[2] In a tort under Article 13(1) of the former Conflict of Laws, whether “the place where the cause occurred” includes the place where the damage occurred (affirmative)

[3] The meaning of the product subject to product liability, and whether the product is directly supplied to the consumer under the supply contract with the specific consumer (affirmative)

[4] The meaning of the manufacturer who bears product liability, and whether the manufacturer is liable for product liability for defects in the manufacture and sale of the product in accordance with the government's direction under the supply contract with the government (affirmative)

[5] Details of the duty to prevent danger to be borne by a manufacturer who designs and manufactures chemical products containing toxic substances harmful to the human body, and in the case where the manufacturer designs and sells, as they are, chemical products with a risk of causing harm to human life and body by violating the above duty, whether such chemical products are deemed to exist as defective (affirmative in principle)

[6] In a case where Gap et al. claimed product liability damages against Eul et al. for defoliant that was manufactured by Eul et al. and scattered in the Vietnam War, the case affirming the judgment below that part of the soldiers suffered damage from defoliant, which was exposed to defoliant, caused by exposure to defoliant, thereby suffering from a special disease, where Eul et al. claimed product liability damages against Eul et al.

[7] In a case where epidemiological correlation between a specific dangerous person and a non-specific disease is acknowledged, whether it can be deemed that there is a probable probability to acknowledge the causal relationship between an individual and a non-specific disease solely based on the fact that an individual was exposed to the dangerous person and the fact that the non-specific disease suffered (negative), and the method of proving the probability in this case

[8] In a case where Gap et al. et al. sought product liability damages against Eul corporation et al. that suffered from defoliants manufactured by Eul et al. and sprayed in the Vietnam War, the case holding that the judgment below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to epidemiological causation and probability, etc., on the ground that part of the soldiers suffered from suffering from disease such as urine disease, etc., which was non-specific diseases caused by exposure to defoliant's TelecommunicationsD

[9] The meaning of and criteria for determining “the date when the injured party becomes aware of the damage and the perpetrator” under Article 766(1) of the Civil Act, and the burden of proving “the time when the injured party becomes aware of the damage” (=a person who asserts the benefit of the completion of

[10] The meaning of "the date when the tort was committed," which is the starting point for the long-term extinctive prescription under Article 766(2) of the Civil Code, and the burden of proving "the time when the objective and specific loss occurred," in the case of damage claim based on the tort at intervals between the harmful act and the occurrence of the damage (=the person who asserts the benefit of extinctive prescription

[11] In a case where Gap et al. et al. claimed product liability damages against Eul et al., a company manufacturing defoliants, for which they suffered from defoliant spreaded in the Vietnam War, and Eul et al. asserted the statute of limitations defense, the case holding that the statute of limitations defense against some veterans constitutes abuse of rights, but the statute of limitations defense against the veterans who filed a provisional attachment application or lawsuit after three years from the date of registration as the patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants does not constitute abuse of rights

[12] Whether the causal relationship between the harmful act and the damage can be recognized at a rate in a claim for damages due to a tort lawsuit (negative)

[2] According to Article 13(1) of the former Conflict of Laws (wholly amended by Act No. 6465 of Apr. 7, 2001), the establishment and effect of a claim arising from a tort in a conflict of laws case involving foreign elements shall be determined by the law of the place where the facts causing the claim occurred. The establishment and effect of a claim arising from a tort in a conflict of laws case includes not only the place where the tort was committed but also the place where the facts causing the tort occurred.

[3] Product liability is a movable property manufactured or processed by adding design, processing, etc. to raw materials and offered for commercial distribution as new goods. This includes not only the supply to many unspecified consumers through various stages of commercial distribution, but also the direct supply to the consumer under a supply contract with a specific consumer.

[4] The manufacturer who is responsible for product liability refers to a person who manufactures, processes, or imports a product as a business, or a person who makes a product with a name, trade name, trademark, or any other recognizable symbol to indicate himself/herself as a manufacturer or to be mistaken for a manufacturer, or a manufacturer is liable for product liability even in cases where the product was manufactured or sold in accordance with the government's order under a supply contract with the government.

[5] Where a manufacturer designs and manufactures a chemical product containing toxic substance harmful to the human body, the user or its surrounding person may be continuously and repeatedly exposed to the chemical product in light of the purpose and method of the use of the chemical product, etc., and the user or its surrounding person has no functional utility with the toxic substance, or has extremely low functional effects, while the manufacturer has continuously and repeatedly exposed to the toxic substance to the risk causing harm to the user’s life and body, and the user’s failure to avoid damage before taking appropriate preventive measures in advance, the manufacturer bears a high risk risk prevention obligation. In other words, the manufacturer must thoroughly verify the safety of the product at the highest technical level at that time, and remove and minimize the risk likely to occur through investigation and research. If it is unclear whether the risk has been removed and reduced properly and it is difficult for the actual user, etc. to properly warn the risk, it is reasonable to deem that the chemical product has a high risk to exist without any special reason for the manufacturer’s design and sale of the product, unless there is a high risk danger danger in light of social norms.

[6] In a case where Gap et al. claimed product liability damages against Eul et al. from defoliant manufactured by Eul et al. and scattered in the Vietnam War, Eul et al., the case affirming the judgment below holding that, in full view of all the circumstances such as the effects of each individual's physical vulnerability on whether or not the harmful substance substance contained in defoliants has made a chlorode, and the period during which the TRD has occurred, it is probable that some of the soldiers were exposed to defoliant and its unique disease caused a chlodity disease, on the ground that it is probable that some of the soldiers suffered damage from defoliant caused by exposure to defoliant contained in defoliants, on the ground that they were exposed to defoliant contained in defoliants, which were spread or remaining in the service area during the Vietnam War, etc., and caused damage to defoliant by exposure to defoliant.

