11. K;

12. L.

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Lee N-soo et al.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The reasoning for this Court's explanation is that the evidence submitted or presented in the trial for the first time is insufficient to acknowledge the plaintiffs' assertion, and "A's witness testimony and R's testimony" is the same as the part of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, it is acceptable to accept it as it is in accordance with the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, since the following judgment is not supplemented or added.

2. Supplementary or additional determination

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

1) In order to raise the funds for the relocation of the Defendant Corporation, the directors of the Defendant Corporation knew of the fact that P was to receive the funds borrowed from teachers in order to pay the funds for the relocation of the Defendant Corporation, the directors of the Defendant Corporation, who agreed to do so at the same time. After the appointment of the P president, the Defendant Corporation resolved to pay the funds borrowed from the teachers to the Defendant Corporation as the obligation of the Defendant Corporation. P led the Plaintiffs and their families (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiffs”) to actively cause the funds for the school development, and provided the issues of expected problems and the results test of the written examination in this case.

P The act of P is intended to repay the money borrowed from teachers in order to raise the school relocation fund, and thus, the act is within the purpose of the defendant corporation, and the defendant corporation is attributed to the defendant corporation, and since the directors of the defendant corporation are aware of the above P act, it is deemed that the defendant corporation committed a tort with the plaintiffs and the defendant corporation. Thus, even if the plaintiffs applied for the written examination in this case with prior consideration of the potential problem of written examination from P, it does not constitute an unlawful act as prescribed in the notice of appointment.

In addition, since the illegality of the corporation's act that actively induceds the plaintiffs to establish the school development fund with the employment of regular teachers is greater than the illegality of the plaintiffs' act, it is against the principle of good faith to cancel the appointment contract with the plaintiffs.

2) Even if the notice of the instant appointment examination reserving the right to cancel an employment contract after the death of the person who committed an unlawful act in the selection examination, the Defendant corporation, even though already aware of the grounds for the cancellation of the agreement, was aware of the Plaintiffs’ unlawful act at the time of employment, and thus, notwithstanding the awareness of the grounds for cancellation of the agreement, concluded with Plaintiff A, B, C, D, E, F, G on March 1, 2008, Plaintiff H, I, and L on March 1, 2009, respectively with Plaintiff J, K, K, and L on March 30, 201, concluded an employment contract with Plaintiff J, K, K, and L on December 30, 201, thereby making the Plaintiffs not exercise the right to cancel for a long period of time, and thus exercising the right to cancel on December 30, 2011, violates the principle of trust and good faith.

In addition, the Defendant corporation, following the resolution of the Teachers' Disciplinary Committee on June 20, 201, imposed a disciplinary measure against the Plaintiff E, H, and L for one month of suspension from office on the Plaintiff A, B, J, K, and I for two months of reduction of salary, and agreed with the said Plaintiffs not to exercise the right to cancel the agreement regarding the said Plaintiffs’ wrongful acts. As such, the Defendant corporation is prohibited from exercising the right to cancel the agreement.

3) Although taking a disciplinary measure as a sanction against the plaintiffs, and accepting it by the plaintiffs, the revocation of the appointment in this case is in violation of the window of prohibition of double punishment, and thus the lawsuit for appointment in this case is null and void.

4) The Plaintiffs issued the school development fund in accordance with the proposal by the P president that the school development fund would be employed as a regular teacher, and the method and process of being employed as a regular teacher after the issuance of the school development fund did not appear. The Plaintiffs merely received the question of whether P would be called as a expected problem or a real-time test problem, and it did not have any causal link between the granting of the school development fund under employment condition and the granting of the school development fund and the granting of the written examination. Accordingly, the cancellation of the appointment by the Defendant corporation is null and void, inasmuch as there is no causal link between the issue and the expected problem or the fact-finding test problem, and the written examination is naturally known.

B. Determination

1) As to the first argument

A) First, we examine whether P was aware of the fact that P was receiving the school development fund due to the employment of regular teachers, and whether P was silent and aided by the directors of the defendant corporation.

If Gap evidence No. 15 and Eul's witness testimony made a whole oral argument, it is acknowledged that at the time the directors of the defendant corporation made a little amount of inquiry about P's illegal act on the ground that P will receive the school development fund by leaving the lawsuit that P will employ regular teachers, but did not confirm such fact or discussed the above problem at the board of directors. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that P knew that the directors of the defendant corporation knew that P will receive the school development fund due to the failure to employ regular teachers, and it is difficult to conclude that P knew of the fact that the directors of the defendant corporation knew of the fact that P will receive the school development fund, which is the main reason for the cancellation of appointment, and that the plaintiffs will receive the written examination by being provided with prior written examination.

B) Next, we examine whether P's act constitutes an act within the scope of the purpose of the defendant corporation and is attributable to the defendant corporation, since P's act is aimed at repaying the borrowed money from teachers in order to raise funds for school relocation.

The legal capacity of a legal entity is limited by the law that served as the basis for the establishment of a legal entity and the purpose of its articles of incorporation. The term "act within the scope of its purpose" does not include acts directly and indirectly necessary for the achievement of the purpose, not limited to the purpose itself stipulated in law or the articles of incorporation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da8821, Nov. 22, 1991).

