2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

A. The plaintiff is a Chinese national, who is an artist with 12 man-made group consisting of C (C; hereinafter referred to as 'C'), and the defendant is an entertainment agency and various sound recording and production companies established for the purpose of entertainment agency.

B. At the time of December 18, 2010, the Plaintiff entered into an exclusive agreement with the Defendant, as of December 17, 2010, with his father, with the content that the Defendant would manage and act for the Plaintiff’s entertainment activities (hereinafter “instant exclusive agreement”). On the same day, under Article 5(4) of the instant exclusive agreement, with respect to preparation for the Plaintiff’s overseas expansion, contracts with a local company, and other local entertainment activities and creation activities in an efficient manner, the Plaintiff agreed to extend the above seven-year contract period by more than three years. The group to which the Plaintiff belongs, as of April 9, 2012, the Plaintiff sold the above seven-year contract period. A group consisting of the group members in Korea, consisting of six members in Korea, and one local group members in China, namely, two members in China, and two members in China, namely, two members in China, and two members in China, namely, two members in China.

D. Around April 2015, the Plaintiff expressed his/her intention to withdraw from C, and thereafter, the Plaintiff sold sound records on July 23, 2015 in China, and was engaged in entertainment activities on August 23, 2015.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, 2, Eul evidence 16-1 and 2, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the assertion on invalidation of a contract

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The instant exclusive agreement is null and void in accordance with Article 103 of the Civil Act, since the Defendant’s abuse of superior position exercises undue control and imposes excessive burden on the Plaintiff, and excessively restricts fundamental human rights, such as the Plaintiff’s freedom of occupation, economic activities, and freedom of general action, thereby violating good morals and other social order. The specific assertion is as follows.

1) The instant exclusive agreement was concluded unilaterally by the Defendant in an absolute superior position.

2) The contract term of the instant exclusive contract expires on the tenth anniversary of the date of the Plaintiff’s entertainment activity. In light of the fact that the entire period of the group, such as the Plaintiff, is not long-term, and the contract term of the said 10-year contract itself is too long, and there is no binding promise as to the possibility of performance in the company, and even if the Plaintiff is unable to carry out a waste, the contract shall be maintained for a ten-year period. In addition, the scope of the application of the instant exclusive contract is not only the global area, but also the case where the Plaintiff performs literary and artistic creation activities that are irrelevant to the Plaintiff’s current activities from the Defendant, as well as the literary and artistic creation activities that are irrelevant thereto, the contract contents are excessively comprehensive, subject to the Defendant’s consent.

3) Article 19(2) of the instant exclusive contract stipulates an excessive penalty by requiring the Plaintiff to pay an amount calculated by multiplying the average monthly sales for the immediately preceding two years as at the time of termination of the contract by the number of months of the remaining contract period as a penalty, in addition to damages where the Plaintiff violates the terms and conditions of the contract. Such an agreement on penalty for breach of contract is only applicable to the Plaintiff and does not apply to the Defendant

4) The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is similar to a type of employment relationship in which one-way command and subsidiary relationship exists, and the Defendant pays the Plaintiff remuneration only by allocating profits generated from the Plaintiff’s entertainment activities without having to guarantee exclusive contract payment or basic pay.

5) Under the instant exclusive agreement, the profit distribution provision is a structure that allows the Defendant to distribute the profits remaining after deducting all the expenses relating to the Plaintiff’s activities and that the Defendant does not incur any economic risk.

B. Determination

1) Relevant legal principles

In a case where the purpose of a juristic act is illegal, and a juristic act which one of the parties abuse his exclusive position or superior position and obtains unjust benefits and imposes an excessive return or other unjust burden on the other party is null and void as it is anti-social (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da34432, Apr. 26, 1996).

2) Determination

In light of the aforementioned legal principles, the following circumstances are examined as to whether the instant exclusive contract is null and void as it is anti-social, and in light of the evidence and evidence Nos. 8-1, 2, and 9-1, 9-4 of the evidence No. 8-2, and the overall purport of the pleadings, the Defendant’s abuse of his exclusive status or superior status, and thus, it is difficult to view the instant exclusive contract as a legal act to gain unjust profits and to impose excessive or unfair burden on the Plaintiff, the other party, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion is rejected.

