[2] The meaning of "material fact" subject to the duty of disclosure under Article 651 of the Commercial Code and the standard for determining such "material fact"

[3] Whether the existence of another insurance contract is subject to duty of disclosure in a case where the insurer asks questions as to the existence of another insurance contract in a contract of life insurance (affirmative), and the requirements to terminate the insurance contract on the grounds of breach of such duty of disclosure

[4] Whether the terms and conditions are valid to terminate an insurance contract which covers the same risk after the conclusion of the life insurance contract, and where such notification obligation is violated, it may terminate the insurance contract (affirmative), and the requirements to terminate the insurance contract on the grounds of breach of such notification obligation

[5] Whether the circumstance of multiple life insurance contracts after entering into a life insurance contract constitutes a case where the risk of accidents under Article 652 of the Commercial Act is significantly changed or increased (negative)

[2] "Important matters" under Article 651 of the Commercial Act, which are the duty of the policyholder or the insured to notify the insurer at the time of the insurance contract, means the standard for the insurer to determine whether to enter into the insurance contract or the content of the insurance contract such as the addition of the premium or special exemption clause by measuring the occurrence of the insurance accident and the extension rate of liability resulting therefrom, and if the insurer objectively knows the fact, it refers to the matters deemed that the contract will not be entered into or at least the same condition would not be entered into if the insurer knows the fact, and what amount of fact should vary depending on the type of the insurance, and should be objectively observed and determined in light of the insurance technology.

[3] If the insurer asks the insurer about the existence of another insurance contract in the contract of life insurance, it may be deemed that it explicitly expressed the intent to take such circumstance into account as data to determine whether to conclude the insurance contract, and in such a case, the existence of another insurance contract shall be subject to the duty of disclosure. However, in order to terminate the insurance contract on the grounds of breach of duty of disclosure as to the existence of another insurance contract, the policyholder or the insured should have to prove the fact that the policyholder or the insured was aware of the existence of the duty of disclosure and of the existence of another insurance contract by intention or gross negligence.

[4] Inasmuch as the duty of disclosure may be recognized at the time of the conclusion of an insurance contract as to the existence of another insurance contract, a contract that guarantees the same risk after the conclusion of the insurance contract shall be notified, and the contract that the insurance contract may be terminated if there is a violation of such duty of notification shall be valid. However, even in such a case, as in the case of a violation of the duty of disclosure to terminate an insurance contract for the reason of breach of such duty of disclosure, the insurer’s failure to inform the policyholder or the insured intentionally or by gross negligence shall be proved first of all, as to the existence of the duty of notification and the fact that the policyholder or the insured had failed

[5] It cannot be deemed that the risk of accidents under Article 652 of the Commercial Act is significantly modified or increased solely on the ground that multiple persons subscribed to life insurance contracts after entering into a life insurance contract.

1. As to the assertion of violation of social order or good faith

An act of anti-social order null and void pursuant to Article 103 of the Civil Act includes not only cases where the contents of rights and obligations which are the object of a juristic act violate good morals and other social order, but also cases where the content itself legally enforces it, or lacks social order conditions or monetary consideration, thereby leading to the anti-social order, and where the motive of the juristic act indicated or known to the other party is anti-social order (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Da56833, Feb. 11, 2000).

However, all of the instant insurance contracts are clear that the content of rights and obligations per se do not violate good morals and other social order. It is evident that the content of the instant insurance contracts does not legally enforce it, or do not constitute anti-social order because of its legal act being contrary to social order or monetary consideration. According to records, even if the contract term is a longer term (3 to 20 years) and the insurance contract of this case does not occur, there are many savings insurance contracts with the content that the beneficiary would receive considerable amounts after the expiration of the contract term or the extended period. In light of these circumstances, in light of these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that the motive for entering into the instant insurance contracts was a large amount of premiums and insurance money and the circumstance leading up to the occurrence of the instant traffic accident, and it is difficult to conclude that the motive for entering into the instant insurance contracts was an anti-social order. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the conclusion of the instant insurance contract was an anti-social act, and the conclusion of the instant insurance contract does not violate the good faith principle or the Defendants’ allegation in the grounds of appeal.

2. Regarding the assertion of deception

No evidence exists to prove that there was a serious disease against the deceased non-party on the record, and the non-party did not notify the Defendants of the fact that he had already subscribed to another insurance at the time of entering into the instant insurance contract. In the same purport, the lower court’s rejection of the Defendants’ assertion to the same purport is justifiable, and the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as indicated in the grounds of appeal. Furthermore, the Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are different issues, and thus it is not appropriate to invoke the instant case. The Defendants’ assertion in the grounds of appeal regarding

3. As to the assertion of suicide

In light of the records, the judgment of the court below that there is no sufficient evidence to acknowledge that the non-party committed suicide is just, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence against the rules of evidence, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence to mislead the facts. The defendants' assertion

4. As to the assertion that Defendant Hyundai Marine Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. breached its duty to disclose