[7] In the case of non-specific diseases, even if the epidemiological correlation between a specific risk factor and a non-specific disease is acknowledged, the causal relationship between an individual and the non-specific disease can not be deemed to have been proven only by the fact that an individual was exposed to a risk factor and the fact that he/she contracted to a non-specific disease. In such a case, as a result of conducting an epidemiological investigation by comparing the exposed group with other general groups not exposed, it shall be proved that the rate of non-specific disease in the non-specific disease in the exposed group exceeds considerably the rate of non-specific disease in the exposed group not exposed to the risk factor, and it shall be proved that there is a probability that the non-specific disease was caused by the risk factor, such as additional proof of the time and degree of exposure, timing of occurrence, health conditions before the exposure to the risk factor, living habits, changes in the state of disease, family history, etc.

[8] In a case where Gap et al. claimed product liability damages against Eul et al. for a variety of diseases such as urine diseases caused by defoliants manufactured by Eul et al. and scattered in the Vietnam War, the case held that the judgment below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on epidemiological causation and probability, etc. on the ground that some soldiers suffered from non-specific diseases such as urine diseases, merely because some soldiers contracted non-specific diseases such as exposure to defoliant at the time of the Vietnam War, and even though it cannot be recognized that some soldiers suffered damage from non-specific diseases such as urine diseases caused by exposure to defoliant that were exposed to defoliant at the time of the Vietnam War, and that some soldiers suffered from non-specific diseases such as urine diseases.

[9] Article 766(1) of the Civil Act provides that a claim for damages caused by a tort shall expire when the injured party or his/her legal representative becomes aware of the damage and of the identity of the perpetrator. Here, “the date when the injured party or his/her legal representative becomes aware of the damage and of the identity of the perpetrator” refers to the date when the injured party or his/her legal representative actually and specifically recognizes the damage and the perpetrator. The recognition is not sufficient solely on the presumption or awareness of the damage occurrence, but also means the date when the injured party becomes aware of the existence of an illegal harmful act, the occurrence of the damage, and the causal relationship between the harmful act and the damage. In other words, the recognition of the requisite fact of the tort, namely, whether the injured party or his/her legal representative has actually and specifically perceived the requisite fact of the tort, should be reasonably recognized by taking into account the various objective circumstances of each individual case and taking into account the circumstances practically possible, and the burden of proof as to the time when the damage was

[10] According to Article 766(2) of the Civil Act, the right to claim damages is extinguished even after ten years have elapsed since the date when the tort occurred. In the case of a claim for damages arising from a tort at a time interval between a harmful act and the occurrence of damage, the "date when the tort occurred", which is the starting point of the long-term extinctive prescription as mentioned above, refers to the time when the damage occurs objectively and specifically, i.e., when the damage actually occurred, and the burden of proof on the time when the damage occurred, is against the person who asserts the benefit of ex

[11] The case holding that in case where Gap et al. and Vietnam War veterans claimed product liability damages against Eul et al., a corporation Eul et al., for which the statute of limitations had been asserted, the case held that it is reasonable to deem that Gap et al. exercised their rights within a considerable period of time since it was not allowed to file a provisional attachment application or provisional attachment application against Eul et al., for the patent right owned by Eul et al. from the time of the outbreak of defoliant until the 10-year statute of limitations had lapsed since Eul et al. filed a lawsuit against Eul et al. for provisional attachment or the 10-year statute of limitations against Eul et al. as to the patent right owned by Eul et al. since it was difficult for them to objectively exercise their rights until they became aware of the existence of the right to claim damages against Eul et al., the remaining soldiers except for part of them were registered as actual aftereffects of defoliants patients and there were considerable difficulties for them to exercise their rights within a period of time corresponding to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act after the registration of actual aftereffects patients.

[12] The causal relationship between the harmful act and the occurrence of damage in a claim for damages due to a tort lawsuit is determined whether or not there exists or not, and the so-called "ratioal causal relationship" cannot be accepted, since it cannot be recognized at a ratio.

2. All appeals by the Plaintiff (Appointeds) and the Defendants’ remaining appeals are dismissed.

3. The costs of appeal between the designated parties listed in paragraph (1) and the Defendants are assessed against each appellant.

1. As to the Defendants’ grounds of appeal

A. Meritorious of legal principles as to international jurisdiction

International jurisdiction shall be determined in accordance with the basic ideology of ensuring equity between the parties, the propriety, speediness, and economy of the judgment. Specifically, not only personal interests such as equity, convenience, and predictability of the parties to the lawsuit, but also national interests such as appropriateness, speediness, efficiency, effectiveness of the judgment, etc. Of these diverse benefits, the determination of which benefits should be reasonably based on the objective basis of the substantial relationship between the suspension of law and the parties in individual cases, and the substantial relationship between the suspension of law and the disputed cases (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da59788, Jan. 27, 2005). In particular, in a product liability lawsuit against a manufacturer manufacturing and selling goods, if the court at the place where the damage occurred determines whether there is the international jurisdiction of the manufacturer at the place where the damage occurred, the determination of whether there is substantial relationship between the manufacturer and the place where the damage occurred, to the extent that it can reasonably be predicted (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Da39677, Nov. 21, 1995).

