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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2013. 10. 23. 선고 2013나30232 판결

[양수금][미간행]

Plaintiff and appellant

[Defendant-Appellee] K&C Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Cheong & Cheong, Attorneys Park Jae-ki et al., Counsel for defendant-appellee

Defendant, Appellant

Defendant

Conclusion of Pleadings

September 4, 2013

The first instance judgment

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2012Da330132 Decided May 23, 2013

Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 20,798,116 won and the amount calculated by the ratio of 20% per annum from the day following the day of service of the copy of the application for modification of the claim and the cause of the claim as of March 26, 2013 to the day of complete payment.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. On April 12, 1995, Nonparty 1 entered into a loan agreement with Aju Mutual Savings and Finance Company and the amount of KRW 95 million on April 12, 1995, with the repayment date as of April 12, 1998 (hereinafter “third loan”). Nonparty 1 borrowed KRW 65 million on the same day (hereinafter “first loan”), KRW 20 million (hereinafter “second loan”), and KRW 10 million (hereinafter “third loan”).

B. On or after June 29, 1996, Nonparty 1 lost the benefit of time by delaying the repayment of the principal and interest of the above loan. Nonparty 1 paid only part of the principal and interest of the first loan, and Nonparty 2 and 3 did not pay the remaining overdue interest.

C. On April 20, 199, Aju Mutual Savings Bank Co., Ltd. transferred the above loan claims against Nonparty 1 to Korea Mutual Savings and Finance Company, and notified Nonparty 1 of the assignment of claims on September 22, 1999. On December 19, 2000, Korea Mutual Savings and Finance Company transferred the above loan claims to Korea Mutual Savings and Finance Company and notified Nonparty 1 of the assignment of claims. < Amended by Act No. 6373, Feb. 17, 2001>

D. Accordingly, a limited liability company specialized in securitization filed a lawsuit against Nonparty 1 for a loan claim against the Busan District Court 2002Kahap5203. On June 26, 2002, Nonparty 1 was sentenced to the above court on February 15, 2002 to pay 20% per annum from February 15, 2002 to May 19, 2002 to KRW 25% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment (hereinafter “related judgment”), and the above judgment became final and conclusive on July 27, 2002.

E. On October 31, 2003, a limited liability company specialized in Han Name-gu securitization transferred the above judgment amount claim to the Plaintiff (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) and notified Nonparty 1 of the above assignment of claim on November 27, 2003.

F. As of December 3, 2012, the Plaintiff transferred the claim for the first loan out of the judgment amount to another party. As of December 3, 2012, the Plaintiff remains KRW 13,086,715 and the final delay damages for the third loan, KRW 7,711,401.

G. On October 18, 2008, Nonparty 1 died and was the inheritor Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 3, the spouse of Nonparty 2 and his lineal descendants. However, on January 20, 2009, Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 3 were on the deceased Nonparty 1’s renunciation of inheritance (the Busan District Court’s Family Branch Decision 2008Ra445). The same judgment became final and conclusive around that time.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 1, 2 evidence, Eul 1 evidence (including additional number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination

A. According to the above facts, barring any special circumstance, the Defendant, the heir of the deceased Nonparty 1, is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff the final delay damages of the second and third loans of KRW 20,798,116 (= KRW 13,086,715 + KRW 7,711,401) out of the relevant judgment amount, and the delay damages therefrom.

B. On the other hand, the defendant asserted that the claim for damages for the final delay of the loans Nos. 2 and 3 had ceased to exist after the lapse of 10 years, a period of extinctive prescription under the Civil Act. Thus, since the facts raised on December 3, 2012, which was ten years from July 27, 2002 when the relevant judgment became final and conclusive, are apparent in the records, the above claim of the plaintiff was extinguished by extinctive prescription. Thus, the defendant's defense is with merit.

C. On May 9, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the deceased non-party 1 for the interruption of extinctive prescription of the pertinent judgment claim (hereinafter “instant prior suit”). A copy of the Plaintiff’s complaint was served on the non-party 4 who resides in the address in the instant complaint, and was sentenced to the judgment in favor of the Plaintiff on September 7, 2012. As such, the extinctive prescription of the relevant claim under the relevant judgment became final and conclusive on October 25, 2012, the Plaintiff’s claim was interrupted on May 9, 2012, and Article 170 of the Civil Act provides that “In the event of dismissal, dismissal, or withdrawal of the lawsuit, the interruption of prescription does not become effective, but, within six months in the event of interruption of prescription, the period of prescription cannot be deemed to be interrupted by the first claim, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff’s dismissal or revocation of the lawsuit against the non-party 1, supra.”

In addition, since the plaintiff's prior suit of this case constitutes a "Peremptory" under Article 174 of the Civil Act and its effect is maintained until September 7, 2012, which is the date on which the judgment in the prior suit of this case was rendered, and as long as the lawsuit of this case was filed within 6 months from that time, the interruption of prescription was interrupted. As such, the time when the interruption of prescription became effective by the peremptory notice reaches the other party and the peremptory notice was delivered to the other party, and the interruption of prescription does not occur unless the other party reaches the other party. Thus, the plaintiff's prior suit of this case does not have any evidence to acknowledge that the duplicate or original copy of the written complaint of this case has reached the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff'

In addition, the plaintiff did not respond to the previous suit of this case even though the non-party 4 received the copy of the complaint of this case on behalf of the defendant and the defendant knew of the contents of the previous suit of this case, and asserted the completion of extinctive prescription in this case is contrary to the good faith principle. However, there is no evidence to deem that the non-party 4 received the duplicate of the previous suit of this case on behalf of the defendant or that the defendant knew of the contents of the previous suit of this case at the time of delivery of the duplicate of the complaint of this case, and therefore, the plaintiff's second re-appeal of this case is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judge 50, 000,000,000