(A) In the amendment of the former Act, the trust of the parties to the existence of the statute is reasonable and reasonable, and if the public interest purpose to achieve the public interest purpose of the amendment of the statute is not justified because the party’s damage caused by the amendment of the statute is extreme, the legislators shall take appropriate measures to protect the party’s trust, such as setting a transitional provision, and it is not permissible to implement or apply the new statute without such appropriate measures. This is because it is contrary to the principle of the protection of trust derived from the principle of the rule of law, which is the basic principle of the Constitution. In order to determine whether it violates such principle of the protection of trust, on the one hand, the purpose of the public interest to be realized through the new statute should be compared and balanced, on the other hand, on the one hand, such as the value of the infringed benefit, the gravity of the

(B) Even if the Patent Attorney’s 1 and 2-year amendment of the Enforcement Decree of the Patent Attorney Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 17551, Mar. 25, 2002; hereinafter “former Enforcement Decree”) were to be implemented as part of the examination to expand the number of professionals, such as patent attorneys, in accordance with the policy of the Regulatory Committee, it is difficult to apply the first-year amendment of the Enforcement Decree of the Patent Attorney Act as part of the examination to the first-year amendment of the second-year amendment of the Enforcement Decree. The first-year amendment of the Patent Attorney Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 17551, Mar. 25, 2002; hereinafter “former Enforcement Decree”) was carried out by the first-year amendment of the Enforcement Decree of the Patent Attorney Act to the first-year amendment of the Enforcement Decree, and the second-year amendment of the Enforcement Decree to the first-year amendment of the Patent Attorney Act to the extent that the first-year amendment of the Enforcement Decree could not immediately be implemented by the second-year amendment.

(C) The infringement of trust benefits under a new statute is not a matter not only where a new statute applies retroactively to a past fact or legal relationship, but also where a new statute regulates a past fact or legal relationship, etc. which occurred in the past but has not yet been completed, thereby infringing on the credibility of the existing statute, the principle of protection of trust may be applied.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Yong-dam, Justice Kim Hwang-sik, and Justice Ahn Dai-hee]

(A) Even if the counter-evaluation system of the first examination was changed to an absolute evaluation system in accordance with the policy of the Regulatory Reform Committee, it cannot be deemed that the number of successful examinees has increased at least due to such change from a legal and institutional point of view, and it does not necessarily legally guarantee the increase in the number of successful examinees. The legislative purport of the pre-amended Enforcement Decree, which is to increase the number of successful examinees, such as patent attorneys, is ultimately that it can be achieved by increasing the number of successful examinees in the second examination, and the first examination is merely a pre-stage examination that grants the qualification for taking the second examination. As such, the method of determining successful examinees in the first examination should be deemed as matters belonging to the authority of the Commissioner of the Korean Intellectual Property Office, so long as the first examination is maintained and reasonably operated as a framework to discharge successful examinees in the second examination is maintained and reasonably operated. Accordingly, even if the first examination was conducted by a patent attorney in 2002 as an absolute evaluation system in accordance with the former Enforcement Decree before the amendment, it should not be deemed that the first examination has a legitimate legal interest and substantial interest.

(B) The passing standards and method of determining successful examinees, such as patent attorneys, can be changed at any time according to changes in the legislative policy. In fact, in light of the fact that the patent attorney examination was converted from the absolute evaluation system to the relative evaluation system and has been converted to the absolute evaluation system again under the former Enforcement Decree before the amendment, the expectation and trust of examinees, which was implemented as an absolute evaluation system in 2002, is nothing more than relative and variable, and it is difficult to view that the infringement of examinees' trust interest due to the immediate implementation of the amended Enforcement Decree is too excessive to the extent that it could not justify the public interest purpose of selecting successful examinees above a certain level.

