2. Costs of appeal shall be borne by each person.

The Plaintiff shall pay 2,981,843,190 won to the Defendant C&C Co., Ltd. and 753,509,858 won to the Defendant C&C Co., Ltd. and 20% interest per annum from January 1, 2006 to the delivery date of the application for modification of the purport of the claim, and 10% interest per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

2. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiff shall revoke the part against the plaintiff in the judgment of the court of first instance. The plaintiff shall pay to the plaintiff 1,746,473,190 won for the defendant C&C Co., Ltd. 1,746,473,190 won, and 525,569,858 won for the defendant C&C Co., Ltd. and each of the above money, 5% per annum from January 1, 2006 to the delivery date of the application for modification of the claim, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

B. Defendant C&C Co., Ltd.: The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against Defendant C&C Co., Ltd., a lawsuit taking over the lawsuit of Defendant C&C, shall be revoked. The plaintiff's claim on the above revoked part shall be dismissed.

C. Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd.: The part against Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd. in the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked. The Plaintiff’s claim against the above revocation shall be dismissed

The following facts are either disputed between the parties, or acknowledged by taking into account the whole purport of the pleadings in each part of Gap evidence 1-1, evidence 3-4 through 9, evidence 12, 13, 14, 19, 23, 28, evidence 6 (including paper numbers), evidence 8, 9-1, 2, and evidence 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, and 22-2, and any part of the evidence 3-11, 15, 16, 17, 17, 18, 21, and 22-1, 3-16, 17, 18, 21, and 22-2, and any part of the statements are not believed.

(a) Status of parties;

Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., Ltd. (hereinafter Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., Defendant Czeyang Co., Ltd., Defendant Czeyang Co., Ltd., Korea Co., Ltd., Korea Co., Ltd., Youngnam Co., Ltd., Youngnam Co., Ltd., Youngnam Co., Ltd., Daegu Co., Ltd., Ltd., hereinafter the above companies are 8 companies and omit the description of Samyang Co., Ltd.) is an enterpriser who manufactures and sells Samyang Co., Ltd., Ltd., under Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter the Fair Trade Act). The Plaintiff purchased shru from the Defendants, and is a company that engages in bak, baking and business.

(b) the current status and characteristics of domestic smuggling markets;

1) Although the previous government has limited the connection import or announced the price of the powder, the sales price notification system was abolished on September 1, 1983, and the smuggling import restriction system was completely liberalized from January 1, 1999, and there is no anti-competitive system in relation to the production and sale of the powder.

2) In 2004, the domestic market price of smuggling is approximately KRW 820 billion based on the sales amount, and the upper 4 enterprises (one of the three enterprises actually engaged in the acquisition of the same portion) account for about 75% of the large 75% market share in Korea in 2004. The market share of each company occupies the upper 3 companies in excess of 25% equal, and the market share of the above 8 companies is almost for the last 3-4 years.

3) Examining the current status of supply and demand of smuggling, on 204. 1,791 gross tons and total sales volume are 1,792,000 gross tons, 1,723,000 gross sales volume are sold in the domestic market, and only 69,000 tons, which are remaining 3.8% of total sales volume, are exported. The import volume of smuggling is merely 13,000 gross tons and thus, the export and import share is low.

4) The distribution route of smuggling is divided into the forms of directly selling products directly to an end-user company, such as gyeast, fruits, and bread companies, and the forms of selling them through an agency or a large discount store. In the case of small products (less than 20 kilograms), it is sold to an end-user company through an agency or a discount store, and 65% in the case of large products (not less than 20 kilograms), it is directly sold to an end-user company, and the proportion sold at an agency and a discount store is about 30%.

5) Smuggling is the second food following the rice consumption in Korea’s total amount of 24% of the total amount of grain consumption. Smuggling consumption is very flexible on the powder price so that the volume of supplied increases, while the price decline is not significant, it can considerably change. In addition, flexible demand for powder price indicates the characteristics of the low demand even if the price increases in the market.

C. Unfair collaborative acts by the Defendants

(1) Agreement, etc. on restricted domestic production (sale) of smuggling

A) Agreement, etc. on restricted production (sale) between 2000 and 2001

(1) On January 22, 2000, seven companies, excluding Defendant Samyang, were to hold a meeting of operating officers of each company on July 2, 200 to determine the amount of each company's shipment (the aggregate amount of company's sales volume and external inventory value) into the association's expense rate before around 1994 (the base rate for the shipment) and each company's officers in charge comply with the standard rate of only once a month. Based on the above agreement, seven companies agreed on February 22, 200 to examine whether the executive officers in charge of each company complie with the standard rate of only one time a month. On the basis of the agreement, each company agreed on July 22, 200 to make up for the new shares of the company (the total amount of company's sales volume and external inventory value) to the association's total quantity of removal into the domestic market with the ratio of 4% excluding the new shares of the company's total stock in bankruptcy at the meeting of each company.

Of the table in the main text, the part of the table CJ (hereinafter referred to as CJ in the table, hereinafter referred to as CJ), the part of the table CJ in the East of Korea, 25.115, 25.115, 18.08.79.724.3524.242

After that, the executive officers and the chief of the business of the seven companies agreed on the monthly standard shipment of each company with meetings at a restaurant within the city once a month.

(2) On the other hand, as at the time of the collective agreement on the quantity of 2000, the seven companies set the standard ratio of each company on the premise of 94.34% after deducting 5.66% of the amount of the association expense of Defendant Samyang as at the time of the collective agreement on the quantity of 94.34%, and the Defendant Samyang, who did not participate in the agreement, carried out more quantity than the rate of the association expense, failed to properly observe the standard ratio by the mutual agreement on the quantity of 2000, and recommended Defendant Samyang to participate in the mutual agreement on the quantity of 200, but did not accept it. On March 2001, the seven companies agreed on the standard ratio of the three companies except for the Defendant Samyang company, by reducing the standard ratio of the aggregate of the Korean portion of the association expense and the parts of the same kind of the same as the Korean portion of the same, and by adjusting it to 25.115%.

