground that there is another creditor as the debtor bears the obligation to perform the obligation in accordance with the principal place of the debt. Thus, even in cases where the debtor performs the obligation to a specific creditor in excess of the obligation and thereby the joint security of other creditors is reduced, the performance does not constitute a fraudulent act in principle. However, in cases where the debtor performs the obligation with the intent to obtain the preferential satisfaction of some of the creditors, in collusion with those creditors, with the intent to cause harm to other creditors (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da6217, Jan. 27, 2004).

In light of the above legal principles, the following circumstances that can be acknowledged by comprehensively considering the health care units, Gap evidence 4 through 8, and Eul evidence 2, and the overall purport of the arguments, i.e., the number of shares issued by the defendant company as of December 3, 2009, and 5.33% of all the former EE, and 4.21% of all the former EE's wife's shares issued shares were owned by 3l.01%, and the former EE company's shares issued by 27.64%, and the former EE company's shares issued by the defendant company's former EE were transferred by 10,00,000,000,000,0000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.

(iv) revocation of fraudulent act and restitution to its original state;

Therefore, the repayment in this case must be revoked as a fraudulent act, and the revocation creditor may demand the beneficiary or the subsequent purchaser to pay money or movable property directly to him/her (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da50061, Nov. 28, 2003). Therefore, the defendant company, the beneficiary, has the intention to return the above amount of reimbursement to the plaintiff, the revocation creditor, as the restitution creditor.

B. Determination as to the defendant's bona fide defense

The Defendant, at the time of the instant repayment, did not know at all that the Plaintiff’s claim for value-added tax was created, and therefore did not have the intent to harm the Plaintiff.

There is no evidence to prove that the defendant was bona fide at the time of the repayment in this case, and the beneficiary's bad faith, which is the requirement for revocation of a fraudulent act, refers to the perception that the juristic act in question would result in the lack of common creditors' joint security, and it does not require an intention to harm a specific creditor, and the good faith of the defendant is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Then, the plaintiff's claim of this case is reasonable, and it is decided as per Disposition by admitting it.