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(영문) 대법원 1994. 4. 12. 선고 93다56053 판결

[건물철거등][공1994.6.1.(969),1429]

Main Issues

(a) Whether statutory superficies under customary law is established in case where a person who has de facto disposal authority to purchase land and construct a new building on the ground, and the building has been put into compulsory auction; and

B. If an appeal against the judgment on the merits is without merit, the judgment correcting the judgment on the declaration of provisional execution

Summary of Judgment

A. Even if a person who actually purchased land and acquired the ownership of a building by constructing a new building on the ground, it cannot be said that the land and the building belong to the same owner unless he/she acquired the ownership of the land. Therefore, the statutory superficies under customary law for the building is not established on the ground that the owner becomes different by the procedure for compulsory auction as to such a building in such an state.

(b)The judgment on the declaration of provisional execution can only be appealed with the objection to the judgment on the merits, and there is an objection to the judgment on the declaration of provisional execution only when the appeal against the judgment on the merits is considered to be well-grounded. Therefore, even if the judgment on the declaration of provisional execution, which has been appealed together with the merits, if it is judged that the appeal on the merits is groundless, the judgment on the declaration of provisional execution cannot

[Reference Provisions]

A. Article 366 of the Civil Procedure Act

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 90Da7200 delivered on May 28, 1991 (Gong1991, 1757) (Gong1991, 2430 delivered on August 27, 1991). Supreme Court Decision 79Da1731 delivered on December 11, 1979 (Gong1980, 12416), Supreme Court Decision 80Da2846,2847 delivered on October 24, 1981 (Gong1981, 1493) (Gong193Da42979 delivered on December 10, 193)

Plaintiff-Appellee

Plaintiff

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant

Judgment of the lower court

Chuncheon District Court Decision 93Na122 delivered on October 8, 1993

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

(1) In light of the records, we find that the court below recognized that the defendant owned the building of this case on the land of this case and possessed all of the land of this case, and there is no error in the rules of evidence against the rules of evidence. The arguments are without merit.

(2) The owner of a building shall be deemed to have acquired a customary statutory superficies for the building, unless there is a condition that the land or a building belongs to the same owner, but if the owner of the building becomes different due to sale and purchase, or for any other reason, the owner of the building shall be deemed to have acquired a customary statutory superficies for the building. Thus, even if a person who has the authority to purchase and purchase the land acquires the ownership of the building on the ground, even if he acquired the ownership of the building by constructing the building on the ground, the land and the building shall not be deemed to belong to the same owner unless he acquires the ownership of the building, and therefore, it does not constitute a customary statutory superficies for the building on the ground that the owner becomes different according to the procedure for compulsory sale by official auction as to the building in such a state (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 8Da2592, Feb. 14, 1989). In the same purport, we accept the decision of the court below rejecting the defense that the defendant acquired a customary statutory superficies for the building in this case, and there is no merit.

(3) As duly determined by the court below, if the Defendant leased the instant land owned by the Plaintiff without an agreement on the term of the lease, the Plaintiff, a lessor, can notify at any time of the termination of the lease, and the termination becomes effective after the lapse of six months from the date on which the Defendant was notified. Thus, the court below's decision that the instant lease was terminated after six months from the arrival date of the agreement by expressing the Plaintiff's intent to terminate the lease with the evidence No. 3-1 (Notice) shall be justifiable. As such, even if the Defendant succeeded to the right of lease with an opposing power against the instant land from the former owner of the instant building, it is not possible to assert the existence of the lease relationship of this case, unless there is any assertion or proof that the term of the lease has not yet been terminated due to the agreement on the term of the lease under the opposing power. It is without merit for the court below to have erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the lease.

(4) On the judgment of provisional execution, the judgment of provisional execution can only be appealed with the objection to the judgment of the merits, and there is no objection to the judgment of the provisional execution only when it is judged that the whole or part of the appeal to the judgment of the merits is well-grounded. Thus, even if there were errors in the judgment of the provisional execution, if it is judged that the appeal to the merits of the case is groundless, the judgment of the provisional execution cannot be made (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da2846,2847 delivered on October 24, 1981). As seen above, as long as the appeal to the merits was made together with the objection to the judgment of the provisional execution of this case, and as long as the appeal to the merits of this case is judged to be groundless, it is not necessary to determine whether there is a misapprehension of legal principles, such as the theory of the judgment of the provisional execution of this case.

(5) Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Song Man-man (Presiding Justice)