(3) After the 2000 Quantity Agreement, seven members except Defendant Cyang agreed to determine the total monthly planned shipment (in-house accommodation) through the business executive meetings, the business director meetings, etc. held once a month in ordinary, and distributed it according to the standard ratio, and then implement the agreement in a way of checking the compliance of the plan based on the respective performance data of seven mutually exchanged seven members.

(4) On the other hand, Defendant Samyang incurred damages, such as GSSM funds (FFFFFFFFF) and the allocation of quota tariff, because it was excluded from the joint charter (joint transport at the time of import of beer) by industry on the ground that he did not join the kelel as above, and paid a higher transport cost than the other company, and did not recognize the association expense ratio according to the actual market share.

B) Agreement, etc. on restricted production (sale) of 202

(1) On February 26, 2002, the number of Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., who was at a disadvantage due to a failure to participate in the volume agreement in 2001, was ultimately admitted to 7 copies. On February 26, 2002, eight Co., Ltd., including Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., agreed to reduce the base ratio of the upper 3 Co., Ltd. to 25% at a conference held by each of the representatives of each company, to increase the base ratio of the upper 3 Co., Ltd. to 8.84%, while the remaining 16.16% of the total 16.16%, to the lower 3 Co., Ltd. (sub-party, cedin portion

8 On March 13, 2002, 8 companies opened a business executive meeting, and from March 2002, 2002, 8 companies changed the standard of allocation by each company from the existing shipping volume to the standard of raw beer processing which is easy to be implemented in the existing shipping volume, and agreed on 2220,000 tons of the total processing standard of raw beer within the year 20,000 tons. In addition, eight companies agreed on each company and monthly planned processing volume at the business executive meeting in the same day or in the middle of March.

(2) Since August 2002, Defendant Samyang, which was incorporated into the instant cartel system, controlled the raw beer of accommodation in accordance with the agreed standard processing and standard ratio, and the implementation methods are as follows.

8 The eight companies inspected the compliance of the standard processing volume and the planned processing volume of each company at any time through the business executives' meeting, the business director's meeting, etc., and settled them at the end of each year, and reflected the excess or excess of the planned volume in the processing plan following the year. In addition, each company's inspection was conducted on a non-regular basis as to whether it complies with the processed volume of each company. The inspection was conducted on an intensive basis between 2-3 and 2-3 persons for each company, and from 2002 to 203. As a result of the inspection, the results of the inspection showed a somewhat different difference from the actual results of some companies, but eight companies settled the excess or deficiencies in comparison with the plan of 202 to 203.

C) Agreement, etc. on the restriction of the volume of production (sale) after 2003

8 The eight companies held a business executive meeting and agreed on the annual standard processing volume (2240,00 tons, 22204, 2250,000 tons), and from time to time agreed on the final planned processing volume by holding a business executive meeting, etc. In addition, in the same manner as in 2002, the eight companies confirmed whether mutually agreed processing volume is properly observed, and if some companies’ performance is somewhat different from the plan, the excess or shortage in the plan was reflected in the plan for the following year. The eight companies followed the nuclear processing plan instead of the plan.

2) Agreement, etc. on the price reduction for smuggling

A) Price increase agreement, etc. on December 200

(1) On December 200, 7 companies except Defendant Samyang agreed to hold a business executive meeting on December 200, 300 won per 20 km, and 6.5% increase per 30 km, and 6.5% increase per 20 km, and agreed to specific increase time by holding a business director meeting on the end of the same month.

(2) For the period from December 29, 200 to February 1, 2001, seven companies raised the standard price for the agents of class 1 products in the same manner as that of the above agreement and implemented (in the case of the Korean system, the price was somewhat different from that of the other company before the increase, but the price was the same as that of the other company after the increase, and the average sales price of class 1 products of class 1, strong, strong, and boomed continuously between January 2001 and February 1, 2001).

B) Price increase agreement, etc. on February 2001

(1) On February 2001, seven companies, except Defendant Samyang, agreed to hold a meeting of a business executive board on February 1, 2001 to increase the price of Class 1 products of Grade 2 in smuggling by KRW 800 per 20 kilograms. Around the end of the same month, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy held a meeting to agree on the specific period of increase.

(2) Since February 201, 2001, 7 companies implemented an agreement by raising the base price of Grade 1 smuggling from February 1, 2001 to April 1, 200 as indicated below (units; hereinafter the same shall apply).

However, Korea, Korea, and East Asia adjusted the ex post facto price increase time on 4.1.1, and other companies also implemented the price change on 4.4.

