[2] In a case where the terms and conditions of the special agreement for accident death entered into with Eul insurance company separately stipulate that "the insured shall pay the insurance proceeds for accident death when he/she dies as a direct cause of a disaster or as a Class I disability, and the insured shall not pay the insurance proceeds unless he/she pays the insurance proceeds. However, this shall not apply where the insured intentionally injures himself/herself in the state of mental illness, and where he/she commits suicide or injures himself/herself after two years have passed from the date of commencement of his/her liability, and where he/she becomes a Grade I disability as a result of his/her suicide or self-harm, as a matter of principle, although the suicide or self-injury by intention does not constitute an accident which is an insurance accident under the special agreement for accident death, but if it falls under exceptional conditions,

[2] In a case where the standardized contract for accident death under the special agreement for accident death entered into with Eul insurance company, which entered into a separate contract with Eul insurance company, provides that the insured shall pay the insurance money for accident death, and one of the cases where the insured does not pay the insurance money, "it shall not apply to the case where the insured intentionally damages himself/herself. However, this shall not apply to the case where the insured has damaged himself/herself due to mental illness or where he/she has committed suicide or has injured himself/herself after two years from the date of commencement of his/her responsibility, and where the insured has passed since he/she intentionally committed suicide or has injured himself/herself, which is an insurance accident under the special agreement for accident death, although it does not constitute an insurance accident under the special agreement for accident death as a matter of principle, the case holding that it is reasonable and reasonable to understand that the insured's act was included in the insurance accident to the effect that if he/she has damaged himself/herself in the state of mental illness and caused suicide or harm to himself/herself, and that it conforms with the principle of interpretation of the terms and conditions.

1. As to the ground of appeal on the recognition of suicide

The gist of the plaintiffs' assertion in this part of the grounds of appeal is that, in light of the following: (a) there is no reason for the deceased to commit suicide in light of the circumstances at the time of the deceased's death; (b) the judgment of the investigative agency that deemed the deceased's private person as a suicide was caused by the death without any criticism; and (c) the private person was indicated as "unexploitation" even after the body examination, the judgment of the court below that deemed the deceased's death was committed a suicide is unlawful, even though it cannot be viewed as a suicide. However, this is ultimately attributable to the selection of evidence or fact-finding, which belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of

2. As to the ground of appeal on the interpretation of the accident death insurance clause

A. The insurance terms and conditions shall be interpreted fairly and reasonably in light of the purpose and purpose of the terms and conditions in accordance with the principle of trust and good faith, and shall be interpreted objectively and uniformly in consideration of the interests of all insurance organizations based on the average customer's understanding potential, without considering the intended purpose and intent of each party to the contract. Even after the above interpretation, in cases where the meaning of the terms and conditions is not clear, such as where the terms and conditions are objectively and objectively interpreted and their respective interpretations are reasonable, it shall be interpreted favorably to customers (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2006Da5505, Sept. 6, 2007; 2008Da81633, May 28, 2009).

B. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court reveals the following facts.

1) On August 16, 2004, the Deceased and the Defendant and the Insured were the deceased, and upon the death of the deceased, entered into the Non-Distribution Sclateral franchise insurance contract (hereinafter “instant prime contract”) with the beneficiary as the inheritor, and the Deceased separately paid the additional premium and also subscribed to the special agreement for non-distribution disaster death (hereinafter “instant special agreement”).

2) Article 21 of the Clause of the instant prime contract provides that, when the insured dies during the insurance period or becomes disabled in class 1 in the table of disability classification, the amount of insurance coverage plus the amount of insurance coverage. Article 9 of the Clause of the instant special contract provides that, when the insured dies or becomes disabled in class 1 in the table of disability classification for a direct reason specified in the disaster classification table during the insurance period period, the insured is entitled to additionally pay the insurance proceeds for death of KRW 50 million. The disaster classification table provides that, “A disaster means an accident of class 1 through 32, which is an accident of class 1 in the following classification.”

In addition, Article 23(1) of the Clause of this case of this case and Article 11(1) of the Clause of this case of this case independently provide that "the company may terminate this contract at the same time with no exemption from insurance money or from the payment of insurance premium when any of the following causes occurs: Provided, That this shall not apply where the insured intentionally damages himself/herself in the state of mental illness. However, the case where the insured intentionally damages himself/herself and where the insured commits suicide or injures himself/herself after two years from the date of commencement of liability of the contract (the date of restoration in the case of an irregular contract)."

C. We examine the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier.

1) Although the instant special agreement is added to the instant main contract, it is different from the instant main contract, which is a type of accident insurance belonging to the insurance type of insurance business of Type 3 insurance business under the Insurance Business Act, which is a type of life insurance, and accordingly differs from the instant main contract. Accordingly, Article 11(1)1 of the instant special agreement should be understood in relation to Article 9 of the instant special agreement regardless of the content of the instant main contract.

