A. The part of the claim for confirmation of ownership in the principal lawsuit against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) 1 by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) is dismissed.

B. As to each real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 3, (1) the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) 1 fulfilled the registration procedure for cancellation of ownership transfer completed on December 30, 1998 by Suwon District Court Dongwon District Court, Dongwon District Court, the registration office of 197097, and (2) Defendant 2 fulfilled the registration procedure for transfer of ownership based on sale on February 17, 1998 against the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant).

C. Defendant 1 (Counterclaim Plaintiff) performed the procedure for registration of ownership transfer on the ground of unjust enrichment return on each real estate listed in the attached Table 1 list to the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant), and implemented the procedure for registration of cancellation of ownership registration completed as of December 28, 2007 with respect to the real estate listed in paragraph (1) other than the 86.4 square meters on the first floor among the real estate listed in the attached Table 2 list (1) and the registration of cancellation completed as of December 28, 2007, as of the real estate listed in the attached Table 2 list.

D. The Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) 1 shall deliver to the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) each of the real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1 and the remainder of Paragraph 1, excluding the 86.4m2 of the real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1 and the 36.4m2 of the real estate listed in the

E. The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant)’s claim against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) on each real estate listed in the separate sheet Nos. 3, and the remainder of the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) claim against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) and the counterclaim claim against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) 1 are all dismissed.

2. The total cost of the lawsuit is borne by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) and the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Plaintiff) each by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and the remainder by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Plaintiff) and the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) and the part by the Defendant (Counterclaim Defendant).

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 (d) may be provisionally executed.

A. As to each real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 3, Defendant 1, around the other hand, performed the procedure for ownership transfer registration for the reason of the transfer agreement on January 29, 2009, and sought a preliminary judgment as set forth in Section 1-B of the Disposition.

B. Defendant 1: (1) The registration procedure for transfer of ownership based on unjust enrichment on each real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1; (4) the registration procedure for cancellation of each real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 26290, No. 26291, and No. 26292, which was completed on December 28, 2007 with respect to each real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 2, shall be followed; and (2) the real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 2 shall be confirmed as owned by the Plaintiff; (3) the amount of money calculated at the rate of 20% per annum from the day after delivery to the day of complete payment; and (4) the real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1 and No. 2 shall be transferred.

2. Claim for a counterclaim

The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant 1 the amount of KRW 820 million and the amount of KRW 700 million each year from August 25, 2008 to the service date of the counterclaim, 5% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment, 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment, and 20% per annum from the day after the service date of the counterclaim to the day of full payment.

3. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiff: The part against the plaintiff among the judgment of the court of first instance on the main lawsuit is revoked and the plaintiff's claim on the main lawsuit corresponding to this part is accepted.

B. Defendant 1

The part against Defendant 1 among the judgment of the first instance on the principal lawsuit is revoked and the plaintiff's claim on the principal lawsuit corresponding to this part is dismissed. The judgment of the first instance on the counterclaim shall be revoked and the counterclaim claim by Defendant 1 shall be accepted.

A. On July 3, 1974, Defendant 1 retired from office on March 2008, when he was appointed as a member of the Plaintiff church, and Nonparty 1 was appointed as a member of the Plaintiff church as the successor of Defendant 1.

B. As to each land listed in the separate sheet No. 1 (hereinafter “the instant land”), the ownership transfer registration was completed in Defendant 1 on the ground of sale over 1982 and 1983. Specific circumstances, such as the date of the ownership transfer registration and the date of the sale and purchase contract on the register, are as follows (where the instant ○○ land is called for according to the order of ownership transfer registration, it shall be indicated as “(i) or (v) land” in the order thereof.

① The land for which registration of ownership transfer was made on June 15, 1982 by Suwon District Court, Suwon District Court, port of registry, and port of registry on June 15, 1982 (the date of the sales contract on the register): ○○○○○○ (on June 15, 1982, the date of the sales contract on the register): (on June 15, 1982, the current address: ○○○○○ (on June 15, 1982, the current address: hereinafter the same shall apply) in the Gyeonggi-do, Gyeonggi-do ( Address 1 omitted), forest land of 84,92 square meters in size as shown in the table below, and

(6) Attached 1. (No. 6. 1. 6. 6) Land (No. 9. 1. 4. 6. 6. 9) No. 97. 1. 1. 6, and (No. 97. 4. 6. 1. 6. 9) No. 97. 4. 1. 6. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 2. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 4. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 4. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 8. 1. 1. 1. 8. 1. . 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. . . 1. 1. . 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

② Land, the ownership of which was transferred on August 2, 1982 by the same registry office as 11901 (the date of the sales contract on the register): Land located in the Gyeonggi-do-gun, Gyeonggi-do ( Address 13 omitted), 324 square meters, and 1,038 square meters in the same Ri, and 58 square meters in the same Ri - Land No. 1,038 square meters in attached Tables 1 and 7.