본문내 포함된 표 ？ ？ 대한 CJ 동아 한국 삼양 대선 영남 삼화 인상일 ？ 2월15일 2월20일 2월23일 2월 26일 3월26일 3월 1일 4월 1일 4월1일 중력고급 20KG 인상전 9,100 9,200 9,080 9,100 9,200 ？ 9,000 ？ 인상후 10,400 10,500 10,430 10,500 10,500 ？ 10,300 ？ 인상액 1,300 1,300 1,350 1,400 1,300 ？ 1,300 ？ 중력1급 20KG 인상전 8,450 8,480 8,450 8,450 8,450 8,400 8,400 8,100 인상후 9,300 9,280 9,250 9,270 9,270 9,300 9,200 8,800 인상액 850 800 800 820 820 900 800 700 중력유사 20KG 인상전 6,900 6,840 7,160 6,100 ？ ？ 6,800 ？ 인상후 7,900 7,840 8,160 7,100 ？ ？ 7,800 ？ 인상액 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 ？ ？ 1,000 ？ 강력1급 20KG 인상전 9,200 9,280 9,170 9,200 9,180 8,910 9,200 8,600 인상후 9,900 10,030 9,870 9,950 9,930 9,900 9,900 9,900 인상액 700 750 700 750 750 990 700 1,300 박력1급 20KG 인상전 8,000 7,980 7,990 8,000 8,000 7,900 8,600 ？ 인상후 8,700 8,780 8,720 8,750 8,720 8,700 9,300 ？ 인상액 700 800 730 750 720 800 700 ？ 중력1급 3KG*6 인상전 8,640 8,670 8,670 8,640 8,700 ？ ？ ？ 인상후 9,210 9,270 9,200 9,480 9,240 ？ ？ ？ 인상액 570 600 530 840 540 ？ ？ ？

C) Price increase agreement, etc. on September 2002

(1) Eight companies including Defendant Samyang agreed on September 16, 2002 on a summary of the price increase time and scope by holding a meeting of the board of business officers on September 16, 2002, and eight business officers agreed on the specific increase time and extent of price by use on the 18th of the same month and the 19th of the same month, and agreed on the final price increase.

(2) Eight companies have implemented the agreement by raising the price equivalent to the price agreement in 2002 as listed below.

본문내 포함된 표 ？ 규격 회분 합의가 대한 CJ 한,동 삼양 대선 영남 삼화 인상일 ？ ？ ？ 9/26 10/2 10/1 10/1 10/5 10/1 10/1 중력고급 20KG 0.36 13300 13250 13300 13250 13360 ？ ？ ？ 13350 ？ 13250 ？ ？ ？ ？ 중력고급 20KG 0.38 12400 12350 12400 12350 12460 ？ 12400 ？ 중력고급 12350 ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ 중력1급 20KG 0.42 10470 10500 10530 10500 10550 10500 10400 10500 중력유사 20KG 0.49 9000 9000 8990 9000 ？ ？ 9000 ？ 중력2급 20KG ？ 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 3급분 20KG ？ 4000 4000 4100 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ 중력1급 3KG*6 ？ 10470 10440 10470 10440 10440 ？ ？ ？ ？ 1KG*10 ？ 6050 6000 6050 6030 6350 ？ ？ ？ 찰밀 3KG*6 ？ 12780 12780 12660 ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ 1KG*10 ？ 7600 7600 7550 ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ 강력1급 20KG 0.43 11130 11100 11180 11100 11180 11100 11100 11400 강력2급 20KG ？ 7800 7500 7750 7930 7800 ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ ？ 박력1급 20KG ？ 10070 10150 10180 10100 10090 10100 10100 9000

D) The agreement on the increase in price of class 2 of April 2003, etc.

8 The 8 companies agreed to increase the value of class 2 of gravitys and studios from KRW 5,700 to KRW 6,200 through the first meeting of the business officers, executive officers, and the business division, which was held in April 2003, and implemented the above agreement by raising the price from April 24, 2003 to May 19, 2009 as listed below:

본문내 포함된 표 구분 ？ 대한 CJ 동아 한국 삼양 대선 영남제분 주식회사 삼화 변경시기 03년 5월6일 5월 5월1일 5월1일 4월24일 5월1일 5월19일 5월1일 중력2급 변경전 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 변경후 6200 6200 6200 6200 6200 6200 6200 6200 변경액 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 박력2급 변경전 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 ？ ？ 변경후 6200 6200 6200 6200 6200 6200 ？ ？ 변경액 500 500 500 500 500 500 ？ ？

E) Price increase agreement, etc. on March 2004

On March 31, 2004, 2004, 8 companies held a business director's meeting on March 31, 2004, and finally agreed on the price increase level and time of increase by item, and raised the price of smuggling from April 14, 2004 to May 1, 2004 in accordance with the agreement.

본문내 포함된 표 구분 대한 CJ 한국, 동아 삼양 대선 삼화 영남 인상일 4월 19일 4월 14일 4월 9일 4월 16일 4월 16일 4월 19일 4월 19일 중력 1 인상전 10500 10530 10500 10560 10500 10500 10400 인상후 11450 11430 11480 11500 11500 11450 11300 인상액 950 900 980 940 1,000 950 900 강력 1 인상전 11100 11180 11100 11180 11100 11400 11100 인상후 12200 12360 12250 12250 12260 12300 12200 인상액 1,100 1,180 1,150 1,070 1,160 900 1,100 박력 1 인상전 10150 10180 10100 10090 10100 9600 10100 인상후 10900 10960 10800 10800 10850 10300 10800 인상액 750 780 700 710 750 700 700 고급 인상전 12350 12400 12350 12460 ？ ？ 12400 인상후 13650 13600 13630 13650 ？ ？ 13600 인상액 1,300 1,200 1,280 1,190 - - 1,200 유사 인상전 9000 9000 9000 ？ 9000 9000 9000 인상후 9950 9900 9900 ？ 9900 9900 9900 인상액 950 900 900 - 900 900 900 중력1 소물 3KG*6 인상전 10440 10470 10470 10440 ？ ？ ？ 인상후 11700 11730 11790 11700 ？ ？ ？ 인상액 1,260 1,260 1,320 1,260 - - ？

3) Agreement on the terms and conditions of transaction in smuggling

8 The eight companies agreed on the abolition or reduction of the incentive through the business executives' meeting and the business director's meeting at around August 2001 and around September 2002, but the incentive has not been reduced, and the agreement was not effective.

