(b) Violation of the Political Funds Act;

(c) Violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act

(d) Occupational embezzlement;

2019 early 681 Request for adjudication on constitutionality

2. A. (c) South 75. Syeast

3. (a) South C. 79. Raw Sheet

4. (a) . (b) d. D 79. Raw Sheet

5.(a) South E. 60. N.W.

6.(a) South 63.F

7. A. G 84. G Sheet

담당변호사 □□, 目, ▦▦, OO

Attorney* (Attorney A and G)

MaMaMa (Attorney A for Defendant A)

Law Firm % (for Defendant A)

담당변호사 EU, ▩▩

Attorney-at-law and (for defendant B)

Attorney $$ 100 (for defendant C)

변호사 ▲▲ ( 피고인 D를 위하여 )

Attorneys △-△ (Presiding Justice for Defendant E and F)

Defendant A shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for 10 months for a crime of 1-A and 2-B of the Decision, and a fine of 10 million won for a crime of 1-B of the Decision.

Where a defendant A fails to pay the above fine, the above defendant shall be confined in a workhouse for a period of 10,000 won converted from one day.

To order the defendant A to pay an amount equivalent to the above fine.

Of the facts charged against Defendant A, the charge of violating the Political Funds Act shall be acquitted.

Defendant A’s request for adjudication on constitutionality of law is dismissed.

[Defendant B]

Defendant B’s 3-A of the holding of the judgment of Defendant B is punished by a fine of three million won or more, and a fine of three million won or more for a crime.

When Defendant B fails to pay each of the above fines, the above Defendant shall be confined in a workhouse for the period calculated by converting each of the KRW 100,000 into one day.

The penalty of KRW 10,050,000 shall be collected from Defendant B.

Defendant B shall be ordered to pay an amount equivalent to the above fine and the additional collection charge.

[Defendant C]

Defendant C shall be punished by a fine of seven million won.

When Defendant C fails to pay the above fine, the above Defendant shall be confined in a workhouse for a period calculated by converting KRW 100,000 into one day.

7.2 million won shall be additionally collected from Defendant C.

Defendant C shall be ordered to pay an amount equivalent to the above fine and the additional collection charge.

[Defendant D]

Of the crimes of Articles 5, 6-A, 6-1, and 6-1 of the holding, Defendant D shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for six months for the crime of violation of the Political Funds Act due to the omission of accounting reports among the crimes of Article 5, 6-1, and 2-1 of the holding, and the crime of violation of the Political Funds Act due to the omission of accounting reports among the crimes of violation of the Political Funds Act due to false accounting reports, among the crimes of Article 6-3 (1) of the holding, KRW 1,00,000 and KRW 6-2 of the holding that each of the crimes of violation of the Political Funds Act due to the false entry of accounting books is punished by a fine not exceeding one million. Where Defendant D fails to pay each of the above fines, each of the above defendants shall be confined in the station for the period of one day converted by one day.

4.20,000 won shall be additionally collected from Defendant D.

To order the defendant D to pay an amount equivalent to the above fines and additional charges.

[Defendant E]

Defendant E shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for six months.

except that the execution of the above punishment shall be suspended for two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive.

A penalty of KRW 1.5 million from Defendant E shall be collected.

Defendant E shall be ordered to pay an amount equivalent to the above additional collection charge.

[Defendant F]

Defendant F shall be punished by a fine of one million won.

When Defendant F fails to pay the above fine, the above Defendant F shall be confined in a workhouse for a period calculated by converting KRW 100,000 into one day.

To order the defendant F to pay an amount equivalent to the above fine.

[Defendant G]

Defendant G shall be punished by a fine of five million won.

When the defendant G does not pay the above fine, the above defendant shall be confined in the old house for a period of 10,000 won converted into one day.

To order the defendant G to pay an amount equivalent to the above fine.

[Status of Defendants]

Defendant A is a representative attorney at law firm H branch (hereinafter referred to as “H”) from around September 3, 2016 to June 29, 2018, who had been working as an attorney in Ulsan District for ten years, and was working as an attorney at the 7th Dong-si local election (hereinafter referred to as “local election”) around June 2017. Defendant A entered a democratic party at the National Assembly on July 11, 2017, and was admitted as a candidate for the head of the Ulsan District, Ulsan District, as well as on May 9, 2018. From around June 13, 2018, Defendant A was elected as the head of Ulsan District, Ulsan District Government, who was elected as the head of the Gu on May 13, 2018.

Defendant B, without any special occupation, became aware of the said A at first time by introducing I, a senior ship of a high school, around November 2017. From December 2017 to June 12, 2018, Defendant B was working as an election volunteer of the said A. From July 1, 2018 to July 1, 2018.

Defendant C became aware of the foregoing A through ten years prior to the end of 2010 years, without any contact during one period, and became a member of the Democratic Party-related event on September 1, 2017, and was requested by the above A to provide guidance to A through SNS from around October 2017, Defendant C was engaged in the above A’s election campaign from around April 4, 2018 to June 12, 2018, and was employed as a contractual worker at the Ulsan-gu National Sports Center from around September 1, 2018.

Defendant D was aware of the above A at the event of a democratic party, but there was no friendly relationship. Defendant D’s request to assist the election from the police officer on May 2018 and received the above A’s request.

5. From around July 29, 201, a person who was appointed as the accountant in charge of the accounting of the above A was in charge of the accounting affairs while participating in the election campaign of the above A from the closing date of accounting report to July 13, 2018.

Defendant E is a person who has been engaged in activities as a member of a democratic party for at least 20 years and directly participates in an election or has been engaged in election campaign several times, at the request of the above A. < Amended by Act No. 1560, May 5, 2018>

It is a volunteer who had been engaged in election campaign in the position of the standing chief of the election campaign office in the above A.

Defendant F is a person who was an election campaign worker from May 29, 2018 to June 2, 2018, and from June 9, 2018 to June 12, 2018, Defendant F is an election campaign manager A’s campaign manager, from May 29, 2018 to June 2, 2018.

Defendant G attempted to engage in an election campaign at the above election campaign office from May 29, 2018 to June 12, 2018, Defendant G was an election campaign worker from May 29, 2018.

J worked as a lawyer for more than ten years, and worked as a lawyer from March 5, 2018 to June 12, 2018.

【Criminal Facts】

1. Defendant A

(a) Offering money and goods related to election campaigns;

Except where allowances, actual expenses, and other benefits are provided pursuant to the provisions of the Public Official Election Act, no person shall provide or express his/her intention to provide money, valuables, or other benefits in connection with the election campaign, or present his/her intention to provide them, or may not promise, instruct, recommend, arrange, demand, or receive them.

① 피고인은 2017. 10. 26. 경 자신의 네이버 밴드 ' A♡더불어 ♡남구 ' 에 피고인의 인지도를 제고하는 글을 게시하고, 피고인을 수행하면서 명함을 배부하는 등 선거운동을 한 C에게 300만 원을 송금한 것을 비롯하여 그때부터 2018. 2. 9. 경까지 별지 범죄일람표 ( 1 ) 기재와 같이 총 4회에 걸쳐 합계 720만 원을 송금하였다 .

Accordingly, the defendant provided money in relation to the election campaign.

② 피고인은 2018. 2. 27. 경 자신의 네이버 밴드 ' A♡더불어♡남구 ' 에 피고인의 인지도를 제고하는 글을 게시하고, 피고인을 수행하면서 명함을 배부하는 등 선거운동을 한 B에게 현금 100만 원을 제공하였다 .

Accordingly, the defendant provided money in relation to the election campaign.

③ On August 11, 2018, the Defendant remitted KRW 4.420,00 to D, who performed activities related to election campaign, including planning of elections, replacement of election campaign workers, discussion on the support of a tax team, payment of extra-court allowances, preparation for investigation by the election commission, in addition to ordinary accounting affairs.

Accordingly, the defendant provided money in relation to the election campaign.

2) Except as otherwise provided for in this Act, no election campaign shall be carried out by means of a propaganda facility, instrument, or various printed materials, broadcasting, newspaper, news communications, magazine, other publications, campaign meetings, debate, debate, alumni meeting, alumni meeting, neighbors’ meeting, information and communications, the establishment of an election campaign organization or private organization, door-to-door visit, or other similar means prior to the election campaign or distribution of documents by means of a prior election campaign or ex-ante election campaign, or by means of a document distribution, and no one shall distribute, post, broadcast, photograph, document, drawing, printed materials, recording, tape, or other similar things, or show any content supporting, recommending, or opposing a political party or candidate for the purpose of influencing the election from 180 days before the election day to the election day, except as otherwise provided for in this Act.

Nevertheless, on February 2, 2018, the Defendant: (a) provided personnel service to the members of the Union who participated in an open regular conference of the labor union in Ulsan-gu, Ulsan-gu; (b) distributed name cards in which the Defendant’s photograph, name, position, etc. are written; and (c) distributed name cards in which the Defendant’s photograph, name, and position should be changed at once to the customers by returning to the areas within the constituency, such as a new market, flood market, and restaurant in the agricultural and fishery products market in Ulsan-gu; and (d) distributed name cards in which the Defendant’s photograph, name, position, etc. are written. Accordingly, the Defendant carried out an election campaign by distributing 200 pages of name cards in a way that is not governed by the provisions of the Public Official Election Act prior to the election campaign period, prior to the election campaign period,

No person shall carry out or have another person carry out an election campaign for members of an educational, religious or professional institution, organization, etc. by taking advantage of an official act within the organization, or have another person carry out an election campaign for a business organization, enterprise, or members thereof by taking advantage of a special transaction status, such as a affiliated or subcontract.

From March 5, 2018 to June 12, 2018, the Defendant had J, a staff member of H, work in the election campaign office, and let J improve A’s personal guidance or send letters supporting the Defendant to the electorate or its neighboring neighbors, and prepare a web posters that publicize and support A, and post a name tag, web poster, video, etc. for A’s election campaign at the PJ’s Facebook.

Accordingly, the defendant used occupational acts within the organization of a professional institution, organization, etc. to conduct an election campaign for its members.

4) Publication of false facts for election purposes

Any person shall be a candidate, his/her spouse or lineal ascendant or descendant in favor of the candidate by means of a speech, broadcasting, newspaper, communication, magazine, poster, propaganda document, or any other means with the intention of being elected or having another person elected.

No person shall publish or have another person publish or publicly announce false facts (where an academic background is posted, including cases in which it is not published by the method under Article 64 (1) of the Public Official Election Act) with respect to the place of birth, status, occupation, career, etc., property, personality, act, organization to which he/she belongs, etc. of his/her lineal descendant or sibling.

The Defendant graduated from Daegu Magu High School on 1986, and graduated from the department of law at around 1992, and completed three semesters after entering the course of a master’s degree on the management of the management of the Magu University on around 2006, and completed three semesters on August 8, 2008, and did not complete the course or graduate from the school. However, the Defendant was appointed as the chief vice-chairperson of the Magdong University on January 30, 2018, after registering as a general member of the Madong-dong University established the Magu University.

(4) The Defendant made 10,00 copies of a preliminary candidate, who did not enter the period of education, from around March 2, 2018 to May 30, 2018, at least 10,000, to 20,000 electors, and made it public for the purpose of election. 2,50 copies of a preliminary candidate, who did not enter the period of education, to 30,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000: 2,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00,000,000,00,000,000,00,000,00,00,00,00.

B. An attorney-at-law in violation of the Attorney-at-law Act or his/her office staff shall not offer or promise to offer money, valuables, entertainment or other benefits in return for introducing, arranging or inducing the acceptance of legal cases or legal affairs.

Nevertheless, on February 29, 2018, the Defendant, at the above H’s office, introduced the matter of law between B and B, agreed to pay 30% of the contract fees as good offices fees. On March 2018, the Defendant accepted K’s personal rehabilitation in the above H office, and accepted the case of his/her delegating from B, and then, on March 29, 2018, transferred the case to B as good offices fees of KRW 1 million, which is part of the contract fees of KRW 5 million.

As such, from December 15, 2017 to June 7, 2018, the Defendant received 90,1400,000 won in total from 23 times as commission fees, and provided 30,550,000 won in total to 4 of the above B, etc.

Accordingly, the defendant provided money in return for introduction, referral, or inducement with respect to the acceptance of legal cases or legal affairs.

2. Violation of the Public Official Election Act by Defendant A and Defendant G

Except for cases where allowances, actual expenses, and other benefits are provided under the Public Official Election Act, no person shall provide or receive any money, valuables, or other benefits in connection with election campaign regardless of the pretext such as allowances, actual expenses, or compensation for volunteer service.

Defendant A promised to pay the election activity expenses through Defendant G, who was demanded from around June 1, 2018 to June 2, 2018, Defendant A promised to pay it through Defendant G, and Defendant G instructed Defendant G to provide election activity expenses, and Defendant G provided KRW 1.5 million in cash as election activity expenses at the election campaign office located in Ulsan-gu Ma-dong on June 3, 2018.

Accordingly, the Defendants conspired to offer money or goods in relation to the election campaign.

3. Defendant B

A. Violation of the Public Official Election Act

Except where allowances, actual expenses, and other benefits are provided pursuant to the provisions of the Public Official Election Act, no person shall provide or express his/her intention to provide money, valuables, or other benefits in connection with the election campaign, or present his/her intention to provide them, or may not promise, instruct, recommend, arrange, demand, or receive them.

