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(영문) 대법원 1987. 2. 24. 선고 86다카1625 판결

[토지소유권이전등기][공1987.4.15.(798),522]

Main Issues

(a) Oral principles and indirect facts;

B. Whether the recognition of the initial date for acquisition by prescription, contrary to the allegations by the parties, violates the principle of pleading

Summary of Judgment

(a) The term "the fact that it refers to the fact that it is referred to in the principle of pleading does not include any indirect facts that help to confirm the existence of the right, which is necessary directly to judge the legal effect of the extinction of the right;

B. As to the prescriptive acquisition of real estate, the starting period of possession, which is the basis for calculating the period of possession, shall be deemed to be only an indirect fact that makes an indirect and means room in determining the period of possession, which is the requisite fact for the prescriptive acquisition, and thus, it cannot be said that it was acknowledged differently from the allegations of the parties,

[Reference Provisions]

(a) Article 188 of the Civil Procedure Act;

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 76Da2083 delivered on January 11, 197, 81Da38 delivered on December 14, 1982. Supreme Court Decision 74Da384 delivered on August 30, 1974, Supreme Court Decision 80Da2671 delivered on June 22, 1982, 82Da565 delivered on November 9, 1982

Plaintiff-Appellee

[Defendant-Appellee] Defendant 1

Defendant, the superior, or the senior

Defendant (Attorney Kang-ho, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Jeju District Court Decision 85Na92 delivered on June 20, 1986

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The lower court determined, based on its evidence, that: (a) the Defendant and the deceased non-party 1 applied for the allocation of farmland under the name of the Defendant to bear the reimbursement amount according to their respective shares as to ( Address 1 omitted) 2606 square meters prior to Seopo-si, a farmland devolving upon the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act on December 30, 1949; (b) the Defendant applied for the allocation of farmland under the name of the Defendant; (c) the repayment was completed upon the allocation of farmland in its name; and (d) the Plaintiff decided to own the farmland in installments pursuant to their respective shares after completing the registration of ownership transfer on April 24, 1959; and (e) the deceased non-party 1, from that time on September 25, 1959, was under the possession and management of ( Address 2 omitted) 839 square meters prior to that time on December 30, 1960; and (e) the Plaintiff continued to own and manage the remaining 415 square meters after the Plaintiff’s possession and the Plaintiff’s heir’s possession.

In light of the records, the court below is just in reviewing the process of the above fact-finding in light of the records, and there is no error of violation of the rules of evidence such as the theory of lawsuit, any error in the reasoning or the lack of reasoning, nor any error of misapprehending the legal principles on the presumption of possession frequently

2. The phrase "fact that is referred to in the principle of pleading" should be deemed not to include any indirect facts that help confirm the existence or absence of a right, which is necessary directly, in determining the legal effect of the creation and extinguishment of a right. As such, in acquiring real estate by prescription, the starting period of possession, which is the basis for calculating the prescriptive acquisition period, is nothing more than an indirect fact that makes an indirect and means room in determining the period of possession, which is the requisite fact for prescriptive acquisition, and thus, it cannot be said that it was judged differently from the plaintiff's assertion that it did not follow the facts of assertion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 4293Da529, Oct. 26, 1961; 74Da384, Aug. 30, 197; 80Da2671, Jun. 22, 1982; 82Da565, Nov. 9, 1982; 206Da15675, Apr. 16, 1967).

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices O Sung-sung (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-제주지방법원 1986.6.20선고 85나92
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