[Supplementary Opinion by Justice Kim Yong-dam to the Dissenting Opinion]

(A) The Constitutional Court should not expand the right of constitutional adjudication without regard to all legal issues as constitutional issues. In order to protect the creation, maintenance, alteration or abolition of a system as the expectation or trust of the Constitution, and the establishment, maintenance, alteration or abolition of a system is expected directly from the Constitution, and in order to examine the constitutionality or illegality of a rule, it should be clearly distinguished whether the order, rule is unconstitutional or not, and whether it is an exercise of judicial power. If there is an accident that all legal issues in the theory of the legal phase, eventually, can be returned to the constitutional issue, this would not be at least fit with the Constitution of Korea, and ultimately, it would be a dangerous accident that denies the independence of judicial power. In order to protect the creation, maintenance, alteration or abolition of a system as the expectation or trust of the Constitution, and if the implementation method was prepared only by statutes other than the Constitution, it is not a matter of expectation of creation, alteration or abolition of the system and trust in the implementation of the statute as the matter of statutory amendment and regulations within the scope of the statute.

(B) The authority to determine the time of enforcement of the amended Act and subordinate statutes is the authority to revise the Act and subordinate statutes. The authority of the person holding the authority to determine the time of enforcement of the amended Act and subordinate statutes constitutes the authority and doctrine that determines the scope and content of the amended Act and subordinate statutes, and is natural content of the legislative authority (Article 40 of the Constitution) and the authority to enact orders and rules (Articles 75 and 95 of the Constitution). Determination of the time of enforcement of the Act and subordinate statutes that have undergone the procedures, such as pre-announcement of legislation (Article 82-2 of the National Assembly Act), pre-announcement of legislation (Article 46 of the Administrative Procedures Act), pre-announcement of administration (Article 46 of the Administrative Procedures Act) is placed at the discretion of the National Assembly or the administration. Although the judicial review of the time of enforcement of the Act and subordinate statutes is not excluded, there is no possibility of interference with the judicial authority related

1. As to the grounds of appeal relating to the violation of the principle of trust protection

A. The basic principle of the rule of law, which is based on the Constitution, is not limited to the formal rule of law that merely requires matters concerning the rights and obligations of the people to be prescribed by law, but also to the substantial aim of the rule of law that the purpose and contents of the law must conform to the constitutional ideology of guaranteeing fundamental rights. In order to realize such substantial rule of law, the legal stability should also be considered in the process of the law.

The principle of substantial rule of law is typically implemented under Article 13 of the Constitution that provides for prohibition of retroactive effect of penal law, prohibition of double punishment, prohibition of deprivation of property rights by retroactive legislation, etc. In addition, the so-called principle of protection of trust that should be protected within an appropriate scope in a case where the people’s reasonable and legitimate trust is formed with respect to the existing legal order also belongs to the principle of the rule of law, which is the basic principle of our Constitution. In other words, if a citizen has formed a certain legal status or living relationship with a specific act corresponding to a statute, based on reasonable and reasonable trust that a certain law will continue in the future, and even if the state does not protect it at all, the people’s trust in legal order and the future legal effect on the current act can not be predicted, and thus, it is necessary for legislators to seek legal stability by taking measures to properly protect such trust in revising the law, and the purpose of protecting the law is not to protect absolute rights or interests, but to protect them from a new point of view, to the extent that it is not to protect individual rights or interests.

Therefore, in the amendment of the former Act, the trust of the parties to the existence of the statute is reasonable and reasonable, and if the public interest purpose of the amendment of the statute is to achieve the public interest purpose of the amendment of the statute is not to justify the destruction of such trust, the legislators shall take appropriate measures to protect the trust of the parties, such as establishing transitional regulations, and it shall not be permitted to implement or apply the new statute without such appropriate measures. This is because, as seen earlier, it violates the principle of the protection of trust derived from the principle of the rule of law, which is the basic principle of the Constitution. In order to determine whether such a principle of the protection of trust is violated, on the one hand, the public interest purpose to be realized through the new statute should be comprehensively compared and balanced (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2002Hun-Ba45, Nov. 28, 2002).

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, (1) the Enforcement Decree of the Patent Attorney Act amended by Presidential Decree No. 16867, Jun. 27, 200; (2) the Patent Attorney Disciplinary Reform Committee, a presidential direct organization, shall convert the selection test into the qualification examination system; (3) the applicants who obtained at least 40 points in each subject from the former "Standing Evaluation System", and obtained at least an average of 60 points in all subjects into the 6th anniversary of the examination (Article 4); and (4) the 6th anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 4th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 4th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 1st anniversary of the 1st amendment.