(d) Disposition, etc. by the Fair Trade Commission.

1) On April 13, 2006, the Fair Trade Commission issued 8 companies, including the Defendants, a corrective order, publication order, and penalty surcharge payment order as shown in the attached Table No. 2006-079 on April 13, 2006. The grounds for such determination are as follows.

(1) The agreement that jointly limits the domestic production of smuggling constitutes an agreement under Article 19(1)3 of the Fair Trade Act that restricts competition with other enterprisers to jointly engage in the act of restricting the production, delivery, transportation, or transaction of goods or the transaction of services that unreasonably restrict competition.

(2) An agreement to jointly increase the price of smuggling shall be construed as "an agreement to jointly determine, maintain, or modify the price unfairly restricting competition with other business entities" under subparagraph 1 of the same paragraph.

(3) The joint abolition or reduction of incentives shall be limited to an act under subparagraph 2 of the same paragraph "agreement with other enterprisers to jointly determine terms and conditions of the transaction of goods or services which unfairly restrict competition, or terms and conditions of payment of the price thereof."

2) As to the disposition of the Fair Trade Commission, the Yong-Nam-Nam-Nam-Nam-Nam, the king, the king, the ASEAN, and the ASEAN, respectively, filed an administrative litigation seeking the revocation of the corrective order, but the court rejected each of the above claims on the ground that the disposition of the Fair Trade Commission is justifiable.

E. Transaction with the Plaintiff

From April 2001 to December 2005, the Plaintiff purchased approximately KRW 21,953,398,001, and approximately KRW 8,174,910,266 from Defendant Samyang to December 2005.

2. Occurrence of liability for damages;

A. The parties' assertion

1) Summary of the Plaintiff’s assertion

A) When the Defendants limited the domestic production of smuggling to a certain level, and thereby the price of smuggling was created in a situation in which it is naturally impossible to form it in accordance with the general supply and demand principle, the Defendants conspired and raised the price of smuggling. The Defendants’ above act is an unfair collaborative act prohibited under Article 19(1) of the Fair Trade Act. As a result, the Plaintiff is liable to pay the Plaintiff damages equivalent to the amount calculated by multiplying the price raised due to the Defendants’ collaborative act (from April 2001 to December 2005, in the case of Defendant C&C, from October 2002 to December 2005) out of the total purchase amount of smuggling purchased from the Defendants (from October 2002, in the case of Defendant C&C, from the actual transaction price) by the price calculated by deducting the price deemed to have been formed if there was no collusion from the actual transaction price. Defendant C&C is liable to pay the Plaintiff the amount of damages for delay to Defendant C&C’s KRW 298,1984,5398,505.

B) Even though the Defendants formed a high price by collusion, they concealed this fact, deceiving the Plaintiff, and sold powder at an unreasonably high price. The Plaintiff concluded a smuggling sales contract without gathering the Defendants’ collusion. If the Plaintiff knew that the price has increased due to the fact of collusion and collusion, the Plaintiff did not enter into a sales contract with the Defendants or entered into a sales contract with the competitive price. The Plaintiff revoked any smuggling sales contract concluded between the Plaintiff and the Defendants pursuant to Article 110(1) of the Civil Act or Article 109(1) of the Civil Act by delivery of the briefs dated December 2, 2008. Accordingly, the Defendants also have the duty to return the smuggling price paid by the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Defendants also have the duty to return the smuggling price paid by the Defendants, but the Plaintiff did not have any obligation to return it, and the price would have been duly formed if the Plaintiff had to return it to the Plaintiff. Ultimately, the amount should be offset by the amount to be returned to the Plaintiff.

B. The nature of liability for damages caused by violation of the Fair Trade Act

1) Establishment of liability for damages

From February 200, 200 to February 2005, Defendant Samyang agreed to restrict and allocate the amount of supply in the domestic smuggling market in order to prevent losses due to price decline due to the excessive supply of goods. A meeting of business executives and employees was held to formulate detailed implementation plans, inspection methods, etc. of the above agreement. In the event that the annual and monthly shipment volume of each company is determined and compliance with the agreement and the performance results of some companies are somewhat different from the plan, it was jointly limited to the production, release, transportation, or transaction of goods by settling accounts in accordance with the plan for the following year. From mid-2, 2000 (from September 16, 2002) from mid-2, Defendant Samyang agreed to increase the price of the major products of the products of the products of the products of the products of the company, and the price increase or decrease in the price of the products of the products of the company through an agreement.

8 companies with most of the market share of smuggling jointly restrict the quantity of the dust produced (sale) and determine, maintain, and change the price of the dust is a collaborative act that unfairly reduces or limits competition in the market for the manufacture and sale of the dust and violates Article 19(1)1 and 3 of the Fair Trade Act.

Therefore, the Defendants are obliged to compensate the Plaintiff for damages caused by the said collaborative act pursuant to Article 56 of the Fair Trade Act.

2) Determination on the Defendant’s assertion

A) Determination as to the assertion that the termination date of the collusion period should be seen as September 2005

The defendants asserted that since they have withdrawn from collusion on September 2005, the termination period of collusion should be seen as September 2005.

In a case where there was an agreement on price fixing, etc. as stipulated in Article 19(1)1 of the Fair Trade Act and an action based on such agreement, the date on which the unfair collaborative act is terminated shall be the date on which the execution of the unfair collaborative act is terminated. Thus, in order to terminate the unfair collaborative act, some enterprisers who participated in the agreement must make an act contrary to the agreement, such as explicitly or impliedly expressing their withdrawal from the agreement to another enterpriser, lowering the price level that would have existed without collusion according to their independent judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du12774, Oct. 23, 2008).

