2. The Commissioner of the Daegu Regional Employment and Labor Office for Permanent Residence;

3. The Commissioner of the Daegu Regional Employment and Labor Office;

(a) Payment of training expenses and prior disposition of this case;

(1) On March 10, 2008, the Plaintiff was recognized as a vocational skills development training course pursuant to Article 24 of the former Act on the Development of Workers’ Vocational Skills (amended by Act No. 9316, Dec. 31, 2008; hereinafter referred to as the “former Act on the Development of Vocational Skills”) for the sake of improving the job ability of self-employed workers (the training period: from March 11, 2008 to April 3, 2008; hereinafter referred to as the “instant training”).

(2) After conducting the instant training on April 11, 2008, the Plaintiff applied for subsidization of expenses for vocational skills development training to the head of the Daegu Regional Employment and Labor Office (hereinafter referred to as the “head of Dae-gu”), and the head of the Defendant Dae-gu paid KRW 1,108,560 to the Plaintiff on April 21, 2008, which includes KRW 61,580 for trainees B.

(3) From April 21, 2008 to April 20, 2009, the head of the permanent branch office of the Daegu Regional Employment and Labor Office (hereinafter referred to as the “head of the permanent branch office”) subsidized the Plaintiff KRW 6,689,830 for training expenses for the vocational ability development pursuant to Article 24 of the former Development of Vocational Skills Act.

(4) The head of the Gu-gu Regional Employment and Labor Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “head of the Gu-U.S.”) provided the Plaintiff with training costs of KRW 4,726,720 pursuant to Article 24 of the former Development of Vocational Skills Act from April 21, 208 to April 20, 209, and April 20.

(5) The Board of Audit and Inspection and the Ministry of Employment and Labor, around August 2010, notified the head of the Gyeonggi Labor Branch of a list of trainees who entered or depart from the Republic of Korea during the vocational skills development training period, and requested the head of the Gyeonggi Labor Branch to conduct an investigation as to whether the management of the illegal departure was conducted. As a result, the head of the Defendant Dae-gu conducted an investigation as to whether the trainee B, who is an employee of the Plaintiff, left the Republic of Korea from March 25, 2008 to April 2, 2008, and was absent for 3 days on March 27, 2008 and April 1, 208, the total amount of KRW 160,00,000 (amended by Presidential Decree No. 2510, Apr. 20, 2011; Presidential Decree No. 2515, Mar. 16, 2008).

B. Details of the instant disposition

(1) On June 21, 201, the head of the defendant Dae-gu issued a disposition of revocation of recognition of the process No. 1-2 or No. 2 in the No. 1-2 or No. 2 of the Attached Table No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the "No. 1") and a disposition of restriction on payment (hereinafter referred to as the "No. 2").

(2) The head of the permanent domicile of the defendant and the head of the Gu/U.S. shall order the plaintiff to return the support training funds listed in the [Attachment 1] Nos. 3 through 4 pursuant to the Disposition No. 2 (Disposition No. 2) of this case (hereinafter referred to as the "Disposition No. 3 to 4 of this case").

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1 to 3-2, Eul evidence 1 to 5, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion is as follows.

(a) the application for the subsidy to the trainee B is only the number of times caused by a simple administrative error that is lighted due to the excessive work of the person in charge of education, which is not by fraud or improper means;

B. Article 56(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22026, Feb. 8, 2010) (hereinafter “Enforcement Decree of the instant case”) is null and void by exceeding the bounds of delegation under Article 35(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, or by excessively infringing the Plaintiff’s property right, thereby violating the Constitution. The scope of the disposition of return of subsidies based on a restriction on payment is limited to those provided by false or other unlawful means, or to the relevant workplace.

D. In imposing sanctions against illegal receipt of subsidies, the Defendants’ act of imposing the instant disposition under the former Employment Insurance Act, which is not the former Act on the Development of Human Resources, is unlawful as it deviates from the scope of discretion or abused discretion.

E. Article 9(3) [Attachment 2] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Development of Skill Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor No. 320 of Apr. 1, 2009; hereinafter “Enforcement Rule of the former Development of Skill Act”) provides that the amount subsidized as expenses for workplace skill development training by trainees B is KRW 61,580, and the degree of the violation is minor and there is no intentional negligence, and the disposition of this case should be mitigated pursuant to Article 9(3) [Attachment 2] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Development of Skill Act.

3. Related statutes;

Attached 2 is as shown in the "related Acts and subordinate statutes".

4. Facts of recognition;

A. The instant training is a self-training conducted by the Daegu Headquarters affiliated with the Plaintiff, the business owner.

