[2] The method of interpreting a juristic act in a case where the objective meaning is not clearly revealed even through the party’s language and text

[3] In a case where Party A, who filed an application for the relocation measures against Party B (SH) who implemented an urban development project, sold the right to purchase prior to the confirmation and decision of Party B to the relocation measures, and Party B again sold it to Party B, the case holding that Party A cannot be deemed to have fulfilled its duty under the sales contract merely on the ground that Party B failed to meet the requirements for the purchase of the right to purchase, or that Party B provided Party B with documents necessary for the change in the name of Party B where it is impossible for Party B to change the ownership

[4] In a case where Party A, who filed an application for the relocation measures against Party B, sold the right to purchase prior to the confirmation and decision of Party B to the relocation measures, and Party B again sold the right to purchase prior to Party B to Party B, the case holding that Party B may rescind the sales contract on the grounds that Party B’s agreement was attributable to Party B’s failure to implement the sales contract on the ground that Party B could not acquire the right to purchase prior to the transfer of the right to purchase prior to the transfer of the right to purchase, and there is a defect that could make it impossible after the implementation of the sales contract impossible for Party B to acquire the right to purchase prior to the transfer of the right to purchase without more than B, although Party A agreed to allow Party B to acquire the right to purchase prior to the transfer of the right to purchase prior to the transfer

[2] Interpretation of a juristic act is clearly binding upon the objective meaning given by the parties to the act of representation. In a case where the objective meaning is not clearly expressed by the parties’ language and text, it shall be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules, common sense of society and transaction norms, by comprehensively taking into account the contents of the language and text, the motive and background leading up to the juristic act, the purpose and genuine intent to be achieved by the parties by the juristic act, the transaction practices, etc.

[3] In a case where Party A, who filed an application for the relocation measures against Party B, sold the right to purchase prior to the confirmation and decision of Party B to Party B, and Party B again sold the right to purchase land to Party B, the case holding that Party B cannot be deemed to have fulfilled its duty solely on the basis that Party B provided the following documents: (a) the fact that Party A’s transfer of the right to purchase land prior to the aforementioned confirmation and decision constitutes a normal ownership in the future; and (b) Party B appears to have transferred the right to purchase land again to Party B in the same purport; and (c) the purpose of a sales contract can be achieved by selecting Party A as Party B as Party B as Party B and permitting the change of the right to purchase land in the future; (b) Party B could be deemed to have fulfilled its duty by issuing documents necessary for the change of the name of Party B to Party B, but Party A failed to meet the requirements for the acquisition of the right to purchase land, or it is impossible to change the name of Party B.

[4] In a case where Party A, who filed an application for the relocation measures against Party B, sold the right to purchase prior to the confirmation and decision of Party B to Party B to the relocation measures, and Party B again sold the right to purchase to Party B, the case holding that Party B’s first transferor at the time of transfer of the right to purchase was in violation of Article 39(1) of the former Housing Act (amended by Act No. 9405 of Feb. 3, 2009) and the requirements for the selection of Party B as the relocation measures stipulated in the above Corporation, and this constitutes a case where Party B could not acquire the right to purchase a long number of defects according to any of the measures taken by the said Corporation, and this constitutes a case where Party B could not acquire the right to purchase a new number of defects after the non-performance of the contract, on the grounds that the contract was concluded to allow Party B to acquire the right to purchase a new number of defects without notifying Party B of such fact, and that Party B could not acquire the right to purchase a new number of defects after the initial contract was concluded.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

A. Article 39(1) of the former Housing Act (amended by Act No. 9405, Feb. 3, 2009; hereinafter “former Housing Act”) provides that “No person shall transfer or acquire (including all acts accompanying the sale, purchase, donation and other changes in rights, but excluding inheritance or mortgage; hereinafter the same shall apply in this Article) any certificate or status falling under any of the following subparagraphs in order to acquire, or to have a person acquire, a house constructed and supplied under this Act; and no person shall acquire, or arrange for, a certificate or status constructed and supplied under this Act or have another person acquire, a house.” Meanwhile, Article 39(2) of the same Act provides that “the Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs or a project undertaker shall not acquire, in violation of the provisions of paragraph (1) or a person who has acquired, a house or status in violation of the provisions of paragraph (1) shall be deemed null and void an application for the supply of the house, or may cancel the housing supply contract already concluded, or the project undertaker concerned has paid the housing price.”