The lower court determined that: (a) the designated persons were all Korean nationals living in the Republic of Korea as members of the armed forces of Vietnam during the second Vietnam War (hereinafter “VE”); (b) the designated persons asserted that the Defendants were suffering from a disease after having been exposed to defoliants spreaded in the service area during the Vietnam War; and (c) the Defendants filed the instant lawsuit claiming product liability against the Defendants who manufactured and sold defoliants at that time; and (d) the Defendants knew of the fact that Korean soldiers were aware of the fact that the Defendants were suffering from a disease after having returned to the Vietnam War, and thus, could have sufficiently predicted that the Defendants could file a lawsuit seeking product liability against the Defendants in the Republic of Korea; (b) there were all data on the military service of the Vietnam War soldiers and their bereaved family members living in the Republic of Korea; and (c) the designated persons claimed that the Defendants suffered from a disease after having been exposed to defoliants during the service area during the Vietnam War should be translated into Korean translation into Korean language; and (d) there were substantial relevance between the parties to the instant lawsuit and the Defendants’ legitimate interests in calculating the amount of damages.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to international jurisdiction as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal

B. Meritorious of legal principles as to governing law

According to Article 13(1) of the former Conflict of Laws (amended by Act No. 6465 of Apr. 7, 2001), the establishment and effect of a claim for a tort in an conflict of laws case with foreign elements shall be determined by the law of the place where the facts causing the tort occurred. The establishment and effect of a claim for a tort shall be determined by the law of the place where the facts causing the tort occurred as well as by the place where the facts causing the tort occurred (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da18167, Jan. 28, 1994, etc.).

Korea is not only the place where the damage of this case occurred, but also the Korean court has international jurisdiction over the lawsuit of this case as seen earlier, the Korean law can be the governing law for the product liability of this case.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to governing law as otherwise alleged in the ground of

C. Meritorious of legal principles as to product liability

(1) Whether defoliant is a product

Product liability refers to a movable property manufactured or processed with new goods by carrying out design, processing, etc. on raw materials, which is supplied for commercial distribution. This includes not only the supply to many unspecified consumers through various stages of commercial distribution, but also the direct supply to consumers under a supply contract with a specific consumer.

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that defoliant was manufactured in a large quantity under an individual supply contract with the Government of the United States of America and actually sold to the Government of the United States of America, and was used by many unspecified soldiers who participated in Vietnam, and it constitutes product subject to product liability. There is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to product subject to product liability as otherwise alleged in the ground of

(2) Whether the product liability constitutes a manufacturer who bears product liability

A manufacturer who is responsible for product liability means a person who engages in the business of manufacturing, processing, or importing a product, or a person who indicates himself/herself as a manufacturer or as a manufacturer by using a name, trade name, trademark, or other recognizable symbol, etc., and a manufacturer who manufactures or sells a product in accordance with the government's order under a supply contract with the government shall bear the product liability when the product is defective.

The court below's decision that the Defendants actually manufactured defoliants and sold it to the U.S. government is just in accordance with the above legal principles, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the manufacturer status as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

(3) Whether defoliant was defective as a product

(A) Where a manufacturer designs and manufactures a chemical product containing toxic substances harmful to the human body, if the user or its surrounding person can continuously and repeatedly be exposed to the toxic substances in light of the purpose and method of the use of the chemical product, etc., and the user or its surrounding person has no functional utility or extremely weak, while the toxic substances are continuously and repeatedly exposed to the toxic substances, there is a risk of harm to the user, etc., and the user, etc. cannot avoid damage before the manufacturer takes appropriate preventive measures in advance, the manufacturer bears a high risk risk prevention obligation. In other words, the manufacturer must thoroughly verify the safety of the product at the highest technological level at that time and remove and minimize the risk likely to occur through the investigation and research, and if there are circumstances where it is unclear whether the risk has been removed and reduced properly and it is difficult for the actual user, etc. to properly warn the risk, the chemical product should not be distributed until the removal and minimum of the risk is confirmed to the extent that the safety is sufficiently secured.

Therefore, where a manufacturer designs and sells chemical products which are likely to cause harm to life and body without violating such high risk prevention obligations, it is reasonable to view that such chemical products are defective in design, unless there are special circumstances.

(B) According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, to produce defoliant 2,4,5-T, which is the raw materials of defoliant 5, the Defendants were aware of the risk of exposure to defoliant 2,3,7,8-TD’s toxic substance in the process, and the risk of exposure to defoliant 2,4,5-TN was entirely generated as by-products, and the risk of exposure to defoliant 2,4,5-T was entirely not entirely affected by the initial use of defoliant 5, and the Defendants were aware of the risk of exposure to defoliant 2,4,4,5-T to the U.S. government at the time of their manufacture and sale of defoliant 5, and the risk of exposure to defoliant 1,4,4,4,4, and the risk of exposure to defoliant 2,4,4,6, which would have been likely to cause harm to the human body. In particular, the Defendants were aware of the risk of exposure to defoliant 5, which would have been likely to cause harm to the human body.

(C) Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to deem that the Defendants violated the duty of high risk prevention for the safety of human body in defoliant manufactured and distributed defoliant without setting up a standard of 1 p pm or without setting such standard. Thus, it is reasonable to deem that the Defendants violated the duty of high risk prevention for the safety of human body in defoliant manufactured and sold during the Vietnam War, thereby failing to ensure the safety of human body and thus failing to ensure the safety of human body.