"Important matters" under Article 651 of the Commercial Act, where the policyholder or the insured is liable to notify the insurer at the time of the insurance contract, means the standard for the insurer to determine whether to conclude the insurance contract or the content of the insurance contract such as the addition of the premium or special exemption clause by measuring the occurrence of the insurance accident and the estimated rate of liability arising therefrom, and where the insurer knows the fact objectively, it refers to the matters deemed that the contract would not be concluded or at least the same condition would not be concluded if the insurer knows the fact, and what fact constitutes a matter of fact-finding, the type of insurance must vary depending on the type of insurance, and must be objectively observed and determined in light of the insurance technology (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Da27971, Dec. 23, 1996; 9Da13737, Feb. 13, 2001).

On the other hand, if the insurer asks the insurer about the existence of another insurance contract in the contract of life insurance, it can be viewed that it explicitly expressed its intent to take such circumstance as a judgment material about whether to conclude the insurance contract, and in such a case, the existence of another insurance contract is subject to duty of disclosure.

However, in order to terminate an insurance contract for reason of breach of duty of disclosure on the existence of another insurance contract, it should be proved that the policyholder or the insured knew of the existence of the duty of disclosure on such matters and of the existence of another insurance contract by intention or gross negligence and failed to fulfill the duty of disclosure.

According to the records, the written offer made by the Nonparty at the time of entering into an insurance contract with the Defendant Hyundai Marine Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the “Defendant Hyundai Marine”) (hereinafter referred to as the “Defendant Hyundai Marine”) is required to enter matters concerning other insurance contracts (Article 164, 166, and 167 of the records), and the Nonparty’s failure to enter them is acknowledged, but there is no evidence suggesting that the Nonparty did not notify the Defendant Hyundai Marine of the conclusion of other insurance contracts due to the above intentional or gross negligence. Thus, the Defendant Hyundai Marine cannot terminate the insurance contract on the ground of such breach of duty of disclosure. In the same purport, the lower court’s rejection of the Defendant Hyundai Marine Fire Insurance’s assertion on the violation of duty of disclosure is justifiable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to

5. As to the assertion of breach of duty to notify the Defendant Hyundai Sea

Like the duty of disclosure can be acknowledged as to the existence of another insurance contract at the time of the conclusion of the insurance contract, if the insurance contract securing the same risk after the conclusion of the insurance contract, it shall be notified, and if there is a violation of such duty of notification, the contract can be terminated.

However, in such a case, as in the case of breach of duty of disclosure to cancel an insurance contract for the reason of breach of duty of notification by the insurer, the policyholder or the insured, as well as in the case of breach of duty of disclosure, must be proved first by the fact that the policyholder or the insured was aware of the existence of the duty of notification and of the conclusion of another insurance contract,

According to the records, at the first instance court and the lower court, Defendant Hyundai Sea submitted the insurance terms and conditions (No. 119, 1120, 1378 of the records) by asserting the termination of the insurance contract due to a breach of duty to notify as to the above insurance contract (No. 19, 120, 1378 of the records). The terms and conditions provide that "where a policyholder or the insured enters into another contract that covers the same risk as this insurance after entering into the contract, he/she shall promptly notify the insurance company thereof in writing and obtain confirmation on the insurance policy, and if he/she violates the duty to notify it after the contract, the insurance company may terminate the insurance contract (No. 190, 192, 193, 206, 207, 227, 228 of the records) and the non-party may cancel the insurance contract (No. 5, 1120, 1378 of the records).

However, according to the above legal principles, in order for Defendant Hyundai Sea to terminate the insurance contract of this case for the Nonparty’s violation of the duty of notification, the Nonparty should first be proved to have failed to notify the Nonparty despite being aware or known of the existence of such duty of notification. However, any material to acknowledge it cannot be found in the record, and as such, Defendant Hyundai Sea cannot terminate the insurance contract of this case on the ground of such breach of the duty of notification. Furthermore, it cannot be viewed that the risk of accident under Article 652 of the Commercial Act is significantly modified or increased solely on the ground that the multiple life insurances subscribed to another life insurance after the conclusion of the life insurance contract. Thus, Defendant Hyundai Sea cannot be asserted for termination on the ground of Article 652 of the Commercial Act. Therefore, even if the lower court failed to decide on this part of the allegation on this part of Defendant Hyundai Sea, it cannot be said that there was an error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment of the lower court. Accordingly, Defendant Hyundai Sea’s assertion in the grounds for appeal on this point cannot be accepted.

6. As to the assertion that Defendant Hyundai Sea Safety Level U.S. did not appear

In light of the records, the judgment of the court below that there is no evidence to acknowledge that the non-party did not wear the safety labelling at the time of the accident in this case is just, and there is no error of law by misconceptioning the facts against the rules of evidence. The argument in the grounds of appeal by the defendant Hyundai Marine cannot

7. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Seo-sung (Presiding Justice)