[2] The case holding that since the state public official Gap had made it impossible or considerably difficult to exercise the right to claim the state compensation with respect to the infringement of the personal rights and interests of Eul by forging the judgment prior to the completion of the statute of limitations on the state compensation right, and the state where it is difficult to expect that Eul objectively claim the state compensation before taking corrective measures with respect to the forged judgment, it constitutes an abuse of rights and thus the State's assertion that the statute of limitations expired cannot be allowed

1. The exercise of the debtor's right of defense based on the statute of limitations is governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. Thus, where the debtor has made it impossible or considerably difficult for the creditor to exercise his right or the interruption of prescription before the expiration of the statute of limitations, or acted to make such measures unnecessary, where the creditor objectively obstructed the creditor from exercising his right, and where the debtor has made the right holder trust, or where there are special circumstances, such as where it is necessary to protect the creditor, and where other creditors under the same conditions receive the repayment of the debt, etc., it is remarkably unfair or unfair to allow the debtor to claim the completion of the statute of limitations as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Da29895, Dec. 12, 1997; 2002Da323232, Oct. 25, 2002).

2. According to the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below, the deceased non-party 1 participated in the 6.25 Incident of the 8th Army under the control of the defendant, and without any justifiable reason on August 1950, it was the person who was totaled by the 16th order of non-party 2. The plaintiffs were the deceased's wife and children, and the non-party 2 did not raise criticism on the above measures. The court of first instance rejected the judgment of the court of first instance on August 17, 1950 on the ground that it was difficult for the deceased to have determined that the non-party 2 had a duty of care for the deceased's life on the basis of the above 0th order of high-class military court (hereinafter referred to as "the judgment of this case"), and thus, it was hard for the court of first instance to find the deceased's non-party 1 to have known that there was no evidence of mental harm caused by the death of the deceased, such as the defendant's non-party 2's judgment of this case.

3. According to the above facts, it is reasonable to view that, around August 1950, Nonparty 2 violated the Plaintiffs’ personal legal interests, such as concealing and manipulating the deceased’s death circumstances, the Plaintiffs’ damages actually occurred. Thus, it is difficult to view that, in light of the above facts, Nonparty 2, a state public official, made it difficult to expect the Plaintiffs to exercise the statute of limitations prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations as to the Plaintiffs’ right of claim for state compensation in this case’s right of abuse of rights under Article 96(2) and (1) of the former Budget and Accounts Act (amended by Act No. 4102 of Mar. 31, 1989, and repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda of the National Finance Act (Act No. 8050 of Oct. 4, 2006, effective until December 31, 2006). However, in light of the above facts, it is difficult to view that the Defendant’s exercise of the statute of limitations as to the Plaintiffs’ right of abuse of rights prior to the judgment.

Therefore, the court below's rejection of the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription on the ground that it cannot be permitted under the principle of good faith is just, and there is no violation of law by misunderstanding legal principles as to extinctive prescription under the State Compensation Act.

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Ill-sook (Presiding Justice)