C. As seen above, in light of the purpose and background behind the introduction of the absolute evaluation system before the amendment, the passing score of the first examination implemented by the relative evaluation system during the several years prior to the amendment, the grace period after the promulgation of the previous Enforcement Decree, the pre-approval and promulgation of the revised Enforcement Decree, and the subsequent publication of the examination, etc., where the first examination is based on the absolute evaluation system pursuant to the previous Enforcement Decree before the amendment, more successful candidates than the first examination would be based on the relative evaluation system. At the same time, the legislative purport of the previous Enforcement Decree before the amendment, and there was a universal expectation to the extent that the Defendant, the legislator, was predicted by himself, and the previous Enforcement Decree was not able to immediately implement the first examination at the time of the first examination until a considerable grace period of more than one year, which had been implemented since 2002, it is sufficient to view the first examination results as satisfying the standards for the first examination, even if the credibility that the examination was conducted in the year 2002 prior to the amendment did not meet the standards for the first examination self evaluation.

Therefore, the examination subjects who prepared the examination in accordance with the standards for passing the examination required by the absolute evaluation system with reasonable and justifiable trust will not implement the first examination and not leave the first examination for more than two months, and the above trust has been significantly damaged. In particular, the plaintiffs' trust benefits of those who obtained 40 points or more in each subject which is the passing criteria under the absolute evaluation system and 60 points or more on an average of all subjects in all subjects, which are not passed by the absolute evaluation system, may have a profound degree of violation. On the other hand, the public interest purpose of which can be achieved by introducing the relative evaluation system under the amended Enforcement Decree is to avoid the difficulty of the second examination operation and management due to the excessive discharge of the first examination applicants and to secure the first examination applicants to pass the first examination, and even if it is difficult to implement the first examination as an absolute evaluation system, these problems may arise when the first examination is implemented as an absolute evaluation system, which can not be considered to have been implemented immediately by the amendment of the Enforcement Decree for the purpose of the first time to implement the examination without justifiable reasons.

Therefore, it is not permissible to implement the instant examination in 2002 under Article 4 (1) 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the amended Act which provides for the relative evaluation system for the first examination, in light of the principle of protection of trust under the Constitution. Therefore, Article 4 (1) 1 of the Addenda of the amended Enforcement Decree provides for the time of implementation for the instant examination immediately shall be deemed null and void as it violates the Constitution.

The reasoning of the court below is just in holding that Article 4 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the amended Act is invalid because it violates the Constitution, although it is different, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle of protection of trust, logical rules and experience, incomplete deliberation, incomplete reasoning or incomplete reasoning, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

The ground of appeal on this part is without merit.

2. As to the grounds of appeal relating to the scope of application of the principle of trust protection

The infringement of trust benefits by new laws and regulations is not a matter not only where a new law applies retroactively to past facts or legal relations, but also where a new law regulates those facts or legal relations which have occurred in the past but have not yet been completed, thereby infringing on trust benefits by the continuation of the existing laws and regulations, the principle of protection of trust can be applied.

Even if the examination of this case was conducted after the enforcement date of the amended Enforcement Decree, since the plaintiffs' act of preparing the examination based on the trust in the former Enforcement Decree was continued before that date, it is just that the court below applied the principle of protecting trust to the plaintiffs' infringement of trust interest due to the immediate enforcement of the amended Enforcement Decree. There is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the scope of application of the principle of

This part of the ground of appeal is without merit.

3. As to the grounds of appeal related to the application of the Act on the Prohibition of Laws, etc.

Article 13 of the Act on the Elimination of Statutes, etc. provides that the Presidential Decree, etc. shall enter into force upon the lapse of 20 days from the date of its promulgation, except as otherwise provided in the Act. However, the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that the date of promulgation shall be the date of its promulgation. As seen earlier, Article 4(1) of the above Addenda provision provides that Article 4(1) of the above Addenda provision shall immediately apply to the examination of this case, which is unconstitutional and excluded from its application, there is no room for the application of Article 13 of the Act on the Elimination of Statutes, etc.,

On the contrary, the ground of appeal on the premise that the above legal provision is applied to the Enforcement Decree of the Amendment, that the judgment of the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles, inconsistent reasoning, and incomplete reasoning is without merit

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.

