2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. From March 11, 2008 to April 3, 2008, Plaintiff Daegu Headquarters implemented A’s curriculum lectures (hereinafter “instant training”) for 18 employees, and applied for the instant training costs to the head of the Daegu Regional Labor Agency (hereinafter “the head of the Daegu Labor Agency”). On April 21, 2008, the head of the Daegu Labor Agency paid training costs to the Plaintiff KRW 1,108,560 for training costs, which includes KRW 61,580 for trainees B.

B. On March 25, 2008, 27, and April 1 of the same year, the head of Daegu Labor Administration confirmed that the Plaintiff was handled as if the Plaintiff had not participated in the instant training. On June 21, 2011, on the ground that the Daegu Headquarters did not participate in the training course for the business owner’s vocational ability development and it was confirmed that the Plaintiff participated in the training course by false or other unlawful means, and that the Defendant’s 20th anniversary of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (amended by Act No. 9316, Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter referred to as the “Employment Development Act”) was returned to the Plaintiff by applying Article 25(1)2 of the same Act and Article 25(1)2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor No. 315, Mar. 10, 2009; hereinafter referred to as the “Enforcement Rule No. 2081 of the Employment Insurance Act”).

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, Gap evidence 2-1, 2, 3, Eul evidence 1, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion on the disposition of return of this case

(a) The fact that a trainee B was present without attending the instant training during the period of departure from Korea and included in the person subject to the application for training costs is attributable to the simple number of employees in charge of the pertinent duties, and thus does not constitute “false or any other unlawful means”.

B. Article 56(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21015, Sept. 18, 2008; hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act”) (hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act”) is null and void since it exceeds the bounds of delegation under Article 35(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, or violates the principle of excessive prohibition under the Constitution, and thus, the instant disposition based on the instant provision of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act is null and void. The instant disposition based on the instant provision of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act and the instant disposition of return based on the instant restriction of payment is all null and void. The scope of return following the instant disposition of return should be limited to those supported by

D. In imposing sanctions against illegal receipt of training expenses, the fact that the head of Daegu Labor Agency imposed the instant restriction on payment in accordance with the Employment Insurance Act, which is not the Vocational Development Act, deviates from or abused the scope of discretion, and the instant return disposition based on the said restriction on payment, is also unlawful.

E. Since the amount subsidized as training expenses for vocational skills development conducted by trainees B is merely 61,580 won and its degree of violation is insignificant, and there is no intentional or gross negligence, the instant disposition to revoke recognition shall be mitigated pursuant to the proviso to Article 9(3) [Attachment 2] of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Development Act, such as the revocation of recognition of training courses, and the instant disposition to restrict support is also excessive disposition based on the revocation of recognition that has not been mitigated, and the instant disposition to return based on the excessive restriction of support is unlawful.

3. Related statutes;

Attachment 'Related Acts and subordinate statutes' shall be as shown.

4. Determination

A. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

(1) Sanction against violation of administrative regulations is a sanction against the objective fact that is a violation of administrative regulations to achieve administrative purposes, and thus, it may be imposed even if there is no intentional or negligent act on the part of the violator, barring special circumstances such as where the violator does not cause any negligence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Du5972, May 26, 2000). "False or other unlawful means" means any unlawful act conducted in order to conceal the eligibility of the non-qualified business owner for payment or the lack of eligibility for payment of vocational skills development training costs, etc., which may affect the decision-making on the payment of vocational skills development training costs (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Du5972, May 26, 200).

(2) Comprehensively taking account of the purport of Gap evidence Nos. 1 and Eul evidence Nos. 1 through 4 (including the number of evidence Nos. 3 and 4), the purport of the entire arguments is as follows: (i) the trainee Eul left Korea and did not participate in the instant training and entered the part of the instant training differently from the fact that the trainee Eul participated in the training; (ii) the trainee Eul was notified that he was unable to participate in the instant training during the period of departure from Korea; and (iii) the plaintiff was aware that he was unable to participate in the instant training during the period of departure from Korea; and (iv) the plaintiff was found to have discovered that the attendance part was not properly managed after the completion of the instant training and received the signature from the trainee Eul after the confirmation of the attendance part.