According to the evidence No. 1-1, No. 3-13, and No. 14, it is recognized that Defendant CC on September 23, 2005, and Defendant C CC Co. on September 30, 2005, Defendant C Co. notified other companies of their intention to not participate in meetings of each industry and to prevent the violation of the Fair Trade Act, thereby expressing their intention to reverse the agreement externally.

However, comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the pleadings in evidence Nos. 11 and 12, the following facts are acknowledged. Since the Plaintiff’s unit price of smuggling, which was purchased from Defendant Samyang company, was 11,510 won from June 2004 to December 2, 2005, and 498 won from May 2004 to December 2005, 2005, in the case of Class 1 smuggling, which was purchased from Defendant Samyang company, the Plaintiff continued to have been 569.5 won from October 2004 to July 2005, and from April 200 to December 205, 2005, the Defendants were determined to have continuously purchased the aforementioned collaborative act at KRW 569.5 won from 205 to December 25, 2005.

B) Determination as to the assertion that liability for damages is not borne on the ground that there was no action by price discount agreement, and there was considerable competition with the payment of incentives.

Defendant Samyang’s agreement on price discount is a price for supplying to a wholesaler operating food materials distribution business. The Plaintiff did not agree on the price for the suspected and exclusive bags supplied to the same end-user as the Plaintiff, and did not raise the price according to the price discount agreement, and the Defendants did not bear liability for damages on the ground that considerable competition was made through the payment of incentives.

Even if the Defendants agreed on the price discount and agreed, it would be reasonable to view that the agreement would result in a change in the actual price of smuggling. As seen earlier, the Defendants, including the Defendants, increased the price similar to the price agreed upon by the collusion companies, and thus, no act of execution is performed. As seen earlier, even if the Defendants paid the Plaintiff the incentive, it cannot be deemed that the Defendants were exempt from liability for damages arising from the violation of Article 19(1)1 and 3 of the Fair Trade Act.

2) Scope of damages

A) Method of calculating damages and amount of damages

(1) Principles

Property damage caused by an illegal act refers to the difference between the property disadvantage caused by the illegal harmful act, that is, the property condition that would have existed without the illegal act and the current property condition that would have caused the illegal act. In other words, the other party to the transaction that paid the excessive price due to the kelel can be said to have suffered damage corresponding to the difference between the price that he paid and the price that would have been formed if there was no collusion with the price that he paid.

In such a case, the most important part in calculating the amount of damages is the presumption of competition price that would have been observed if there had not occurred any collusion. It is necessary to prevent unfair conclusion that recognizes damages for the increase in prices due to the causes in the market or trade, which has no causal link with the collusion. The competitive price should only be the price, excluding special circumstances, such as collusion, in the situation where other transaction conditions are maintained in the market at issue. Although there are cases where it is difficult to accurately measure the above competitive price, the said competitive price is difficult, but it is so that the right to receive the Plaintiff’s compensation should not be infringed only on the simple trend of the amount of damages. Meanwhile, as it is difficult to measure, if it is evaluated that the amount of damages was properly presumed by scientific and reasonable means under the theoretical basis and data, the court shall order compensation for damages calculated as such

(2) Damages based on the estimation method of estimating the pharmacological formula

(A) In the method of estimating a competitive price: (4) the estimate is based on ① pre-ex post facto subsidization; (2) the estimate based on the limit costs or average costs; (3) the analysis of the similar market; (4) the structural measurement under the fully competitive assumption; and (5) the estimation of demand through the 2010 Formula structure under an incomplete competition; and (6) the estimation of the estimate of a stable formula.

Among them, it is expressed as a method of estimation by a measurement and economics model. This is the most representative analysis method used to estimate the dynamic competition price based on the method of estimating the correlation between collusion and other economic factors than collusion by setting various factors affecting the price as a variable and by separating the effect of the collaborative act on the price and the correlation between the collusion and the price by accurately distinguishing the correlation between the price. Among them, it is used to estimate the dynamic competition price. Among them, it is the plenary analysis method used to objectively distinguish and measure the economic factors other than collusion with the price impact on the price.

The method is to specify the correlation between the price (subsidiary variables) and the factors (e.g., explanation variables) affecting the price, using a reduction-control model, and among them, it is to set a price-fixing model taking into account all the variables affecting the price, and to estimate the relationship between the price and explanation variables by utilizing all the price between the collusion time and the non-satisfying time. Since the difference between the price and the price between the non-satisfying time exists at 1 and the non-satisfying time, if there is no change in all other conditions, it indicates how much the price of the collusion time actually increases compared to the price of the non-satisfying time.

Therefore, in order to control the factors affecting the price of dust in addition to collusion and to estimate the effect of collusion after considering the characteristics of the price of dust dust affected by the supply and demand of dust in addition to the factors caused by collusion, a revolving analysis model shall be established based on the reduction-type type, which is the method of determining the balanced market price of dust in accordance with the above method, and the amount of damages shall be calculated based on the method that takes into account the factors that distinguish the period of collusion and the various economic variables affecting the supply and demand of dust, 6) explanatory variables.

(B) According to the result of the Nonparty’s appraisal by the Nonparty at the first instance trial, the amount of damages arising from the transaction between April 2001 and December 2005, for which the Plaintiff sought against Defendant CCB, is recognized as KRW 2,981,843,190, and the amount of damages arising from the transaction between October 2002 and December 2005, for which the Plaintiff sought against Defendant CCB, is KRW 753,509,858.

B) Determination of the Defendants’ assertion

(1) Defendants’ assertion

For the following reasons, it is unfair to use any further variable after collusion, and thus, the result of appraisal by the first instance appraiser is unjust.

