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(영문) 대법원 1983. 4. 12. 선고 82다카1702 판결

[손해배상][집31(2)민,100;공1983.6.1.(705),813]

Main Issues

(a) Negligence set-off in medical treatment compensation under the Labor Standards Act;

(b) The criteria for calculating the lost profit where the victim who was under the real name of a party loses his/her ability to work under the real name of the Mawan-man (=the degree of loss of ability to work due to the name

Summary of Judgment

A. The liability for accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act does not apply to the principle of fault liability and the theory of comparative negligence, and Article 81 of the Labor Standards Act provides that an employee may be exempted from the liability for compensation on the ground that the employee was grossly negligent with regard to compensation for suspension of work and compensation for disability under Article 81 of the Labor Standards Act. However, since there is no provision in the medical care compensation, a business operator may not be exempted from the payment of medical

B. Since the Plaintiff had already been registered before the instant accident, as a freezing technician had been working in the Defendant Association as a freezing technician due to the instant accident while serving in the Defendant Association, the degree of loss of labor ability due to the name of the party, which was not attributable to the Defendant, ought to be calculated by considering the degree of loss of labor ability due to the name of the party responsible for the Defendant, without considering the degree of loss of labor ability, solely based on the name of the party responsible for the Defendant.

[Reference Provisions]

A. Articles 81 and 78 of the Labor Standards Act; Article 763 of the Civil Act; Article 763 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 81Meu351 Decided October 13, 1981

Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant-Appellee-Appellant

Suwon District Livestock Cooperatives (Attorney Lee Dong-han et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 81Na4105 decided October 5, 1982

Text

The part of the judgment below concerning the claim for damages against property is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

Reasons

1. We examine the Plaintiff’s attorney’s grounds of appeal.

(1) Ground of appeal No. 1

Unless otherwise specifically provided for in the Act, the principle of liability for negligence and the theory of offsetting negligence is not applicable to the liability for accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act. Article 81 of the Labor Standards Act provides that an employee may be exempted from the liability for compensation on the ground that the employee was grossly negligent in paying compensation for suspension of work and compensation for disability under Article 81 of the Labor Standards Act, but since there is no provision in the medical care compensation, it is the case where a business operator cannot be exempted from the liability for medical care compensation equivalent to the rate of negligence even if the employee was negligent (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision

In this case, the court below acknowledged that the defendant union paid 10,054,887 won to the non-party 3's medical treatment facilities in the non-party 5,027,443 won (10,054,887 x 50/100) equivalent to the degree of double plaintiff's negligence, and deducted the amount from the defendant's damages in this case on the ground that the plaintiff had a duty to return it to the defendant.

However, according to the evidence Nos. 18 (the document of the same content as the evidence No. 20-4) without dispute in the establishment, it is recognized that the payment of medical care benefits under the Labor Standards Act is stipulated in Articles 7 and 13 of the Regulations on the Employee Retirement Benefits and Accident Compensation for Workers of the Defendant Union. If the Defendant’s payment of medical care expenses as above is paid as compensation for medical care under the above provisions, the Defendant is obligated to pay the full amount thereof to the Plaintiff, and even if the Plaintiff’s negligence competes in the accident of this case, it is obvious in light of the above stated reasoning.

According to the records, even though it is obvious that the plaintiff's attorney points out the same points on the third day for pleading of the court below, the court below acknowledged the plaintiff's obligation to return medical expenses equivalent to the plaintiff's ratio of negligence without any deliberation and determination at all. Thus, the part of the court below's judgment concerning the deduction of medical expenses in the above judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the payment of incomplete hearing and medical care compensation, which constitutes

(2) Ground of appeal No. 2

According to the facts established by the court below, we affirm the decision of the court below that the plaintiff's negligence ratio as the injured party corresponds to 50%, and there is no misunderstanding of the legal principle of comparative negligence, and even after examining the evidence cooking process which has been confirmed by the above facts, there is no violation of the rules of evidence and the rules of experience such as the theory of lawsuit. Therefore,

2. We examine the grounds of appeal by the defendant's attorney.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the fact that the plaintiff, as the freezing technician prior to the accident of this case, had already been registered in around 1950, the unit was employed and worked as a freezing 7 member of the defendant association, and received the full amount of the fixed wage, lost both snow due to the accident of this case, and where one eye is registered in the real name of one eye, 24% of the working ability as the freezing technician or ordinary worker would lose 85% of the working ability as the freezing technician, and the remaining 15% of the working ability as the freezing technician or ordinary worker would lose 85% of the working ability as the freezing technician and the remaining 15% of the working ability would be disqualified. The plaintiff was unable to work as an employee of the defendant association due to the accident of this case, thereby losing the entire amount of the wage, and thus calculating the plaintiff's lost profit and other damages based on the total amount of the revenue.

However, even though the Plaintiff, whose real name was the subject of the instant bill, was the real name of the two bills due to the injury caused by the instant accident, and became disqualified as a freezing technician or a general worker, the result of the loss of labor ability is due to the fact that the subject was already real name due to the cause not attributable to the Defendant, and if the subject was not the subject of the instant bill, it would be obvious that even if the subject was the real name of the subject of the instant accident, the result of the loss of labor ability such as the real name of the two bills would not result in the result of the loss of labor ability such as the case of the two bills.

Thus, without considering the degree of loss of the labor ability caused by the real name of a party that cannot be responsible to the defendant, the court below should calculate the amount of damages based on the loss of the labor ability caused by the real name of a party that is responsible to the defendant. However, the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of damages caused by the loss of the labor ability caused by the loss of the labor ability due to the real name of a party that is not responsible to the defendant, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, and it constitutes the ground for reversal under Article 12 (2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings.

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below concerning the claim for damages on the property is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of

Justices Lee Lee Sung-soo (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1982.10.5선고 81나4105
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