2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

On March 12, 2012, the Defendant revoked the disposition of imposition of value-added tax ○○ (including additional tax) for the second term portion of value-added tax (including the Plaintiff’s claim for revocation of the disposition of imposition of value-added tax ○○ (including additional tax) for the second term portion of 2010 against the Plaintiff on March 12, 2012.

2. Purport of appeal

The same shall apply to the order.

A. The Plaintiff is a company established for the purpose of providing online information and providing Internet services.

B. On March 12, 2012, 2012, the director of ○○ Regional Tax Office issued a tax investigation against the Plaintiff, and notified the Defendant of the tax data, and accordingly, the Defendant issued a revised and notified the Plaintiff of the value-added tax ○○ and value-added tax ○○ for the first period of 2010, and the second period of 2010.

C. On June 8, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a petition for a trial with the Tax Tribunal. On November 8, 2013, the Tax Tribunal rendered a decision that “The imposition of value-added tax on March 12, 2012, imposed on a securities company the value-added tax base and tax amount calculated by deducting the fees for securities company paid to the securities company from the sales amount, and the remainder of the claims are dismissed.”

D. In accordance with the purport of the above decision, the Defendant decided to reduce the amount of KRW 00,00 among the initial amount of value-added tax for a period of two years, 2010, and notified the Plaintiff thereof (hereinafter “the instant disposition”).

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1 to 3, Eul evidence 1 (including paper numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) An ordinary investor shall deposit a certain amount of deposit in the securities company in order for the investor to engage in futures and options. The Plaintiff lends funds to an ordinary investor who has no ability to pay a high amount of deposit, and the Plaintiff’s HTS (HTS) is merely an intention to deliver customer’s order to the HTS as designed to secure the collection of loan. Therefore, the principal service provided by the Plaintiff is not a transaction account lending and a transaction system, but a money lending is not a monetary lending. Thus, even if the substance of the futures account lending business is acknowledged as alleged by the Defendant, it constitutes a service exempt from value-added tax. It is still included in the supply of the main service as a service incidental to the exempted deposit loan, and thus, it must be evaluated as a tax-free service.

2) Even if the Plaintiff’s provision of services constitutes an investment brokerage business, not a money credit business, it constitutes a service exempt from value-added tax, regardless of whether the Plaintiff obtained the authorization of a financial investment business under the former Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013; hereinafter “Capital Markets Act”).

3) In the case of other companies lending money, the Defendant exempted the Plaintiff from taxation by deeming it as monetary credit business, and the handling of the Plaintiff with the same economic substance differently contradicts the principle of tax equality. Furthermore, the instant disposition is contrary to the principle of tax equality, given that it is consistent attitude between the Tax Tribunal and the tax authorities that the Plaintiff becomes subject to tax exemption under the Value-Added Tax Act regardless of whether the Plaintiff obtained authorization with respect to financial and insurance

B. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Facts of recognition

1) The Plaintiff invited customers to join as its members, opened a futures and options trading account (hereinafter “instant account”) in the name of leB, the representative director of the Plaintiff, and made the securities company conduct customers’ futures and options trading through the instant account.

2) The process in which the Plaintiff’s futures and options transactions are conducted through HTS is as follows.

A) If the customer joins the Plaintiff as a member and deposits the security money to the Plaintiff, the customer’s virtual account is created.

B) In the customer’s HTS virtual account, the sum of “security deposits deposited by the customer to the Plaintiff” and “the maximum limit of the deposit money to be operated by the Plaintiff to the customer is indicated as the total amount of deposit, and the customer may engage in futures and options transactions within the limit of the total amount of deposit.

C) The Plaintiff’s HTS is linked to the HTS by the securities company, and if the customer purchases and sells orders to the Plaintiff’s HTS, the securities company’s purchase and sales orders also take place.

D) If the purchase and sale transaction was conducted through the Plaintiff’s HTS, the Plaintiff’s fee to be paid to the securities company and the customer’s fee to be paid to the Plaintiff (hereinafter “instant fee”) shall be deducted from the total deposit amount. The method of calculating the instant fee is as follows.

이 사건 수수료 = 선물��옵션 거래대금 × 수수료율(선물 0.0026%, 옵션 0.11%)

E) The Plaintiff spent considerable expenses for the operation and maintenance of the HTS.

3) The method of settlement is as follows:

A) If a customer gains profit from the customer, the amount calculated by deducting the instant commission for each transaction and the securities company fee from the sum realized in the first amount of the secured money deposited to the Plaintiff is indicated in the Plaintiff’s HTS amount. If the customer files an application for the withdrawal to the Plaintiff within this amount, the Plaintiff would have the customer remitted the amount to the customer’s account.

B) The Plaintiff’s HTS sets up that if a customer suffers a loss from a transaction, the customer must appropriate the loss with the security deposit deposited at the time of the Plaintiff’s subscription to the HTS, and, if the remaining amount of the security deposit is below a certain amount, gift and options goods owned by the customer automatically are damaged by the customer. This is the automatic female function.