With the exception of the dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Yong-dam, Justice Kim Hwang-sik, and Justice Ahn Dai-hee, the majority opinion of all participating judges is delivered, and there is a supplementary opinion to the dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Yong-dam.

5. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Yong-dam, Justice Kim Hwang-sik, and Justice Ahn Dai-hee is as follows.

A. The majority opinion argues that preparing for the examination in a way that meets the passing standards under the trust that the examinee will conduct the examination in an absolute evaluation system under the former Enforcement Decree before the amendment, is an exercise of reasonable and justifiable trust. Furthermore, the infringement of the examinee's trust due to the immediate implementation of the amended Enforcement Decree shall be excessive to the extent that it would be justified even if considering the public interest purpose of the immediate implementation of the amended Enforcement Decree. Thus, the enforcement of Article 4 (1) of the amended Enforcement Decree, which provides for a relative evaluation system of the first patent attorney examination, of the amended Enforcement Decree, cannot be permitted in light of the principle of protection of trust under the Constitution. Thus, the part of the amended Enforcement Decree, which immediately implement the examination of this case under Article 4 (1) of the amended Enforcement Decree, is in violation of the Constitution and becomes null and void, but we cannot agree with the majority opinion for the following reasons.

B. First, we examine whether the exercise of trust and trust mentioned in the Majority Opinion should be legally protected and reasonable.

In accordance with the absolute evaluation system, the majority opinion is that the number of successful examinees is much more than the case of a relative evaluation system, and at the same time, the legislative purport of the Enforcement Decree prior to the amendment, and as long as the defendant, who was the legislator, was a universal expectation to the extent that the test is predicted by himself, it is sufficient to view that preparing the test in a way that meets the standards for passing the test to be an exercise of reasonable and legitimate trust, under the trust that the test will be conducted through an absolute evaluation system.

However, even if the relative evaluation system of the first examination was changed to an absolute evaluation system in accordance with the policies of the Regulatory Committee, at least from a legal and institutional point of view, the number of successful applicants can not be deemed to have been increased due to such change, and the change does not legally guarantee the increase in the number of successful applicants. Furthermore, as the level of the test margin has no basis to be maintained as before, there is room for a change in the number of successful applicants depending on the adjustment of the test margin level as long as the level of the test margin has never been maintained as there is no reason to do so. In other words, the absolute evaluation system is not a legal device that guarantees a number of successful applicants than the counter evaluation system.

The legislative intent of the former Enforcement Decree, such as patent attorneys, is ultimately to increase the number of successful applicants in the second examination of patent attorneys, which can ultimately be achieved by increasing the number of successful applicants in the second examination of patent attorneys, and as long as the first examination is merely a prior examination that grants qualification for taking the second examination, the method of determining successful applicants in the first examination of a reasonable number of successful applicants in the second examination should be deemed to be matters belonging to the defendant's authority.

Therefore, even if the examination of this case was conducted as an absolute assessment system pursuant to the former Enforcement Decree before the amendment and the examination of this case was formed with the expectation or trust that the level of the examination will be maintained at the previous level, it is merely a de facto fact arising from the subjective interests of the plaintiffs, and it is reasonable to have legal justification, and it does not necessarily mean that the defendant must protect it.

Furthermore, the test strategies or guidelines that make preparations in a way that meets the passing criteria under the premise that the test difficulties between them are also justifiable, that is, the test strategies or guidelines that are prepared to the extent that they will only pass the preliminary examination, can not be said to be a reasonable and legitimate exercise of trust worth protecting them.

In addition, even if the defendant selects any evaluation method among absolute evaluations or counter-evaluations so that the defendant can sufficiently adjust the degree of difficulty of the examination by absolute evaluation and sufficiently adjust the number of examinees to pass the examination in the first examination, the result of the examination is ultimately determined by the deliberation guidance for individual subjects of the examination. Thus, unless there is a sudden change in the evaluation method, it is difficult to view that the execution by the counter-evaluation of the examination itself infringes on the expectation interest of the examinees, and even if the examinees who have been aware of it as the counter-evaluation of the examination results have obtained the points that can be passed according to the absolute evaluation, it is only a factual result of the examination, and it is not logical to deem that such examination results were infringed on the expectation interest of the examinees.