B. B included in the list of trainees of the instant training was unable to sign an attendance book for 3 days ( March 25, 2008, March 27, 2008, March 2008, March 27, 2008, April 1, 2008) from March 25, 2008 to April 2, 2008 by using annual paid leave to travel abroad. A training officer of the instant case confirmed the attendance book only after the completion of the instant training and had B attend the attendance book.

D. The confirmation of the attendance of the instant training is that the trainee himself/herself sign the attendance book at the time of commencement and termination of the training, and the person in charge of the training or the training instructor has his/her signature on this confirmation.

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 9 to 10, Eul evidence 1 to 5, the purport of the whole pleadings

5. Determination

A. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2. A

(1) Sanction against violation of administrative regulations is a sanction against the objective fact that is a violation of administrative regulations to achieve administrative purposes, and thus, barring any special circumstance, such as where a failure to perform his/her duties is not caused by an intentional act or negligence, it may be imposed even on the violator (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 98Du5972, May 26, 2000; 20025177, Sept. 2, 2003); and "any false or other unlawful means" means any unlawful act committed by an unqualified business owner in order to conceal the eligibility to receive payment or the lack of eligibility to receive payment of incentives for promotion of new employment, which may affect the decision-making on the payment of incentives for promotion of employment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2009Du4272, Jun. 11, 2009; 2005Du727, Feb. 27, 2005).

(2) We examine the following circumstances, i.e., (i) as if a trainee B departs from a foreign country and did not participate in the instant training; (ii) as if the trainee B participated in the training, the fact is stated differently from the fact that the trainee B participated in the training; and (iii) the subsidies for training costs are

Since it is essential to accurately confirm the attendance of the plaintiff. ③ The training of this case is planned and operated by the plaintiff itself as workplace skill development training, not by the entrusted training, but by 18 trainees, and it was easy for the plaintiff to attend and manage the training.) It is reasonable to deem that the plaintiff's worker B did not participate in the training of this case due to the use of annual paid leave, and thus, the plaintiff was negligent in the plaintiff because he could have known that he did not participate in the training of this case. Even if he did not know the fact, he could have known that he did not know that he did not participate in the training of this case. ⑤ In light of the fact that the plaintiff discovered that the attendance attendance was not properly managed after the completion of the training of this case, and obtained the signature from the trainee B after the fact that the plaintiff was confirmed by the attendance division, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

B. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2.B.

(1) Whether the parent law is out of the scope of delegation

Article 35 (1) of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that the Minister of Labor may restrict support to a person who has received or intends to receive support by fraud or other improper means as prescribed by the Presidential Decree, and may order him/her to return the support already provided. In light of the purpose and purport of workplace skill development projects and the content thereof, it is reasonable to deem that the Presidential Decree is delegated to the Minister of Labor as to whether the Minister of Labor must issue a restriction on support or an order to return the support, and therefore, the provision of the Enforcement Decree of the case does not exceed the scope of delegation under Article 56 of the former Employment Insurance Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Du6105, Oct. 27, 2006).

(2) Whether it violates the principle of excessive prohibition

The enforcement decree of this case does not grant any kind of incentives, etc. to a person who has received or intended to receive incentives, etc. by fraud or other improper means, regardless of whether they are related to false or other improper means, and if they have been paid by mistake, it is reasonable to deem that the provision of this case is a provision that has been prepared to achieve the purpose of sanctions against unjust recipients of incentives, etc., by ordering the return thereof if they were paid by mistake, and to achieve the purpose of preventing unjust payments of future incentives, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du6476, Aug. 20, 2009).

As above, the enforcement decree of this case is just and its purpose was limited to one year, not for a long period of time, in a way to achieve its purpose, and thus, the infringement of property rights was limited to a minimum limit. The necessity of the public interest to strictly control and manage the payment of subsidies for the establishment of employment insurance finance and the efficient and transparent operation of the support system is greater than the private interest infringed upon by the restriction on payment of subsidies. If the fact that the payment of subsidies was received through false or other unlawful means was discovered, the subsidy was not paid for one year during the restriction period of payment if it was found that the fact was found that the fact was delayed, and the restriction on the scope of return of the subsidy was not a whole of the subsidy paid for one year during the restriction period of payment, but a part of the subsidy was found to be more favorable, and thus it does not violate the principle of excessive prohibition. In light of the above, the enforcement decree of this case cannot be deemed to violate the principle of excessive prohibition.

