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(영문) 대법원 2012. 12. 13. 선고 2010두4964 판결

[종합토지세등부과처분취소][미간행]

Main Issues

[1] The meaning of Article 234-12 subparagraph 6 of the former Local Tax Act before the amendment by Act No. 732 of Jan. 5, 2005, and Article 194-7 subparagraph 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act upon delegation from the former Local Tax Act, Article 186 subparagraph 4 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act before the amendment by Act No. 1021 of Mar. 31, 2010, and Article 137 (1) subparagraph 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act after delegation from the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act, where the land which is a road under the Road Act is used as an exception for the imposition of the aggregate land tax or

[2] The case affirming the judgment below holding that in case where Eul's heir Eul, who was the real titleholder of the situation, was liable for the payment of aggregate land tax and property tax on the above land in order to file a lawsuit for cancellation of registration of ownership preservation and a lawsuit for claim for return of unjust enrichment due to possession and use of the land against the state for invalidation of cause, and the tax authority, who received unjust enrichment, obtained a favorable or final judgment, made a disposition of imposition of aggregate land tax and property tax on the above land

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 234-9(1) (see current Article 107(1)), Article 234-12 (see current Article 109(3)1) of the former Local Tax Act (Amended by Act No. 732, Jan. 5, 2005); Article 183(1) (see current Article 107(3)1) of the former Local Tax Act (Amended by Act No. 1021, Mar. 31, 201); Article 186 subparag. 4 (see current Article 109(3)1); Article 194-7 subparag. 1 (see current Article 108(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (Amended by Presidential Decree No. 18696, Jan. 5, 2005); Article 183(1) of the former Local Tax Act (Amended by Act No. 10170, Jan. 1, 2007) (see current Article 107(1) of the Local Tax Act)

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 92Nu15505 delivered on September 14, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2822)

Plaintiff-Appellant

Plaintiff (Attorney Cho Chang-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellee

Spocheon Market

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 2009Nu21200 decided February 3, 2010

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the assertion that a de facto owner is not a de facto owner

Article 234-9(1) of the former Local Tax Act (amended by Act No. 7332, Jan. 5, 2005; hereinafter “former Local Tax Act”) and Article 183(1) of the former Local Tax Act (wholly amended by Act No. 1021, Mar. 31, 2010; hereinafter “former Local Tax Act”) stipulate a person who actually owns land or property as of the tax base date as a taxpayer for aggregate land tax or property tax. In light of the legislative purpose and character of aggregate land tax and property tax, “a person who actually owns land or property” in each of the above provisions shall be deemed to mean a person who actually owns land or property, regardless of whether he/she is registered as the owner on the public register (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 93Nu1022, Apr. 18, 1996; 205Du15045, Mar. 23, 2006).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence duly admitted by the court below, ① the land of this case was used as a local road under the Road Act, which is a road under the name of the Republic of Korea on December 4, 1995 after the registration of preservation of ownership was completed. The plaintiff, the heir of the deceased non-party, upon the assessment of the land of this case, filed a lawsuit claiming the cancellation of registration of the above registration of preservation of ownership on the ground that the cause becomes null and void against the Republic of Korea, and the judgment became final and conclusive on April 28, 2006. ② The plaintiff again filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Korea for claiming the return of unjust enrichment on the possession and use of the land of this case against the Republic of Korea, and received the payment of KRW 1,45,692,260 in total from the Republic of Korea on September 11, 2007, ③ the defendant imposed the property tax of this case for each year of June 13, 2008 and each year of 203 through 2005.

Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, even if the Republic of Korea has actually used and profit from the said land when registration of preservation of ownership was made invalid under the name of the Republic of Korea, insofar as the Plaintiff was found to be the real owner in the lawsuit for registration of cancellation of registration of preservation of ownership filed by the Plaintiff against the Republic of Korea and was rendered a final and conclusive judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff shall be deemed to be a person in a position to exercise the right to use, profit, and dispose of the said land in the taxable period prior to the final and conclusive judgment, regardless of whether the Plaintiff actually exercised the right as the owner, and thus, shall be deemed to be a person liable

In the same purport, the judgment of the court below is just on the premise that the plaintiff is the actual owner of the land of this case and the taxpayer of each aggregate land tax of this case as of the tax base date of this case, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the actual owner of each aggregate land tax or property tax.

In addition, the court below did not indicate the plaintiff's specific and direct decision on the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff cannot be deemed as the actual owner of the land of this case for the taxable period before the judgment on the plaintiff's claim for cancellation of registration of cancellation of registration of ownership preservation filed against Korea becomes final and conclusive, but it can be known that the court below rejected the plaintiff's above assertion in light of the overall purport of the reasoning of the judgment below, and it is clear that the plaintiff's above assertion is dismissed as seen earlier. Thus, this part

2. As to the assertion that a fee is not used

Article 234-12 subparag. 6 of the former Local Tax Act and Article 194-7 subparag. 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 18669 of Jan. 5, 2005), Article 186 subparag. 4 of the former Local Tax Act, and Article 137(1)1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20794 of May 27, 2008) upon delegation of the former Local Tax Act provide that no aggregate land tax or property tax shall be imposed on land which is a road under the Road Act, but the same shall not apply where the relevant land is used for pay. In light of the purport of these provisions and the fact that no restriction is imposed on the concept of pay, the term "in cases of using it as oil" in this context refers to cases where a price is paid for the use of the relevant land under any pretext, and if the use thereof has the meaning of compensation, it shall not be asked periodically or repeatedly for 195.

The lower court determined that the instant land as of each of the tax base dates of this case did not constitute the subject of exemption from aggregate land tax or property tax, on the ground that unjust enrichment paid by the Republic of Korea to the Plaintiff has the nature of consideration for the use of the instant land, and thus, the instant land should be deemed to

In light of the above provisions, legal principles, and records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the fee use as an exception requirement for exemption from aggregate land tax or property tax, contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Poe-dae (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-서울고등법원 2010.2.3.선고 2009누21200
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