C. Furthermore, even if the exercise of trust and its trust as stated in the Majority Opinion should be legally protected and reasonable, whether the infringement of trust interest of examinees due to the immediate implementation of the amended Enforcement Decree is excessive to the extent that it is impossible to justify the public interest purpose that it can not be justified due to the immediate implementation of the amended Enforcement Decree.

In light of the fact that the test of this case is implemented as an absolute assessment system in accordance with the former Enforcement Decree before the amendment, the expectation and trust of the examinees who are to be implemented as an absolute assessment system is nothing more than relative and variable. The subjects of this case are no longer than the previous subjects, and the preparation period of more than 4 months was allowed from the date of pre-announcement of legislation until the date of pre-announcement of legislation. Although the number of successful examinees in the first examination is being implemented as a relative assessment system, it is difficult to view that the number of successful examinees in the first examination is 2.4 times in the case of a judicial test, 2 times in the case of a certified public accountant examination, 104 times in the case of an administrative announcement, etc., the number of successful examinees in the second examination as to the final successful examinees is 4 to 45 times in the case of an absolute assessment system, etc., and it is difficult for the defendant to immediately implement the revised examination to the extent that the number of successful examinees in the first examination exceeds the final number of successful examinees, 104 to the minimum level of trust interest of successful examinees.

D. Nevertheless, the lower court determined that the disposition of this case by the Defendant was unlawful on the ground that the supplementary part of Article 4 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the amended Enforcement Decree was invalid in light of the principle of protection of trust under the Constitution. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the principle of protection of trust, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, and thus, it is reasonable to reverse the judgment of the lower court and remand the case to the lower court for a new trial and determination. The

6. Concurrence with the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Yong-dam

A. As to the majority opinion's view of this case as an issue of constitutional adjudication

(1) Article 101(1) of the Constitution provides that “The judicial authority shall belong to a court comprised of judges,” and Article 111(1) provides that “The Constitutional Court shall take charge of the following matters,” thereby taking a two-dimensional structure that separates the matters in charge of the Constitutional Court from the judicial authority.”

However, as long as the judicial power and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court are separated and independent from each other, the problem of how to understand and set the scope and limits of the latter is against the boundary between the two parties, and as the boundary of the court and the Constitutional Court brings about the important constitutional issues of the state that the independence of the court and the Constitutional Court can be mutually infringed upon, it should be carefully examined.

The ordinary constitutional adjudication refers to "an independent trial on constitutional issues" or "judicial action against constitutional matters", and the term in this context refers to the issues directly related to each provision of the Constitution or the major principles of the Constitution, including fundamental rights provisions, rather than various provisions. The Constitution reconcepts them in relation to the right to the constitutional adjudication on the review of constitutional laws and regulations, and makes them take charge of the Constitutional Court (Article 107(1) and Article 111(1)1 of the Constitution). While the Constitutional Court has the right to examine the constitutional order and rule belongs to the Supreme Court (Article 107(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea), the Constitutional Court should not expand the right to the constitutional adjudication without taking all legal matters into account the constitutional issues, but it should be understood that the order, rule, and rule, whether it is unconstitutional or not, and whether it is an issue of the constitutionality of the Constitution or rule, and it should be understood that it should not be distinguished from all legal issues in the course of exercising the right to the constitutional adjudication.

(2) To protect the creation, maintenance, alteration, or abolition of a certain system as an expectation or trust under the Constitution, the creation, maintenance, alteration, or abolition of the system must be expected and trusted directly from the Constitution, and if the system is prepared only under the statutes other than the Constitution, the expectation and trust of the creation, maintenance, alteration, or abolition of the system should also be, in principle, a matter of law. Therefore, as in this case, the order, rule, and municipal ordinance entrusted by the law with the enforcement of the law regarding the system established under the law should be treated as a matter of law, first of all, and it should not be treated as a matter of the Constitution.

The majority opinion takes an attitude that “if the trust of the parties to the existence of the former Act is reasonable and justifiable in the amendment of the Act, and if the public interest purpose of the amendment of the Act is to achieve the new Act and subordinate statutes is unable to justify the destruction of the party’s trust, it shall not be permitted to implement or apply the new Act and subordinate statutes without proper measures, such as establishing a transitional provision to protect the party’s trust, which is the basic principle of the Constitution, it shall be contrary to the principle of the protection of trust derived from the principle of the rule of law, which is the basic principle of the Constitution.” It does not ask whether the party’s trust is derived from the Constitution, and even if it is derived from the law, order, or rule even if it is derived from the municipal ordinances, it does not seem that all of them go back to the issue of the violation of the Constitution. However, such an attitude is not acceptable as seen earlier, the boundary between the judicial authority and the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.

In the past, the issue of the protection of trust under orders and rules has been dealt with as a legal issue, and the attempt to deal with it as a constitutional issue may be linked to the issue of the infringement of judicial power.

(3) In particular, the majority opinion points out only the enforcement period of the Addenda to the Enforcement Decree of the Amendment in this case. According to Article 13-2 of the Act on the Definition of Acts and subordinate statutes, etc., the law, Presidential Decree, Ordinance of the Prime Minister, and Ordinances of Ministries directly related to the limitation of citizens' rights or the imposition of obligations shall be enforced at least 30 days after the date of promulgation unless there are special grounds for urgent enforcement. Thus, the validity of the Addenda to the Enforcement Decree of the Amendment is not a matter to be dealt with within the scope of this Act, but a matter

B. As to the enforcement time of the amended enforcement decree in this case, as to the private law enforcement time

(1) The Majority Opinion states that “A preparation for an examination in a manner that meets the standards for passing the examination was an exercise of reasonable and justifiable trust,” and states that “A person subject to the protection of trust is “an act of preparing an examination that meets the standards for passing the examination.” Although it is not clear what means “a person subject to preparing an examination that meets the standards for passing the examination,” the Majority Opinion’s overall context can not be readily accepted in light of the principle of the protection of trust.”

However, it is doubtful whether the pre-announcement procedure was implemented, the period of public notice under the law was complied with, and thus, it can be said that “i.e., implementation was impossible,” and if expressed by the majority opinion, it is more difficult to understand that the act is subject to protection of trust, which is not legally and legally protected but legally.

(2) The authority to determine the time of enforcement of the amended statute shall be the authority to amend the statute. The authority of the authority to determine the time of enforcement of the amended statute shall constitute the authority and doctrine to determine the scope and contents of the amended statute, and shall be the content of the legislative authority (Article 40 of the Constitution) and the authority to enact orders and rules (Articles 75 and 95 of the Constitution).

In particular, it is common to stipulate that the time of enforcement shall be from the date of promulgation by the Addenda to each Act and subordinate statutes, and the laws, Presidential Decrees, Ordinances of the Prime Minister, and Ordinances of the Ministries directly related to limitation on the rights of the people or imposition of obligations shall be enforced at least 30 days after the date of promulgation, as seen earlier, and if there are no special provisions to determine the time of enforcement, the laws, Presidential Decrees, Ordinances of the Prime Minister, and Ordinances of the Ministries shall take effect upon the lapse of 20 days after their promulgation (Article 53(7) of the Constitution, Articles 13, 13-2 of the Act on the Elimination of Acts and subordinate statutes, etc.). Furthermore, the National Assembly and the Administration shall, in addition, implement the pre-announcement of legislation (Article 82-2 of the National Assembly Act), and the pre-announcement of legislation (Article 46 of the Administrative Procedures Act) in order to prevent unexpected damage to the National Assembly, the period of pre-announcement of legislation shall be determined in consideration of the method and procedure prescribed by the National Assembly Regulations and shall not be implemented immediately.

(3) Although judicial affirmativeism is considered as one ideology that the court should aim at, on the basis of the mechanism, there are cases where power is separated, and the meaning of the text of the law is relatively clear in a relatively clear sexual law country, the judicial affirmativeism is rather likely to violate the rule of law and infringe other powers by dilution the text of the law, so the exercise of judicial affirmativeism should be done carefully in consideration of these aspects.

Chief Justice Lee Yong-chul (Presiding Justice)