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(영문) 대법원 1995. 6. 13. 선고 95다1323 판결

[해고무효확인등][공1995.7.15.(996),2394]

Main Issues

(a) The meaning of "justifiable conduct for the business of a trade union" under Article 39 (1) of the Trade Union Act;

(b) The effect of the original disciplinary action, where the review is null and void due to a failure to implement the review procedure on the disciplinary action or a serious defect in the review procedure.

(c) Where disciplinary action itself cannot be deemed null and void even if the review has been implemented without guaranteeing the right to participate of a trade union as provided in the collective agreement.

Summary of Judgment

(a) "Justifiable action for operations of a trade union" in Article 39 subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act refers to the legitimate activity of a trade union; however, even if a trade union member is not in itself an organized activity of a trade union in accordance with the resolution or specific instruction of a trade union, it can be viewed as an activity of a trade union in light of the nature of that activity, or if it can be viewed that a trade union member has implied authorization or approval, the action of the trade union member must be regarded

B. Reviewing the procedure of disciplinary action is a procedure of remedy or final determination for a disciplinary action, and its legitimacy should be determined in full on the whole of the disciplinary procedure. Therefore, a disciplinary action becomes null and void in a case where it is impossible to recognize the validity of review due to a failure to comply with review procedures or grave defect in review procedures, even if the original disciplinary action satisfies all the requirements.

C. Where a collective agreement provides for the right to participate in a procedure for review against disciplinary dismissal of a union member, if the trade union voluntarily waives the right to participate in such review, or where there are special circumstances, such as where the trade union directly notifies the company that the union will suspend its business operations in the future, or where all the union members, which have lost its function as a trade union, voluntarily notified the company that they will suspend their business operations in the future and completely suspended their trade union activities by resignation, the disciplinary action itself cannot be deemed null and void due to the lack of guaranteeing the participation of the representative of the union.

[Reference Provisions]

(a) Article 39 subparag. 1(b) of the Trade Union Act; Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Nu124 delivered on September 24, 1991 (Gong1991, 2631), 91Nu4164 delivered on November 12, 1991 (Gong1992, 139), 92Da18542 delivered on September 25, 1992 (Gong1992, 293) B. Supreme Court Decision 92Da4935 delivered on October 22, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 3151), 93Da29662 delivered on January 24, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 195Da32074 delivered on December 8, 1992)

Plaintiff-Appellee

Plaintiff 1 and 2 others, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Defendant-Appellant

Attorney Lee Jae-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee and three others

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu High Court Decision 93Na7588 delivered on November 24, 1994

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

1. We examine the first ground for appeal.

The court below found that the plaintiff was found to have been aware of the fact that the plaintiff was at least 04:27 on the following day while he was in the process of inspecting the condition of the plaintiff's product's product's product's grade while he was in the inspection room from 23:30 on July 16, 192 when he was in the inspection team of the factory correction board of the defendant company's heat 1 to 2:0 on board (on board) and was in front of the inspection team and was in front of the work team (on board), he was in front of the inspection team, and was in front of the work team (on board), and was in the process of determining the product's grade. The court below did not err by misapprehending the rules of evidence in light of the records, such as the examination method, the defendant company's work method at the above board, the defendant company's remaining in front of 1 to 2 hours, and there were no errors in the judgment below's finding that the plaintiff's new wall was in violation of the rules of evidence.

2. We examine the second ground for appeal.

"Justifiable conduct for business of a trade union" in Article 39 subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act means that a trade union is engaged in legitimate activities. However, even if a trade union member is not in itself organized activities according to a resolution or specific instruction of a trade union, if it can be viewed as an activity of a trade union due to the nature of such activity, or if it can be viewed that a trade union has implied authorization or approval, it shall be deemed an activity for the trade union's business (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 88Nu1950, Apr. 25, 1989; 89Nu8217, Aug. 10, 190; 91Nu4164, Nov. 12, 1991).

The court below found that the defendant company's trade union's act of distributing printed materials cannot be deemed as an illegal act in violation of Article 13 of the collective agreement and Article 51 subparagraph 11 of the Rules of Employment in light of the circumstances where the plaintiff distributed printed materials and its contents, time of distribution, place of distribution, etc., and rather, the act of distributing printed materials in violation of Article 39 subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act should be deemed as an "act for work of the trade union" under Article 39 subparagraph 1 of the Labor Union Act, in light of the above precedents of the party members, it is just in light of the above precedents of the court below, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to Article 39 subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act, as discussed in the judgment below.