Although the court below's explanation of its reasoning is somewhat insufficient or inappropriate, the conclusion that the Defendants' design defect in defoliant manufactured and sold is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to product defect or the burden of proof, or in violation of the principle of pleading, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

(4) Claim of immunity on the ground of development risk

If the manufacturer could not discover the existence of a defect at the level of science and technology at the time of the supply of the product, barring special circumstances, the manufacturer may not be held liable for the defect of the product, considering that there is no predictability about the occurrence of the result.

However, as seen earlier, inasmuch as the Defendants were found to have breached a high-level duty of care to prevent risk of harm to life and body caused by repeated exposure to the T CD, which is a toxic substance contained in defoliants, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the Defendants could not find any defect in defoliants at the scientific and technical level at the time of the manufacture and sale of defoliant. Accordingly, the Defendants’ assertion of exemption from liability based on such premise cannot be accepted.

Although the reasoning of the court below is somewhat inappropriate or inadequate, the conclusion of rejecting the Defendants’ assertion of immunity on the grounds of development risk is justifiable, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles on breach of duty of care and exemption, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

(5) Claim for discharge on the grounds of compliance with the statutory standards

The lower court rejected the Defendants’ assertion of discharge on the ground that, at the time of the Defendants’ manufacture and sale of defoliants, there was no standard on the content of defoliant’s 2,4,5-T, or its raw material under the laws and regulations of the United States at the time of the Defendants’ manufacture and sale, and the contract and its specifications on the supply of defoliant did not provide for the existence or degree of the content of defoliant, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the defect was caused by the observance of the United States’ Defense Materials Production Act or the contract on the supply of defoliants based thereon, and rather, the defect was caused by the Defendants’ mistake that did not take sufficient measures to ensure safety.

In light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the breach of duty of care and exemption.

D. Meritorious of legal principles as to causation

(1) Whether there exists causation between exposure to defoliants and exposure to defoliant, a unique disease,

Comprehensively taking account of its adopted evidence, the lower court acknowledged the following facts: (a) the relevant designated parties participating in the Vietnam War suffered salt in the course of completing the service in the Vietnam War; and (b) the so-called “specific disease” caused by exposure to defoliant contained in defoliants.

Furthermore, the court below determined as follows: (a) comprehensively taking into account the impact of each individual physical reaction on defoliant’s origin and form; (b) the period during which the defoliant was exposed to; (c) the occurrence of chronic salts; (d) the possibility of occurrence of the relevant designated parties; and (e) the period during which the relevant designated parties suffered from the occurrence of the calculium after the completion of the service in the Vietnam War; (e) the frequency of occurrence of the calculium in Korea; (e) the quantity of domestic waste incineration or incineration disposal rate; and (g) the possibility that the relevant designated parties returned to the Republic of Korea after the Vietnam War and were exposed to the calculum in the Republic of Korea; and (e) the possibility that the relevant designated parties were exposed to the calul in the Republic of Korea after returning to the Republic of Korea through their service in the Vietnam War, it is probable that the relevant designated parties suffered damage to the calulum’s remaining in the area of defoliants during the Vietnam War, on the grounds that there was no counter-proof to the probability.

In light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error of exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or misapprehending the legal principles on causation and probability, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

(2) Whether there exists causation between exposure to defoliants and non-specific diseases

(A) The lower court presumed that, inasmuch as TRD contained in defoliant is not clearly revealed in clinical or pathology, and it is not possible to conduct human tests on it, it is not possible to do so. In such a case, the lower court collectively observed persons exposed to defoliants, and confirmed that there was an epidemiological causal relationship between TRD and the disease, and based on such epidemiological causal relationship, found that the individual victim’s disease could be recognized as a considerable probability that the individual victim’s disease was caused by TRD exposure after the arrival of the disease to the individual victim.

Furthermore, based on the circumstances stated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the report of the U.S. National Institute of Sciences, which examined the correlation between defoliant exposure and various diseases, could be trusted in terms of expertise, comprehensiveness, scientific, objectivity, etc., and that there is sufficient evidence to acknowledge the causal link between exposure to defoliants and exposure to defoliants in the said report as well as evidence to recognize the causal link between exposure to defoliants and exposure to defoliants, but, on the other hand, determined that there is sufficient probability that there is a significant causal link between the remaining diseases in the area where defoliants was classified as limited; (1) non-finite cancer; (2) finite cancer; (3) finite cancer; (8) finite cancer; (3) finite cancer; (9) finite cancer; (1) finite cancer; (1) finite cancer; (1) finite disease in the area where defoliants was exposed to the environment of the Republic of Korea; and (1) finite disease in the area where defoliants was exposed to the Vietnam region; (3) finfect’s of exposure to the remaining disease.

In addition, the lower court determined that, insofar as the Plaintiffs proved that the pertinent designated parties were highly likely to have suffered from each of the diseases that occurred due to exposure to T CDs in the Vietnam War, the Defendants may be exempted from their liability only by counter-proofly proving that the relevant designated parties were not exposed to Vietnam at the time of their service in Vietnam, not at the level of the occurrence of each of the diseases, or that the rate of the outbreak of the Vietnam War veterans, which was actually exposed to the relevant disease, is similar or lower than that of the group that was not exposed to the TRIPS, or that each of the diseases owned by the relevant designated parties was entirely caused by any other cause. However, there is no evidence to acknowledge this.