① As a result of appraisal, the amount of damages is calculated on the premise that the collusion is likely not to reduce the price in order to obtain favorable results in calculating the amount of damages due to collusion after the collusion was discovered, but it is not realistic that the seven companies have reached an agreement on a new price in any form in the smuggling market, which forms the supply store market. Even if there is an act of similar collusion, it is difficult to continue the act of similar collusion for one year and six months, which is one year and six months, after the collusion which is premised on the result of appraisal, and return to the competitive price within the short period.

② Additional variables after collusion had been set at a higher price than the competitive price even after the collusion had been completed, and the factual relations have been sufficiently examined by an official institution such as the Fair Trade Commission, and the issue to be determined is not a matter to be determined by the presumption of measurement economics or by the presumption of measurement and economics.

(3) Determination

(A) Fact finding

As a result of the Nonparty’s appraisal of the first instance court, the following facts are acknowledged in full view of the purport of the entire pleadings as a result of the fact inquiry into the first instance court appraiser.

① The result of appraiser’s appraisal is that the period from January 2006 to June 2007 was set as a more variable after collusion with the explanation variables, and is considered as a result of appraiser’s appraisal.

② In the United States, there were cases where companies participating in the collusion do not immediately return to the price at the price at which the collusion was discovered. Some scholars analyze that they take such strategies to avoid the significant presumption of the amount of damages to be borne by the companies in accordance with the Anti-Corruption Act.

③ In the case of Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd, the monthly unit price (unit price) of the kind of smuggling, which can be compared with the smuggling price during the period of collusion ( October 2002 - January 1, 2006 - June 2007) and the following:

The kind of statistical data contained in the main text from January 200 to September 2002, 200 to December 12, 2006 to June 2007 average 8260 111197 transaction frequency 157 1157 403 479 474 transaction frequency 82 532388

④ In the case of Defendant C&C, the monthly unit price (unit of unit of unit of unit of unit of unit of 2007) of the type of smuggling, which can be compared with the smuggling price during the period of collusion transfer (as of January 1, 200; - March 3, 2001; - April 9, 2001; 2002. - October 12, 2005, 2005), after collusion (as of January 2006 - June 2007) is as follows:

The kind of statistical data contained in the main text from January 200 to March 2001, 200 to September 12, 2002 to September 2005, 2006 to June 2007 average of 395 42045 trading frequency 23 243 19812

⑤ As above, the price of the powder sold by the Defendants increases in the collusion period, and the price drops again after the collusion has been completed. In addition, the average price during the collusion period is considerably high compared with the price before the collusion transfer, and the price did not decline promptly after the collusion is completed. Even after the collusion is completed, it is difficult to find out only basic statistical analysis alone whether the price was due to external economic factors, such as a display, etc., even after the collusion. However, even if other conditions are fixed, in the case of Defendant Samyang company, the basic model variables during the period after the collusion was presumed to be 0.0525, and the basic model variables during the period after the collusion was presumed to be 0.1150,00 after the collusion.

6) An appraiser has an economic theoretical basis that the product price may not be returned to the market price after collusion, i.e., the additional measurement model is a general model rather than the other measurement model (the model excluded from the previous variables is premised on the assumption that the price was average after collusion with the former price before and after collusion, but the added model does not require any such family). The model that was excluded from the previous variables shows that the price increase effect caused by collusion would be underassessment if a similar fence exists during the period after collusion. If, within the period after collusion (as of January 2006 - June 6, 2007) in this case, if it can accurately specify the time of returning to the competitive price at the time after collusion, it can be predicted more accurately by applying the previous variables only at some time, but if it is different from the actual price at the competitive price, it can be added to the estimate effect after collusion.

7) In a case where the remaining variables are added to the period after the collusion as an explanatory variable, the amount of damages that the Plaintiff suffered from a transaction with Defendant C&C from April 2001 to December 2005 due to the Defendants’ collusion shall be presumed to be KRW 2,981,843,190, and the amount of damages that the Plaintiff sustained from a transaction with Defendant C&C from October 2002 to December 2005 shall be presumed to be KRW 753,509,858, respectively.

8) On the other hand, if the remaining variables are not added to the period after collusion, the damages suffered by the plaintiff in a transaction with the defendant C&C are presumed to be KRW 1,339,614,029, and the damages incurred in a transaction with the defendant C&C are presumed to be KRW 516,316,013, respectively.

(C) the board:

In this case, in light of the fact that the dust price after the completion of the collusion did not decline immediately before the collusion (the fact that such fact can not be recognized only through an investigation by the Fair Trade Commission), it does not seem to be based only on the possibility of use of the remaining variables after the collusion. The appraiser’s appraisal result should be respected unless the appraisal method, etc. is contrary to the empirical rule or unreasonable. The use of the remaining variables after collusion does not seem to be contrary to the empirical rule or unreasonable (the appraiser applied an additional variables to the whole period of one year and six months after collusion due to difficulties in accurately identifying the time of return at the competition price after collusion, and in such a case, the Plaintiff’s damages can be assessed excessively, taking into account the fact that the Defendants’ limitation of liability is considered).

3) Determination as to the Defendants’ assertion of mutual aid

A) Claim for deduction of the amount of incentives

(1) Notes

The Defendants paid incentives during the period of collusion to the Plaintiff. The amount of incentives is the price at which the actual selling price falls. The amount of incentives received by the Plaintiff in return for the performance of the sales contract shall be deducted from the total amount of damages.