(3) Land, the ownership of which was transferred on August 31, 1982 by the same registry office (the date of the sales contract on the register): Land No. 239 square meters ( Address 14 omitted) and No. 9 attached Table 1.

④ The land, the ownership of which was transferred on July 13, 1983 as the receipt of 16890 on the register (the date of the sales contract on the register): The land is the land located on July 9, 1983, the scale of which is 2,016 square meters of forest land and 1,160 square meters of the same Ri ( Address 15 omitted), 1,160 square meters of land and 149 square meters of the same Ri ( Address 16 omitted), 149 square meters of the same Ri ( Address 17 omitted), 10,11, and 12 attached Table 1.

(5) Land, the ownership of which was transferred on August 1, 1983 by the same registry office (on July 30, 1983, the date of the sales contract on the register): Land No. 545 square meters of forest land and 545 square meters of forest land and 8 attached Table 1, which was transferred on August 1, 1983:

C. Around October 1982, the Plaintiff church used a temporary worship of the building on the instant ○○ Ri land as a temporary exhibition place. On October 14, 1982, Defendant 1 had obtained a building permit from the competent authority on the instant land on the land attached Table 1, 2, and 3 from October 14, 1982, and had been started, and construction work on the instant ○○ Ri land on June 14, 1985, most of the real estate in attached Table 2, Paragraph 1 of the [Attachment 2, 1,09.4 square meters, not 220 square meters, and 86.4 square meters and 70 square meters of the 1st, 3rd, 196.4 square meters of the 1st, 4th, 1985 (hereinafter “1st building”) or 194 square meters of the 196th, 206th, 196.

D. The first building was used as a Dogwon (the name was “△△△ Dogwon”). Since 1996, it was used as a Dogwon from around 199, and the building listed in attached Table 2 List 2 (hereinafter “second building”) was completed on November 17, 199, and the building management ledger was prepared in the name of Defendant 1 on the same day after obtaining approval for use on November 17, 1999. The building construction listed in attached Table 2 List 2 List 3 (hereinafter “third building”) was completed on October 17, 200, and it was completed on October 17, 200.

E. Each of the buildings listed in the attached Table 2 (including both the first, additional, second, and third buildings; hereinafter “each of the buildings of this case”) was unregistered, but Defendant 1 completed each registration of preservation of ownership in its own name on December 28, 2007.

F. On February 17, 1998, the Plaintiff church purchased each of the lands listed in the annexed Table 3 (hereinafter “instant land”) from Defendant 2 for KRW 1,09,2,000,000,000,000 from Defendant 2, and was unable to transfer the ownership to the name of the church in the name of the instant land of the instant Dong, which is farmland, after obtaining the understanding of Defendant 2, the purchaser was under the name of Nonparty 2, who is the Plaintiff church, and later changed to Defendant 1, and Defendant 2 completed the registration of ownership transfer on the instant land of the instant Dong on December 30, 1998.

[Ground for recognition: Facts without dispute; Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 3, 25 through 29, 118, 121 through 125 (in the case of documentary evidence which does not separately refer to the provisional number, including all branch numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply); Eul's statement of evidence Nos. 56 through 70; and the purport of the whole pleadings]

2. Determination on the part of the main lawsuit against Defendant 1 concerning the claim for ownership confirmation and the defense against Defendant 1 before the main lawsuit

The contents to be explained in this part are as follows: (a) Articles 2 and 3 of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance except for the modification of “the instant flagwon” to “each building of this case” (main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act).

3. Claim against Defendant 1 for the remainder of the principal lawsuit

A. Claim on ○○○ land of this case

(1) The parties' assertion

As the Plaintiff purchased the instant land of ○○○, which is the money accumulated by the Plaintiff church in order to establish the Dogwon, and entered into a sales contract under the name of Defendant 1, who is a pastor of the Plaintiff church at the time of the purchase of the instant land of Dogwon, and completed the registration of ownership transfer in the future of Defendant 1, there is a title trust relationship between the Plaintiff church and Defendant 1. Even if the title trust agreement is null and void pursuant to the Act on the Registration of Real Estate under Actual Titleholder’s Name (hereinafter “Real Estate Real Name Act”), Defendant 1 acquired the complete ownership of the instant land of ○○○○○, thereby unjust enrichment, Defendant 1 asserts that he is obligated to implement the procedures for the registration of ownership transfer on the instant land of ○○○○○, and deliver the instant land to the Plaintiff.

In regard to this, Defendant 1 asserted that the instant ○○ land was purchased with its own funds and was only owned by Defendant 1, and that the instant ○○ land was not nominally owned by the Plaintiff.