피고인은 2018. 2. 27. 경 자신의 페이스북, A의 네이버 밴드인 ' AV 더불어 ♡남구 ' , 더불어민주당 울산시당 밴드 등에 A의 지지를 호소하는 글, 동영상 등을 게시하고, A를 수행하면서 명함을 배부하는 등 선거운동을 한 대가로 A로부터 현금 100만 원을 제공받았다 .

Accordingly, the defendant received money in relation to the election campaign.

(b) Violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act

No person shall receive or demand money, valuables, entertainment or other benefits in return after introducing, arranging or inducing a party to a legal case or other interested person to a specific attorney-at-law or his/her office staff member with respect to the acceptance of a legal case or legal affairs.

Nevertheless, the Defendant introduced a total of four legal cases to A from March 29, 2018 to June 7, 2018, and received a total of KRW 9050,000,000 for five occasions in return.

Accordingly, the defendant introduced to a particular attorney about the acceptance of legal cases or legal affairs.

· It received money and valuables in return after arranging or inducing them.

4. Defendant C’s violation of the Public Official Election Act

Except where allowances, actual expenses, and other benefits are provided pursuant to the provisions of the Public Official Election Act, no person shall provide or express his/her intention to provide money, valuables, or other benefits in connection with the election campaign, or present his/her intention to provide them, or may not promise, instruct, recommend, arrange, demand, or receive them.

그럼에도 피고인은 2017. 10. 26. 경 자신의 페이스북, A의 네이버 밴드인 ' A♡더불어 ♡남구 ', 더불어민주당 울산시당 밴드 등에 A의 지지를 호소하는 글, 동영상 등을 게시하고, A를 수행하면서 명함을 배부하는 등 선거운동을 한 대가로 A로부터 300만 원을 송금 받은 것을 비롯하여 그때부터 2018. 2. 9. 경까지 별지 범죄일람표 ( 1 ) 기재와 같이 총 4회에 걸쳐 합계 720만 원을 송금 받았다 .

Accordingly, the defendant received money in relation to the election campaign.

5. Violation of the Public Official Election Act by Defendant D, Defendant E, and Defendant F

Except for the cases of providing allowances, actual expenses, and other benefits under the provisions of the Public Official Election Act, anyone shall provide, express an intention to provide, or promise to provide money, valuables, or other benefits in connection with the election campaign regardless of the pretext thereof, such as allowances, actual expenses, and other compensation

No instruction, recommendation, mediation, request, or receipt shall be made.

Defendant E received only two-day allowances registered as an election campaign worker and did not receive the remaining 16-day allowances, such as arranging a list of electors by X-cellation, etc., Defendant E demanded Defendant D to pay 0-day allowances by posting a telephone around June 16, 2018.

Accordingly, Defendant D and Defendant F determined Defendant F’s allowance of KRW 2.5 million, and paid KRW 1120,000 (X 70,000 won per 16 days) to the above Defendant F’s allowance in addition to the above Defendant F’s allowance, and Defendant F conspiredd to pay KRW 11.20,000 to the above Defendant F.

On June 19, 2018, Defendant D remitted 3.620,000 won from the political fund account to Defendant F as an allowance, and Defendant F delivered the saidO only or KRW 1.120,000 in cash at the Dong-gu, Ulsan-gu, Seoul Special Metropolitan City on June 20, 2018.

Accordingly, Defendant E demanded the provision of money in connection with the election campaign, and Defendant D and Defendant F provided money in collusion with each other in relation to the election campaign.

6. Defendant D

(a) Offering money or goods related to election campaigns;

Except for cases where allowances, actual expenses, and other benefits are provided under the Public Official Election Act, no person shall provide or receive any money, valuables, or other benefits in connection with election campaign regardless of the pretext such as allowances, actual expenses, or compensation for volunteer service.

On June 12, 2018, the Defendant issued KRW 100,000 in cash to the election campaign worker P who was engaged in tax-related activities at the election campaign office in Ulsan-gu Ma-dong, Ulsan-gu Ma-dong, as additional allowances, and deposited KRW 700,000 in cash to Q Q’s account using the CD flag for the benefit of 10,000 allowances, and issued KRW 20,000 in cash to the volunteer who was made up of the web posters to publicize and support A around June 13, 2018.

As a result, the Defendant provided money and valuables of KRW 1 million in total to P, Q and R in relation to the election campaign.

2) Receipt of money and valuables related to the election campaign;

The defendant was paid all allowances to be paid as a person in charge of accounting, but August 2018.

11. A was remitted KRW 4,420,00 from A to the Defendant’s agricultural bank account in return for work related to the election campaign, such as landscaping planning, replacement of election campaign workers, support for oil team, provision of extra-court allowances for election campaign workers, preparation for investigation by the election commission, etc.

Accordingly, the Defendant received money and valuables in relation to the election campaign.

(b) Occupational embezzlement;

The defendant had a mind to embezzled political funds that he had been in custody as an opportunity to manage the A's political funds account.

On June 27, 2018, the Defendant found S even though there is no allowance to be paid to S for the driver of the relevant vehicle on or around June 27, 2018, and demanded S to find the details of remittance. The Defendant requested that S return KRW 1.5 million from the said political fund account to the account designated as the remittance table. On June 28, 2018, the Defendant remitted KRW 700,000 from the said political fund account to the S’s account under the pretext of being a secondary engineer around June 28, 2018, and around June 29, 2018, respectively.

Since June 29, 2018, June 30, 2018, June 30, 2018, and July 3, 2018, the Defendant was living together with the Defendant through his U.S. account designated by the Defendant, and KRW 1.5 million in total, three times each, five hundred and fifty hundred and fifty thousand won in total. < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 289

The remittance received from the nominal account and embezzled it.

C. Violation 1 of the Political Funds Act) Unuse of the deposit account on which a report has been made, unentry in the account book, and omission in the election expenses shall not be made without going through the deposit account on which a report has been made in connection with the election expenses, and shall not be made without making a false entry or entry therein, counterfeited or altered, or shall not make a false entry or false entry, forgery, or omission in the election expenses without justifiable grounds.

Nevertheless, around June 12, 2018, the Defendant issued KRW 100,000 in cash to the election campaign worker P who had engaged in tax-related activities at the election campaign office located in Ulsan-gu MaMa MaMa-dong on the same day as additional allowances, and the Defendant received KRW 4,20,000 in cash from the Defendant’s agricultural bank account in relation to the election campaign around August 11, 2018, as additional allowances to KRW 10,000 in cash from the CD flag to Q Q’s account in terms of ten-day allowances.

As a result, the Defendant, as an accountant in charge, did not go through the deposit account reported in relation to election expenses, spent the total of KRW 1,00,000,000 in the election expenses, and did not enter the fact that the total of KRW 5,422,00 in the account book, but omitted in the accounting report without justifiable grounds.

2) In relation to the false entry or false accounting report, the accountant in charge shall not keep or enter the accounting book or make a false entry, forgery or alteration thereof, and shall not fail to make an accounting report on the election expenses without justifiable grounds or make a false entry, forgery, alteration or omission.

① In order to conceal the fact that the Defendant paid KRW 1.1.20,000 to the 0-day allowance at an election campaign office, the Defendant, while paying KRW 2.5 million to the 2.5 million to the 1.122 billion to the F, entered a false account book and entered a false accounting report without justifiable grounds, in order to avoid the violation of the Public Official Election Act.

② On June 28, 2018, the Defendant remitted the amount of KRW 700,000 from the political fund account to the S’s account under the name of a second engineer. On June 29, 2018, the Defendant wired the amount of KRW 800,000 from the political fund account to the S’s account under the name of oil expense. On June 29, 2018, the Defendant returned the amount of KRW 1.5 million to the Defendant’s family living together with the Defendant’s family living together. However, the Defendant entered the accounting book in falsity as if he/she paid KRW 1.5 million under the name of the second engineer, in the name of the second engineer, and entered the accounting report without justifiable grounds.

7. Violation of the Public Official Election Act by Defendant E

Except for cases where allowances, actual expenses, and other benefits are provided under the Public Official Election Act, no person shall provide or receive any money, valuables, or other benefits in connection with election campaign regardless of the pretext such as allowances, actual expenses, or compensation for volunteer service.

(a) Offering money or goods related to election campaigns;

피고인은 울산 남구 소재 A의 선거사무소에서 유선전화기를 설치하고 전화로 A의 지지를 호소하는 선거운동을 하기로 마음먹고, 친구인 W로부터 전화홍보 업무를 수행할 박소, 김◆◆, 이▲▲, 윤△△을 소개받았다 .

On June 7, 2018, the Defendant: (a) installed four wire phones in the name of F in the above election campaign office at the beginning of the election campaign office; (b) granted 50,000 won per day from June 7, 2018 to June 11, 201; and (c) allowed four electors, such as the above gambling, to file a claim for support against A by calling to the electorate.

피고인은 2018. 6. 19. 경 위 W로 하여금 위 박소 등 4명에 대한 수당 합계 100만 원을 지급하게 하고, 2018. 6. 22. 경 울산 남구 % % 동에 있는 음식점에서 W, 박소 ◇ 등 5명을 만나서 함께 식사를 한 후 W에게 회식비 명목으로 현금 20만 원을 교부하였다 .

이로써 피고인은 선거운동과 관련하여 W, 박소 ), 김◆◆, 이▲▲, 윤△△에게 합계 120만 원의 금품을 제공하였다 .

(b) Receipt of money and valuables related to election campaign;

On June 3, 2018, the Defendant received KRW 1.5 million in cash from A and G in the election campaign office located in Ulsan-gu Ma-dong Ma-gu Ma-dong, Ulsan-gu in terms of activity expenses related to election campaign.

Accordingly, the defendant received money in relation to the election campaign.

Summary of Evidence

Omission

Application of Statutes

1. Article applicable to criminal facts;

A. Defendant A: Articles 230(2) and (1)4, and 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act (the provision of money and valuables related to election campaign; Provided, That the provision of money and valuables related to election campaign to Party C is included in the provision of money and valuables related to election campaign; Article 30 of the Criminal Act is included in the provision of money and valuables related to election campaign to Party E); Article 254(2) of the Public Official Election Act (the violation of election campaign period); Articles 255(2)5 and 93(1)5 of the Public Official Election Act; Articles 255(1)9 and 85(3) of the Public Official Election Act (the distribution of documents by unlawful means); Article 250(1) (the publication of false facts for the purpose of election) of the Public Official Election Act; Article 109(2) and Article 34(2)(2) of the Attorney-at-Law Act;

(b) Defendant B: Article 230(1)7 and 4, Article 135(3) (a) of the Public Official Election Act; Article 109 Subparag. 2 and Article 34(1)2 of the Attorney-at-Law Act (a receipt of money or valuables related to election campaign);

C. Defendant C: Articles 230(1)7 and 135(3)4, and 135(3)4, and 135(2)4, and 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act (hereinafter “Public Official Election Act”); Articles 230(2) and (1)4, and 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act (Article 30 of the Criminal Act in relation to the provision of money or goods related to election campaign; Provided, That Article 30 of the Criminal Act in relation to the provision of money or goods related to election campaign, Article 230(1)7 and 4, and Article 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act (the receipt of money or goods related to election campaign), Articles 356 and 35(1) of the Criminal Act (the receipt of money or goods related to the occupational embezzlement), Articles 49(2)3 and 36(2) of the Political Funds Act (the disbursement of election expenses without any deposit account that has been reported); Article 49(2)5(1) and (4) of the Political Funds Act

(e) Defendant E: Articles 230(3) and (1)4, 135(3) (a) of the Public Official Election Act; Articles 230(1)4 and 135(3) (a) of the Public Official Election Act; Articles 230(1)4 and 135(3) (a) of the Public Official Election Act; Articles 230(1)7 and 230(1)4 and 135(3) (a) of the Public Official Election Act;

(f) Defendant F: Articles 230(2)4 and 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act, and Article 30 of the Criminal Act (Provided, That the above Defendant does not have any person in charge of accounting, and there is no person in charge of accounting, punishment provided for in the proviso to Article 33 and Article 50 of the Public Official Election Act pursuant to the proviso to Article 230(1) of the Criminal Act)

(g) Defendant G: Articles 230(2)4 and 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act, Article 30 of the Criminal Act (Provided, That the above Defendant does not have a candidate’s identity, and thus, is subject to punishment provided for in Article 230(1) of the Public Official Election Act pursuant to the proviso to Article 33 of the Criminal Act and Article 50 of the Criminal Act)

1. Commercial competition;

Defendant A: Articles 40 and 50 of the Criminal Act (Violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the violation of an election campaign period, the distribution of documents by means of unlawful methods, and the punishment prescribed for the violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the violation of an election campaign period with heavy nature of crimes)

1. Selection of punishment;

A. Defendant A: Imprisonment with prison labor for a violation of each Public Official Election Act and each fine for a violation of each Attorney-at-Law

B. Defendant B, C, F, and G: Each fine is selected. Defendant D shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for the violation of each Political Fund Act due to the violation of each Public Official Election Act, the omission of accounting reports and the false entry of accounting reports, and each fine for the violation of each Political Fund Act and the crime of occupational embezzlement due to the false entry of accounting books.

D. Defendant E: Selection of imprisonment with prison labor

1. A separate sentence for concurrent crimes;

(a) Defendant A: Article 18(3), (1)3, and (2) of the Public Official Election Act / [Article 18(2) of the Public Official Election Act / [Article 18(3), (2) of the Public Official Election Act / [Article 18(3), (1)3, and (2) of the Public Official Election Act / [Article 18(3) of the Act /

(b) Defendant B: Article 18(3), (1)3, and (2) of the Public Official Election Act / [1] Article 18(3), (1)3, and (2) of the Public Official Election Act / [2] Article 18(3), (1)3, and (2) of the Public Official Election Act / [3-B] Article 18(1)

(c) Defendant D: Articles 18 (3), 18 (1) 3 and (2), 263 (2), and 265 of the Public Official Election Act [1] Articles 5 (5), 6-a (6-3 (1), 6-3 (2), and 265 of the Public Official Election Act at the time of making a statement of the violation of each political fund due to the omission of accounting reports, the violation of the Political Funds Act due to the omission of accounting reports, and 2) Articles 18 (3), 18 (1) 3 and (2), 263 (2) and 265 of the Public Official Election Act [1] Articles 5 (5), 6-a (2), and 6-c) of the Public Official Election Act at the time of making a false statement, and 6-3 (2) of the Political Funds Act at the time of making a statement of accounts due to the omission of the reported deposit account, the violation of each political fund due to the omission of accounting books, and 2) of the Political Funds Act]

1. Aggravation for concurrent crimes;

(a) Defendant A: the former part of Article 37, Article 38(1)2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act (Article 50 of the Public Official Election Act) (Article 38(1)2 and Article 50 of the same Act (Article 50 of the same Act among concurrent crimes with punishment prescribed for a violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the provision of money and valuables to each public official election, among concurrent crimes with punishment, among crimes of violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act, and among concurrent crimes with punishment prescribed for a violation of the

(b) Defendant B: the former part of Article 37, Article 38(1)2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act (i.e., each violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act; and (ii) an aggravated punishment for concurrent crimes with punishment prescribed for the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act on April 3, 2018, with the largest punishment

(c) Defendant D: the former part of Article 37, Articles 38 (1) 2 and 50 of the Criminal Act (the crimes of violation of each Public Official Election Act, the omission of accounting reports and false entry of accounting reports among the crimes of violation of each Public Official Election Act, the crimes of violation of each Political Funds Act due to the omission of accounting reports and false entry of accounting reports, the amount of concurrent crimes against the crime of violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the provision of money and valuables against the crime of violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the provision of money and valuables against the crime of violation of each public official election Act, the amount of unuse of the deposit account, the entry of accounting books,

(d) Defendant E: the former part of Article 37, Articles 38 (1) 2 and 50 of the Criminal Act. Article 50 (Concurrent Crimes Concerning Punishment of Public Official Election Act due to Request for Money or Valuables Related to Election Campaign, which is the largest punishment)

1. Suspension of execution;

Defendant E: Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act (The following sentencing grounds shall be taken into consideration in favor of the above Defendant)

1. Detention in a workhouse;

Defendant A, B, C, D, F, and G: Articles 70(1) and 69(2) of each Criminal Act

1. Collection;

(a) Defendant B: proviso to Article 236 of the Public Official Election Act (one million won received in connection with election campaign) and the latter part of Article 116 of the Attorney-at-Law Act ( nine hundred and five million won received in return for introducing legal cases);

B. Defendant C, D, and E: each proviso to Article 236 of the Public Official Election Act

1. Order of provisional payment;

A, B, C, D, E, F, and G: Determination on the assertion regarding admissibility of evidence of the Defendant A and the defense counsel under Article 334(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

1. Determination as to the argument regarding the statement and recording of the election commission

A. Summary of the assertion

In light of the authority granted to an employee of the Election Commission under the Public Official Election Act and the authority of other investigation agencies and the process of investigation and accusation accordingly, this constitutes documents prepared in the course of investigation. As such, an election commission’s written answer should not be admissible as long as the Defendant does not recognize the content thereof pursuant to Article 312(3) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In addition, Article 312(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act also applies to the case where the interrogation of the accused or the suspect prepared by the investigative agency other than the public prosecutor and the video tapes, CDs, or similar things recorded in the interrogation process conducted by the investigative agency as the suspect are admissible as evidence of guilt against the accused.

Therefore, as long as Defendant A does not consent to the election commission’s written answer and recording with respect to the Defendants, each of the above evidence should be denied the admissibility of Defendant A.

B. Determination

In light of the following circumstances, in light of Article 312(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act regarding the admissibility of suspect interrogation protocol prepared by investigative agencies other than the public prosecutor, Articles 196 and 197 of the investigative agencies, and the legislative intent of the provisions on the authority of the election commission to investigate under the Public Official Election Act, the election commission’s written answer cannot be deemed as an interrogation protocol prepared by investigative agencies other than the public prosecutor, and even if Defendant A does not consent to the use of it as evidence or denies its contents, the written answer of the election commission in this case is admissible as evidence pursuant to Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and thus, Defendant A and the defense counsel’s allegation in this part is rejected.

(1) In order to decide whether to institute and maintain a public prosecution by clarifying the existence of suspicion of a crime, an investigation (investigation) refers to the activities of an investigation agency to discover and secure a criminal and collect and preserve evidence, and an investigation agency other than a public prosecutor means a judicial police officer under Article 196 of the Criminal Procedure Act and a person who performs the duties of a judicial police officer in relation to forestry, maritime affairs, resale, taxes, military investigation agency, and other special matters and the scope of duties thereof shall be prescribed by Act. Article 197 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that "the duties of a judicial police officer in relation to forestry, maritime affairs, resale, taxes, military investigation agency, and other special matters and the scope of duties thereof shall be prescribed by Act."

(2) However, there is no provision that grants the authority to perform the duties of judicial police officers for members or employees of the Election Commission. Rather, Article 14-2 of the Election Commission Act provides that "members and employees of various levels of Election Management Committees are found to violate the Public Official Election

A warning or corrective order shall be issued to the election commission, and if the offense is deemed significantly detrimental to the fairness of election or if it is suspended, alert or corrective order is not complied with, an investigation request or a criminal charge may be filed with the competent investigation agency. "Request for investigation or a criminal charge shall not be referred to as "investigation" to members and employees of the election commission," and only the authority to request investigation or file a criminal charge may be granted to members and employees of the election commission. In accordance with Articles 272-2 and 272-3 of the Public Official Election Act, members and employees of the election commission may request the submission of relevant documents and other materials necessary for investigation in relation to election crimes, and if deemed necessary to ask questions and investigate the persons concerned, they may be accompanied or present at the election commission, but they may not be subject to investigation to request investigation or file a criminal charge, but they may not be subject to compulsory arrest, detention, etc. Therefore,

③ In addition, Article 312(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the examination of a suspect conducted by an investigative agency other than a public prosecutor, considering the fact that the circumstantial guarantee of credit is imminent, was enacted to the effect that the admissibility of evidence is denied unless it is acknowledged by the defendant or defense counsel who is the original person, in a public trial or its preparation procedure (see Supreme Court Decision 94Do2287, Mar. 24, 1995). It is a product of legislative policy consideration to prevent the lack of fundamental human rights guarantee of individuals, who may not know whether there is suspicion in the interrogation of an investigative agency other than a public prosecutor (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 82Do1479, Sept. 14, 1982). However, the election commission is a constitutional institution established to conduct the affairs concerning a fair management of an election and referendum and a political party in accordance with Article 114 of the Constitution, and judges, educatorss, etc. participate as members, political neutrality and independence, and there is no possibility of compelling judicial police officers to investigate more than 2016.

④ According to the revision of the Public Official Election Act on August 13, 2013, the right to refuse to make statements and the right to assistance of counsel was stipulated by the members of the Election Commission or employees to be polled. The purport of the amendment of this Act appears to be to guarantee the fundamental rights of those polled. However, in light of the aforementioned circumstances, given that there is no provision that grants a member of the Election Commission or an employee the authority of judicial police officers to perform the duties of those polled, it is difficult to view that a written answer by the Election Commission constitutes an interrogation protocol prepared by investigation agencies other than the public prosecutor solely on the ground that there is some addition of the content that guarantees the fundamental rights of those

(5) Therefore, an election commission’s written answer, other than Articles 311 and 312 of the Criminal Procedure Act, shall be admissible as evidence pursuant to Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, since it is a document that states a defendant’s statement, in addition to the above Articles 31 and 312 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and even if Defendant A did not consent to the use of the written answer in the instant case as evidence or the Defendants denied its content, the admissibility of evidence shall be recognized pursuant to Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act when the defendants proved that they made a statement under particularly reliable circumstances. The defendants recognized the authenticity of the formation of each written answer by the election commission in the instant case, and the statements are deemed to have been made under particularly reliable circumstances. Thus, each of the election commission’s written answer in the instant case

2. Determination as to the assertion relating to the recording record of the election commission (No. 4,98 No. 4 and 98)

A. Summary of the assertion

According to Article 272-2 (7) of the Public Official Election Act, when a member or an employee of the Election Commission asks questions to those polled or investigates, he/she shall inform them that he/she has the right to refuse to make statements and the right to assistance of counsel, and this cannot be viewed any different case where he/she investigates those polled by telephone. Therefore, a record of the investigation conducted without notifying the right to refuse to make statements and the right to assistance of counsel is inadmissible as illegally collected evidence.

(b) judgment;

Article 272-2 (7) of the Public Official Election Act provides that "When the members or employees of each election commission question or investigate persons to be polled pursuant to paragraph (1), they shall inform them that they have the right to refuse to make a statement and have the right to receive assistance of counsel before making an inquiry or investigation, they shall enter their answers in the questionnaire."

Meanwhile, in light of the provisions of Article 146-3 of the Rules on the Management of Public Official Election, where those to be polled wish to be polled, and the convenience of investigation, etc., the question and investigation through a similar method, such as telephone conversations, are not allowed. However, even if such method is conducted, there is no doubt that compliance with the above provisions of the Public Official Election Act and the due process principles and guarantee of fundamental rights of those polled should be ensured. Therefore, if the members, employees, etc. of the Election Commission make inquiries and investigations by telephone conversations, it is reasonable to view that the public official election law should inform those polled of the right to refuse to make statements and the right to receive assistance of counsel.

However, each recording Nos. 4, 98 of the evidence list Nos. 4, 98 submitted by the prosecutor shall constitute evidence that a public official of the election commission asked and investigates by telephone conversations without notifying Defendant A and Defendant B of the right to refuse to make statements and the right to assistance of counsel, and the recording shall constitute evidence that has been collected in violation of due process prescribed in the Public Official Election Act. Therefore, it is reasonable to view that each of the above evidence is inadmissible in accordance with Article 308-2

Therefore, since the defendant A and the defense counsel pointing this out are with merit, each recording of the above shall not be considered as evidence of guilt.

Reasons for conviction

1. Defendant A

(a) Principles related to the offering of money or goods related to each election campaign;

The crime of violation of Article 230(1)4 and Article 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act is subject to the punishment of offering money, valuables, or other benefits in connection with the election campaign or expressing an intention or promising to offer them. The subject of the punishment is not limited to offering money, valuables, or other benefits during the election campaign period as prescribed by the above Act, and in relation to the election campaign, "in relation to the election campaign" as referred to in Article 135(3) of the same Act, "as the motive for the election campaign," it is more broad, and even if there was no purpose of influencing the election purpose or election, it is necessary to regulate any act that is likely to infringe on the freedom and fairness of the election. Thus, even if the provision of money and valuables does not necessarily need to be the consideration for the election campaign, and it is included in the election campaign related to the election campaign, such as the consideration for providing information related to the election campaign, and expenses for the election affairs related to the election campaign (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Do10109, Dec. 23, 201010).

2) The fact that the offering of money and valuables related to the election campaign against C and B is recognized

According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by this Court, the following facts are recognized.

① On June 2017, Defendant A decided to the head of Ulsan-gu, Ulsan-do, and entered the Democratic Party on July 2017 with a view to getting involved in an election campaign, Defendant A, who attempted to engage in an election campaign.

② Defendant A and Defendant C came to know, around 2004, that the contact was closed after dividing her talks and talks. On June 201, 2017, Defendant A and Defendant B came to know that there was no friendly relationship between Defendant A’s university and Defendant B, and Defendant B’s high school line.

③ From October 2017, Defendant C accepted the request from Defendant A to assist in his election campaign in a local election in 2018. From October 16, 2017, Defendant C posted a number of articles of advertising Defendant A, including distributing name cards, to Defendant A from around January 2018, following Defendant A’s purchase of NAV on around October 16, 2017.

④ On November 14, 2017, Defendant B joined the broadband and posted the first letter on November 29, 2017, and then on January 5, 2018, Defendant B posted a regional election campaign schedule, and on January 15, 2018, a number of comments on the preparation for local election and publicity of Defendant A, such as posting a notice of explanation sessions on candidate guidance, etc., and from around December 2017, Defendant B sent a word on the preparation for and planning for election campaign with Defendant A. Meanwhile, Defendant A expressed that Defendant B would have any monetary part required in the process of election campaign, such as the cost and price of substitution, to Defendant B.

⑤ Defendant C began to work at H office around January 2018, and Defendant B started to work at H office around February 2018; Defendant C prepared a job and computer for the said Defendants at the said office; and on February 2018, 2018.

20. Around 20, even though the registration of the attorney-at-law association staff of Defendant B was completed, the above Defendants did not work regularly in the H office, did not process special duties, and there was no discussion about the benefits between Defendant A and the H office in relation to the work at the H office. In addition, Defendant A did not appear to have worked in the H office for the purpose of engaging in the attorney-at-law work while running H. In addition, Defendant A did not appear to have worked in the H office for the purpose of engaging in the work at the H office.

1. The Defendant B and C did not attend the H office from March 2018, but did not work for the Defendant’s election campaign office at the H office.

7) Meanwhile, Defendant A transferred Defendant C’s KRW 3 million on October 26, 2017, KRW 1.5 million on November 17, 2017, KRW 200,000,000 on January 23, 2018, and KRW 7.2 million on February 7, 2018 to Defendant C’s post office or Kak Bank account, and Defendant B paid KRW 1 million in cash on February 27, 2018.

B) The point of offering money and valuables related to the election campaign against C

In light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the above 7.2 million won paid by Defendant A to Defendant C in connection with an election campaign was paid, and this part of the facts charged is guilty.

① On October 26, 2017, when Defendant A had started to pay the money to Defendant C, Defendant A asked Defendant C to assist Defendant C in his/her election campaign, Defendant C posted his/her article on the Bande on around October 2017, and Defendant C took part in election campaign, etc., and there was no special monetary transaction between the said Defendants prior to that, prior to that, prior to that, there was no special monetary transaction.

② Defendant A did not have a special relationship with Defendant A until the election campaign is held by Defendant A, and Defendant C began to contact Defendant A in full by requesting an election campaign. After that, Defendant C, along with Defendant B, took a significant role in the election campaign of Defendant A.

③ Although Defendant A asserts to the effect that the amount paid to Defendant C is a loan, the said Defendants did not have any written arrangement as to the same disposal document as the loan certificate, and did not have any specific agreement on the interest, maturity, etc., and Defendant C did not have any payment of interest. Moreover, Defendant A does not seem to have any circumstance where the said Defendants demanded the payment of principal or interest. The said monetary transaction between the said Defendants had any exceptional substance different from the ordinary monetary loan. However, the said Defendants did not seem to have reached an exceptional monetary loan agreement, except that the said Defendants are related to the election for withdrawal by Defendant A. Even if Defendant A actually lent the said money to Defendant C, it does not appear to have been close to the conclusion of the said exceptional monetary loan agreement. Even if the said Defendants actually lent the said money to the Defendant C, it is a loan of interest, non-payment period, time of payment, relationship between the said Defendants, time and role of Defendant C commencing an election campaign, economic circumstances of Defendant C, etc., it is difficult to deem that the said money was paid regardless of the above election campaign, and the facts charged were not accepted by Defendant C through the above.

④ On September 7, 2018, Defendant C stated that “the first investigation was conducted by the Election Commission,” and “the first investigation was made on October 2017 and around November 201,” and that “the first investigation was made on September 7, 2018.” This stated that “The maximum amount of KRW 4 million was borrowed from the degree of KRW 4 million on December 2017,” and that “the election commission’s person in charge was presented details of transactions, such as KRW 3 million on October 26, 2017 and KRW 1.5 million on November 17, 2017, it appears that the above 4.5 million amount was borrowed from Defendant A, and that there was no additional loan, and that there was no objective difference between the time of borrowing money and the total amount of the loan received from Defendant C, and that there was no objective difference between the number of times of borrowing money and the total amount of the loan received from Defendant C. This appears to have been made.

No. 1) No. 1) Defendant C registered as an election campaign worker for the preliminary candidate period of Defendant A and did not receive legal allowances of KRW 3.99,00,000, but did not request Defendant A or Defendant D to pay them. In this regard, Defendant C’s assertion that Defendant C did not receive money and attempted to engage in election campaign in good faith. However, considering Defendant C’s economic situation where the individual rehabilitation procedure was in progress and the personal debt seems to be considerable, Defendant C’s assertion that Defendant C supported Defendant A’s election campaign without compensation is difficult.

[1] Defendant A and his defense counsel argued to the effect that they are not related to election campaign since they did not engage in activities related to election campaign at the time when they are paid the money. However, in light of the following facts: ① Defendant A asked Defendant A to assist in election campaign before paying the money to Defendant C, and Defendant C was scheduled to assist and engage in election campaign by accepting it; ④ Defendant C began to engage in election campaign that is informed of Defendant A by proposing the activities with Defendant A along with Defendant A from the end of 2017 to the day of election campaign; and ④ from the end of 2017 to the day of election campaign; Defendant C made a considerable contribution in the election campaign process from the election day to the day of election campaign; and Defendant C participated in election campaign around February 2018 to the day of election campaign. In light of the fact that each amount paid by Defendant A to Defendant C constitutes actual election campaign, it can be sufficiently recognized that each amount paid to Defendant C was paid as a motive for election campaign at least.

C) The point of offering money or goods related to the election campaign B

In light of the aforementioned legal principles, it is reasonable to view that Defendant A paid KRW 1 million to Defendant B in connection with the election campaign, and this part of the facts charged is also found guilty.

① Defendant A made a statement to the effect that the prosecutorial investigation would pay KRW 1 million as a holiday expense, and Defendant B also made a statement to the prosecutorial investigation to the effect that he received KRW 1 million with the knowledge that he was given as a holiday expense in the above purport. However, Defendant A made a statement to the effect that he did not pay KRW 1 million to H’s employees as a holiday expense in the name of a holiday. However, Defendant A made a statement to the effect that he did not pay KRW 1 million as a holiday expense in the name of a holiday. In light of the fact that: (a) Defendant A did not pay cash in the name of a holiday; and (b) was not paid at the time of the establishment of a holiday in 2018; and (c) it appears that Defendant A did not pay KRW 1 million to H’s employees as a holiday expense. Defendant A also made a statement to the effect that he did not pay the amount equivalent to KRW 1 million as a holiday expense in the name of a holiday.

② Defendant A partially reversed the statement to the effect that Defendant B paid 1 million won for the medical expenses of his father, taking into account the circumstances where Defendant B was raising her her son who suffered from brain disease at this court, and Defendant B also made a statement to the same purport. However, even if Defendant B brought up her her son who suffered from brain disease after divorce, most of the hospital expenses of his her son could be resolved through State subsidies, and the State subsidies were received in addition to hospital expenses. Defendant A also seems to have been well aware of this fact; ④ Defendant B appears to have not been well aware of the need for medical treatment of her son, such as hospital expenses, etc. around the time when Defendant B received KRW 1 million from Defendant A; and Defendant B did not completely mention that the above Defendants paid her her her son’s her son’s son’s her son’s son’s her son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s her son’s son’s her son.

③ Furthermore, in light of the following: (a) Defendant B appears to have worked for the election campaign against Defendant A prior to his/her attendance at H office; (b) Defendant B appears to have worked for a shorter period of time; and (c) Defendant B actually worked for H office from March 2018 to have worked for election campaign; (d) Defendant B was in charge of an election campaign with Defendant C while taking charge of only election-related affairs; (e) Defendant B did not work for H office for a certain period of time; and (e) it appears that Defendant B did not work regularly at the office for a certain period of time; and (e) it appears that Defendant B would not have worked for the office for the public; and (e) it appears that Defendant B would not work regularly at the office for the public; and (e) it is difficult to deem Defendant B to have worked for the office for the public to have worked for the public; and (e) it is difficult to deem Defendant B to have paid part of his/her work to Defendant B or his/her employee for the public interest for his/her election campaign.

3) The point of offering money or goods related to the election campaign against D

In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by this Court, it is reasonable to view that Defendant A paid KRW 4.42 million to Defendant D in relation to the election campaign and did not have any negligence of Defendant A. Thus, this part of the facts charged also is guilty.

① During the first investigation at the prosecutor’s office, Defendant D made a statement with respect to the name of KRW 4,420,00 won related to this part of the facts charged (the statement of witness) at the prosecutor’s office, “A made a false statement.” During the second investigation (the first interrogation of the suspect), Defendant D transferred KRW 4,420,00 to Defendant A by being aware of the fact that “A was given with the maximum coverage of election expenses, as in other persons, and he was given the share of the election expenses.” However, Defendant D made a statement to the purport that “A was given. However, even though Defendant D was not divided with Defendant A, it cannot be deemed that the above statement was made, and Defendant D was sufficiently aware of the meaning of “Is” in the above statement, since it was a timely investigation related to the violation of the Public Official Election Act after taking charge of accounting-related duties at the Democratic Election Countermeasures Headquarters at the time of the presidential election in 2017.

② Defendant D, at the time of the third investigation at the prosecutor’s office (the second interrogation), reversed the existing statement, and “the amount of KRW 2 million out of the above 4.420,000 is lent to Defendant B, and the remainder was paid money used individually in the election process.” Defendant D made a false statement, which included the assertion on the money used individually in the election process, in this court, and paid KRW 1.4 million, KRW 9 million, KRW 900,000,000, and KRW 1.220,000,000,000,000,000,000 won for using the V’s check card, and in light of the following circumstances, it is difficult to believe all of the above statements as it is.

① Defendant B did not have borrowed the money from Defendant D at all, and denied it, and there was no agreement on a loan for consumption among the above Defendants, and the above Defendants did not appear to have been nearest to engage in a monetary transaction, and even if Defendant D did not seem to have had an economic surplus to the extent that it could have lent the money equivalent to KRW 2 million to Defendant B, it does not appear that there was an economic surplus. Nevertheless, there is no reason to demand the repayment of the loan.

④ Defendant D did not give a clear answer to the reasons why the money lent to Defendant B should be paid by Defendant A, not Defendant B.

Although Defendant D asserts that he used a reasonable amount of money up to 4.420,000 won individually in the election process, it does not disclose the specific contents thereof, which is also the same as in the statement made more concrete than in this court. In other words, Defendant D did not reveal in detail, when and how much money was paid in the election process, and how and how other miscellaneous expenses were used in the election process, and even when examining all of the records of this case, there is no circumstance to recognize Defendant D to have paid his money in the election process.

② Defendant D’s remaining grounds remain at the time of the second prosecutorial investigation on whether there was a basis for using his personal money, and there is no basis to arrange for the said money separately. However, X and V’s notice to the effect that “A made a statement to the effect that it was, but this court stated to the effect that “I reported the details arranged to it to Defendant A via X.” As such, Defendant D’s statement is entirely inconsistent as to whether there existed the details used to use his personal money.

① Meanwhile, Defendant D’s defense counsel presented reference materials while finding new materials to support Defendant D’s assertion on the last day of trial. According to the above reference materials, Defendant D’s defense counsel asserts to the effect that the disbursement details, such as some of the loans to Defendant B, campaign posters, siren car prices, etc., are confirmed.

However, the above reference materials are identical to some (Evidence No. 258 of the evidence list, No. 9. 2,877 of the evidence record) of the election expenses disbursement in the evidence record. It seems clear that Defendant D merely arranged the revenue and expenditure of the election funds managed by Defendant D, and that Defendant D did not organize the personal expenses of Defendant D. In other words, the reference materials include not only the expenditure of the funds, campaign posters, rental cars, etc. paid to Defendant B, but also the disbursement details of considerable items, such as food expenses and personnel expenses, from June 8 to June 14, 2018. (The reference materials include each amount paid by Defendant D to Q, R, and P as seen below). It is difficult to view that Defendant D’s personal expenses are grounds for the above personal expenses, since there is no indication that Defendant D paid funds to Defendant D as personal expenses in the items asserted by Defendant D.

Rather, Defendant D’s defense counsel’s above assertion based on the above details of election expense disbursement that is difficult to serve as the basis for Defendant D’s personal funds disbursement is more strongly supported by the circumstance that Defendant D did not have paid personal expenses during the election campaign.

(3) On the other hand, Defendant A and his defense counsel permitted Defendant D to bring money to Defendant D’s explanation by reliance on Defendant D, who had been in charge of accounting, claiming that Defendant D’s entry into a private will personally, and Defendant A did not know whether Defendant D’s assertion was true or not. Thus, Defendant A asserted to the effect that there was no perception that Defendant D would pay money in connection with election campaign.

However, in light of the statements made by Defendant D in the first and second prosecutorial investigation as seen earlier, it is reasonable to deem that Defendant A also requested payment of money, including Bobs, from Defendant D, or approved it after consultation with Defendant D. Therefore, the allegation by Defendant A and the defense counsel in this part is without merit.

In addition, even if Defendant A’s assertion is a fact, ① the Public Official Election Act strictly limits the provision of money and valuables to the election campaign manager, including a person in charge of accounting, and provides aggravated punishment if the candidate provides money and valuables, and the elected person is sentenced to a fine exceeding one million won for an election-related crime, the election should be invalidated. As such, it should be strictly determined as to whether there is no illegal provision of money and valuables in relation to the person in charge of accounting and the election campaign worker. Defendant A, a legal expert, who is an attorney-at-law, seems to have been well aware of this point. Although Defendant A argues that Defendant D would transfer money and valuables to KRW 4420,00,00,000 without specific confirmation, it is reasonable to view that Defendant A would have provided money and valuables against the above purpose of the Public Official Election Act, in light of the purport of the Public Official Election Act which permits the provision of money and valuables between the candidate and the person in charge of accounting.

(b) Relevant legal principles concerning advance election campaigns and the distribution of documents by unlawful means;

“Election campaign” refers to an act that can be objectively recognized by the intention of promoting the election or defeat of a specific candidate in a specific election. Determination as to whether an act constitutes an act ought to be made objectively against an act indicated outside, rather than an internal intent of the person who conducts such act. Therefore, even though an act is not recognized as an act of realizing such intent under the circumstances at the time of the act, it cannot be deemed an election campaign with a subjective mind, or an act is not simply an act affecting the election, or an act is necessary or favorable for promoting the election or the defeat of the election. Furthermore, from the perspective of a State agency or a legal expert related to an election, it should be determined based on the specific situation at the time of the act from the perspective of the general public, in particular, an elector who experienced the act at issue rather than closely analyzing the organic relationship between individual acts or emphasizing the legal meaning and effect thereof.

The intent of the above purpose is not only explicit methods such as requesting support by disclosing a specific intention to leave an election, but also cases where the intent to promote an election or defeat in a specific election from an elector’s perspective is easily inferred in light of the objective circumstances at the time (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do1812, Aug. 26, 2016).

2) Specific determination

In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by this court, Defendant A’s distribution of name with the expression “shall be changed to the above conference, etc. at once” can be evaluated as having reached the extent that it was objectively recognizable from the perspective of the general elector’s point of view, as an act committed for the purpose of his election to go to the candidate for the head of the South and North Korean local election at the 7th time, which was committed for the purpose of the 7th local constituency election at the same time. Accordingly, each of the facts charged in this part of the facts charged is found guilty. < Amended by Act No. 11883, Jun. 1, 2017; Act No. 1487, Jun. 2, 2017>

7. It is reasonable to view that: (a) as a person who had an intention to run for the election of the remaining head of the Gu from the perspective of the elector at the time of February 2018, was objectively perceived as a person, who had an intention to run for the election of the remaining head of the Gu, after entering a democratic party and going through various SNS

② A around February 2018, Defendant A had a horse conference (on February 26, 2018) and had a preliminary candidate registered (on March 2, 2018, Defendant A’s registration of preliminary candidate), and the act in around that time was performed for a local election intended to be held on June 2018 from the general elector’s perspective, even if it was difficult for Defendant A to see that the act was conducted for a local election intended to be held on June 2018.

③ In addition, considering the fact that Defendant A’s desire to inform citizens of the name “A, which is expected to be political persons or election campaigned,” as to the reason why Defendant A’s name at the regular conference, market, etc. of a trade union, it is sufficiently recognized that Defendant A had the intention and purpose of promoting an election in a local election intended to be held four months after the election by giving notice of his face and name to the participants of the said conference and the market merchants, etc., who are most residents of the election district scheduled to be going out, and it is difficult to view that the said act was a mere restraint or enhancement of guidance or an ordinary political activity, as alleged by Defendant A and the defense counsel.

④ The name cards distributed by Defendant A at the above conference, etc. constitutes documents or printed materials indicating the candidate’s name under Article 93 of the Public Official Election Act, and Defendant A’s act, who distributed it around February 2018, distributed it to Defendant A during the period from 180 days before the election day prohibited under the above provision, constitutes distribution of documents in a manner that is not permitted under the Public Official Election Act.

⑤ Meanwhile, Defendant A and his defense counsel asserted that the crime of violating the Public Official Election Act due to the distribution of documents by unlawful means is not established when the crime of violating the Public Official Election Act due to the violation of the Act was committed while Supreme Court Decision 97Do856 Decided June 9, 1998 and Supreme Court Decision 2009Do1938 Decided May 14, 2009. However, the above Supreme Court Decision is a judgment on the interpretation of the Public Official Election Act prior to the amendment, and Article 254(2) of the Public Official Election Act provides, “The above Supreme Court Decision is a judgment on the interpretation of the Public Official Election Act prior to the amendment, with the exception of the methods prescribed by this Act prior to the election campaign period, the above provisions of Article 254(2) of the Public Official Election Act provides that “any propaganda facilities and tools or various printed materials, newspapers, news communications, magazines, other publications, campaign meetings, neighborhood meetings, other assemblies, information and communications organizations, establishment of information and communications organizations, and other methods and arguments that allow the above amendment of the election campaign period shall be punished for not more than five years.

(c) Relevant legal principles concerning election campaigns taking advantage of special status;

Article 85 (3) of the Public Official Election Act provides that anyone shall not be allowed to carry out or have another person carry out an election campaign using an official act within an educational, religious or professional institution, organization, etc. In this context, "act of carrying out an election campaign for its members by taking advantage of an official act within the organization of a professional institution, etc." means an act of carrying out or having another person carry out an election campaign for its members by taking advantage of an opportunity to carry out his/her duties or to carry out his/her duties, and specifically, when determining whether an act is "an act of taking advantage of an official act within the organization", it shall be determined whether the act is an act related to his/her duties by comprehensively observing various circumstances, such as the time, place, method, etc. of performing duties (see Supreme Court Decision 201Do12148, Apr. 28, 201; 201Do12161, Feb. 16, 2014).

In light of the above legal principles, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by this Court, Defendant A can be recognized as having the J of H employee who is a member of the law firm conduct an election campaign by taking advantage of his official act within H organization. Thus, this part of the facts charged is also found guilty.

① Defendant A, as an employer of J, was in a position to have influence over his/her duties.

② Defendant A, who was in the above position, asked the J to assist in his election campaign, and accordingly, the J appears to have led Defendant A to the election campaign.

③ After accepting Defendant A’s request from March 2018 to June 2018, the J sent text messages to the electorates who stay in the election office of Defendant A, rather than H, for a considerable time from March 2018 to June 2018, while serving in the election office of Defendant A, the J sent out a text message to the electorates with support of Defendant A, and carried out the election campaign, such as drawing up the web posters, posting the name of Defendant A, and posting the web posters. During that process, Defendant A appears to have given specific instructions on the method and content of sending text messages.

④ On March 6, 2018, the J sent to Defendant A a message that “I would like to keep the election office until the election office is held.” On the other hand, I seem to have experienced difficulties for J to concurrently carry out H’s office work and election office work. In light of the evidence record Nos. 7 and 2, 313.

(5) Of course, Defendant A, who accepted the proposal of J, appears to have caused the J to extend the work of the election campaign office. However, the method is not to newly employ other employees, such as the method proposed by the J, but to have H carry out election campaign-related work, and the J seems to have worked in the election campaign office by proposing that Y would have worked in the election campaign office again. In light of these circumstances, the Justice seems to have worked in the election campaign-related work because Y, who is an employee of H, was not able to perform the work he/she had worked in the election campaign office.

6) In light of the overall circumstances such as Defendant A’s status and the process during which the J voluntarily made a statement to the effect that he assisted an election campaign, and the time and place during which Defendant A took part in the election campaign, such as the time and place during which he took part in the election campaign, such as the time during which he took part in the election campaign, and the time and place during which he took part in the election campaign, Defendant A was recognized to have taken part in the opportunity to perform his duties at least, and even if the J had some intent to voluntarily assist the election campaign, such as the above statement, even if it does not interfere with the recognition of the facts charged.

D. Defendant A and his defense counsel argued to the effect that the disclosure of false facts for the purpose of election corresponds to the publication (the publication of false facts) of the false facts. Defendant A and his defense counsel argued that the act of failing to enter the fact in the name of the graduate school and the election campaign bulletin, etc. constitutes a career other than the academic background, and constitutes a false academic background. However, the entry alone constitutes a publication of false facts prohibited under the Public Official Election Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Do716, Dec. 22, 2005, etc.) since it is sufficient for Defendant A to recognize the above graduate school as a graduate or a person who completed the above course. Therefore, the entry in the name of Defendant A and the election campaign bulletin, etc. constitutes a description of the academic background as provided in Article 250(1) of the Public Official Election Act, and the omission of entry in the name of Defendant A and the election campaign bulletin, etc., even though they were entered within the period of education, constitutes a publication of false facts prohibited under the Public Official Election Act (see, 2004Do716, etc.

Furthermore, as mentioned below in the judgment on Defendant A’s request for adjudication on the constitutionality of a law, such interpretation does not constitute an extended interpretation or analogical interpretation beyond the ordinary meaning of the legal text, and this part of the provisions related to the Public Official Election Act do not violate the principle of clarity and the principle of no punishment without the law, and does not constitute an excessive violation of the freedom of election campaign or an infringement of the right to equality as to opportunity for election campaign. 2) Relevant legal principles

Since the fact of publishing false information in the crime of publishing false information under the Public Official Election Act constitutes the content of the element, it is necessary to recognize that the matter is false as the content of the actor's intentional act. Since it is difficult to know or prove it outside due to its nature, the existence or absence of such subjective perception should be determined by considering all the circumstances such as the Defendant's academic background, career, social status, circumstances of publication, time of publication, and the objectively anticipated ripple effect, based on the contents of the publication, the existence and content of explanatory materials, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Do2627, Jul. 22, 2005). The intention of the crime includes not only the conclusive intention but also the so-called intention to recognize it, which is the intention to recognize it, and also the so-called intention to recognize it, and thus, the crime of publishing false information under Article 250 (1) of the Public Official Election Act is also established by willful intentional intention (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Do5190, Feb. 26, 2004).

B) Specific determination

Comprehensively taking account of the following facts and circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by this Court, it is reasonable to view that Defendant A entered the academic background set aside from the graduate school of △ University without stating the study period in the circumstance where Defendant A knew that the false information was published in dolusium. It also is sufficiently recognized with the purpose of Defendant A’s election.

① Defendant A entered “the first vice-chairperson of the graduate school association in the △△ branch” column rather than “the academic background” column among the academic background and career of the name cards and election campaign bulletins. It seems that Defendant A sufficiently recognized that the entry constitutes the entry of the academic background.

② On March 28, 2018, Defendant A, who sought confirmation of the contents to be written on his own professional pen, instructed Defendant A to retire from the GJ, and added Defendant A to the last day of the Vice-Chairperson of the Cheongdae-gu Office of the General Graduate of the △△ Group. As such, Defendant A, according to Defendant A’s instruction, was written the academic background and career column of the name cards and the sentence bulletin on the basis of the added professional pen.

③ Defendant A was engaged in activities for a considerable period of time in Ulsan District and did not have any special connection with Ulsan District. Defendant A had a sufficient incentive to enter false academic background in that it could underline the relationship with Ulsan District through the academic background on the graduate school of Cheongsan District, which is located in Ulsan District. For the same purpose, Defendant A, in the prosecutor’s investigation, was required to emphasize the relationship with Ulsan District, regardless of whether there was a violation of the election strategy.

④ In light of the above circumstances, even if Defendant A and the defense counsel’s assertion that he did not know that the period of study should be specified is merely a mere assertion of the legal site, and thus, it cannot be accepted, and even if he acted on the assertion that he did not have an awareness of illegality, it is difficult to deem that Defendant A did not have an awareness of illegality. Even if Defendant A did not have an awareness of illegality, if Defendant A paid little attention, it can be seen that the act was illegal, and therefore, there is no justifiable reason under Article 16 of the Criminal Act.

2. The point of offering money and valuables related to the election campaign by Defendant A and G

(a) Defendant E (a) the relevant persons’ statement

On November 15, 2018, Defendant E was first investigated by the prosecution, and “The demand to Defendant A was defective, Defendant A received the request from Defendant G due to the lack of activity expenses, and thereafter, Defendant A could have known that Defendant A made a phone call to Defendant G, but Defendant G made a statement to the effect that it was “the decision to grant cash 1.5 million won.”

After that, Defendant E, under the second investigation conducted by the prosecution on November 28, 2018, did not accurately memory whether he again demanded to meet the expense for the test. Defendant E’s demand to Defendant A was changed to another person or not, and the fact that he demanded the expense for the activity was delivered to Defendant G without memory, and received money from Defendant G. The statement was reversed to the purport that the Defendant G received money.

Defendant E, at the point of time in this Court, stated that Defendant G was partly reversed the statement to the effect that Defendant G paid KRW 1.5 million to 1.5 million, and that Defendant G made a statement to the effect that “1.5 million won was naturally considered to have been written on the ground that it was not based on the grounds that there was no such fund, and how she received KRW 1.5 million from Defendant G, and that she received KRW 1.5 million from Defendant G, and that she did not request she paid money to her.” Defendant G made a statement to the effect that Defendant G paid 1.5 million won. Defendant G stated to the effect that “1.5 million won was naturally considered to have been written on the ground that it was not based on the ground that the statement was re-written above. 2) Defendant G stated to the effect that it was a statement to the effect that it was a non-founded statement.

Defendant G was investigated for the first time by the prosecution on November 21, 2018, and “whether or not Defendant G paid KRW 1,500,000 to Defendant E” is irrelevant to memory. < Amended by Act No. 15083, Nov. 22, 2018>

4. In the second prosecutorial investigation process, “the date is not accurately memory, but the payment of money to Defendant E is the same as the argue paid money to Defendant E, and the argue is not accurately memory, and the statement to this effect was reversed.

After that, in this court, Defendant G paid 1.5 million won to Defendant E, and did not accurately associate with whom she instructed, but if she is c, c that she has expressed the same purport as the second statement at the prosecution while making a false statement. 3)

은 2018. 12. 4. 피고인 G를 조사하던 수사검사와 전화통화에서는 " 피고인 E로부터 활동비를 요구 받은 적이 없고, 피고인 G에게 150만 원을 피고인 E에게 교부하라고 지시한 사실도 없다 " 는 취지로 진술하였다가, 이 법정에서는 " 피고인 E가 D, Z , Â 등이 있는 자리에서 사람이 많이 찾아오는데, 후보가 돈을 안쓴다고 불평을 하길래 피고인 G에게 ' 피고인 E에게 밥 사먹도록 하라 ' 고 150만 원을 전해주라고 하였다 " 는 취지로 진술을 번복하였다 .

4) Defendant A

From the investigation stage to this court, Defendant A did not request activity expenses from Defendant E, nor instructed Defendant G to pay KRW 1.5 million to Defendant A. Defendant G, and Defendant G paid KRW 1.5 million to Defendant E was also aware of the fact that Defendant G paid KRW 1.5 million during the investigation process.

B. Determination of the credibility of each of the above statements

1) First, we examine Defendant E’s legal statement, Defendant G’s prosecutorial office and legal statement, and legal statement.

In full view of each of the above statements, it can be summarized as follows: (a) Defendant A did not provide any demand from any group for the payment of money to any other person; (b) merely discussed the dissatisfaction that Defendant A, a candidate, did not use the money in excess of the amount; (c) Defendant G instructed this Defendant G to deliver KRW 1.5 million to Defendant E; and (d) Defendant G, who received the direction, paid KRW 1.5 million to Defendant E.

However, the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence of this case, i.e., ① the content of this statement, in itself, appears very exceptional, and all relevant persons are investigating agencies.

The contents of the statement are newly made in this court when there is no statement. It appears that the contents and circumstances of the statement appeared to be a significant act; ② although the statement was made to Defendant G, it was not made at all about the specific contents of the above order, such as the time, place, etc. while the above order was made; ③ Defendant G appears to be not consistent with the above statement; ③ Defendant G made and kept activity files in order to manage a certain cash at the election campaign, and arranged and keep the revenue and expenditure details of the cash, but it appears clear that Defendant G made and kept the activity files in order to “from the investigation process to this court, there is no fact that he prepared the activity files.” However, it was prepared in preparation for this purpose with money as money, but it is hard to reverse the above Defendant E’s oral statement that it is difficult or objective fact-finding, and it is also difficult to say that Defendant E’s oral statement or oral statement was made.

2) Next, considering the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence of this case with respect to Defendant E’s prosecutorial statement, i.e., (i) it is difficult to find out any motive or reason to make a false statement unfavorable to Defendant A who aided his election campaign without a clear memory; (ii) Defendant E has past experience in election campaign and has been punished for violation of the Public Official Election Act, and (iii) it has been sufficiently aware of what it means the content of his/her statement; however, Defendant E’s first prosecutorial statement was sent to the above statement, the credibility of its first prosecutorial statement is recognized.

On the other hand, although Defendant E reverses his second prosecutorial statement in the process of his second prosecutorial statement, it seems that Defendant E reverses his statement in consideration of the relationship with Defendant A, etc., and it is difficult to believe it as it is. Even if Defendant E changed his statement as above, it is difficult to view that Defendant E’s credibility of Defendant E’s first prosecutorial statement is nonexistent solely on the grounds of such circumstances as the circumstance and circumstances at the time.

3) Therefore, among each of the above statements, only Defendant E’s first prosecutorial statement should be recognized as credibility.

C. Specific determination as to the establishment of crime

According to the first prosecutor's statement of Defendant E, the credibility of which is recognized as above, Defendant E demanded Defendant E to pay activity expenses, and Defendant A expressed that Defendant A received money from Defendant G, and thereafter, Defendant G paid KRW 1.5 million to Defendant E.

In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the above facts and the evidence of this case, i.e., (i) Defendant A received money from Defendant A; (ii) Defendant G paid KRW 1.5 million to Defendant A as the content of Defendant A’s talked; (iii) Defendant G appears to have been well aware of a certain cash of an election campaign; and (vi) Defendant G continuously repeats a statement that is difficult to believe in itself or objective fact-finding; (iv) Defendant A is responsible for protecting the Republic of Korea, even though Defendant A memoryd a person who ordered Defendant E to give money, it appears to have reached the above statement in order to protect the Republic of Korea; and (vi) Defendant A requested payment of activity expenses from Defendant A to pay KRW 1.5 million to Defendant A; and (vi) Defendant A paid the role of Defendant E in relation to the election campaign. In light of the aforementioned circumstances, it is reasonable to deem that Defendant A paid the role of Defendant E in the election campaign.

Therefore, since the public invitation relationship between Defendant A and Defendant G and the election campaign relation to the money paid are all recognized, this part of the facts charged is also found guilty.

3. The part of the charge of receiving money and valuables related to Defendant B’s election campaign is found guilty for the same reason as the above-mentioned No. 1-A(2)-C).

4. The part of the charge of receiving money and valuables related to Defendant C’s election campaign is found guilty for the same reason as Article 1-A-2(b) of the above Act.

5. Defendant D

A. Whether the public offering of money or goods related to each election campaign is recognized as a public offering relationship between Defendant D and Defendant F

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by this court, Defendant D and Defendant F conspired to the effect that Defendant F paid the O’s wages to the Defendant F, and that Defendant F provided the money and the money for the election campaign by paying it to 0. However, in full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by this court, Defendant D and Defendant F made payment to 0 as part of Defendant F’s allowance, Defendant F made payment to 0 as part of Defendant F’s allowance, and Defendant F made payment to 0 again to 0.

① On June 16, 2018, Defendant D asked Defendant E to pay KRW 1.120,00 to Defendant E at the candidate’s own expense, not a statutory allowance, and sent Defendant A a letter letter to the effect that “the deposit is reserved as a matter of election law” on June 17, 2018, Defendant D is in conflict with the Public Official Election Act when paying allowances toO.

② In light of the fact that Defendant D deposited KRW 2.5 million and KRW 1.22 million in a telephone conversation with Defendant F, it is evident that Defendant D’s 3.62 million, which Defendant D paid to Defendant F, is an amount calculated in consideration of KRW 1.122,00,00,000, which is to be paid to Defendant F.

③ Considering the period from April 3, 2018, when Defendant F was an election campaign manager, Defendant D and his defense counsel asserted to the effect that the statutory allowances to be paid by Defendant F exceed 3.622,00 won, which is the preliminary candidate period for Defendant F’s election campaign manager, are more than 3.620,00 won, and Defendant F was merely paid reasonable allowances. However, in light of the fact that most of Defendant F did not receive the statutory allowances during the preliminary candidate period except Defendant F’s election campaign head, Defendant D and 8), Defendant F was considered to have had considerable influence on the payment of allowances to Defendant F and the determination of the amount thereof. Accordingly, Defendant D and defense counsel’s assertion in this part is without merit.

④ Such circumstances also revealed that Defendant D expressed his intent to pay high allowances to Defendant F in telephone conversations with Defendant F, and that he would also be paid in telephone conversations with O. It also revealed that Defendant D would be paid in the above manner.

⑤ Defendant F also stated in this Court that “The money paid to theO” should be paid from the election campaign, and that he delivered the money paid from the election campaign to 0.”

B) Whether to recognize the relevance of election campaign or not, Defendant D and the defense counsel asserted that theO was an individual secretary of Defendant E and F, and that there was no work related to election campaign. The payment of consideration to a person employed for simple labor in the election campaign office is not relevant to election campaign (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do3692, Jul. 26, 2007). However, according to the evidence duly adopted and examined by this court, it is recognized that theO prepared a list as an X-cell file with the direction of Defendant E, and prepared an organization, appeal, election organization name, etc. used in the election campaign as a computer, and it cannot be deemed that it was merely a simple labor for election campaign performed by theO, and all of them are sufficiently related to the election campaign in question, since all of them were a motive for election campaign.

C) Sub-determination

Therefore, Defendant D paid allowances to Defendant F in collusion with Defendant F, and it is recognized that this was paid in connection with election campaign. Thus, Defendant D’s charge is found guilty.

2) The point of offering money and valuables related to the election campaign against P and Q

In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and examined by this court, Defendant D, and the defense counsel did not have paid KRW 100,000 to P and Q, and all of them claimed to the effect that X paid the above amount. However, it is sufficiently recognized that Defendant D, other than X, paid KRW 10,000 and KRW 700,000 to P. Furthermore, in light of the fact that P was an election campaign worker, and Q was in charge of the production of promotional web posters, this part of the facts charged are found guilty.

① As seen earlier, part of the election expenses disbursement (No. 9No. 2, 877 of the evidence record) in which Defendant D appears to have arranged the revenue and expenditure details of the election funds he managed, indicated that Defendant D paid KRW 100,000 to P on June 12, 2018, KRW 700,000 to Q.

② On June 12, 2018, P made a statement to the effect that Defendant D did not receive KRW 100,000 at the request of Defendant D during the investigation stage to this court, and, except for the statement to the effect that Defendant D did not receive KRW 100,000,00 from the investigation stage, “A statement was made to the effect that Defendant D was directly paid KRW 100,000”, and it appears to be relatively clear that Defendant D was paid KRW 100,000 to Defendant D’s account. Defendant D deposited KRW 70,000 with KRW 16:10 on June 10, 2018, and Defendant D exchanged with Q immediately before and after the deposit. In this regard, Q made a statement to the effect that “I would have made a call to pay an allowance to be paid in cash from Defendant D, and later, Q made a statement to the effect that Defendant D deposited a talk with Defendant D’s account again.

④ When the amount of money paid to P and Q was problematic and the prosecution investigation was conducted, Defendant D called P and Q to talk about the fact that he received money to the investigation agency, and Defendant D talked about the fact that he received money to the investigation agency.

No. 1) A states that X paid KRW 100,00 to P in an investigative agency and this court made a statement to the effect that it deposited KRW 700,000 to Q. However, X appears to be a space between the face of P, Q. It is difficult for X to find out the reasons for payment of its own money to P and Q that it was not aware at all, and there is no explanation to obtain payment about the process of payment of the money, and the time and method of payment of the money to P. There is no concrete statement about the source of cash alleged to have been deposited to Q. The source of money, the process of keeping the money at the time of payment, etc. It is difficult to make a statement to the effect that X made a statement to the effect that it did not specifically state whether or not it was given to Q after depositing KRW 700,000,000,000 to Q, and that there is no concrete statement about whether or not it was given at the time of payment of the money in accordance with the above legal system and attitude of X.

3) The point of offering money or goods relating to the election campaign against R

In light of the following circumstances, Defendant D’s payment of KRW 200,00 to R, while recognizing the fact that Defendant C paid the amount of KRW 200,000 to R, it is found that Defendant C paid KRW 20,000 to the Plaintiff upon Defendant C’s request. However, Defendant C paid KRW 20,000 as an allowance for election campaign to R, on the ground that this part of Defendant C’s election campaign, it can be acknowledged that Defendant D paid KRW 2,00,000 to R in charge of the work of producing and supporting the web circulation posters, which is recognized through the evidence duly adopted and examined by this court: < Amended by Act No. 11614, Mar. 23, 2018; Act No. 13374, Jun. 13, 2018; Act No. 13888, Feb. 28, 2010>

B. The part of the facts charged regarding the receipt of money and valuables related to election campaign is found guilty for the same reason as the above 1-A(3).

C. Points of occupational embezzlement

In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by this Court, it is reasonable to view that Defendant D arbitrarily embezzled KRW 1.5 million from the Defendant’s political fund account, which was managed by the business without any consultation with Defendant A, even though he did not use his funds during the election campaign period. Thus, this part of the facts charged also is guilty.

① Defendant D and his defense counsel claimed that Defendant D paid KRW 1.5 million in cash in order to make a statement of the fact that Defendant D’s transfer of KRW 700,000 and KRW 800,000 from the political fund account from S to the U account in order to make the statement of the fact. However, in light of the circumstances as seen in Article 1(a)(3) of the above Act, even if Defendant D and his defense counsel paid oil to S in cash during the election campaign period, it is difficult to view that Defendant D and V paid oil to Defendant D and V’s personal funds. This part of the assertion is without merit.

② If Defendant D used money borrowed from V, it would be reasonable for us to immediately withdraw and use the money transferred to VI’s account, even if it was possible for us to do so, U’s third party’s receipt of the money through U’s account does not easily gain profit. In this regard, “I am head in the U.S. Won, but I am head in the U.S.,” and “I am am money from the U.S., the U.S., the U.S., in the place where the money should be paid.” However, if I am paid money by U.S.’s request, it is difficult to use the money transferred to U for the first time from 5 days to 30 days, in light of the fact that I am am able to use the money transferred to NA’s account. However, it is difficult to use the money transferred to NA’s account for the first time from 50 days to 50 days to 50 days from 50 days from the date of the first account transfer.

③ Defendant A appears to have not been aware of the foregoing facts since Defendant D paid KRW 1.5 million to S at will without reporting or entering the same into U’s account (hereinafter “Defendant D”) and returned it to S via U’s account (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 4., Supreme Court Decision 4.420,000 won, which was received in connection with the election campaign by Defendant D and the defense counsel, to the effect that Defendant D and the defense counsel voluntarily prosecuted the prosecution without any difference between the KRW 1.5 million and the KRW 1.5 million, but the above KRW 4.20,00 won was reported to Defendant D and transferred it under the approval, while this part of this case was 1.5 million in that Defendant D transferred it to S’s political fund account without any consultation with Defendant A and received the return thereof).

(d) Unuse of each reported deposit account, entry of books of account, and omission of election expenses;

According to the circumstances examined in the above 5-A, 2-3), and 2-2 of the above evidence, the defendant D did not go through the reported deposit account, but paid 10,000 won to P, Q, and 20,000 won to R, and received 4.420,000 won from the defendant A. Although each of the above money related to election expenses was entered in the account book, it was not entered in the account book, and it was found that 5,420,000 won was omitted in the accounting report for the election expenses. Thus, all of these facts charged are found guilty.

2) False entry and false accounting report

According to the circumstances examined in the above 5-A, 1.0,00 won for allowances, 1.20,000 won for Defendant F while paying allowances to Defendant F, as if he paid 1.22,000 won to Defendant F with false accounting books, entered false accounting reports without justifiable grounds, remitted the total amount of KRW 1.5 million from S in the political fund account to S in the name of the secondary engineer and oil expenses, and received return of KRW 1.5 million from S in the name of the account in the name of the second engineer and the second fuel expenses, but it is reasonable to view that S made a false entry of accounting reports as if he paid KRW 1.5 million in the name of the second engineer and oil expenses, and that all of the charges in this part are guilty.

