2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasoning of this court’s judgment is as follows: (a) the Plaintiff’s addition of a new judgment on the assertion by this court is identical to the reasoning of the first instance judgment; and (b) thus, the part is cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act

2. The plaintiff's additional assertion and judgment as to the additional assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) Violation of the principle of substantial taxation

Since the deceased Lee Dong-A (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased"), who is the decedent of the plaintiff et al., paid all the sale price of the housing of this case before the death on December 12, 1993, the housing of this case is deemed to have been inherited by the plaintiff et al. under the principle of substantial taxation, but the disposition of this case reported differently is unlawful.

2) Extinction of the right to collect the national tax

As the Plaintiff, etc. transferred the instant house on December 16, 2003, and did not file a final tax base return between May 1, 2004 and May 31, 2004, the extinctive prescription of the right to collect the national tax has expired on June 1, 2009, while the extinctive prescription of the right to collect the national tax was completed on June 1, 2009, the disposition of this case on March 1, 2010 thereafter is unlawful.

B. Determination

1) Whether the substance over form principle is violated

Even according to all evidence submitted by the Plaintiff, it is insufficient to recognize that the Plaintiff paid all the sales price of the instant housing before the deceased’s words were as alleged by the Plaintiff. Rather, in full view of the purport of the entire pleadings as to the instant housing, the down payment and intermediate payment were paid until March 18, 1992, and the deceased on December 12, 1993, the Plaintiff et al. was changed the name of the purchaser of the instant housing without completion of the instant housing and the remainder payment of the sales price was paid, and thereafter, the approval for use was made on August 1, 1994 and the Plaintiff et al. completed the registration for ownership transfer on October 20, 1994.

Therefore, since it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff et al. inherited the house of this case at the time of commencing the inheritance, the disposition of this case is legitimate under such premise, and there is no illegality in violation of the principle of substantial taxation as alleged by the plaintiff.

2) Whether the right to collect the national tax is extinguished

Article 27 (1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that "the time when the State can exercise its right to collect national taxes under paragraph (1) for five years from the time it is possible to exercise such right, the time limit for payment shall be determined by Presidential Decree." Article 12-4 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that "the time when the State can exercise its right to collect national taxes under paragraph (1)" means the date of the following subparagraphs, while Article 27 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that "the time when it is possible to exercise its right to the State for the fixed number of national taxes" means the date of the following subparagraphs, and that "the time when the duty to pay national taxes

In this case, since the Plaintiff did not report the tax base and tax amount with respect to the transfer income tax of this case, there is no room for application of the provision on the extinctive prescription of the right to collect the national tax of this case [it is seven years for the exclusion period of imposition of "where a taxpayer fails to file a tax base return within the statutory reporting period, according to Article 26-2 (1) 2 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 9911 of Jan. 1, 2010), although the Plaintiff transferred the instant house on December 16, 2003 and did not file a standard final tax return between May 1, 2004 and March 1, 2004. The instant disposition was made on June 1, 2004, which was within seven years from the day following the date following the final tax base return. Thus, the exclusion period does not exceed the exclusion period].

3. Conclusion

The judgment of the first instance is justifiable. The appeal filed by the Plaintiff shall not be accepted as groundless.