Therefore, the lower court determined that the pertinent designated parties who participated in the Vietnam War suffered damage from each of the diseases caused by exposure to defoliant manufactured by the Defendants and sold to the U.S. government, and sprayed in the Vietnam War.

(B) However, we cannot accept the above judgment of the court below.

1) The term “epidemology” means an study aimed at identifying the correlation with various natural and social factors by analyzing the outbreak, distribution, extinction, etc. of diseases as a collective phenomenon, and thereby preventing and reducing the occurrence of diseases. The epidemology examines and ascertains the cause of a disease as a collective phenomenon, and does not establish the cause of an individual’s disease. Therefore, even if an epidemiological correlation exists between a certain risk factor and a certain disease, it does not confirm the existence of the cause of a disease as a group, but rather, if the occurrence rate of a disease by a group exposed to a risk factor is higher than that of another group not exposed to the risk factor, it can be inferred how much the possibility of the occurrence of a disease by an individual belonging to that group would have occurred as the risk factor depending on the degree of higher ratio.

On the other hand, unlike “specific disease” that occurs by a specific sick person and clearly corresponding to the cause and result, so-called “non-specific disease” means a disease that happens in combination with congenital factors, such as genetic and physical properties, drinking, smoking, age, eating habits, occupational and environmental factors. In the case of non-specific diseases, even if the epidemiological correlation exists between a specific risk factor and the non-specific disease, insofar as there is no possibility that the individual or group exposed to the risk is exposed to other risk factors, the epidemiological correlation merely means that the exposure to the risk factor is likely to cause the disease or increase if it is exposed, and it does not lead to the conclusion that the cause of the disease is the risk factor.

Therefore, even if epidemiological correlation between a specific risk factor and a non-specific disease is acknowledged, the causal relationship between an individual and the non-specific disease can not be deemed to have been proven only by the fact that the individual was exposed to the risk factor and the fact that the non-specific disease affected by the non-specific disease. In such a case, as a result of an epidemiological investigation conducted by comparing the exposed group with other general groups not exposed to the risk factor, it should be proved that the rate of non-specific disease caused by the non-specific disease exceeds considerably the rate of the non-specific disease in the exposed group not exposed to the risk factor, and it should be proved that the individual’s time and degree of exposure, the timing of occurrence, health conditions before the exposure to the risk factor, living habits, changes in the conditions of the disease, family history, etc., and that the non-specific disease was caused by the risk factor.

2) We examine the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records.

The non-specific disease of this case, such as urology from most relevant designated parties, is not a unique disease arising only from exposure to defoliant, but a disease that may arise from any other congenital and acquired factors.

The report of the U.S. National Institute of Sciences, based on which the court below recognized the causal relationship, was prepared to submit relevant data to the Congress of the United States and the Veterans Agency in accordance with the 1991 Act, enacted in order to establish the basis for compensation and support for veterans of the United States who participated in the War before Vietnam and claimed to have been exposed to defoliants for various diseases, for the purpose of veterans policy.

The above report states that there is a statistical relationship between exposure to defoliants and the non-specific disease of this case, namely, the exposure to defoliants and the increase of risk of the occurrence of the non-specific disease of this case, and that it does not indicate the existence of causation between the two. Furthermore, the statistical relationship here indicates only the relationship between exposure to defoliants and the result in the general population group, and it does not indicate that any individual's disease is likely to be related to exposure to defoliants, or that it is likely that the disease of this case may be caused by exposure to defoliants.

In addition, the above report does not directly conduct an epidemiological investigation against the Korean military personnel or the U.S. military personnel who participated in the Vietnam War as a specific group and compared it with other general groups, but it is merely acknowledged that there was a statistical relationship between the exposure to defoliants and the non-specific disease of this case by analyzing the epidemiological research results based on the existing thesis against the population exposed to various industrial and environment.

Therefore, this report is difficult to find out whether the rate of non-specific diseases in this case to the soldiers in the Vietnam War is higher than the rate of the outbreak to the general public who are not exposed to defoliants, and how much is high, and it is impossible to clarify how much the risk of the outbreak of the non-specific diseases in this case increases due to defoliant exposure.

Therefore, the circumstance that there was statistical relationship between defoliant exposure and the non-specific disease of this case, and the pertinent designated parties who participated in the Vietnam War contracted the non-specific disease of this case cannot be said to be probable that the non-specific disease of this case occurred due to the exposure to defoliant that was sprayed at the time of the Vietnam War. This does not change even if the relevant designated parties were to have a considerable probability of being exposed, directly or indirectly, to the defoliant that was exposed to, or remaining in, defoliant that was sprayed in the service area and neighboring areas at the time of the Vietnam War, and that there was a considerable probability that the relevant designated parties were exposed to, defoliant that were exposed, directly or indirectly, through the way of spraying that remains in the region.

3) Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise on the grounds stated in its reasoning that the pertinent designated parties suffered from the instant non-specific disease due to the exposure of the instant non-specific disease at the time of the service in the Vietnam War, and, insofar as there was no counter-proof by the Defendants to reverse the probability, the relevant designated parties suffered damage from the instant non-specific disease due to exposure of defoliant manufactured and sold by the Defendants to defoliant.

In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to epidemiological causation and probability, and as to the burden of proof, and by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal on this point has merit.