Reasons for sentencing

1. The scope of punishment by law;

A. Defendant A1’s violation of each Public Official Election Act: Imprisonment from January to June 2) each violation of each Attorney-at-Law Act: a fine of 50,000 to 75 million won;

B. Defendant B1’s violation of the Public Official Election Act: a fine of KRW 50,00 to KRW 30 million: each violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act: a fine of KRW 50,000 to KRW 75,000. Defendant C: a fine of KRW 50,000 to KRW 30 million.

(d) Violation of each Political Fund Act due to the failure to use the deposit account reported, the failure to enter the account books, and the false entry of the accounting reports in violation of each of the Public Official Election Act (Defendant D1): The crime of occupational embezzlement: a fine of KRW 50,000 to KRW 30 million: a fine of KRW 50,000: a fine of KRW 50,000 to KRW 30 million;

(e) Defendant E: Imprisonment of January to June 10.

(f) Defendant F: fine of KRW 50,000 to KRW 30,000; or

G. Defendant G: fine of KRW 50,000 to KRW 30,000.

2. Scope of recommended sentences according to the sentencing criteria;

A. The current sentencing guidelines on the crime of violation of the Public Official Election Act due to the provision of money and goods related to the election campaign in violation of each of the public Official Election Act (Defendant A1) are imposed on the former Public Official Election Act (amended by Act No. 12393, Feb. 13, 2014) that had been punished by imprisonment with prison labor for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding 10,000 won (Article 230(1) and 7 years, or by a fine not exceeding 15 million won (Article 230(2)). Therefore, the current sentencing guidelines on the crime of violation of the public Official Election Act due to the provision of money and goods related to the election campaign in violation of each of the public Official Election Act (amended by Act No. 12393, Feb. 13, 2014) are not applicable as they are: Provided, That the statutory punishment is the same when selecting a sentence, and the scope of recommending punishment should be calculated according to the current sentencing guidelines, in consideration of various crimes related to the above public Official Election Act.

A) 1 Crimes (Violation of the Public Official Election Act)

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. (No. 3.) General Purchase by Candidates, etc. (no. 1. 3.)

[Scope of Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, Crimes No. 2 (Violation of Public Official Election Act) of Imprisonment from 8 months to 2 years

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. (No. 3.) General Purchase by Candidates, etc. (no. 1. 3.)

[Scope of Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, 8 months to 2 years old) 3 Crimes (Violation of Public Official Election Act)

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. (No. 3.) General Purchase by Candidates, etc. (no. 1. 3.)

[The scope of recommendation field and recommendation range] The basic area of recommendation range, the scope of recommendation range according to the standards for handling multiple crimes: Imprisonment for 8 months to 3 years (the upper limit of crime ＋ 1/2 of the upper limit of crime ＋ 1/3 of the upper limit of crime 2 + 1/3 of the upper limit of crime 3) and fine for violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act, so the sentencing criteria shall not apply.

B. Defendant B1) Violation of each of the Public Official Election Act

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election 01. General Purchase of Election Offense / [Type 2] Purchase, and Purchase related to the recommendation of a candidate for a political party (no special person)

[The scope of recommendations and recommendations] The sentencing guidelines are not applied as the basic area of recommendation, and each fine for violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act was selected from June to April 2).

C. Defendant C [Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. [Type 2] General Purchase, and Purchase related to the recommendation of a candidate for a political party (no special person)

[The scope of recommendations and recommendations] Basic Area, Imprisonment of six months to one year and four months;

D. Defendant D1’s violation of each of the Public Official Election Act, omission of accounting expenses, and false entry of accounting reports, each of the violation of each of the Political Funds Act (Violation of the Public Official Election Act)

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. (No. 3.) General Purchase by Candidates, etc. (no. 1. 3.)

[Scope of Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, Crimes No. 2 (Violation of Public Official Election Act) of Imprisonment from 8 months to 2 years

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. (No. 3.) General Purchase by Candidates, etc. (no. 1. 3.)

[Scope of Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, 8 months to 2 years old) 3 Crimes (Violation of Public Official Election Act)

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. (No. 3.) General Purchase by Candidates, etc. (no. 1. 3.)

[The scope of recommendation field and recommendation range] The basic area of recommendation range, the scope of recommendation range according to the standards for handling multiple crimes: imprisonment of 8 months to 3 years (the upper limit of 1 crime + 1/2 of the upper limit of 2 crime + 1/3 of the upper limit of 3 crime 2 + 2) the unuse of the deposit account reported, the unentry of the account book, and each crime of violating the Political Funds Act due to the false entry of the account book is not set the sentencing criteria.

3) As the fine for occupational embezzlement was selected, the sentencing criteria shall not apply.

E. Defendant E1) 1 crime (Violation of the Public Official Election Act)

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. General Purchase and Inducing of Understanding [Type 2], Purchase related to the recommendation of a candidate for a political party [Special Aggravation of Punishment]: A previous conviction (including a fine)

[The scope of recommendations and recommendations] Aggravation, 10 months to 2 years from 10 months to 2 months) Crimes 2 (Violation of Public Official Election Act)

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. General Purchase and Inducing of Understanding [Type 2], Purchase related to the recommendation of a candidate for a political party [Special Aggravation of Punishment]: A previous conviction (including a fine)

[Scope of Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Aggravation, 10 months to 2.3 Crimes (Violation of Public Official Election Act)

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election Crimes 01. General Purchase and Inducing of Understanding [Type 2], Purchase related to the recommendation of a candidate for a political party [Special Aggravation of Punishment]: A previous conviction (including a fine)

[The scope of recommendations and recommendations] Aggravation, 10 months to 2 months of imprisonment

(d) Scope of recommendations according to standards for handling multiple crimes: From 10 to 4 years: Imprisonment (the first crime maximum + the second crime maximum + 1/2 of the second crime maximum + 1/3 of the third crime maximum).

F. Defendant F

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election 01. General Purchase of Election Offense / [Type 2] Purchase, and Purchase related to the recommendation of a candidate for a political party (no special person)

[The scope of recommendations and recommendations] Basic Area, Imprisonment of six months to one year and four months;

G. Defendant G.

[Determination of Type] Purchase of Election 01. General Purchase of Election Offense / [Type 2] Purchase, and Purchase related to the recommendation of a candidate for a political party (no special person)

[The scope of recommendations and recommendations] Basic Area, Imprisonment of six months to one year and four months;

3. Determination of sentence;

A. Reasons for common sentencing factors

In order to ensure that elections are held fairly in accordance with the free will of the people and democratic procedures, and to prevent excessive and mixed elections following the election campaign, the Public Official Election Act strictly limits the payment of money and valuables related to the election campaign regardless of the pretext, other than allowances and actual expenses prescribed by the Public Official Election Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 2004Hu484, Jan. 27, 2005), and where a candidate, accountant in charge, etc. provide money and valuables, there are provisions that punish them strictly (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 2004Hu484, Jan. 27, 2005). The legislative intent of the above is to eradicate the inducement of purchase and understanding, thereby promoting the realization of fair and clean election. Nevertheless, the Defendants do not commit any act contrary to the purport of the Public Official Election Act, such as offering, demanding, or receiving money and valuables in connection with the election campaign during the election campaign.

Considering the importance of illegality in receiving money and valuables between voters, the influence of free decision-making by persons subject to acts, and the ripple effect on society as a whole, giving and receiving money and valuables related to election cannot be paid to the Defendants, and even in order to eradicate all attempts to influence the election by means of mobilization of money and valuables, it is necessary to sentence the Defendants with severe penalty equivalent thereto.

These circumstances shall take into account the unfavorable circumstances to all the Defendants.

B. Defendant A1’s violation of the Public Official Election Act: (a) each violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act: a fine of KRW 10 million is the final subject to the benefit accrued from the election campaign; (b) Defendant A was responsible for preventing and regulating illegal acts related to the election campaign. In particular, the above Defendant, who has worked as a lawyer for a considerable period of time as a legal expert, was in a position to be required to comply with the Public Official Election Act with a law-abiding spirit. Nevertheless, the above Defendant provided money and valuables to election campaigners for about 14 million won in total; (c) provided money and valuables before the law permits the election campaign period; and (d) provided a campaign campaign period to emphasize the relationship with the region; and (e) had an employee in charge of the attorney-at-law to carry out an election campaign using his/her own position. In addition, considering the difference between the two candidates and the voting in the election campaign elected, it appears that the Defendant did not have any influence on the result of the election, even though he/she did not have been aware of the circumstances related to the aforementioned.

On the other hand, the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act committed by the above defendant also goes against the purpose of the Attorney-at-law Act to protect the interests of interested persons and to promote fairness of legal life and smooth operation of law and order by paying a considerable amount of money and valuables to the other party arranging the legal case, thereby preventing the unauthorized person from participating in other person's legal case. The number of violations and the amount are not so

However, the above defendant has no record of crime except for one time of fine, and there is no record of crime, and the crime of violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act is against the above defendant, considering the circumstances favorable to the above defendant. The above defendant's age, character and conduct, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, and the sentencing conditions specified in the arguments of this case, such as the circumstances after the crime, shall be determined as ordered.

C. Defendant B1’s violation of the Public Official Election Act: a fine of KRW 3 million for each violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act: Defendant B received KRW 1 million in relation to the election campaign from Defendant A, and arranged legal cases and received KRW 9 million in relation to the election campaign. The above Defendant’s act is against the intent of the Public Official Election Act and the Attorney-at-Law Act, and its nature and circumstances are not good.

However, the above defendant has no record of crime exceeding a fine, there is no record of the same kind of crime, and the crime of violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act is against the above defendant's favorable circumstances, such as the defendant's age, character and conduct, environment, motive, means and result of the crime, and the sentencing conditions specified in the arguments of this case, such as the circumstances after the crime, shall be determined as the sentence as ordered.

(d) Defendant C: Fines of seven million won;

Defendant C is not liable for receiving a certain amount of money from Defendant A to KRW 7.2 million, and the responsibility therefor is not provided.

However, the above defendant has no record of crime exceeding a fine, and the fact that there is no record of the same kind of crime shall be considered as a favorable condition for the above defendant, and the sentencing conditions as the order shall be determined by taking into account the above defendant's age, character and behavior, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, and the circumstances after the crime.

E. Defendant D1’s violation of each Political Funds Act due to the omission of accounting reports and false accounting reports: (a) the failure to use each deposit account on which a report has been filed; (b) the failure to enter each account book; and (c) the violation of each political fund due to false accounting reports: a fine of KRW 1 million: a fine of KRW 1 million: (d) the Defendant D, as a person in charge of accounting, has a duty to follow the procedures set forth in the Public Official Election Act and the Political Funds Act in a transparent and strict manner; (b) the Defendant received KRW 4,420,00 from Defendant A while having a duty to follow the procedures set forth in the Public Official Election Act and the Political Funds Act, and provided an election campaign worker with a total of KRW 2,120,000,000,000,000,0000,000 won; and (c) the Defendant used the relevant person to make a false statement by actively participating upon the commencement of an investigation related to the Public Official Election Act violation; and (d) the circumstances after consistently making efforts to deny all criminal facts.

However, there is no record of crime exceeding the fine against the above defendant, and there is no record of the same kind of crime, etc. shall be considered as a favorable condition for the above defendant, and the sentencing conditions as the order shall be determined by taking into account the above defendant's age, character and behavior, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, and the circumstances after the crime.

F. Defendant E: six months of imprisonment with prison labor, two years of suspended execution, Defendant E demanded Defendant A to provide money and valuables, received KRW 1.5 million from Defendant G, demanded Defendant D to provide money and valuables, and provided money and valuables equivalent to KRW 1,200,000 to election campaigners. In particular, the above Defendant was experienced in election campaign and was aware of the fact that he had been punished for the same kind of crime, and even though he was well aware of the importance of election-related crimes, it is not good to commit such crime and commit such crime.

However, the above defendant's facts of crime are generally confessioned and reflected in the above defendant's favorable circumstances. In addition, the above defendant's age, character and conduct, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, etc. shall be considered as a whole, and the sentencing conditions as shown in the argument of this case, such as the circumstances after the crime, shall be determined as ordered.

(g) Defendant F: Fines of one million won;

Defendant F provided 1.20,00 won to 0,000 won in collusion with Defendant D to assist in an election campaign, and the responsibility of Defendant F is not minor.

However, the above defendant's acknowledgement of the crime of this case is against the above defendant, the first offender who has no criminal record, and the fact that the crime of this case was committed to provide a daily consideration to the above defendant is considered as favorable to the above defendant. In addition, the above defendant's age, character and behavior, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, and the conditions of sentencing specified in the arguments of this case, such as the circumstances after the crime, shall be determined as the sentence as ordered.

(h) Defendant G: Fines of five million won;

Defendant G, in collusion with Defendant A, provided KRW 1.5 million to Defendant E, and repeated statements contrary to objective facts in the course of investigation and trial, etc., and the circumstances after the crime are not good.

However, the above defendant is a primary offender who has no criminal power, and the crime of this case is an aspect for the defendant A, which is in the fifth degree of relationship with the above defendant, considering the circumstances favorable to the above defendant. In addition, the above defendant's age, character and conduct, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, and the sentencing conditions specified in the arguments of this case, such as the circumstances after the crime, shall be determined as ordered by taking into account the following factors.

The non-guilty part against Defendant A

1. Summary of the facts charged concerning the violation of each Political Fund Act;

(a) Unuse in the reported deposit account, unwritten entry in the account book, and omission in the election expenses shall not be made without going through the deposit account on which the report has been made, and shall not be made to keep and enter the account book, or a false entry, forgery, or alteration shall not be made, or a false entry, forgery, or omission shall not be made without justifiable grounds, with respect to the election expenses.

