2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Cheong-gu Office

The judgment that the defendant revoked the imposition of OOO(including additional OOO) of capital gains tax belonging to the year 2011 against the plaintiff on September 1, 2012.

A. On June 30, 1965, the Plaintiff completed the registration of transfer of ownership on the ground of sale on February 8, 1954 pursuant to the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Transfer of Ownership of General Farmland (hereinafter “Special Measures Act”).

B. On May 27, 2011, the Plaintiff transferred the instant land to the OOE, and applied Article 69 of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act by applying Article 69 of the same Act to the effect that the instant land falls under one of its own farmland for at least eight years at the time of preliminary return on the tax base of capital gains tax, and paid the remainder of the OOE when applying Article 69 of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act.

C. On September 1, 2012, the Defendant did not clarify the date of settling the balance of the instant land.

On June 30, 1965, the date of receipt of registration, shall be deemed the time of acquisition. The plaintiff did not meet the requirements for re- village since October 20, 1968, which was after the acquisition of the land of this case, and did not meet the requirements for re- village from October 20, 1968 to the time of transfer, and the plaintiff did not have any objective data to regard the land of this case as being self-employed for at least eight years, and by denying the special long-term holding deduction, the plaintiff was subject to the disposition of this case imposing OOO(including additional OOO) of capital gains tax for the year

D. On October 19, 2012, the Plaintiff filed an appeal on the instant disposition, but was dismissed on December 27, 2012.

Facts that there is no dispute, Gap 1 and 7 evidence, the purport of the whole pleadings, and the purport of the whole pleadings.

2. The plaintiff's assertion

As to the land of this case on June 30, 1965, the Plaintiff completed the registration of ownership transfer based on sale on February 8, 1954 under the Act on Special Measures for the Plaintiff’s future, and is presumed to have actually acquired the land of this case on February 8, 1954, which is the date of the cause of the registration of ownership transfer, and paid the price thereof. Even if not, it can be recognized that the Plaintiff paid the price of the land of this case by other evidence. Since the Plaintiff directly cultivated the land of this case after residing in the location of the land of this case for at least eight years from that time while living in the location of the land of this case, he was able to support the household-type labor, and thus directly cultivated the land of this case, the disposition of this case, which imposed the transfer income tax on the Plaintiff,

3. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The time of acquiring the instant land

According to Article 98 of the Income Tax Act and Article 162 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, in calculating gains on transfer of assets, the time of acquisition shall be the date of liquidation of the price of the assets concerned, and if the date of liquidation is unclear, it shall be the date of receipt of registration recorded in the register.

As to the instant case, the Plaintiff appears to have been recorded on February 8, 1954 as the cause of acquisition on the registry of the land in this case. However, it appears to have been based on a guarantor's letter of guarantee under the Act on Special Measures and a written confirmation accordingly. However, although the registration of transfer of ownership under the Act on Special Measures is presumed to have been a registration that is consistent with the substantive legal relationship because the registered titleholder acquired ownership through legitimate cause of registration, the registration of transfer of ownership under the Act on Special Measures is presumed to have been consistent with the substantive legal relationship, it is presumed to have been a registration that is consistent with the substantive legal relationship. However, it is difficult to view that the said Act permits the transfer of ownership from the registered titleholder immediately to the actual transferee of the real estate through an heir or a third party, as well as from the fact that the date of sale on the registry is the date of sale on February 8, 1954.

Furthermore, each statement of Gap evidence Nos. 2, Gap evidence Nos. 16, 17, and 1 through 3 is insufficient to recognize that the plaintiff paid the land price of this case on February 8, 1954. There is no other evidence to prove otherwise, and there is no other evidence to know the date of liquidation. Thus, the time when the plaintiff acquired the land of this case shall be deemed June 30, 1965, which is the date of receipt of registration recorded in the register. The plaintiff's assertion contrary to this is without merit.

(b) Whether he/she has re-establishedd for at least eight years;

Article 69(1) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 11133, Dec. 31, 2011; hereinafter the same) provides that the tax amount equivalent to 100/100 of the transfer income tax shall be reduced on the income accruing from the transfer of land prescribed by the Presidential Decree, which is cultivated directly by a resident residing in the seat of farmland for not less than eight years and directly by the resident prescribed by the Presidential Decree, shall be reduced or exempted. As such, it constitutes a “person residing in and directly cultivated directly in the seat of the farmland” and constitutes a “person residing in and directly cultivated directly in the seat

On October 20, 1968, when the resident registration system was implemented, the plaintiff continued to file a resident registration report in Seoul as of October 20, 1968, when the plaintiff had his domicile on October 20, 1968, when the resident registration system was enforced, and there is no other counter-proof. Thus, after October 20, 1968, the plaintiff resided in Seoul as of October 20, 1968, not less than 20 kilometers from the land of this case. Accordingly, the plaintiff could not be deemed to have resided in farmland for not less than eight years since June 30, 1965.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff asserted that only the moving-in report was made in Seoul and the basis of livelihood was the cultivation of the instant land even at the time when the resident registration was made in Seoul as above. However, it is insufficient to recognize that the Plaintiff had resided in the instant land, which was not the above resident registration place, for eight years or longer, or had cultivated the instant land directly. There is no other evidence.

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit, and the disposition of this case is legitimate.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed for lack of reason.