E. Meritorious of legal principles as to the statute of limitations defense

(1) Whether the extinctive prescription under Article 766(1) of the Civil Act has expired

(A) Article 766(1) of the Civil Act provides that a claim for damages caused by a tort shall expire when the victim or his/her legal representative becomes aware of the damage and of the identity of the perpetrator. Here, “the date when the victim or his/her legal representative becomes aware of the damage and of the identity of the perpetrator” refers to the date when the victim or his/her legal representative actually and specifically recognizes the damage and the perpetrator. The recognition is not sufficient solely on the presumption or awareness of the damage occurrence, but also means the date when the victim becomes aware of the existence of an illegal harmful act, the occurrence of the damage, and the causal relationship between the harmful act and the damage (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Da13282, Mar. 10, 201). In addition, whether the victim or his/her legal representative ought to reasonably recognize the damage claim by taking into account the various objective circumstances of each individual case and considering the actual circumstances enabling the damage claim (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da47949, Jun. 29, 2009).

(B) In full view of the circumstances indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s application for provisional attachment against part of the patent rights of the Defendants or the Defendant’s filing of the instant lawsuit cannot be deemed as having completed the short-term extinctive prescription under Article 76(1)6 of the Civil Act, on the ground that it is reasonable to view that the Defendant’s claim for damages from exposure to defoliants was based on adequate grounds for causation between the exposure to defoliants and the disease caused by the completion of the registration thereof, and that the Defendant’s claim for damages from exposure to defoliants was not based on adequate grounds for damages caused by exposure to defoliants. Thus, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s claim for provisional attachment against part of the patent rights before three years elapse from the date of the completion of the registration of the patient suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants among the designated parties listed in attached Table 3 of the lower judgment cannot be deemed as having completed the short-term extinctive prescription under Article 76(1)6 of the Civil Act.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below is just in rejecting the defendants' defense of extinctive prescription against the designated parties other than those for whom the three-year extinctive prescription period under Article 766(1) of the Civil Act has expired from the date of registration of patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants ( May 4, 199) or from the date of the lawsuit of this case ( September 30, 199) from the date of registration of patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants, for the above reasons. In so doing, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the starting point of the short-term extinctive prescription period under Article 766(1) of the Civil Act and the burden of proof, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

(2) Whether the extinctive prescription under Article 766(2) of the Civil Act has expired

(A) According to Article 766(2) of the Civil Act, the right to claim damages is extinguished even after ten years have elapsed since the date when the tort occurred. In the case of a claim for damages caused by a tort at intervals of time between a harmful act and the occurrence of damage, “the date when the tort occurred”, which is the starting point of the long-term extinctive prescription as above, refers to the time when objective and specific damage occurs, i.e., the time when the occurrence of damage is deemed as real, and the burden of proof as to the time when the damage occurred, is the person who asserts the benefit of extinctive prescription (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da41880, May 22, 1992, etc.)

(B) The lower court rejected the Defendants’ defense of extinctive prescription in accordance with Article 766(2) of the Civil Act, on the ground that there was no proof of the Defendants as to the period of the occurrence of the disease, except for diseases recognized to have been 10 years since May 4, 1999 or September 30, 1999 where part of the designated parties applied for provisional attachment against part of the Defendants’ patent rights at the time of occurrence, since the starting point of the long-term extinctive prescription against the instant claim for damages had the burden of proof against the Defendants claiming the benefit of extinctive prescription.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below is just in rejecting the defendants' defense of extinctive prescription under the above provision against the designated parties except for the designated parties whose 10-year extinctive prescription period under Article 766(2) of the Civil Act has expired from the date of the above provisional attachment application or the filing date of the instant lawsuit (hereinafter "designated parties whose long-term extinctive prescription period has expired"), and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the starting point of the long-term extinctive prescription under Article 766(2) of the Civil Act and the burden of proof, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

(3) Whether the statute of limitations defense against the designated parties whose statute of limitations has expired constitutes abuse of rights

(A) The obligor’s exercise of the right of defense based on the statute of limitations is subject to the control of the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. As such, in a case where the obligor, prior to the completion of the statute of limitations, made it impossible or considerably difficult for the obligee to exercise his right or the interruption of the statute of limitations, acted to make such an obligee believe it unnecessary, made the obligee unable to exercise his right, or made the obligee believe that it was objectively obstructed, or made the obligor believe that the obligor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the completion of the statute of limitations, and when the obligor exercised his right within a considerable period of time that the obligor would expect the exercise of right, the obligor’s assertion for the completion of the statute of limitations cannot be allowed as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2002Da32332, Oct. 25, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 2012Da

However, denying the validity of the completion of prescription based on the principle of trust and good faith should be limited to an exceptional limitation on the system of extinctive prescription, the ideology of which is to achieve legal stability, to relieve difficulties in proving evidence, and to impose sanctions on neglect of the exercise of rights. Therefore, the “reasonable period” of the above exercise of rights should be limited to a short period corresponding to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act, barring special circumstances. Therefore, even where it is inevitable to acknowledge the extension of the period due to special circumstances in individual cases, in cases of a claim for damages caused by tort, the period may not exceed three years, which is the short-term extinctive prescription period under Article 766(1) of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819, May 6, 2013).

