2. B

2. Of the costs of lawsuit, the part resulting from the intervention in the litigation is borne by the Intervenor (Appointed Party) and the remainder by the Defendant, respectively.

(a) On December 6, 2010, C (D representative at the time) obtained permission for displaying outdoor advertisements, etc. with the following contents installed on the outer wall of the Gangnam-gu Seoul E ground F Building (hereinafter “instant building”) from the Defendant on an outdoor street sign board (hereinafter “instant advertisement”) (hereinafter “instant advertisement permission”).

Types of advertisements, etc.: Number of street (electronic display board): 18.0m x8.7m (Lighting: DoD) display location and place: Gangnam-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government E buildings, fourth to sixth floor display period: Commercials content from December 6, 2010 to December 5, 2013: Commercial advertisements and public service advertisements.

B. The Plaintiff acquired the right to permit the display of the instant advertisement from C and received a certificate of permission for display of the instant advertisement from the Defendant on September 9, 201 after reporting the change to the Defendant, such as the manager, etc.

C. On January 12, 201, the Defendant issued the instant disposition revoking the permission for display of the instant advertisements on the ground that the Plaintiff falls under Article 13(1)1 of the Outdoor Advertisements, etc. Control Act (hereinafter referred to as “the case where permission was obtained or reported by false or other unlawful means”) on the grounds that the following grounds (hereinafter referred to as “instant grounds for disposition”) were stated with respect to the Plaintiff.

① Failure to perform a large-scale repair before installing the instant advertisement on the instant building: Terms and conditions before the application for permission was filed. ② Retention of illegal packaging and finishings installed in the instant building site: Issuing a written consent of the manager suspended from office.

(4) No. 50% of the official seal of the manager of a management body affixed with a written consent to use a building (no. 50% of the official seal of the manager)

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1-2, Gap evidence 2-1 and 2-2, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

(1) Non-existence of grounds for disposition

(A) The instant permission did not contain any conditions of permission such as (i) and (ii) the grounds for the instant disposition; and (ii) even if such conditions of permission are deemed to exist, the Plaintiff fulfilled all of them.

(B) In light of the fact that the management body consisting of all sectional owners as an aggregate building becomes a manager of the instant building and its manager represents the management body externally. C received a written consent to use for installing the instant advertisement from G manager of the instant building, who was holding exclusive right to use the common area under the regulations of the management body of the instant building as of August 2, 2010, and C was a lessee of the instant building outside of the building at the time of obtaining the permission for displaying the instant advertisement from the Defendant on December 6, 2010, as a lessee of the instant building at the time of obtaining the permission for displaying the advertisement from the Defendant, even though C’s official seal affixed to the management body’s written consent to use of the instant building among the accompanying documents submitted by the Defendant was inconsistent with the official seal used at the time of the application for the permission for displaying the instant advertisement, it cannot be deemed that C obtained the permission for displaying the instant advertisement by false or other unlawful means, and it is difficult to view that C had any defect in the procedure for using the instant advertisement.

(2) A deviation from or abuse of discretionary power

In light of the fact that the Plaintiff holds a substantive right to install advertisements on the outer wall of the instant building even if the grounds for the instant disposition exist, the instant disposition is excessively disadvantageous to the Plaintiff compared to the public interest that could be achieved by the instant disposition, so it is erroneous in the misapprehension of the scope of discretion or abuse of this disposition.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Form.

(c) Fact of recognition;

(1) On February 10, 2010, C entered into a lease agreement of KRW 200,000,000 (15,000,000,000 if electric signs are installed by obtaining permission for installation) for the purpose of installing the instant advertisements on the outer wall of the instant building between G and the manager of the management body of the instant building. On September 9, 2011, the Plaintiff who acquired the right to permission for display of the instant advertisements entered into a lease agreement of KRW 30,00,000 for the same purpose with H as the manager of the management body of the instant building.

(2) On August 2, 2010, C received a written consent of the use for the installation of the instant advertisement from G, who is the manager of the management body of the instant building and acting manager of the instant building.