(2) Determination

In light of the following circumstances, additional evidence of the above basic facts and the above basic facts, Gap 5 through 22, 31 through 39, 44 through 93, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 118 through 133, Eul 16, 16, 20, part of Eul 4 and 20, Eul 4 and 20, and the testimony of non-party 3, the plaintiff church purchased the land of this case with the amount accumulated in order to establish the Dolwon site, and it is sufficiently confirmed that the title trust was made in the name of defendant 1, who is the Dolwon's company, and the non-party 2-2, subparagraph 17, 2-2, subparagraph 2-2, subparagraph 2-2, subparagraph 2-2, subparagraph 2-2, subparagraph 17, 2-17, 21 through 36-4, 361 through 4, respectively.

With respect to the purchase price of the instant land at ○○○○○○, Defendant 1 stated that the purchase price of the instant land at KRW 34 million was KRW 34 million (the reply of April 21, 2009), Defendant 1 purchased KRW 28 million in the year 1982, KRW 5 million in the subsequent purchase of additional land at KRW 1-2 years, and KRW 1.5 million in the subsequent purchase (Evidence 34-5,6). The sum of the purchase price indicated in the sales contract and receipt of the instant land at KRW 34.5 million in total is KRW 27 million in total, KRW 300,000 in total, KRW 30,00 in the registry (No. 100, KRW 100 in the above registry, and KRW 100,300 in the above registry) and KRW 305,300 in the above registry (No. 306,50,000 in the above registry).

The plaintiff church's 1983 council's 1983 council's 30. The 1983th council's 3th council's 40th council's 9th council's 3th council's 1983th council's 19,419,858's 161,00 won, the 160th council's 3th council's 3th council's 9th council's 9th council's 3th council's 198 association's 3th council's 9th council's 190 association's 3th council's 9th council's 190 association's 3th council's 9th council's 190 association's 3th council's 3th council's 9th council's 1982 association's 3th council's 190 association's 3th council's 9th council's 1982 association's 3th council's 19.

Moreover, taking into account the fact that Defendant 1 purchased the 1974 church's 1974 church's 20th anniversary of the fact that the 198th anniversary of the fact that the 198th anniversary of the fact that the 198th anniversary of the fact that the 198th anniversary of the purchase of the church's properties, the 198th anniversary of the fact that the 19th anniversary of the 198th 19th 7th 198th 7th 198, the 198th 1st 196th 2th 196th 197, the 198th 1st 196th 16th 196, the 198th 2nd 197th 197th 197 197, the 198th 2nd 2nd 197th 197.

Until the dispute occurred in around 2007, the plaintiff church and the defendant 1 had consistently engaged in speech that corresponds to the fact that the △△△△△ Do council members owned by the plaintiff. In other words, the defendant 1 obtained from the competent authority in November 1, 1982 the permission to occupy and use the road on the access road to the land of ○○○○○○○○ in this case to attach the signboard, and obtained the permission to post the "Guidewon of △△△△△△△△△△△" in November 1, 1983. After that, the plaintiff church was in charge of various events related to the △△△△△ Do council members at the initiative of the defendant 1 of the plaintiff church, among the history history of the plaintiff church, the contents related thereto were as follows, and the contents, such as the following, 1), 5, 9, etc. were included in the school life pocketbook provided to the plaintiff church members.

(i) the commencement of the new construction of the △△△ Dogwon in January 1982

2) On June 15, 1982, 1982, △△△△ Dogwon and △△△△ Dogwon purchased forest land (as approximately 30,000 square meters) [in the case of combining the area of the instant ○○○○ land, it constitutes approximately 27,358 square meters in the case of converting it into a flat with the area of about 90,440 square meters. Defendant 1 submitted as evidence the history of the Plaintiff church (Evidence 4) stating that “(as for Defendant 1’s purchase of the instant land)” was additionally included in the statement on June 15, 1982, and both the Plaintiff and Defendant 1 were unable to submit the original history of the Plaintiff church’s original copy, but all the parties did not dispute the fact that the additional part was made, and only on the basis of the additional statement, it is insufficient to recognize Defendant 1’s acquisition of the instant land at their own expense].

3) On July 16, 1982, the basic commencement of the acquisition of the permission for forest damage (hereinafter referred to as "forest damage permission")

(4) On July 4, 1982, the implementation of the total mobilization week ( note 880 persons)

5) The first industrial conference of △△△△△△△ (one thousand five hundred per annum) on August 9, 1982 to April 14, 1982

6) Fili/Do Tourism on September 21, 1982 (000 Ri residents)

7) Completion of the building on October 1982, 1982, △△△△△△△, 100 persons per annum (1,000 persons per annum), 40 1 Dong, 7 Do road rooms, 1 Dong Dong-dong, 1 Dong-dong, and 1 Dong-dong)

8) On November 8, 1982, the craft ship of △△△△△ Dogwon

9) On June 7, 1983, the establishment and worship of the △△ branch.

In addition, by the year of 2007, the Plaintiff church continuously indicated the “△△△ Dowon” as an affiliated agency of the Plaintiff church, and Defendant 1 emphasized that the Plaintiff church is a newspaper article, an interview within the church, or an △△△ Dowon in the church, and requested the Plaintiff church members to provide money or effort services.

○ The point at which the dispute between the Plaintiff and Defendant 1 on the instant land and each of the instant buildings was created was around the beginning of 2007, which was immediately before Defendant 1 got out of the country, and entered the safe-end rest, but Defendant 1, on December 28, 2007, registered the preservation of ownership on each of the instant buildings, which had not been registered, began to refuse to transfer the registration and to claim the right, and the Plaintiff was also locked separately in the personal book and the job office of Defendant 1, who was in the principal place of the Plaintiff church, and prevented Defendant 1 from entering and leaving documents.

○ 원고 교회가 앞서 본 바와 같이 교회 인근 부동산을 매수하면서 유지재단 앞으로 등기한 경우 외에도 담임 목사인 피고 1 앞으로 소유권이전등기를 해 뒀다가 추후 유지재단 앞으로 이전한 사례도 있었다(수원시 (주소 21~31 생략) 등 대지는 1976. 5. 20. 피고 1 앞으로 소유권이전등기가 됐다가 1988년 및 1989년에 걸쳐 유지재단 앞으로 소유권이전등기가 됐다). 한편 원고 교회에 비치된 구역회 보고서는 작성자나 당시 상황에 따라 구역회 보고서의 내용이 매년 같지 않았는데, 원고 교회가 보관 중인 1978년도부터의 구역회 보고서에는 원고 교회 교인 현황, 원고 교회 재산 목록 및 수입예산서와 지출예산서가 나타난 비교적 자세한 구역회 보고서가 작성된 경우도 있고(1978년도부터 1981년까지, 1983년), 1982년은 그 작성자의 기재나 지금까지 작성된 항목의 기재가 없이 2장짜리의 간단한 구역회 보고서가 작성됐는데 여기에는 예산보고나 교회 재산에 대한 기재는 없으며 1984년 이후에도 예산보고나 교회 재산에 대한 기재가 생략된 간략한 보고서가 작성되는 경우가 많아, 구역회 보고서에 이 사건 ○○리 토지의 구입 및 기재가 없다 하더라도 이러한 사정을 이 사건 ○○리 토지가 원고 교회 소유가 아닌 징표로 볼 수 없다.

In the event that the instant ○○-ri land was farmland based on forests and fields, it was impossible to file for the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Plaintiff church. At the time of the purchase of the instant ○-ri land, another real estate held in title trust in the future by the Plaintiff was located in Defendant 1, even at the time of the purchase of the instant ○○-ri land. At the time, the Plaintiff appears to have sufficient motive for the instant ○-ri land to be held in title trust in the future of Defendant 1, because the Plaintiff had absolutely trusted Defendant 1, the members of

○ On August 7, 2009, both parties to the Plaintiff church and Defendant 1, etc. were present at the lawsuit of this case, and Defendant 1, etc. opened the entrance and the office room of the Plaintiff church and organized and divided various documents and articles inside the entrance. At that time, the sales contract, the registration certificate, and various documents related to the Plaintiff church’s finance related to the land of this case were discovered.

Defendant 1 asserted that he deposited money deposited by his wife before marriage, nurse and public health clinic staff, monthly salary received from the kindergarten principal, and Defendant 1 purchased the land of this case by saving the money received from the Plaintiff church. However, Defendant 1’s wife had worked as a nurse from March 1964 to September 1965, and 11 months from 1974 and 1975, respectively. Defendant 1’s wife had worked as a public health clinic staff for 1974 and 1975. From January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1980, she did not have much any money deposited when he had worked as the president during the actual period of service (the evidence appears to have rejected Defendant 1’s purchase of real estate and apartment houses located in Yeongdeungpo-gu, Seoul, 1978, and it was difficult for the Defendant 1 to purchase the land of this case or to purchase the land of Yeongdeungpo-gu (the address 32,33 omitted). The evidence presented to Defendant 12 and 16).

As seen in the following 3-C., Defendant 1 stated that the Plaintiff church received a loan of KRW 700,000,000 from the Plaintiff church upon the occurrence of a dispute with the Plaintiff church on the land of this case which it held in trust after 2007, which was registered under its own name, and this was not a criminal issue and there was no intention to withdraw the loan after the full repayment of the loan, and there was no intention to withhold the actual amount of the loan, and the purpose of exercising the pressure to secure the retirement allowance was to exercise the pressure to secure the retirement allowance, and the ownership has not been returned until now notwithstanding the request made by the Plaintiff church.

Since Defendant 1 taken office as a member of the Plaintiff church in 1974, he was unable to exercise the coercive authority and influence over over 30 years since he was appointed as a member of the Plaintiff church, thereby representing the Plaintiff church and leading its members, and it was difficult for the Plaintiff church to expect to keep documents against Defendant 1. Rather, the important documents of the Plaintiff church prepared during that period are likely to have been under the influence of Defendant 1.