(B) According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, although the Defendants, a manufacturer of defoliants, predicted or predicted the risk of causing harm to human life and body, it was difficult to measure that it was caused by defoliant’s disease, but did not properly take preventive measures. As a result, Korean military personnel, who participated in Vietnam, at the request of the Government of Vietnam and the U.S., suffered physical and mental pain without any error. In Korea, since the early 190s, there was a significant discussion about defoliant’s aftermathy, it was difficult to determine whether the Defendants returned to the Republic of Korea after the completion of their service and caused harm to human body, and even if it was difficult to recognize that the Defendants suffered harm caused by the occurrence of harm to human body, such as the occurrence of harm caused by defoliants, it was difficult to view that the Defendants suffered harm from the completion of their research outcomes in the lawsuit, including this case’s occurrence of harm caused by exposure to defoliants, even if it was extremely difficult to recognize that the disease was caused by a long period of time due to the occurrence of harm to human body.

In light of the above circumstances and the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that there was a disability that it is difficult to expect that the Defendants exercise their rights to claim compensation against the damages caused by defoliants until the designated parties for whom the long-term statute of limitations has expired exercise their rights within a considerable period of time after the registration as patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants, by being registered as patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants and became aware that their diseases were related to exposure to defoliants manufactured and sold by the Defendants. Therefore, if the designated parties for whom the long-term statute of limitations has expired exercise their rights within a considerable period of time after the registration as patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants, the Defendants’ assertion that the statute of limitations expired is abuse of rights against the principle of trust and good faith and thus, cannot be allowed.

Furthermore, among the designated parties who applied for provisional attachment or filed the instant lawsuit after registering as patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants, the designated parties, other than 1,725, 6,586, and 9,742 listed in the attached Table 3 of the judgment of the court below, are manufactured and sold by the Defendants located in the United States. Therefore, careful review of international jurisdiction and governing law was required. Many evidence regarding the harmfulness of human body and defects in defoliants contained in defoliants are located in the United States, and there were considerable difficulties for the designated parties to exercise their rights, such as filing an application for provisional attachment or filing a lawsuit against the Defendants within a period equivalent to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act after the registration of patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants. Considering this, it is reasonable to deem that the remaining designated parties exercised their rights within a reasonable period that could exclude the Defendants’ defense of extinctive prescription.

Therefore, although the court below was somewhat inappropriate or inadequate at the time of this part of the reasoning, the conclusion of rejecting the defendants' defense of extinctive prescription against the remaining designated parties is just, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to the abuse of rights in the defense of extinctive prescription, as

(C) Meanwhile, the lower court determined that the Defendants’ defense of extinctive prescription cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights on the ground that there was an obstacle that it was difficult for the Defendants to expect to file a lawsuit claiming damages against defoliants until they are registered as patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants, with respect to the exercise of their right to claim damages. However, the lower court’s determination on this part is difficult to accept.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the aforementioned designated parties filed an application for provisional attachment of part of the patent rights of the Defendants or the instant lawsuit without such provisional attachment after three years from the date they were registered as patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants, and there is no evidence to deem that the aforementioned designated parties exercised their rights before the provisional attachment

Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the aforementioned designated parties recognized the existence of the right to claim damages against the Defendants by registering as a patient suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants, and the exercise of the right to claim damages was possible. Thus, there were no obstacles to objectively exercising the right. However, since the aforementioned designated parties applied for provisional attachment or filed the instant lawsuit without provisional attachment after three years from that time, and the Defendants’ defense of extinctive prescription cannot be deemed as abuse of rights.

Nevertheless, the court below determined that the statute of limitations defense against the above designated parties constitutes abuse of rights, and thus, this part of the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to abuse of rights in the defense of extinctive prescription, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal on this point is justified.

F. Other grounds of appeal

(1) Violation of the legal principles as to government contractor defenses under the U.S. law

As long as the law of the Republic of Korea is recognized as the governing law of the instant case, all matters regarding the requirements for establishment of a tort, capacity of a tort, effect of a tort, etc. shall be determined by the law of the Republic of Korea, and the U.S. law cannot be considered as the governing law only with regard to the grounds for exemption from liability. Therefore, the so-called government-contractor defense

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to government contractor defenses under the law of the United States.

(2) Whether the act was legitimate

The court below determined that even if the Defendants’ act of manufacturing and selling defoliant was based on laws and regulations, the Defendants’ act of manufacturing and selling defective defoliant, which violated their duty to prevent high risk, cannot be deemed reasonable socially, and thus, it cannot be deemed as a legitimate act.

In light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there are no errors of exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or of misapprehending the legal principles on justifiable acts, as otherwise alleged in the ground of

(3) Whether the act was forced or not

Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the court below is just in holding that the defendants' act of manufacturing and selling defective defoliants cannot be deemed to be a forced act that could not have been expected to avoid it, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to forced acts as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

(4) Whether an emergency evacuation is an emergency

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the court below is just in holding that the defendants' act of manufacturing and selling defective products does not constitute an emergency evacuation since it cannot be viewed as an act of avoiding the present imminent danger and it cannot be viewed as an act of avoiding the current imminent danger, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding legal principles as to emergency evacuation as otherwise alleged in

(5) Claim on the computation of consolation money

The court shall determine the amount of consolation money in consideration of all the circumstances between the victim and the perpetrator. Thus, it can be considered when determining the amount of consolation money, such as whether the victim is able to receive compensation for property damage caused by the accident in question from the perpetrator, and the reasons such as the amount of consolation money.

The lower court determined that most of the property losses suffered by the designated parties as indicated in the Attachment No. 3 List of the lower judgment are impossible or difficult to determine or prove the amount, and thus, such reasons were also considered in determining the amount of consolation money.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the calculation of consolation money as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

In addition, the ground of appeal on the computation of consolation money is merely an error in the selection of evidence and fact-finding which belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the fact-finding court, and it cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal.