In addition, according to the overall purport of the evidence No. 3-1 and No. 13 as well as the arguments, P has used approximately KRW 715 million out of KRW 1.42 billion received from the plaintiffs, etc. as the name of the school development fund in order to pay the borrowed money from the former president to the former president.

However, the reason for cancellation of appointment does not mean that the act of receiving money as the name of the school development fund should not be considered separately from the act of offering written examination questions, since the act of receiving money as the name of the school development fund is a fraudulent act with a written examination and applying for a written examination after being given written examination questions, and the act of providing written examination questions in return for a written examination under the name of the school development fund does not belong to the purpose of the school foundation itself nor does it constitute an act directly or indirectly necessary for the achievement of the purpose. Thus, it cannot be viewed as an act within the purpose of the defendant foundation since the act of offering written examination questions in advance is not an act within the scope of the purpose of the defendant foundation (it is difficult to view the above act of P as an act within the scope of the purpose of the defendant foundation even in that the amount of half of the money received as the school development fund is used for a purpose other than the above loan repayment purpose. The act of P is attributed to the defendant foundation and it cannot be deemed that the defendant foundation committed a tort jointly with the plaintiffs.

In addition, it is difficult to view that the above plaintiffs delivered money as the school development fund and did not know about the issue of written examination (the plaintiff knew about the expected or actual test problem and the written examination issue, but it is difficult to see that the plaintiffs did not know about the issue of written examination, as examined below, so long as the plaintiffs knew about the expected or practical test problem, and even if they knew about the issue of written examination, it is difficult to see that the plaintiffs applied for the appointment examination in this case with the knowledge that it is related to the issue of written examination, and that the above behavior in P cannot be seen as an act within the purpose of school juristic person, it is difficult to see that the defendant juristic person actively induced the plaintiff to commit an illegal act, and that P and the plaintiffs committed the illegal act in this case according to the unity of written examination.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' above assertion on different premise is without merit.

2) As to the second argument

In general, the exercise of rights shall be in accordance with the good faith and shall not be abused. Thus, in a case where the person holding the right of rescission does not exercise the right within a reasonable period of time and the person holding the right of rescission has justifiable grounds to believe that it does not exercise the right, and thereafter, the exercise of the right of rescission is not allowed in accordance with the so-called principle of invalidation, in a case where it is recognized that the exercise of the right of rescission is in violation of the good faith principle which controls the whole legal order (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da12234, Nov. 25, 1994).

After the examination of appointment of this case on March 1, 2008, the facts that the defendant corporation entered into an employment contract with the plaintiff H, K, and L on March 1, 2009, the plaintiff J, K, and L on March 1, 201, and allowed the plaintiffs to work in the school of the defendant corporation for about 1 year and 10 months to December 30, 201, which was at the time of the cancellation of appointment of this case. However, it is difficult to view that the above circumstances are as follows: (i) it is difficult for the plaintiffs to clearly know that other persons, other than the plaintiffs who actively participated in P, from among the persons related to the defendant corporation, were not aware of unlawful acts; and (ii) it is difficult to view that the plaintiffs were not able to exercise their right to rescind the appointment of the plaintiffs until the expiration of 10 years or 10 months from December 30, 201 from the Busan Metropolitan City Superintendent's Office of Education until the cancellation of appointment report to the plaintiffs.

In addition, prior to the cancellation of appointment of the instant case, the Defendant corporation did not agree with the said Plaintiffs to refuse to exercise the right to rescission of an agreement with respect to the said Plaintiffs’ unlawful acts on the sole basis of the fact that Plaintiff E, H, L, A, J, K,K, and I were subject to the resolution of the teachers’ disciplinary committee prior to the cancellation of appointment.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' above assertion is without merit.

3) As to the third argument

Inasmuch as the nature of the instant disciplinary action, which is a punitive sanction, and the cancellation of appointment under private law, is different, it cannot be deemed as a violation of the principle of prohibition of double punishment and prohibition of double punishment on the ground that the instant revocation of appointment after the disciplinary action was made.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' above assertion is without merit.

4) On the fourth argument

Although the plaintiffs argued that P was unaware of the fact that the issue was the only issue of the written examination, while the issue was the only issue of the written examination. However, in light of the fact that P was found to be the issue of the written examination, it is difficult to see that P did not know of the fact that the issue was the only issue of the written examination, and as long as the plaintiffs knew that it was the problem of the preliminary examination or the practical examination, it constitutes an illegal conduct prescribed in the notice of the appointment examination of this case, so long as the plaintiffs knew that it was related to the problem of the written examination, it is possible to revoke the appointment, and that there was no causal relation between the granting of the employment condition development fund and the granting of the written examination, and that Q would not have any causal relation between the granting of the written examination when the appointment examination of this case was denied and the granting of the written examination.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' above assertion is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed due to the lack of reason, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed as it is without reason. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Efficacy

Freeboard Kim