3. We examine the fourth ground for appeal.

According to Article 25 subparag. 3 of the collective agreement between the defendant company and the labor union, when a member of the labor union is subject to heavy disciplinary action against dismissal of union members or more in relation to Article 39 subparag. 1 of the Trade Union Act, the court below rejected the defendant's following arguments, namely, the defendant company's trade union at the time of organizing the review procedure was merely 37 members of the labor union, and the defendant company's executive officer at the time of organizing the review committee's office was not able to receive the defendant's allegation that the plaintiff's act of distributing printed materials constitutes "act for the business of the labor union" under Article 39 subparag. 1 of the Trade Union Act due to the nature of the act. Thus, the defendant company should be present at the personnel committee for review to consider the plaintiff's act of distributing printed materials as grounds for disciplinary action. However, the defendant company did not notify the defendant of the fact that the non-party company's office was not able to receive the non-party 2's statement of resignation from the labor union.

The procedure of review on a disciplinary action is a procedure of relief or confirmation on a disciplinary action, and its legitimacy should be determined in whole as to the procedure of a disciplinary action. Thus, even if the original disciplinary action satisfies all the requirements, if it is impossible to recognize the validity of a retrial due to a failure to comply with the review procedure at all or a serious defect in the review procedure (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 92Da4935, Oct. 22, 1993; 93Da29662, Jan. 24, 1995).

Therefore, Article 25 subparag. 3 of the collective agreement between the defendant company and the trade union provides that three representatives of the union shall be appointed as members of the personnel committee if a member requests a review on disciplinary dismissal related to Article 39 subparag. 1 of the Trade Union Act. However, if a review is conducted without guaranteeing the right to participate in the trade union and a disciplinary dismissal becomes final and conclusive without guaranteeing the right to participate in the trade union, the disciplinary action shall be deemed null and void in principle due to significant defects in the procedure. However, if the trade union voluntarily renounced the right to participate in such review (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 92Da32074, Dec. 8, 192; 94Da46763, Mar. 28, 195) or a trade union which has lost its function as a trade union, and if there are special circumstances, such as that the trade union directly notifies the company that it will suspend its business in the future, and that all members of the trade union who have formed an operating body of the union have resigned and completely suspended its activities, it shall not be deemed null and void.

However, according to Gap evidence Nos. 18, 19-1 through 4, and Gap evidence Nos. 20, which were not rejected by the court below, the defendant company's trade union established 19,00 members at one time, but lost its function as a trade union since the number of union members at around August 3, 1992 upon the plaintiff's request for reexamination is not less than 37,000. The trade union requested that all union officers and executives (7) resign from the executive department and cancel their former work as of August 1 of the same year. The trade union sent a request for cooperation to the company as of July 25 of the same year to the above company that it was not possible for the company to appoint non-party 3 as the manager of the company's fund to preserve and maintain the union's funds and assets under the suspension of future business operation. Thus, it should be deemed that the company's benefits should not be accepted from the company's benefits management fund to the extent that it is not possible for the union's members to receive the above opinion from the company's funds.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that there is a serious procedural defect in the review procedure on the premise of a different opinion is erroneous in the determination of the legality of the disciplinary procedure. Thus, there is a ground for appeal pointing this out.

4. We examine the third ground for appeal.

The court below held that the defendant company's act related to Article 39 subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act among the grounds for disciplinary action against the plaintiff is a defect in the procedure that did not comply with Article 25 subparagraph 3 of the collective agreement. Thus, the remaining grounds for disciplinary action without procedural defect should be determined whether there are justifiable grounds for disciplinary action. If the plaintiff's main grounds for disciplinary action against the plaintiff, the court below erred in inducing the defendant's act of waters in the process of prosecutor's work. Thus, even if the defendant's act of water surface and other grounds for disciplinary action are determined comprehensively, the court below held that the defendant's choice of disciplinary action which is the most severe disciplinary action against the plaintiff

However, the fact that the defendant company cannot be deemed to have committed a procedural violation in violation of Article 25 subparag. 3 of the collective agreement, as stated in the above ground of appeal No. 4. Therefore, it is erroneous for the court below to have determined the legitimacy of the disciplinary action on the grounds of violation of Article 39 subparag. 1 of the Trade Union Act, except for the grounds of disciplinary action pursuant to Article 25 subparag. 3 of the collective agreement, on the grounds of violation of Article 25 subparag. 3 of the collective agreement. However, according to the records, even if all the grounds of disciplinary action related to Article 39 subparag. 1 of the Trade Union Act constitute justifiable acts for the trade union's work, it cannot be viewed as the grounds of disciplinary action, and even if all the grounds of disciplinary action against the plaintiff are determined comprehensively, it cannot be deemed that the defendant's choice of the disciplinary action most severe to the plaintiff is a legitimate exercise of the right of disciplinary action. Thus, the decision of the court below that the disciplinary

5. If so, even if there is an error in the judgment of the court below as to the fourth ground for appeal, such an error does not have affected the conclusion of the judgment, and eventually, the appeal of this case is delivered to the ground for appeal without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-대구고등법원 1994.11.24.선고 93나7588
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