The Defendant concurrently served as an accountant in charge from March 2, 2018 to May 28, 2018, and disbursed election expenses through J.

On March 3, 2018, the Defendant used one mobile phone (010- 9646- *646-****) opened in the name of the Defendant for the purpose of sending election campaign letters, and did not pay the usage fees. < Amended by Act No. 1537, Mar. 3, 2018>

5. Around 28.28. Upon receipt of a report from the J on the payment of user fees, a new bank (101******* 8901; hereinafter referred to as a "political fund account") in the name of the Defendant, other than the reported deposit account [the reported deposit account (2070******* 8901; hereinafter referred to as the "political fund account] remitted 205,990 won from the new bank account under the name of the Defendant (1101****** 020) to the virtual account of KT, which was not entered in the account book, and thereby omitted election expenses 205,990 won while making the accounting report.

As a result, the defendant did not go through a deposit account reported in relation to election expenses, and did not enter it in an account book, but omitted election expenses without any justifiable reason.

(b) In the event that any person in charge of accounting who is not a documentary evidence receives and disburses political funds, he/she shall obtain a receipt and other documentary evidence.

Nevertheless, the Defendant: (a) around May 28, 2018; (b) around May 28, 2018; (c) KRW 205,90;

A new bank (1101*** 0200) account in the name of the bank (1101*** 0200) and did not provide documentary evidence related thereto.

As a result, the Defendant did not provide receipts or other documentary evidence while paying political funds.

2. Determination

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence of this case, i.e., the J 2018.

5. On March 2, 2018, Defendant D had to deposit money to the National Assembly Head of B, who had unpaid telephone rent of KRW 100,00. It appears that the National Assembly Head of B would have paid KRW 205,90 of the mobile phone charges on each of the above facts charged after the receipt of the word “,” and ② the J would have paid KRW 205,990 from the new bank under the name of Defendant A (101** 0200) to the KT account. The above new bank account did not appear to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have not been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have been able to have.

3. Conclusion

Thus, since the charge of violation of each of the Political Funds Act against Defendant A constitutes a case where there is no proof of crime, it is so decided as per Disposition by the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act to render a verdict of innocence pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and as the above Defendant does not consent to the public announcement of the judgment of innocence, the summary of this part of the judgment of

Judgment on Defendant A’s motion for adjudication on constitutionality of law

1. Legal provisions applicable to the application;

The provisions of the law for which the defendant A and his defense counsel seek an adjudication on the constitutionality of law are as follows:

Preparation and posting shall be limited to the ratio: Provided, That in consideration of the population density, posting places, etc., one percent of the population may be adjusted to 1,000, as prescribed by the National Election Commission Regulations;

A. Violation of the principle of clarity and prohibition of analogical interpretation

The above provision of the law does not provide for anyone to know where the scope of " academic background" subject to punishment is according to the usual interpretation method, so it violates the principle of clarity of the principle of no punishment without law, and even if the status of executive officer of a private organization, such as the chief vice president of the Mandong-gu branch of the Mandong-gu branch of the Mandong-gu branch of the △ branch, falls under the career rather than the academic background, the courts of various levels, including the Supreme Court, expand the target of punishment by applying the restriction on academic background without any ground for the career. This is in violation of the principle of no punishment without law of no punishment without law.

B. It is against the principle of excessive prohibition by interpreting that the status of executive officers of a private organization, such as the head president of the Dong-gu graduate school, in violation of the principle of excessive prohibition, is subject to punishment by applying the provisions related to academic background, such as the appropriateness of means, minimum nature of infringement, and balance of legal interests, etc.

C. Infringement of equal rights

The above provision of the law subject to the application discriminates against whether there is no substantial difference between the experience on the premise and dissemination of the non-regular academic background, and the experience on the premise and dissemination of the regular academic background, even though there is no substantial difference between the experience on the premise and dissemination of the regular academic background, and imposes restrictions on the method of publication on the same private group, the Korean society, and the Korean society, which are the same private group, without reasonable grounds, and thus, violates the right

3. Determination:

A. The establishment of the crime of violating the Public Official Election Act due to the publication of false facts among the facts charged against Defendant A is changed depending on whether the legal provision subject to the application for recognition of the premise of the judgment is unconstitutional, and the text of the judgment of this case differs, so the premise of the judgment is recognized

B. With respect to the argument regarding the interpretation of a law, the subject matter of the Constitutional Court’s proposal on the constitutionality of a statutory provision under Article 41(1) of the Constitutional Court Act is solely a violation of the Constitution itself, and the authority on how to interpret and apply the statutory provision is exclusively attached to the court with the highest court. Therefore, the issue of how to interpret and apply the statutory provision ought to be resolved through the court’s trial procedure. Therefore, it is not allowed to dispute a specific interpretation theory itself through the procedure of filing an application for adjudication on the constitutionality of a statute (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 2008Ka70, Dec. 23, 2010; Supreme Court Order 2005Kala74, May 27, 2005).

As to this case, among the defendant A and his defense counsel's arguments on health stand, clarity, prohibition of analogical interpretation, prohibition of excessive prohibition, etc., it seems to include the defendant A and his defense counsel's assertion that the defendant's argument that this case includes "a career premised on the academic background" or "a career based on the academic background" in the provision of the law to be applied for, it seems that there is a considerable part of the argument that it violates the Constitution.

However, in light of the above legal principles, the above assertion by the defendant A and the defense counsel is not allowed to dispute the specific interpretation theory of the legal provision through the procedure of application for adjudication on constitutionality.

C. The principle of clarity and the principle of no punishment without the law, which is guaranteed through Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution, refers to a crime and punishment must be determined by law. The principle of clarity derived from such principle of no punishment without the law refers to what is intended to punish a law and what can be predicted by anyone, and which clearly provides the elements of a crime so that he/she can make a decision on his/her act accordingly. Such principle of clarity is especially strictly required in the penal law, but it is not necessary to stipulate all the elements of a crime by the simple descriptive concept of meaning, on the ground that the elements of a crime must be clear, but even in the ordinary method of interpretation without permission of a person, the legislative authority should be understood as having to be able to understand all the protected legal interests of the punishment law in question and the kinds and degree of the act and punishment prohibited thereby. Even if the elements of the punishment law require a broad interpretation of judges, it cannot be viewed as violating the Constitution's penal provisions (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Hun-Ba276).

B) Penal provisions shall be strictly interpreted and applied in accordance with the language and text, and they shall not be excessively expanded or analogically interpreted in the direction unfavorable to the defendant. However, in the sea of penal provisions, the teleological interpretation in consideration of the legislative intent and purpose of the law shall not be excluded unless it goes beyond the ordinary meaning of legal text (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Do2819, Feb. 21, 2002, etc.).

2) Whether the principle of clarity has been violated

If a person who has a sound common sense and ordinary legal sentiments the scope of his/her academic background (the regular academic background and the academic background completed by a foreign country equivalent thereto) and the method of posting each of the above academic background is sufficiently clear and concrete, the above provision of the law subject to the application can sufficiently be seen as an act intended to punish by a normal interpretation method and the degree of punishment for a violation of such provision. Thus, it is difficult to see that the provision of the above application violates the principle of clarity.

Article 64 (1) of the Public Official Election Act provides that "A shall provide for the career "B" and include the method of posting educational background, acquisition degree, etc.," and Article 64 (5) provides for the method of correcting or deleting the matters on campaign posters prepared and submitted pursuant to the above Article 64 (1), and provides for the method of correcting or deleting the matters on campaign posters submitted pursuant to the above Article 64 (1) (hereinafter referred to as "career, etc.") and provides for a penal provision in cases where false information about career, etc. is published pursuant to Article 250 (1).

Article 64(1) and (5) of the Public Official Election Act and Article 250(1) of the same Act include the following circumstances, i.e., ① entry of the term “career” in advance into several kinds of “inwards” or “inwards”, and “careers that are not schools” as “careers”. Article 64 of the Public Official Election Act provides that “If a person intends to use career as a strictly distinguishable concept,” “the term “careers are interpreted as included in academic background,” and “the term “the term “careers” should be interpreted as “the term “the other necessary matters,” and “the term “the term “the term,” and “the other necessary matters,” should be interpreted as “the term, “the term,” and “the term, “the term,” and “the term,” and “the term, “the term,” and “the other necessary matters,” should be interpreted as “the term,” and “the term, “the term,” and “the term,” and “the term,” respectively, should be interpreted and interpreted.

Furthermore, the expression of the career indicating the status of executive officer of a private organization, such as the "President of the Korean President of the Dog University University", can be deemed as including the ordinary electorates sufficient academic background to enable a candidate to be perceived as a graduate or a person who has completed the pertinent school. In such a case, the above career is included in the academic background or a person who has entered both the academic background and the academic career, and such interpretation cannot be deemed to constitute an extension interpretation or analogical interpretation beyond the ordinary meaning of the legal text.

4) Sub-decisions

Therefore, the defendant A and the defense counsel's assertion that the legal provision subject to the application violates the principle of clarity or the prohibition of analogical interpretation is without merit.

D. With respect to the assertion of violation of the principle of prohibition of excessive restriction, the legislative intent of the provision of the law in question is to guarantee the fairness of election by regulating the acts that affect the fair judgment of electors by exaggerationing the academic achievement, or affect the correct judgment, and there is a considerable difference between the case where the relevant school is graduated from the school in the academic achievement, the suitability of the means of stating the period of education is also recognized. In addition, considering the meaning of academic achievement in our society and the importance of the candidate as a factor to judge the candidate, even though there is a somewhat limited aspect in the election campaign bulletin, etc., it is difficult to view that the degree of restriction is serious to be contrary to the minimum degree of infringement, and it is also recognized that the formation of legal interest equality between the public interest and securing the fairness of election.

Therefore, the defendant A and the defense counsel's assertion that the legal provisions subject to the application violate the excessive prohibition principle is not reasonable.

E. As to the assertion on the right of equality, the principle of equality under Article 11(1) of the Constitution does not mean an absolute equality that denies any discriminatory treatment, but rather means a relative equality that does not discriminate against a person without any reasonable ground in the legislative and legal application. Accordingly, discrimination or inequality with reasonable grounds is not contrary to the principle of equality (see Supreme Court Decision 99Do2309, Oct. 12, 199, etc.).

2) Since the regular academic background and non-regular academic background are considerably different from the existence of the relevant law and the possibility of recognition among the general electors, it is difficult to view that there is no reasonable ground for discrimination on the grounds that there is a difference in whether it can be entered in the election campaign bulletin, etc., and such circumstance is different in the case of a private group where the possibility of being recognized by the candidate as a graduate or a person who has completed the relevant school is sufficient to be recognized as a person who has completed the relevant school.

In addition, as in the instant case, the false statement on academic background, as in the name of the region, can lead to an elector’s fair judgment by falsely or exaggeratedly stating the elector’s history of graduation from a famous university, etc., and thus, requires strict regulations, such as falsely or exaggerated the elector’s ability to misleads the elector’s fair judgment, and thus, it cannot be evaluated that the organization such as the club on academic background and the meeting of native folks, etc., on the basis that the two are different from each other, cannot be seen as discrimination without reasonable grounds.

3) Therefore, there is no reason for Defendant A and the defense counsel’s assertion that the legal provision subject to the application infringes on the right of equality.

4. Conclusion

Thus, Defendant A’s motion for adjudication on the constitutionality of law is without merit, and it is dismissed.

Judges Kim Jong-sung

Judge Lee Il-il

Since there is no disadvantage, the above provision will be added ex officio without the amendment process.

2) Although the applicable provisions of the indictment in this case are omitted, there is no difficulty in guaranteeing the defendant's right to defense, and the defendant is virtually not in fact.

Since there is no benefit, the above provision will be added ex officio without the amendment process.

3) Defendant A also lent money to Defendant C in the course of the election commission’s investigation

It is time when the defendant C was prepared to do so, which may cause damage to the help of his election at the time when the defendant C has been closed.

Each statement was made to the effect that the statement was ".........."

4) The Seoul High Court Decision 2017 - 799 decided June 15, 2017 cited by Defendant A’s defense counsel is about eight months before the election day.

It is not appropriate to use the case as a matter of issue, with the exception of this case.

5) Article 254(2) of the former Public Official Election Act (amended by Act No. 9974, Jan. 25, 2010);

A person who commits an act falling under any of the following subparagraphs shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or 400, except as otherwise provided in this Act:

A person shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 00 million won.

6) As regards the part of the activity files prepared by Defendant G, J directly against Defendant G in relation to the part arranged by Defendant G as money received from J.

In other words, there is no written delivery of cash, and there is no withdrawal of cash and delivery of cash to Defendant A.

According to the above, it is deemed that Defendant A instructed Defendant G to withdraw cash and given Defendant G to manage it.

Since it is reasonable, Defendant A also knew that Defendant G had been in charge of the cash management of the election campaign.

Da.

7) As to who Defendant G orders the payment of money, these circumstances are “not well memory, but they are harder.”

(1) The phrase “this note” does not mean that Defendant A gave money despite having made an ambiguous statement to the effect that the statement was made.

“I not see, e.g., a conclusive answer to G, and (see, e.g., the recording book of the witness in G).

8) Defendant D also received 80,000 won allowances for two days (from May 29, 2018 to May 30, 2018).

9) The same applies to other Defendants to whom Article 230(1) or (2) of the Public Official Election Act applies.

A person shall be appointed.