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

C. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2. C

However, Article 56(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act does not provide, or intend to receive, subsidies by fraud or other improper means, for one year from the date on which the person received or applied for payment, and if there exists any subsidy, etc. within the payment restriction period, the person ordered the return of the subsidy, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du6476, Aug. 20, 2009). Thus, it cannot be deemed that the subsidy, etc. paid during the payment restriction period is limited to the subsidy, etc. paid by fraud or other improper means, or that it is limited to the place of business paid in a false or other unlawful manner. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

D. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion No. 2. D

(1) Whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion under the social norms shall be determined by comparing and balancing the degree of infringement on public interest and the disadvantages suffered by an individual due to such disposition, by objectively examining the content of the offense, which is the reason for the disposition, the public interest to be achieved by the relevant disposition, and all the relevant circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du6946, Sept. 20, 2007)

Article 35 (1) of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that the Minister of Labor may order a person who has received or intends to receive support for employment security and vocational skills development activities by fraud or other improper means to restrict the support or return the support already provided, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. Article 35 (2) of the same Act provides that where the Minister of Labor orders the return pursuant to paragraph (1) of the same Article, he/she may additionally collect an amount not exceeding the amount paid by fraud or other improper means according to the standards prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor. The proviso provides that Article 16 (5) 1 of the same Act and Article 25 (4) 1 of the same Act (the provision where the State or a local government entrusts workplace skill development training) shall apply mutatis mutandis to a person who conducts workplace skill development training under subparagraph 1 of Article 2 of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills.

Meanwhile, according to Article 25 (4) of the former Workers' Vocational Skills Development Act, the Minister of Labor may order a person whose recognition has been revoked pursuant to paragraph (1) or a business owner, workers, business owners' organizations, etc., or vocational skills development organizations whose participation in courses or loans have been restricted pursuant to paragraph (3) to return all or part of the amount already provided or loaned. In such cases, the amount already provided by fraud or other improper means among the amount already provided pursuant to the standards prescribed by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor may be additionally collected.

(2) Comprehensively considering the contents of the above provisions and the relevant provisions of the former Employment Insurance Act, where a business owner receives training costs by false or other unlawful means in conducting workplace skill development training after obtaining recognition from the Minister of Labor in accordance with the former Act on the Development of Vocational Skills, along with various sanctions prescribed in Article 25 of the former Development of Skills Act (a recognition cancellation, recognition restriction, restriction on recognition, restriction on subsidies or loans, order for return of illegally received amount, order for return of additionally collected amount), pursuant to Article 35(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act and Article 56(1) and (2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act.

Article 25(4)1 of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that a person who has received or intends to receive training expenses by fraud or other improper means shall not be obliged to pay the remaining training expenses, and shall not be paid subsidies, etc. for one year from the date he/she has received or applied for payment of training expenses. However, if an additional amount is collected with respect to an order to refund training expenses paid by fraud or other improper means pursuant to Article 35(2) of the former Employment Insurance Act, it is reasonable to deem that the scope of such amount shall be determined pursuant to Article 25(4)1 of the former Workers’ Vocational Skills Development Act. The above provision differs from the subject and contents of the regulation, and there is no ground to deem that the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers is preferentially applied to the Employment Insurance Act as a special law of the Employment Insurance Act, and it is difficult to deem that the Defendants violated discretionary power on the ground that they were

E. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion Nos. 2. E

(1) According to Article 25(1) of the former Act on the Development of Skills, where a person who has obtained recognition of a training course commits an act falling under any of the subparagraphs of Article 25(1) of the former Act on the Development of Skill, the Minister of Labor may order correction or revoke recognition of the training course, but has received support by fraud or other improper means (Article 25(2)). On the other hand, pursuant to Article 9(3) [Attachment 2] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Development of Skill (amended by Labor Ordinance No. 320 of April 1, 2009; hereinafter “Enforcement Rule of the former Act on the Development of Skill”; 1. A. (1) of the same Act, where a person who has obtained recognition of a training course commits an act falling under any of the subparagraphs of Article 25(1) of the former Act on the Development of Skill, the Minister of Labor shall issue a corrective order, revoke recognition, or restrict recognition in accordance with individual standards, but where the degree of violation is insignificant or insignificant, a corrective order may be mitigated within the extent of one-half.

(2) The proviso of Article 25(1) of the former Development of Skills Act provides that the recognition shall be revoked by fraud or other improper means (Article 25(2)), and that there is no room for discretion. ② The criteria for the cancellation of recognition, etc. of training courses are merely that the criteria for taking measures such as the cancellation of recognition, etc. under Article 9(3) [Attachment 2] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Development of Skills Act are not effective externally by the court or citizens. ③ In light of the fact that there is no intentional or gross negligence in receiving the support by fraud or other improper means, or that it is difficult to deem that the degree of violation is minor, as seen earlier, if there is no intentional or gross negligence in receiving the support, or if the degree of violation is minor, the provision that can be mitigated within the scope of 1/2 (a corrective order in cases of revocation) of the criteria set forth in the individual criteria, and thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Civil Service Bureau

Judges Kim Yong-nam

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.