(2) Determination:

Defendant CC entered into an agreement with the Plaintiff for the purpose of increasing sales while selling smuggling. The agreement on the payment of incentives continued even after the collusion period, and the payment of incentives continued to have been continued. Defendant C CC also entered into an agreement on the payment of incentives with the Plaintiff during the collusion period, and continued to pay the incentives. During the collusion period, the amount of the incentives that Defendant CC C CC offered to the Plaintiff is KRW 766,539,60, 432,743,560, respectively (the fact that there is no dispute over the grounds for recognition).

In light of the fact that the incentives paid by the Defendants were based on an agreement separate from the smuggling purchase agreement, and that the incentives are paid even after the completion of the Defendants’ collaborative act, etc., the payment of the incentives does not seem to have a proximate causal relation with the collaborative act. Thus, the incentives paid by the Defendants are not deductible in the amount of damages.

B) Determination as to the claim for deduction of the full cost amount

(1) Notes

The Plaintiff is an intermediate seller who purchased smuggling and sells products to consumers. Since the direct purpose of the purchase of smuggling is to manufacture and sell goods using them as the raw materials of the product, it is closely related between the purchase of smuggling and the sales of the Plaintiff’s final product. Compensation for losses arising from tort is to compensate for actual losses. Considering the risk of double compensation that may arise in situations where the Defendants do not have any legal basis to prevent indirect buyers from claiming damages, if the Defendants transferred the increased cost to consumers by reflecting the increase in the price of the product in the cost of the product, the Plaintiff’s increased cost due to the increase in the price of the product cannot be said to be the damage. Even if the Plaintiff’s increase in the cost of the product is considered to be the result of the appraisal by the appraiser of the first instance, according to the appraisal by the appraiser of the first instance, the amount prior to the Plaintiff’s final costs to the Plaintiff’s final consumers should be presumed to be the amount of damages arising from the Defendant’s tort as the amount of damages to be deducted from the amount of damages to the Defendant’s final consumers.

(2) Determination:

According to the result of appraisal by the appraiser of the first instance trial, the Plaintiff transferred the price discount costs arising from collusion to the final consumer, and the amount is presumed to be the same as the amount claimed by the Defendants. However, for the following reasons, the amount cannot be deducted from the Plaintiff’s damages.

Even if the Plaintiff, as a purchaser of raw materials at the intermediate stage, transferred all or part of his/her losses to indirect buyers, the lower buyer, pursuant to the prior agreement, etc. with the Defendants, the Plaintiff raised the price of the goods at a fixed rate or amount corresponding to the price of the smuggling paid in excess of the Plaintiff, and accordingly, the sales volume of the goods also remains entirely left to the Plaintiff’s intent, barring special circumstances, such as where there is no change in the sales volume of the goods, whether or not the cost would be paid by raising the price of the goods manufactured by using the smuggling as the raw material and the scope thereof. The Plaintiff’s damages have already been determined as of the time when the transaction took place by purchasing and paying the price of the goods at a price higher than the normal price that would have been formed without collusion from the Defendants. The issue of whether the Plaintiff would transfer the cost to the lower buyer at the risk of the decrease in demand due to the increase in the product price. Accordingly, even if the Plaintiff recovered part of the damages, the Plaintiff’s profits acquired by the Plaintiff after the price increase is separate from the agreement.

4) Limitation on liability

In light of the ideology of the equitable apportionment of damages system, the amount of damages to be compensated by the Defendants may be limited, taking into account all the circumstances indicated in the pleadings, such as the following circumstances. The amount of damages to be compensated by the Defendant C&C is limited to KRW 1,235,370,00, and the amount of damages to be compensated by the Defendant C&C to KRW 227,940,000, respectively.

① The appraiser of the first instance court calculated the Plaintiff’s amount of damages by using any further variable for the period after collusion (i.e., January 2006 - January 6, 2007) as an explanatory variable. If the smuggling price was returned to the competitive price at any time of the above period, the amount of damages recognized earlier may be an excessive assessment. It seems extremely difficult in view of the nature of proving that the Plaintiff returned to the competitive price at any time. In such cases, the court may determine the amount of damages in order to recognize a reasonable amount of damages based on the purport of the entire pleadings and the result of the examination of evidence (Article 57 of the Fair Trade Act).

② The Plaintiff received a bounty from the Defendants during the period of collusion. Since the bounty paid by the Defendants was practically at a price at a price at a price at a price at which it was substantially reduced in the transaction relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendants, it is reasonable to take this into account in calculating the amount of damages suffered by the Plaintiff in accordance with the good faith principle. The appraiser of the first instance court did not take into account the Plaintiff’s bounty in calculating the amount of damages on the grounds that the amount of the bounty claimed by the parties is different, so the amount of damages as seen earlier may be deemed to have been excessively assessed (after the report was submitted to the court of first instance, the parties did not dispute that the degree of 1/2 of the amount paid as the bounty should be deducted from the amount of damages or that the amount of

③ The Plaintiff transferred part of the damages incurred by the Defendants’ collaborative act to consumers. The purpose of the Fair Trade Act is to promote fair and free competition and ultimately protect consumers. In a case where the Plaintiff, who paid part of the damages to consumers, is ultimately compensated for the entire amount of damages without considering the fact that the entire cost was paid, then it goes against the ideology of the compensation system by acquiring the benefits that the Plaintiff did not mean. It is reasonable to partially reduce the amount of damages borne by the Defendants, taking into account

5) Sub-committee

Therefore, Defendant C&C is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff 1,235,370,00 won, Defendant C&C’s 227,940,000 won, and each of the above payments after January 1, 2006, which the Plaintiffs sought after the date of tort, 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act from May 27, 2009, which is the date of the first instance judgment, until May 27, 2009, and 20% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment.