(3) The above facts are revealed based on the above evidence. ① Training costs can be found based on whether they are present.

Since it is essential to confirm accurate attendance, ② The training in this case is planned and operated by the Plaintiff itself as workplace skill development training rather than the entrusted decoration, and is merely 18 trainees. It seems easy to be present. ③ If the head of the Daegu Labor Agency had known that the Plaintiff had not been present but had been paid training expenses for B, it would have influenced the decision-making of the head of the Daegu Labor Agency on the payment of training expenses. In addition, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff’s above act would have been treated as having not present part of the training in this case, and that the Plaintiff’s claim for training expenses for B was done by false or other unlawful means.

(4) The Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

B. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

(1) Whether the parent law is out of the scope of delegation

Article 35(1) of the Employment Insurance Act provides that "the Minister of Labor may order a person who has received or intends to receive subsidies for workplace skill development projects by cooking or other unlawful means to restrict such subsidies or return subsidies, as prescribed by Presidential Decree." In light of the purpose and purpose of workplace skill development projects, the content thereof, etc., it is reasonable to deem that the Presidential Decree is delegated to the Minister of Labor as to whether the Minister of Labor must have to issue a restriction on subsidies or an order to return subsidies. Therefore, the provision of the Enforcement Decree of the instant case does not require the person who has received or intends to receive workplace skill development training expenses by fraud or other improper means to pay any remaining training expenses, not order the person to return the already paid training expenses, but order the person to return the already paid training expenses, and that the provision that the person does not pay training expenses for one year from the date he/she received or applied for the payment of training expenses is in accordance with the delegation of the above Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Du61

(2) Whether it violates the principle of excessive prohibition

The enforcement decree of this case is reasonable, and the provision of this case is established in order to achieve the purpose of preventing unfair payment of subsidies, etc. by ordering a person who received or intends to receive subsidies, incentives, or expenses for workplace skill development training (hereinafter referred to as "subsidies, etc.") by fraud or other improper means for one year from the date when the person received or applied for subsidies, etc., but does not provide any or all subsidies, etc. for one year from the date when the person received or applied for subsidies, etc., and by ordering the return of the subsidies, if the payment was made in error, it is reasonable to view that the provision of this case was established in order to achieve the purpose of preventing unfair payment of the subsidies, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du6476, Aug. 20, 200). This case’s enforcement decree was just, and its purpose was limited to one year, not for a long time, but for infringement of property rights. In light of the need to strictly control and manage the subsidies for efficient and transparent operation of the subsidies, etc.

(3) The plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

C. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

Article 56(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act provides that where a person received or intended to receive subsidies, etc. by fraud or other improper means, the return of the subsidies, etc. already paid and the payment of the unpaid subsidies, etc. is limited. On the other hand, Article 56(2) of the same Act (the same as the Enforcement Decree of this case) provides that where a person received or intended to receive subsidies, etc. by fraud or other improper means, he/she shall not pay any subsidies, etc. for one year from the date he/she received or applied

In order to order the return of the subsidy, it is intended to impose sanctions on the illegal receipt of the subsidy.

Therefore, “subsidies, etc. granted during the period of payment restriction” under Article 56(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the above Act need not be paid by fraud or other improper means (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Du22584, Apr. 15, 2010).

Therefore, the term "subsidies, etc. paid during the period of restriction on payment" under the provision of the Enforcement Decree of this case shall not be deemed to be limited to those paid by fraud or other improper means or to those paid in a place of business.

The plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

D. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

(1) Article 35 (1) of the Employment Insurance Act provides that "the Minister of Labor may order a person who has received, or intends to receive, support for employment security and vocational skills development programs by fraud or other improper means to restrict such support or to return already provided, as prescribed by Presidential Decree." The main text of Article 35 (2) provides that "the Minister of Labor may additionally collect an amount not exceeding an amount equivalent to the amount that has been paid by fraud or other improper means in accordance with the guidelines prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor if he/she orders a return pursuant to paragraph (1)." The proviso provides that "Article 16 (5) 1 of the Occupational Development Act (the provision where the State or a local government conducts workplace skill development training upon entrustment) and Article 25 (4) 1 (the provision where workplace skill development training is conducted by an employer) of the same Act."

On the other hand, Article 25 (4) of the Vocational Development Act provides that "the Minister of Labor may order a person whose recognition has been revoked pursuant to paragraph (1) or a business owner, worker, business owner, business owner's organization, etc., or workplace skill development organization whose education, support, or loan has been restricted pursuant to paragraph (3) to return all or part of the amount already provided or used. In such cases, the amount already provided by fraud or other improper means among the amount already provided in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor may be additionally collected as follows:

(2) In full view of the above provisions, the Vocational Development Act, and the Employment Insurance Act, where a business owner received training costs by false or other unlawful means in conducting workplace skill development training by obtaining recognition from the Minister of Labor in accordance with the Vocational Development Act, the occupational development training shall not be paid the remainder of the training costs, and shall not be paid one year from the date of receiving the training costs or applying for the reimbursement of the training costs, and shall not be paid with subsidies under Article 35(2) of the Employment Insurance Act, in addition to various sanctions under Article 25 of the Vocational Development Act (e.g., revocation of recognition, restrictions on recognition, restrictions on subsidies or loans, orders to refund the amount of unlawful payments, orders to refund the amount additionally collected), and shall be included in the Employment Insurance Act’s development or vocational ability development support or vocational ability development support under Article 35(1) and (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act, with respect to the scope of the amount to be collected by adding the amount of training costs paid by false or other unlawful means.

(3) If so, the Employment Insurance Act and the Vocational Development Act are different from the subject or content of the regulation, and there is no ground to view that the Vocational Development Act preferentially applies to the Employment Insurance Act as a special law under the Employment Insurance Act. Therefore, the instant restriction on payment was made based on the Employment Insurance Act, not the Vocational Development Act, and cannot be deemed as a deviation from and abuse of discretion

(4) The plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

E. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2-E

(1) According to Article 25(1) of the Vocational Development Act, where a person who has been recognized as a vocational skills development training course falls under any of the subparagraphs of Article 25(1) of the aforesaid Act, the Minister of Labor may issue a corrective order or revoke the recognition of the relevant training course, but he/she shall revoke the recognition if he/she has received support by fraud or other improper means (Article 25(2)). Meanwhile, according to Article 9(3) [Attachment 2] of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Development Act and Article 9(1)(a) of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Development Act, where a person who has been recognized as a training course commits an act falling under any of the subparagraphs of Article 25(1) of the Vocational Development Act, he/she shall issue a corrective order, revoke recognition, or restrict recognition in accordance with the individual standards, but where the degree of violation has no intention or gross negligence or is minor, he/she may take measures by reducing it within the limit

(2) The proviso of Article 25(1) of the Vocational Development Act provides that the recognition shall be revoked by fraud or other improper means (Article 25(1)2) and does not have room for discretion. In addition, in light of the facts acknowledged earlier, the Plaintiff’s illegal receipt of the training expenses B cannot be deemed as either intentional or gross negligence or a minor violation. Therefore, in rendering the instant revocation disposition, the Administrator of the Daegu Labor Agency cannot be deemed as a deviation or abuse of discretion on the grounds that the proviso of Article 9(3) [Attachment 2] of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Development Act was not applied to the non-application of the proviso of Article 9(1)1 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act, such as cancellation of the training course.

(3) The plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judge Choi Jong-Un

Judges Kim Jae-sik

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.