4) The Plaintiff did not obtain authorization from the Financial Services Commission under the Capital Markets Act with respect to its business.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 4 through 15, 17, Eul evidence No. 2, the purpose of all pleadings

D. Determination

1) Nature of the service rendered by the Plaintiff

A) The term “investment brokerage business” means the business of selling and purchasing financial investment instruments, soliciting offers, offering, accepting offers, or soliciting offers, offering, and accepting offers for the issuance and underwriting of securities on another person’s account regardless of the name of the district (Article 6(3) of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act explicitly added “mediation” to the aforementioned amendment). The securities account in which customer deposits are deposited with the recruited members, and HTS for trading securities and futures on the Exchange and futures, etc., and then a certain percentage of fees are collected.

The act of receiving and causing a final profit and loss from the transaction to be attributed to the members shall be deemed to run an investment brokerage business for the purpose of pursuing profits, beyond simply lending a futures trading deposit to the members (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2013Do1592, Jul. 25, 2013; 2015Do1233, Apr. 23, 2015).

B) The following circumstances revealed by the above facts are as follows: (a) the Plaintiff recruited members who intend to engage in futures and options and allowed them to use the account of this case; (b) provided members to engage in transactions with the exchange and futures; and (c) received a certain percentage of fees after the Plaintiff made them to trade with the exchange and futures; (d) the Plaintiff’s deposit money cannot be deemed as being transferred to the members; and (e) the Plaintiff’s deposit money is in proportion to the amount of transaction and the number of transactions, not the period of use of the money, but the number of members, and no fee is imposed unless the members do so; (b) the instant fee can be deemed as the price of use of the instant account and HTS rather than the interest on the deposit money; (c) the members are in forms of making transactions through the instant account and HTS and causing profits or losses arising from transactions, but all profits and losses arising from transactions are ultimately attributed to the members, and thus, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff’s financial investment instruments’s account is a business that sells money to the members.

C) Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion based on the premise that the principal service provided by the Plaintiff is a monetary credit business is without merit.

2) Whether it is subject to value-added tax exemption without obtaining authorization for financial investment business

A) Article 12 of the former Value-Added Tax Act (amended by Act No. 11129, Dec. 31, 201; hereinafter the same) stipulates that only the supply of specific goods or services and the import of specific goods shall be exempted from value-added tax, and Article 33(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22578, Dec. 30, 201; hereinafter the same) provides that "financial and insurance services prescribed by Presidential Decree" shall be exempted from value-added tax. Thus, Article 33(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22578, Dec. 3

B) Article 33(1)4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act provides that an investment brokerage business shall be exempted from value-added tax, and the Capital Markets Act provides that any person who intends to engage in a financial investment business, including an investment brokerage business, shall obtain authorization from the Financial Services Commission and shall not engage in a financial investment business without obtaining such authorization (Articles 11 and 12 of the Capital Markets Act). In addition, considering the legislative intent of the Capital Markets Act to enhance fairness and reliability of financial investment business and protect investors who are consumers of financial investment instruments, it is reasonable to deem that an investment brokerage business exempt from value-added tax is limited to the case where the Financial Services Commission obtains such authorization (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 83Nu404, Feb. 9, 198).

C) Therefore, the Plaintiff’s operation of investment brokerage business without authorization from the Financial Services Commission under the Capital Markets Act does not constitute a tax exemption subject to value-added tax. The Plaintiff’s assertion contrary thereto is groundless.

3) Whether the principle of tax equality is violated, etc.

The principle of equality is to prohibit the arbitrary and arbitrary treatment of the same in essence. However, the service provided by the Plaintiff is not just a loan of deposit money, but also an investment brokerage business, so it cannot be deemed that it violates the principle of equality by treating the service differently from the case of a simple loan of deposit money. The tax authority imposed the same tax on other companies related to the Plaintiff.

Furthermore, there is no evidence to deem that the tax authority’s non-taxation practices have been established with respect to the provision of services identical to the Plaintiff prior to the instant disposition. It is related to the question and reply required by the Plaintiff under the Value-Added Tax Act regardless of whether the authorization was obtained under the said Act. Article 33(1)4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act provides that the value-added tax shall be exempted on the investment brokerage business under the said Act, and the said provision does not impose any specific restriction on the “other money lending business” under Article 33(1)18 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act. Thus, the interpretation of the above question and reply cannot be extended to the case of the investment brokerage business. In addition, the decision of the Tax Tribunal cited by the Plaintiff is nothing more than that of the instant disposition and it does not bind the court’

Therefore, the prior plaintiff's assertion cannot be accepted on a different premise.

3. Conclusion

Since the instant disposition is lawful, the judgment of the first instance court, which different conclusions, is revoked, and the Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed.