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(영문) 수원지방법원 2019.10.24. 선고 2019구합65994 판결

지원금반환명령등처분취소청구의소

Cases

2019Guhap6594 Action demanding revocation of the disposition, such as an order for return of subsidies

Plaintiff

A Stock Company

Attorney Kim Jae-sung, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Defendant

The Administrator of the Gyeonggi Local Labor Agency;

Conclusion of Pleadings

September 19, 2019

Imposition of Judgment

October 24, 2019

Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim

The Defendant’s disposition of restricting the payment of subsidies (from February 19, 2019 to November 18, 2019) to the Plaintiff as of February 19, 2019, ordering the return of KRW 9 million, and imposing additional collection of KRW 18 million shall be revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff applied for employment promotion subsidies to the Defendant and received KRW 9 million in total twice on the grounds that he/she newly employed B, who was a person who completed the employment success program, as well as C, on December 10, 2016, and December 20, 2016.

B. On February 19, 2019, the Defendant issued a disposition to restrict the payment period to the Plaintiff on the ground that “A” was employed as a commercial worker on October 18, 2016, and “A” on November 7, 2016, but was employed as a commercial worker, and ordered the Plaintiff to participate in unjust participation as to whether he/she has failed to secure employment, and that “B was granted a subsidy by filing a false report as if he/she was employed respectively as of December 10, 2016, and as of December 20, 2016,” the Defendant issued a disposition to restrict the payment period to the Plaintiff on the ground that “the payment period of the employment promotion subsidy was granted from February 19, 2019 to November 18, 2019, the return of the employment promotion subsidy to KRW 9 million, and the additional collection of KRW 18 million (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1, Eul evidence Nos. 4, 10, and 11, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

Article 78(1) of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act provides for the upper limit of additional collection; Article 78(1) of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act provides that “The Plaintiff’s person in charge of personnel management (former retired company) took overall charge of such procedures as receiving subsidies; the Plaintiff’s representative director was not aware of this in detail; the Plaintiff’s request for subsidies in the same manner as “on the part of B and C’s job placement and receipt of fees is not a problem; other companies also apply for subsidies.” In light of the fact that other companies have believed this and applied for subsidies, the additional collection of KRW 18 million among the instant disposition is unlawful by abusing and abusing discretion.

B. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

1) Article 35(2) of the Employment Insurance Act provides that “In addition, where a return order is issued pursuant to paragraph (1), an amount not exceeding five times the amount of unlawful payment may be collected in accordance with the standards prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor.” Article 78(1)1 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act provides that “Where there is no number of times a person receives or intends to receive a payment or a return order issued by the Minister of Employment and Labor under Article 35(1) for the last five years prior to the date of detection of unlawful payment, he/she shall additionally collect twice the amount received by fraud or other improper means.”

Even if the criteria for a punitive administrative disposition are prescribed in the form of Ministerial Ordinance, since it does not have any external binding force, it shall not immediately be deemed a legitimate disposition, as it conforms to the above criteria for disposition (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Du1684, Jun. 22, 2006). However, the above criteria for disposition do not in itself conform to the Constitution or laws, or, in light of the content and purport of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes and the contents of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, it shall not be determined that the above disposition was either deviating from the scope of discretion or abused discretion, unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that the pertinent disposition is considerably unreasonable (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du6946, Sept. 20, 200

2) Determination

In light of the following circumstances known by the above facts, the instant disposition cannot be deemed to have exceeded the scope of discretionary power or abused discretionary power.

A) The Defendant ordered the return of the amount of unlawful receipt pursuant to Article 35(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, and additionally collected an amount equivalent to twice the amount of unlawful receipt pursuant to Article 35(2) of the same Act and Article 78(1)1 of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act. It is difficult to deem that there is a reasonable ground to believe that the foregoing standard does not in itself conform with the Constitution or laws, or that sanctions imposed pursuant to the former Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act are considerably unreasonable in light of the content of the act of violation that served as the ground for the disposition

B) The Plaintiff’s act of abusing the employment promotion support system by unlawful means cannot be deemed to be negligible. The instant disposition, including additional collection, imposes disadvantages on the Plaintiff who committed such unlawful acts, and at the same time, was taken from the necessity of public interest to prevent the abuse of the support system for employment promotion in the future, and the disposition is deemed to have been taken in comparison with the disadvantage of the Plaintiff and the need for public interest as above, and thus, it is difficult to deem

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

The presiding judge, the senior judge;

Judges' Branch Office Counter

Judges Choi Young-young

Attached Form

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.