(6) Whether the starting date of the damages for delay violates the principle of pleading.

If there is a considerable interval between the time of illegal act and the time of damages, the time of damages for delay shall be the initial date of damages for delay (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da76368 decided July 28, 201).

The lower court, based on its stated reasoning, ordered the commencement date of registration of patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants at the time of the occurrence of the disease after exposure to defoliants, and ordered the time of registration of patients suffering from actual aftereffects of defoliants to pay damages for delay.

The above determination by the court below was made in favor of the Defendants by recognizing the date on which the damages for delay was actually incurred, and thus, it cannot be accepted that the Defendants asserted the violation of the principle of pleading against the designated parties whose claim for damages had not been extinguished by the statute of limitations among the designated parties who suffered from exposure to defoliants, and argued that the calculation of damages for delay was erroneous.

(7) Whether other litigation procedures are unlawful

The defendants alleged that the court below unfairly solicited the plaintiffs to submit evidence, the defendants provided an opportunity to defend against the defendants after the closing of pleadings upon the motion for resumption of pleadings only for a short time, and that the examination of evidence was conducted without any military service records or medical records. However, the defendants' assertion in the grounds of appeal is nothing more than attributable to the court's exercise of discretion or right to explanation or the selection of evidence belonging to the fact-finding court's discretionary power or right to explanation, and thus, it cannot be accepted.

2. Regarding the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal

A. Violation of the rules of evidence on causation and misapprehension of the legal principle

(1) The lower court, based on its adopted evidence, found the facts as indicated in its reasoning: (i) It is a disease recognized to provide compensation or assistance from the perspective of veterans policy despite lack of evidence to acknowledge epidemiological causal relationship with defoliant exposure; (ii) it is difficult for Nonparty 1, the originator of Nonparty 2, to have had professional knowledge about epidemiological or medical science at the request of the Plaintiff in a lawsuit related to defoliants; (iii) the epidemiological investigation report by Nonparty 2, which was conducted based on the law of defoliants, is hard to find out that there was a low reliability on the process of selecting defoliants and conducted an investigation based on the law of defoliants 2; and (iv) it is difficult to find that there is no other objective evidence to acknowledge the causal relationship between the 3th anniversary of the amendment of the law of defoliants and the 3th anniversary of the fact that it is difficult to find out that there is no other evidence to acknowledge the causal relationship between the 3th anniversary of the 1st Amendment of the law of defoliants, and thus, it is difficult to use the 4th dynamic research method as evidence to find it as an internal evidence for environmental protection.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is acceptable, and there is no error of exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or of misapprehending the legal principles as to causation, as otherwise alleged in the

(2) In addition, the causal relationship between the harmful act and the occurrence of damage in a claim for damages due to a tort lawsuit is determined whether or not there exists or not, and it cannot be recognized at a certain rate, so-called "ratioal causal relationship" cannot be accepted.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the percentage causation as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal

B. Meritorious of legal principles as to the calculation of consolation money

(1) Inasmuch as a claim for compensation for property damage and a claim for compensation for mental damage are separate claims different from each other, the parties to the lawsuit shall specify the amount of the lawsuit and make a determination as to the propriety of each claim by the court (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da32569, Sept. 22, 2006, etc.). In addition, the amount of consolation money for mental damage caused by a tort may be determined at the discretion of the fact-finding court in consideration of various circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da66001, Jun. 23, 2005, etc.).

(2) Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and records, it is just to determine that the court below cannot recognize comprehensive consolation money in lieu of property damage compensation, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the calculation of consolation money as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

3. The scope of reversal of the part of the judgment below against the defendants

A. Of the designated parties listed in the attached Table 3 of the judgment below, the part accepting part of the claim for damages by the designated parties suffering from a disease, other than salt scalkin, is unlawful since it is difficult to recognize causation. Thus, this part shall be reversed.

However, although the part accepting the claim of 10,340, 12,835, 13,053, 13, and 13,801 on the same list of urology and urology together with urology and urology was erroneous in recognizing causation with respect to urology that is difficult to recognize causation, the court below determined the amount of consolation money in consideration of the main criteria of disability rating, the amount of consolation money calculated, and other various circumstances that can be known by the record, even without considering the circumstance attributable to urology, it is reasonable for the court below to determine the amount of consolation money calculated with respect to the above urology. Accordingly, this part is justified and there is no error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment, and there is no ground for reversal.

B. On the other hand, the part of the judgment of the court below which partially accepted the claim for damages by the designated parties 1,725, 6,586, and 9,742 as shown in the attached list No. 3 of the judgment below is unlawful since the defendants' defense of extinctive prescription cannot be deemed to constitute abuse of rights, since it is unlawful as it does not constitute abuse of rights. Thus, this

C. Ultimately, among the part of the judgment below against the Defendants, the part of the judgment below against the Defendants: ① 1,082, 3,818, 9,562, 12,248, 13,053, and ② 559, 598, 598, 626, 626, 3,750, 567, 6865, 686, 614, 150, 3614, 150, 157, 164, 305, 150, 157, 164, 150, 2, 626, 3,750, 650, 686, 686, 136, 636, 136, 464, 157, 305, 154, 165, 164, 165

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the Defendants, excluding the part concerning the designated parties who partially accepted the claim, is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The remaining appeals by the Defendants and the plaintiffs' appeals are all dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

[Attachment] List of Appointeds: Omitted

Justices Kim Shin (Presiding Justice)