Article 9 of the Terms and Conditions of the Special Agreement of this case provides that the time when a disaster occurs as a direct cause or a death of class 1 or a disability of class 1 is caused by intention and suicide or self-injury does not constitute a disaster. Thus, if Article 11(1)1 of the Terms and Conditions of the Special Agreement of this case is interpreted as a provision that limits the exemption and exemption applicable only to the case where a cause for the payment of insurance money under Article 9 of the Terms and Conditions of the Special Agreement of this case occurs, Article 11(1)1 of the Terms and Conditions of the Special Agreement of this case is not applicable from the beginning

However, in order to say that a clause that exists strictly is not denied by the Regulation of Terms and Conditions Act, but simply a clause that is not subject to the interpretation of the terms and conditions, it should be clear that the provision is an ambiguous clause that is not subject to the application of the provision, even if it is based on the average customer's understanding possibility. Thus, it cannot be viewed as such under Article 11 (1) 1 of the Terms and Conditions.

Rather, according to the average customer's understanding possibility, the above provision does not constitute an accident that is an insurance accident as stipulated in Article 9 of the Clause of this case, in principle, because suicide or self-injury intentionally lacks contingent capacity. However, there is sufficient room to understand to the effect that, in cases where the insured has damaged himself/herself in the state of mental illness and where he/she committed suicide or injured himself/herself after the lapse of two years from the date of commencement of liability, it is sufficient to understand to the effect that the above provision is included in the insurance accident and is deemed as a cause

This is a firm position of the Supreme Court that "a person who has injured himself/herself in a state of mental disease" can be subject to the payment of insurance proceeds (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da49713, Mar. 10, 2006). Thus, interpreting the same applies to "where a person commits suicide after the lapse of two years from the date of commencing liability or has harmed himself/herself, thereby causing a disability in class 1" as well as to "where he/she causes a disability in class 1 due to his/her suicide or self-harm after the lapse of two years from the date of commencing liability" conforms to the general concept. Even though the provisions of the main sentence of Article 11(1)1 of the Clause of the Special Agreement are not stipulated in Article 659(1), 732-2, and 739 of the Commercial Act, the insurer shall be exempted from the liability under the provisions of Article 11(1)1 of the Special Agreement, and therefore, the meaning of Article 11(1)1 of the Special Agreement between the parties to insurance contracts of this case is not the main sentence but the reasons for the above.

2) Meanwhile, Supreme Court Decision 2008Da81633 Decided May 28, 2009 held that the main contract is an insured accident without distinction between the main contract and the death or the first class disability, and that the "Death or the first class disability" caused by the special contract is an insured accident. In the main contract, Article 23 (1) 1 of the main contract of this case and Article 11 (1) 1 of the Clause of this case (hereinafter referred to as "the main contract of this case") of the main contract of this case provide that "the main contract of this case which is not stipulated in the main contract of this case shall be subject to the main contract of this case, unless the main contract of this case is stipulated in the main contract of this case." < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 22008Da81633 Decided 209, May 25, 2010>

D. Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise, that the proviso to Article 11(1)1 of the Terms and Conditions of the instant special agreement is not likely to be applicable to the instant special agreement, which is erroneous as it is included in the terms and conditions of the instant special agreement, and the death, etc. caused by a disaster, as the Defendant uses the former standardized terms and conditions (amended by January 29, 2010) as it is in principle in the process of establishing the terms and conditions of the instant special agreement. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of the terms and conditions of the insurance, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The Plaintiff’s ground of

3. As to the ground of appeal on the deduction of insurance policy loans

A. According to the records, among the death insurance money based on the main contract of this case, the plaintiffs filed a claim for the payment of the amount which the defendant had not received by deducting the insurance loan (hereinafter "amount not received by general death insurance money") and the accident death insurance money based on the special contract of this case. The first instance court rejected the claim for the amount of the accident death insurance money and dismissed the claim for the amount not received by general death insurance money. The defendant appealed against this, but the plaintiffs did not file an appeal or incidental appeal. The court below revoked the part against the defendant among the judgment of the first instance by citing the defendant's appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim corresponding to that part. The court below ruled that the plaintiffs dismissed the part against the defendant among the judgment of the court of first instance by citing the defendant's appeal

B. Therefore, the part of the claim for non-receiving amount of general death benefit, which is the part against the plaintiffs in the first instance trial, was transferred to the lower court by the defendant's appeal, but that part was not subject to the judgment of the lower court because the plaintiffs filed an objection against this part, and that part was not subject to the appeal. Even if the lower court explained that the plaintiffs' claim on this part was groundless, it is merely an unnecessary judgment as to that part not subject to the judgment of the lower court. Therefore, this part of the ground of appeal that the lower court's judgment on this part is unlawful is without merit without further review (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da1487, May 26

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-dae (Presiding Justice)