(3) Sub-determination

The instant title trust agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant 1 is reasonable to deem that there was a so-called contract title trust agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant 1 on the instant ○○ land, since the Plaintiff purchased the instant land under the name of Defendant 1, trusting Defendant 1, and the sales contract was concluded under the name of Defendant 1, and the ownership transfer registration was completed in the future. The said title trust agreement is null and void by Article 4 of

However, according to the provisions of Article 4 (1) and (2) of the Real Estate Real Name Act, where a title truster and a title trustee enter into a title trust agreement with the owner who was the party and was unaware of the fact that the title trust agreement existed, and the title trustee entered into the title trust agreement and completed the registration of ownership transfer under the title trust agreement between the title truster and the title trustee, notwithstanding the invalidation of the title trust agreement between the title truster and the title trustee, the title trustee shall be deemed to have the full ownership of the relevant real estate (see Supreme Court Decision 98Do4347, Mar. 24, 200). The provisions of Article 20 of the Real Estate Real Name Act concerning the title truster and the title trustee shall be deemed to have the ownership of the relevant real estate, and even if the period has elapsed without the grace period stipulated under Article 11 of the Real Estate Real Name Act, the title truster and the title trustee shall be subject to Article 4 (1) of the said Act, and if so, the ownership of the relevant real estate shall be fully acquired by the title truster and the title trustee.

Therefore, Defendant 1 is obligated to implement the registration procedure for transfer of ownership on the instant ○○ land and deliver the instant ○○ land to the Plaintiff.

(4) Determination as to Defendant 1’s assertion

(A) As alleged by the Plaintiff, Defendant 1 asserts that even if the Plaintiff purchased the instant land of ○○○○ from the seller and owned it in title trust under Defendant 1, such title trust agreement is null and void by Article 4(1) of the Real Estate Real Name Act, and the title truster cannot file a claim for the registration of transfer of ownership based on the termination of the title trust unless the title truster did not file the registration of transfer of ownership based on the title trust, as stipulated in Article 11 of the Real Estate Real Name Act, within one year from July 1, 1995, the enforcement date of the Real Estate Real Name

On the other hand, as seen earlier, Defendant 1’s obligation to transfer the ownership of the instant land to Defendant 1 is not a title trust but a return of unjust enrichment. As such, Defendant 1’s above assertion is without merit.

(B) Defendant 1’s assertion that Defendant 1’s claim for ownership transfer registration against Defendant 1 for the restoration of the instant ○○ land on the grounds as seen earlier was extinguished by extinctive prescription after the lapse of the ten-year period under Article 162(1) of the Civil Act, by nature, as the claim for return of unjust enrichment under the provisions of law.

On July 1, 1996, when the grace period stipulated in Article 11 of the Real Estate Real Name Act has expired as to the claim for ownership transfer registration based on unjust enrichment, Defendant 1 acquired full ownership of the instant ○○ land on July 1, 1996, and on the same day, the Plaintiff has the right to claim the return of unjust enrichment against Defendant 1. The Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant 1 only after the lapse of 10 years from July 1, 1996 and March 19, 2009, which was later than 10 years from July 19, 196, and thus, the said right to claim the return of unjust enrichment expired. Accordingly, Defendant 1’s defense is well-grounded.

(1) On this ground, the Plaintiff asserts that the extinctive prescription was interrupted until March 2008, since it is objectively impossible for the Plaintiff to exercise the right to claim the return of unjust enrichment against Defendant 1 by March 2008, when Defendant 1 retired from the position of a pastor of the Plaintiff church.

On the other hand, Article 166 of the Civil Code provides that "the extinctive prescription shall commence from the time when a right can be exercised." However, this means that the extinctive prescription shall not run from the time when a legal disability is removed in the event that a right cannot be exercised due to a legal disability, such as the passage of the time limit and the failure of conditions, etc.

(2) Next, Defendant 1’s defense of extinctive prescription is contrary to the good faith principle and cannot be allowed for abuse of rights.

On the other hand, the obligor’s exercise of the right of defense based on the statute of limitations is subject to the control of the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. As such, in special cases where the obligor has made it impossible or considerably difficult for the obligee to exercise his right or interruption of prescription prior to the completion of the statute of limitations, or acted to make such measures unnecessary, or there was an objective obstacle that the obligee was unable to exercise his right, or the obligor has made the right holder trust as such, or made the obligor do not invoke the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where other creditors receive the repayment of the obligation under the same conditions significantly unfair or unfair, the obligor’s assertion for the completion of the statute of limitations cannot be allowed as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Da3232, Oct. 25, 2002; 204Da3469, May 29, 2008).