(3) On the other hand, the Seoul Central District Court rendered a provisional disposition on August 4, 2010 stating that “B shall not perform the duties of an acting manager of the management body of the building of this case as the acting manager of the management body of this case until the judgment on the merits of the case claiming confirmation of the absence of the authority of the acting manager of the management body of the building of this case becomes final and conclusive.”

(4) On November 19, 2010, C submitted to the Defendant a written consent of use made at the time of the application for permission to display the instant advertisement (the preparation date is written in November, 2010; hereinafter referred to as “written consent of use on November 19, 2010”), and the Defendant demanded C to affix the official seal of the management body under the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings (hereinafter referred to as “Integrated Buildings Act”) on the ground that the official seal of the management body attached to the said written consent and the official seal attached by the regulations of the management body of the instant building are different.

(5) On December 6, 2010, C confirmed that C is a legitimate lessee of the outer wall of the building of this case from the head of the division who has assisted C in the management of the building of this case, and submitted to C a written consent of use (the date of preparation is indicated as 2010 years; hereinafter referred to as the "written consent of use") and a written vindication on it. The Defendant determined that the official seal affixed to the above written consent of use corresponds to the official seal affixed to the business management body of the building of this case, and issued C the permission for display of the advertisement of this case on the same day.

(6) The manager of the instant building from August 4, 201 to June 16, 201, and the official seal of the management body attached to the consent of December 6, 2010, which was submitted by C to the Defendant, and the official seal of the management body, which was used by C of the former manager of the instant building, around 2006.

[Ground of Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 5, Gap 7 through 9 (including branch numbers for evidence A 5, 8), Eul 4 through 11 (including branch numbers for evidence B 4, 5, 9, 11), the witness G testimony, and the purport of the whole pleadings

D. Determination

(1) Whether there is a ground for disposition

(A) First, we examine whether there exist grounds for the instant disposition ①, ② or not to the Plaintiff.

However, since the administrative act of the other party is established when it was externally displayed, even if an administrative agency grants a certain condition of permission inside the building site, it shall be deemed that the permission is not a condition of permission unless the condition of permission is indicated externally against the other party. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the permission of this case is not a condition of permission on December 6, 2010 at the time when the defendant grants permission for display of the advertisement of this case to C on December 6, 2010 or on September 9, 201 when the defendant delivered the certificate of permission for display of the advertisement of this case (report) to C, as stated in ① and ②, it is insufficient to recognize that it externally displayed the condition of permission that "to install the advertisement of this case before installing the advertisement of this case, and to remove the illegal packaging vehicle installed in the building site of this case." Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the permission of this case is not a condition of permission for display.

Even in cases where it is deemed that the conditions of permission such as the entry were included in the permission for display of the instant advertisement, the following circumstances are revealed by the respective entries in Gap evidence 3, Gap evidence 4-1 through 3, Eul evidence 2 and 3, Eul evidence 2, and the entire purport of pleadings, namely, Gap received the report completion certificate on large-scale repair of the instant building on November 15, 2010, prior to obtaining the permission for display of the instant advertisement from the defendant; Eul removed the instant building on November 1, 2010; Eul removed the illegal packaging of the instant building on the back of the instant building; the staff of the defendant at the time confirmed that the illegal packaging was removed on the spot; and Eul taken photographs verifying that it was difficult to recognize the existence of the instant condition of permission on November 8, 2010, which was the same as the Defendant’s on-site investigation as at the time of obtaining the permission for display of the instant advertisement on November 16, 2010.

Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to exist, i.e., grounds for disposition.

(B) Next, we examine whether there exist grounds for the instant disposition ③ or ⑤ to the Plaintiff.