A) The Fair Trade Commission: (a) prepared and publicly announced a standard exclusive contract for popular culture artists through a sufficient process of gathering opinions through conference and interview on several occasions with incumbent and incumbent entertainers, such as the Korea Enterers’ Association, the Korea Entertainment Association, the Korea Broadcasting Film Association, the Korea Film Association, etc.; and (b) based on the above standard exclusive contract period is basically not limited to the contract period itself, considering that the above standard exclusive contract period exceeds 10 years for the purpose of generating profits. However, it is inappropriate for the entertainment planning company to utilize the long-term contract for the combination of performers on the condition of the contract period. In particular, it is difficult for the Plaintiff to conclude that the long-term contract period can be claimed for the termination of the contract even if 7 years have elapsed since the direction of pursuing each other, considering the fact that maintaining the long-term contract period from the date of signing the contract is a big loss to each other; and (c) it is difficult for the Plaintiff to separately conclude the contract period as an exclusive contract period and to make it difficult for the Plaintiff to do so within a certain period of time.

On the other hand, the standard binding contract also sets forth the scope of the application of the contract as a global area, and includes activities agreed separately by contracting parties such as literature, art, etc. regarding the scope of entertainment activities. The exclusive contract of this case was concluded by promising the Plaintiff’s overseas activities, and specific scope of entertainment activities and media can be determined differently by agreement between the source and the Defendant (Article 3(2)). Therefore, it is difficult to readily conclude that the contract is excessively comprehensive.

B) While planning companies engaged in entertainment business like the Defendant invested a considerable amount of time and expenses to discover and foster new authorization water, it is extremely small to create profits by obtaining public approval (the case where the Plaintiff becomes a small hotel). Therefore, from the viewpoint of planning companies engaged in entertainment business such as the Defendant, it would incur a large amount of damages if the successful artist in obtaining public approval by investing a long time and considerable expenses, and it is difficult for the Plaintiff to prove the specific amount of damages. Therefore, it is difficult for the Plaintiff to receive appropriate damages due to the lack of any difficulty to prove the specific amount of damages. In light of the above, it is necessary for the Plaintiff to prepare sanctions against the Defendant’s nonperformance of obligations in advance, and the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay damages to the Plaintiff, as seen earlier, should not be reduced to the extent that the contract was breached by the Defendant’s new management company, such as the Defendant, even if there is no significant decrease in the contract amount due to the Plaintiff’s breach of the obligation to pay damages to the Plaintiff.

C) As seen in the following 3-b. B., the instant exclusive contract has the nature of “a delegation” or “a non-distinct contract similar to delegation,” and it is difficult to view the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant as similar to a type of employment relationship with which one-way command and subsidiary relationship is one-way. In addition, in order to discover and foster a new artist, the Defendant is required to invest a considerable amount of time and expenses, and where an artist who entered into an exclusive contract is not related to a contract, or who fails to obtain a human seal after a cover, the damages therefrom should also be borne, and it is difficult to deem that the Defendant is unjust on the grounds that the Plaintiff did not pay the exclusive contract

D) The instant exclusive contract provides that the trademark, design, and other similar intellectual property rights shall be developed by using all the items indicating the identity of the Plaintiff, including the Plaintiff’s name and photograph during the contract period, and the Plaintiff’s name shall be applied, registered, or used domestically and overseas (Article 9(1)). In relation to the Plaintiff, contents, such as music, etc. planned, developed, and produced by the Defendant shall belong to the Defendant, and the right necessary for the use of contents, including music, including the Plaintiff’s performance, shall be granted to the Defendant automatically at the same time (Article 12(1)). It cannot be said that it is unreasonable for the Fair Trade Commission to have the Defendant reverted to the right regarding contents, which are performed as part of the entertainment activity, based on the Defendant’s support, to the Defendant, who is an affiliated company. The said standard exclusive contract published by the Fair Trade Commission, is subject to the entertainment planning company’s development and content produced by the entertainment planning company in relation to an artist during the contract period, and the right necessary for