According to the above facts, since 1974 to March 2008, Defendant 1 was in office as a member of the Plaintiff church, and exercised his authority to prevent the transfer of ownership on the land of this case. Until before the retirement of 2007, Defendant 1 stated that the △△△△ members were the ownership of the Plaintiff church, and indicated in Defendant 1’s bulletin, newsletter, and the Plaintiff’s daily life pocket book as an affiliated organization of the Plaintiff church, and it was difficult for the Plaintiff to bring an action for the registration of ownership transfer on the land of this case for the purpose of developing the Plaintiff church’s right to ○○○○, which was the first time after the Plaintiff church’s expiration of the grace period, and it was difficult for the Plaintiff to bring an action for the registration of ownership transfer on the land of this case to the Plaintiff, which was the first time after the Plaintiff church’s expiration of the grace period. However, it was difficult for the Plaintiff church to expect the registration of the land of this case to be registered under the name of Defendant 1 at any time between the Plaintiff church and the Plaintiff church.

If so, in light of the above legal principles, the acceptance of the statute of limitations defense by Defendant 1 to this case is so harsh that it cannot be justified in light of the concept of justice, and thus, it cannot be allowed against the principle of trust and good faith.

Therefore, Defendant 1’s defense of extinctive prescription is eventually groundless.

(C) Defendant 1 asserts to the purport that the Plaintiff’s claim on the instant ○○ land is unjustifiable, since he/she occupied the instant ○○ land in peace and openly and openly with the intention to own it between 1982 and 20 years from the late 1983 and 1983, such as newly building each of the instant buildings by taking his/her own expenses in the instant ○○○ land and operating a Dowon, Youth Training Center, and △△ International Schools in succession.

However, unless there is any specific assertion or proof as to the commencement of possession under Defendant 1's own title, the possession of real estate in the name of the title trustee cannot be regarded as an independent possession due to the nature of the title (Supreme Court Decisions 91Da27655 delivered on December 10, 191, Supreme Court Decision 2001Da8097, April 26, 2002, Supreme Court Decision 2001Da8097, 8103 delivered on April 26, 2002), and the registration of transfer of ownership under Defendant 1 as to the instant land was based on the title trust agreement with the Plaintiff. Unless there is any specific assertion or proof as to the commencement of possession under Defendant 1's own title, it cannot be regarded as an independent possession due to the nature of the title, and thus, Defendant 1's above assertion based on the acquisition by prescription or the acquisition by prescription under the premise that possession is an independent possession is without merit.

B. Claim concerning each of the buildings of this case

(1) The parties' assertion

The plaintiff asserts that, although each of the buildings of this case was newly constructed as the attached building of the plaintiff church, it was owned by the plaintiff church, Defendant 1 completed the registration of preservation of ownership of each of the buildings of this case in 2007, Defendant 1 has the obligation to cancel the registration of preservation of ownership and deliver each of the buildings of this case to the plaintiff.

In regard to this, Defendant 1 asserted that each of the buildings of this case was constructed by the member of the Plaintiff church, and based on Defendant 1's ground that Defendant 1 was the member of the Plaintiff church, and that Defendant 1 was the member of the Plaintiff church, the member of the △△△△△△△ Council was introduced to the affiliated organization of the Plaintiff church in order to impose the tax on the Plaintiff church, and the Plaintiff was not the affiliated organization of the Plaintiff church, and the Plaintiff did not deliver the money that the members contributed to the △△△△△ Do council member to Defendant 1, who was the operator of the △△△△△ Do council member, but did not use the money as the money of the Plaintiff church's construction or operation of the △△△△ Do council member. Since Defendant 1 was working as the member of the Plaintiff church, the contract on the △△△△ Do council member was concluded in the name of the Plaintiff church and received the money from the Defendant 1 and the money of the Defendant 1, who was the member of the Plaintiff church.

(2) Determination

(a) The primary building;

According to the above facts and the following circumstances acknowledged by the aforementioned evidence, the first building completed around 1983 after the construction began among each of the buildings of this case and around 1985 was done by Defendant 1, who is the members of the plaintiff church and the members of the plaintiff church (at that time, Defendant 1 was working for the church as the members of the plaintiff church, and therefore, it cannot be viewed that it was done for personal interests by not only for the church but also for the individual church's membership in the plaintiff church)'s effort and service. The main construction cost is not only for the plaintiff church members to provide funds that the plaintiff church members contributed to "the construction cost of the plaintiff church" as the "the building cost of the plaintiff church," but also for the remaining construction cost is hard to view that the plaintiff church members did not go through the plaintiff church but directly delivered the money to the plaintiff church by other members of the plaintiff church, and it is difficult to see that it was made for the plaintiff to use the money directly to the plaintiff church for his own interest at the expense of the plaintiff church (the plaintiff's 1).