Article 13(1) of the Outdoor Advertisements, etc. Control Act provides that "the head of a Si, etc. may revoke permission for or return a report on an advertisement, etc. if the person who has obtained permission for or filed a report on an advertisement, etc. under Article 3(1) falls under any of the following subparagraphs," and Article 13(1) of the same Act provides that "any person who has obtained permission or filed a report by fraudulent or other illegal means" is one of the grounds for revocation of permission. "any false or other unlawful means" in this case means any case in which permission is obtained by fraudulent means or other acts deemed unfair by social norms, notwithstanding that permission cannot be obtained by ordinary

(2) Each statement of No. 4 through 11 (including the branch numbers of No. 4, 5, 9, 11) and the following circumstances, which can be known by the witness G testimony and the entire purport of the pleading, i.e., the management body composed of all sectional owners as an aggregate building, becomes the manager of the building of this case and the manager is the manager of the building of this case. C, as the manager of the building of this case as of August 2, 2010, was issued a written consent to use for installation of the advertisement of this case to the manager of the commercial building of this case with the authority to exclusive use under the regulations of the management body of the building of this case. The plaintiff acquired the right to use the advertisement of this case from the defendant 3 as a legitimate owner of the building of this case, and subsequent acquisition of the right to use the advertisement of this case by the defendant 1 to install the advertisement of this case under the lease contract of this case from the defendant 2, 2011.

However, Article 10(1) of the Regulations provides that "the acts of preserving the building of this case may be carried out by co-owners" and Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that "the provisions of Paragraph (1) may be separately determined by the regulations," and Article 10(1) of the Rules of the Commercial Building provide that "the manager may collect a certain amount of usage fees from a specific sectional owner or a third party for the common use and allow him to divert them for a certain period after obtaining approval from the representative committee." According to the above provisions, it is deemed that it is legitimate for the plaintiff to enter into a lease contract for the installation of the advertisements of this case with G manager of the building of this case on February 10, 201, and that it is difficult for the manager to obtain permission for the same purpose from the manager of the building of this case on September 9, 201 to obtain permission for the installation of the advertisements of this case from 10, which is an official seal of the manager of the building of this case. It is also necessary to maintain the safety and appearance of the building of this case).

Therefore, there are no grounds for the instant disposition in the Plaintiff.

(2) Whether the discretionary authority is deviates or abused or not

(A) In a case where a disposition is revoked on the ground that there is a defect in an administrative disposition, if the disposition is a disposition that grants the rights or interests to the people, the disposition may be revoked only when the necessity of the public interest needs to be revoked and the disadvantages to be suffered by the parties due to the revocation are compared to the necessity of the public interest, and where the necessity of the public interest is strong enough to justify the disadvantages to be suffered by the parties concerned. If the defect in the disposition is attributable to the party's filing an application by means of abolition or other fraudulent methods, it shall be deemed that the party was aware that the benefits from the disposition were illegally acquired, and the possibility of revocation was anticipated. Thus, it shall not be deemed that the party himself may not invoke the trust interest in the above disposition and that the administrative agency did not consider it (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 201Du5286, Feb. 5, 2002; 2003Du4669, May 25, 2006

(B) Considering that C had obtained permission for display of the instant advertisement from the Defendant by using “any false or other unlawful means” under Article 13(1)1 of the Outdoor Advertisements, etc. Control Act, the following circumstances, i.e., C, the manager of the instant building before obtaining the permission for display, was issued a written consent to use the instant advertisement for the installation of common areas under the regulations of the Commercial Building Management Committee, and thereafter, the Plaintiff acquired the right to use the instant advertisement from C on September 9, 201, because it appears that it was difficult for C to view the Plaintiff as the manager of the instant building or the Defendant to obtain the permission for display of the instant advertisement on the grounds that it was difficult for C to obtain the permission for installation of the instant advertisement by taking over the right to use the instant advertisement from the Defendant on the following grounds: (a) as the manager of the instant building on August 2, 2010, the Plaintiff did not appear to have been aware that it was unlawful in the process of the Plaintiff’s acquisition of the right to use the instant advertisement by transfer or the Defendant.

(3) Sub-decisions

Therefore, the disposition of this case is unlawful, and the plaintiff's assertion is with merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is reasonable, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

decoration of Judge Merit;

Judge Cham Name

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.