In relation to the distribution of profits, the exclusive contract of this case provides that all profits derived from the above contract shall once be received by the defendant and distributed 2-5% of the proceeds generated from tangible storage and reproduction media, such as music records, etc., according to the sales volume of the defendant. Profits from digital file forms, such as music sources and images, shall be 10% of net profits, 50% of net profits (60% in the case of a group), and 50% of net profits (60% in the case of a group) of profits generated from entertainment activities and news book publishing, etc. The exclusive contract of this case shall be distributed to the plaintiff in proportion to the number of members of the group (see Articles 14 and 2). Even if the defendant's profits from the production of music records and videos are not sold in excess of a certain amount, the defendant shall not be deemed to have distributed the above net profits to the plaintiff, and even if the profits from the sale of the music records is not distributed to the plaintiff, it shall not be deemed to have been distributed to the plaintiff.

In light of the fact that it inevitably occurs, the agreement on the distribution of revenue of the exclusive agreement of this case is not unreasonable.

3. Determination as to the assertion on termination of a contract

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The Defendant did not fully guarantee the Plaintiff’s activities under the instant exclusive agreement, and did not control the Plaintiff’s personal activities, or operated unilaterally the Defendant’s opinion or health status, etc., without disregarding the Plaintiff’s other members of the same group. In addition, the Defendant did not comply with the timing of settlement, which is to be decided semi-annually in settling profits, and did not comply with the demand to present specific settlement data. For this reason, the Plaintiff is completely broken down with the Defendant. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s trust relationship with the Defendant is terminated by the delivery of a duplicate of the instant written complaint. Accordingly, the instant exclusive agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is no longer effective.

B. Determination

1) Relevant legal principles

In light of the contents of the exclusive agreement between the entertainment planning company and the artist as seen earlier, since the performance borne by the entertainment planning company under such exclusive agreement is the performance of the business for the artist, the exclusive agreement is deemed to have the nature of the delegation or a non-distincing contract similar to the delegation. The exclusive obligation borne by the artist under the exclusive agreement is a continuous and incidental, and in its nature, it is an essential element to maintain the highest trust relationship between the contracting parties in order to achieve the purpose of the contract. Therefore, compelling an artist to perform the exclusive obligation against his/her free will even in a case where such trust relationship has been broken is excessive, and thus, it is contrary to the concept of modern culture and the ideology of personality of the artist, so if such trust relationship is broken, an artist can terminate the exclusive management agreement.

2) Determination

As to the instant case, it is difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff’s right to terminate the instant exclusive contract was created in full view of the following circumstances, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant exclusive contract is terminated on the ground of the failure of trust between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is unreasonable, as to whether the Plaintiff’s right to terminate the instant exclusive contract is excessively strong, and is contrary to the modern cultural concept and the ideology of personality respect, namely, whether the right to terminate the instant exclusive contract may be acknowledged on the ground of failure of trust between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, in full view of the overall purport of the pleadings as follows:

A) The fact that the Defendant did not fully guarantee the Plaintiff’s activities under the instant exclusive agreement, and did not unilaterally control the Plaintiff’s personal activities, or operated the Plaintiff’s opinion or health status, etc., without disregarding the Plaintiff’s opinion or health status, and that the Plaintiff was unfairly discriminated with other members of the same group, is insufficient to recognize it solely with the descriptions of the evidence No. 7-1 through No. 16, and evidence No. 8, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

B) Around April 9, 2012, the Defendant: (a) after having made a decrecation in land with C; (b) on the profit accrued from the date of the decrecation in land for the year 2012 to December 31, 2012 from the date of the decrecation in land for the Plaintiff; (c) on the profit accrued from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013 to December 31, 2013; (d) on the profit accrued from February 21, 2014; (e) on the profit accrued from January 1, 2014 to June 30, 2014; (e) on the profit accrued from January 1, 2014 to June 31, 2014 to the Plaintiff, the Defendant did not appear to have made a specific request for the Plaintiff’s initial settlement of the profit accrued to the Plaintiff; (e) on the other hand, the Plaintiff did not appear to have reached the trust agreement between the Plaintiff two per two years.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

For judges standing:

Judges Lee Jong-deok

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.