(c) whether the duty to restore to the original state exists due to deception or mistake;

1) Generally, even if a party to a contract did not notify the other party of the market price of the object owned by him/her of the market price, or notified him/her of the market price higher than the market price by falsity, it cannot be deemed that it interfered with the other party’s decision-making (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Da54406, 54413, Sept. 4, 2002). As seen earlier, the Defendants agreed on the restricted amount of production (sale quantity) prohibited under the Fair Trade Act, and agreed on the price in advance. However, there is no evidence to deem that the Defendants were aware of the competition price of the smuggling, and it is difficult to deem that the Defendants were liable to notify the Plaintiff of the price of the unfair collaborative act prohibited under the Fair Trade Act. Even if the Defendants committed the unfair collaborative act prohibited under the Fair Trade Act, and thereby, the market price higher than the market price was formed, in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is difficult to deem that the Defendants was obligated

2) If there is an error in the content of a juristic act, the contract may be cancelled. An error in the competition price in an agreement for the purchase of smuggling is merely an error in the motive of the decision for the purchase, and it shall not be deemed an error in the important part of the content of the juristic act.

In this regard, the Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff’s mistake on the price of smuggling is caused by the Defendants, and thus, it should be deemed as an error in the important part of the content of the legal act. As seen earlier, it is difficult to view that the Defendants, while entering into a sales contract, have a duty to notify the Plaintiff of the competition price or an unfair collaborative act. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff caused an error in the Plaintiff’s competition price.

3) The Plaintiff cannot cancel a sales contract for a smuggling with the Defendants on the grounds of fraud or mistake ( even if the Plaintiff recognizes the right to cancel a contract based on deception or mistake, the Plaintiff’s assertion is difficult to accept even though there is no proof on the appropriate value equivalent to the smuggling to be returned to the Defendants around December 2008, which was at the time of cancellation of the contract, even though it is necessary to prove the difference between the smuggling paid by the Plaintiff and the price equivalent to the smuggling to be returned by the Plaintiff.

3. Conclusion

The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants is with merit within the scope of the above recognition, and the remainder is without merit. The judgment of the court of first instance is with merit. Each appeal against the Defendants and each appeal against the Defendants is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

[Attachment]

Judge Lee Jin-hee (Presiding Judge)

(1) On September 1, 2007, Defendant C&C Co., Ltd. took over the instant lawsuit following the overall succession of the rights and obligations of the stock company upon the division of C&C from the stock company.

Note 2) As of 2004, the market share in the year 2004 is 24.6% of Korea, Defendant Cwork 25% of Korea, Dong Cwork 16.8% of Korea, 8.4% of Korea, Defendant Cyyang's 10.5% of Korea, 7.3% of comparison, 3.6% of Cywork, and 3.6% of Yong-Namon.

3) The Samyang Coryang Co., Ltd. is a company in charge of the production of the smuggling, which holds not less than 27% of the shares of Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd. for the purpose of management participation, concurrently holds office as the chief or executive officer of Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., and the substantial right to determine the price and quantity of the domestic sales price and output of the smuggling is Defendant Samyang. In the instant unfair collaborative act, most of the persons who actually participated in the price and production agreement are officers and employees of Defendant Samyang Co., Ltd., and if Defendant Samyang notified of the result of the meeting to Samyang Mayang Co., Ltd., Ltd., the company is practically under the control of

4) There is a difference between scholars in relation to the classification and terms of the above method, but in this case, the terms, classification listed in the Non-Party appraiser’s appraisal document of the first instance trial should be followed in this case. ① The method is to estimate the price increase due to collusion by directly comparing the price before and after price collusion, ② the method is to estimate the price increase based on limited costs or average costs, ③ the method is to estimate the price increase based on the competitive price in the market by finding the market similar to the total price price in the market, ④ the method is to estimate the market situation in the case where the market is not a total price increase by conducting a revolving analysis under the premise of the total competition with the market. ⑤ The method is to estimate the market situation in the case where the total price is not a price increase by conducting a revolving analysis under the incomplete competitive assumption.

5) In addition, it is a method of measuring the suitability to identify the relationship between one dependent variables and one independent variables in the case of analyzing the relationship between one dependent variable and one independent variables. In the case of analyzing the relationship between one dependent variable and one independent variables, it is a multiple-time analysis. It is a multiple-time analysis in order to identify the relationship between one dependent variables and one independent variables.

Note6) The variables considered as the explanatory variables in this case include the following factors: (a) the collusion ever during the participation period of Defendant Cyang company (from April 2001 to September 2002); (b) the collusion ever during the participation period of Defendant Cyang company (from October 2002 to December 2005); (c) the collusion ever after the collusion (from January 2006), the substantial domestic production; (d) the producer price index; (e) the producer price index; (e) the production cost of the raw material cost; (f) the production cost of the raw material price; (f) the production cost of the raw material price; (f) the production price index; (f) the monthly average monthly variable considered to control the seasonal factors; and (f) the fixed effect index to reflect the special characteristics of each product

Note 7) Average 8.97% price higher than before the participation in the collusion during the collusion period, and the average 3.72% price lowers the collusion after the collusion period was completed. From 8.97% of the variables in the collusion period, the collusion period is the rate calculated by deducting 5.25% of the variables after the collusion.

Note 8) Over the one-time period of collusion, the average price of dust was 5.91% higher, and the price of dust was 15.67% higher than the period before the collusion during the two-year period of collusion. Comparing one-time period of collusion with the two-stage period of collusion, the average price of about 9.8% higher than the one-time period of collusion during the two-stage period of collusion. The price after the collusion lowers by 4.17% on an average compared with the two-stage price. The price after the collusion lowers by approximately 4.17% (1.67% to 11.50%) compared with the price of the two-stage period of collusion.