3. 4. 4. 8 6 . 7 . 8 . 1 . 8 . 1 . 8 . 1 . 4 . . 8 . 1 . 5 . 8 . 1 . 6 . 4 . . 8 . 1 . 5 . 1 . 8 . 1 . 4 . . 8 . 1 . . 8 . 1 . . 8 . . 1 . . 8 . . 1 . . 1 . . 8 . . 4 . . . . . 1 . . 1 . . . 1 . . 1 . . . 1 . . . 1 . . . 1 . . 2 . . 1 . . 1 . . 2 . . 1 . . 1 . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . 2. . . . . . . . 2. . . . . . 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .... . .... . . . . . .. ................................ ........... . .... . ........................................................ ............................................................................... ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Defendant 1 asserts that, even if the first building was not completely completed in 1985, the construction cost required for Defendant 1 to move and extend one building to the above 6th △△△△△△△△△, and that this cost was not borne by the Plaintiff church. Although the first 3th 6th Do church building was included in the first 1st 2th story, the new 3th 5th Do church building was included in the third 6th 5th 6th 1st 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 198 166666th 198 1977 16th 1986 16th 1987 198666th 1967 1966th 19667 1987.

The Plaintiff church included three separate organizations, including “△△△ Dowon,” which is the foundation of the Plaintiff church, including “△△△△ Do Council member,” and “△△ Do Council member,” and all of the accounts of each organization were established after 1980 and carried out separately from the Plaintiff church. Since Defendant 1’s wife had from the beginning managed the accounts of △△△△ Do Council member, Defendant 1’s wife was in charge of managing the accounts of the Plaintiff church and the △△△ Do Council member (where Defendant 1’s wife was written, all of the buildings of this case can not be readily concluded as owned by Defendant 1, solely on the grounds that the management of the accounts of △△△ Do Council member was carried out separately from the Plaintiff church.

○○ In addition, from January 1, 1986 to January 2007, the Plaintiff church entered the KRW △△△ Do Council members as an affiliated organization in the Plaintiff church’s member’s member living pocket book, and Defendant 1 did not raise any objection to express Defendant 1’s member of the △△△△ Do council as an affiliated organization of the Plaintiff church, and even the history of the Plaintiff church, the details of the establishment of the △△△ Do Council members were included in detail.

(b) Additional buildings, secondary buildings and third buildings;

The fact that the Plaintiff continued to provide 60,000 won of the building that had been built for 198 square meters since 204 as well as the fact that the Plaintiff had been built for 10 years after 204 square meters of the building, but the church basically has the substance as an association which is not a legal entity, and the real estate such as the church or the 10th anniversary of its religious community is the material foundation of the religious community, such as the foundation's basic property, and it is difficult for the Plaintiff to provide the 19th anniversary of the construction of the building and the 3th anniversary of the construction of the building that had been built for 190 square meters of the building, which had not been built for 30 years since 204 square meters of the building, to secure the ownership of the building and the 3th anniversary of the construction of the building that had not been built for 30 years of the building, and it is difficult for the Plaintiff to separately assert the ownership of the building and the 1st attached property of the church.

Ultimately, this part of the plaintiff's assertion about the Czedong and the second building and the third building among the additional buildings is without merit.

(C) Sub-determination

Defendant 1 is obligated to cancel the registration of transfer of ownership of the real estate in paragraph (1) (hereinafter referred to as “first building and its appurtenant building”) of the remainder except for the C-dong among the real estate in paragraph (1) of the attached Table 2 attached hereto and deliver the said building to the Plaintiff.

(D) Determination on Defendant 1’s assertion of prescriptive acquisition

Defendant 1, on the land of this case, newly constructed each of the instant buildings at his own expense and operated Dogwon, Youth Training Center, and △△ International Schools in succession. Defendant 1 occupied the instant ○○ land in peace and public performance with the intention to own it between 1982 and 20 years after 1983. Thus, Defendant 1 asserted to the purport that the Plaintiff’s claim was unjust.

Since 1983, it is difficult to recognize the fact that Defendant 1 occupied the first building and its appurtenant buildings in the capacity of an individual who is not the qualification of the Plaintiff church as a pastor. Moreover, even if the first building was originally acquired by the Plaintiff and the attached buildings were acquired by the Plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Act on the conformity of real estate, it is an objective circumstance that the possession cannot be deemed to have been carried out with the intent to exclusively control as his own property by excluding the ownership of another and by its own property. It is reasonable to view that the presumption that the possession by Defendant 1 constitutes a case where the possessor was occupied with the knowledge that there was no legal act or any other legal requirements such as a juristic act which may cause the acquisition of ownership at the time of the commencement of possession, etc., and that the presumption that the possession by Defendant 1 was an autonomous possession was reversed.

Therefore, Defendant 1’s assertion on the acquisition by prescription on the premise that it is an independent possession is without reason to further examine it.

C. Claim as to the land of △dong in this case

(1) Judgment on the main claim

On January 29, 2009, Defendant 1 sent a content-certified mail to the effect that Defendant 1 would respond to a sales contract after preparing a notarial deed stating that he/she did not claim the land of this case as his/her own ownership, and that he/she will clearly adjust transfer income tax and other disposal expenses, etc., and that he/she received it at that time (Evidence A No. 28). Such circumstance alone is difficult to view that Defendant 1 and the Plaintiff reached a conclusive agreement on the transfer of ownership on the land of this case as of January 29, 2009, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this differently.

Therefore, the primary argument that the Plaintiff seeks to register the ownership transfer of the instant land to Defendant 1 on the ground of the transfer agreement dated January 29, 2009 is without merit.

(2) Determination on the conjunctive claim

According to the above recognition, it is reasonable to view that there was a title trust agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants as to the land in △dong, since the Plaintiff entrusted his name to Defendant 1 and completed the ownership transfer registration under the name of Defendant 1, and Defendant 2, the seller, was aware of the same fact. Therefore, the title trust agreement on the land in △dong is null and void by Article 4 of the Real Estate Real Name Act, and the ownership transfer registration under Defendant 1 is also null and void. However, the sales contract between Defendant 2 and the Plaintiff, the truster, still remains valid. As such, the Plaintiff may file a claim against Defendant 2 for the registration of ownership transfer pursuant to the sales contract, and the Plaintiff’s subrogation of Defendant 2, the seller, to preserve the right to claim the ownership transfer registration, may seek the cancellation of the registration under its invalid name.

Therefore, Defendant 2 is obligated to perform the registration of ownership transfer on the land of △dong in this case to the Plaintiff, and Defendant 1 is obligated to implement the procedure for cancellation of ownership transfer registration on the land of △dong in this case.

Ultimately, the plaintiff's conjunctive claim is justified.

D. Claim for a loan

The contents to be explained in this part are as stated in Section 4 of the Reasons for the Judgment of the first instance (the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act).

4. Determination on a counterclaim

A. Request for a loan

The provisions of Article 6(a) of the Reasons for the Judgment of the court of the first instance, except for the following modifications or additions (main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act).

● 제1심 판결 제16면 제2, 3행의 “을 제33호증의 기재에 의하면, 피고 1의 처인 소외 7이 농협으로부터 1999. 12. 8. 2천만 원을, 1999. 12. 30. 1억 원을 각 대출받은 사실” ⇒ “을 제33호증의 기재에 의하면, 피고 1이 농협으로부터 1999. 12. 8. 2,000만 원, 1999. 12. 30. 4,000만 원, 피고 1의 처 소외 7이 농협으로부터 1999. 12. 30. 6,000만 원 합계 1억 2,000만 원을 각 대출받은 사실”

● 제1심 판결 제16면 제5행의 “을 제35호증의 기재” ⇒ “갑 제92호증, 을 제35호증의 각 기재”

(b) Claim for withdrawal;

(1) Except for the following additions, Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act provides for the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance court (main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act).

(2) Determination on Defendant 1’s additional assertion

Defendant 1 asserts that the defect of the resolution of the District Personnel Committee is merely a formal defect, and that the resolution cannot be deemed to be null and void as a matter of course. Thus, the plaintiff is obligated to pay the amount of KRW 700 million to Defendant 1 in accordance with the above resolution.

As seen earlier, the matters related to the advance payment to Defendant 1 are matters that fall under the duties of the district personnel committee, rather than the district personnel committee. Therefore, the resolution of the district personnel committee to pay the advance payment to Defendant 1 cannot be deemed to have the effect of the resolution, rather than a mere formal defect. Therefore, Defendant 1’s above assertion on the premise that the matters related to the advance payment to Defendant 1 falls under the duties of the district personnel committee is without merit.

In addition, at the time of the District Council on January 11, 2009, Defendant 1 made a conditional resolution that the Plaintiff dealt with the issue of the retirement payment of Defendant 1 in compliance with the response of the Council or the headquarters, and thereafter, Defendant 1 notified the Suwon-si Coordination Committee on the problems of the Suwon-si District Council, the Gyeonggi-do Council Administrative Coordination Committee, and the Supervision of the Korean Film Council to the effect that the conditions have been fulfilled because it notified that the Plaintiff should respect and execute the resolution of the District Personnel Committee.

The above assertion by Defendant 1 on the premise that there was a conditional resolution, as alleged by Defendant 1 at the time of the district conference on January 11, 2009, since it is difficult to recognize it only with the descriptions of evidence Nos. 30, No. 13, and No. 25, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it, it is difficult to acknowledge it, and there is no reason to further examine it.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the plaintiff's claim for confirmation of ownership against the defendant 1 is dismissed, and the remaining part of the plaintiff's claim for confirmation of ownership against the defendant 1 is accepted within the extent of the above recognition, and the claim for the main claim other than the above dismissal and acceptance is dismissed as without merit. The plaintiff's main claim against the defendant 1 as to the attached list 3 is dismissed as without merit. The plaintiff's main claim against the defendant 1 as to the attached list 3 is dismissed as without merit. The judgment of the court of first instance is unfair with different conclusions, and it is so unfair in the judgment of the court of first instance, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the court of first instance to revise the judgment, including the plaintiff's main claim against the defendant 1

[Attachment]

Judges Yoon Sung (Presiding Judge)