As above, Article 39 (1) of the former Housing Act provides that with respect to an act in violation of the prohibition of resale under Article 39 (2) of the same Act, the status that allows the violator to apply for a supply of housing may be invalidated, or the housing supply contract already concluded may be revoked. In light of the provision that when the amount corresponding to the housing price under Article 39 (3) of the same Act has been paid, the project undertaker shall be deemed to have acquired the relevant housing on the date of payment, the former Housing Act does not have a position to regard the act in violation of Article 39 (1) of the same Act as invalid as an act in violation of the validity provision, and instead, it is interpreted that the former Housing Act takes a position that makes it possible to determine the validity of the relevant act by nullifying the status that allows the project undertaker to apply for a supply of housing under any ex post facto measure or cancelling the housing supply

Therefore, the prohibition of Article 39(1) of the former Housing Act is merely merely a simple regulation, and cannot be deemed an effective regulation, and even if the parties agreed to violate the provision, the agreement does not naturally become null and void (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 98Da17954, Jul. 10, 1998; 2007Da5248, Dec. 13, 2007; 55255, Dec. 13, 2007).

B. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and records, the sales contract concluded between the plaintiff and the defendant violates Article 39(1)4(b) of the former Housing Act Article 43(1)2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act. However, the relevant provisions of the former Housing Act, etc. are not effective provisions, but merely merely a simple regulation, and thus, it is justifiable to determine that the defendant's obligation pursuant to the instant sales contract cannot be deemed an original impossibility.

As alleged in the ground of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on interpretation and application of Article 39 (1) of the former Housing Act or on the original impossibility.

The ground of appeal on this part is without merit.

2. As to the third ground for appeal

A. Interpretation of a juristic act is clearly confirming the objective meaning that the party gave to the expression of the juristic act. In a case where the objective meaning is not clearly revealed by the party’s language and text, it shall be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules, general common sense and transaction norms so that it can conform to the ideology of social justice and equity (see Supreme Court Decisions 2000Da33607, Jan. 19, 2001; 2007Da6024, October 29, 2009; 2007Da6024, 6031, Oct. 29, 2009).

B. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveals the following facts.

(1) The non-party 1, who owns the land of Eunpyeong-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government (hereinafter omitted) and the housing and neighborhood living facilities thereon, were incorporated into the site for the urban development project district of Eunpyeong New Town No. 3-1, and 3-2 district, which was implemented by the SH Corporation. Accordingly, the non-party 1 entered into a contract for relocation removal with the SP on May 11, 2006, and applied for relocation measures to obtain the housing site of not more than 330 square meters or the right to purchase an apartment site of not more than 135 square meters for exclusive use from the SP Corporation (hereinafter “the right to purchase the housing site of this case”).

(2) At the time, EP set a non-conformity of the meaning that it is not a person eligible for the supply of an apartment unit for sale under Article 39(1)4 of the Housing Act and Article 43(1)2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Housing Act in cases where it resells the status of a person eligible for the supply of an apartment unit for sale prior to confirmation of the result of the review of the relocation measures, and Article 78 of the Act on the Acquisition of Land, etc. for Public Works and the Compensation therefor, which became final and conclusive as a result of the review of the relocation measures and became eligible for the occupancy of an apartment unit for the relocation measures, after the right to move into the apartment unit for the relocation measures has been granted to EP and then the sales contract was concluded with EP Corporation

(3) However, on May 12, 2006, prior to the confirmation and decision of EP as a relocation measure holder, Nonparty 1 entered into a contract with Nonparty 1 and the Defendant to sell the instant sales right at KRW 240 million. The special terms and conditions of the sales contract (No. 8-5) stipulate that “The sales contract (No. 8-5) shall be at least at KRW 52 square meters or large-scale 100 square meters of the right to move in at KRW 3-2 of Ei New Town, and the seller shall transfer the registration without any conditions following the lease.”

(4) On June 3, 2006, the Plaintiff concluded a sales contract with the name of the contracting party to purchase the instant water unit at KRW 300 million (hereinafter “instant sales contract”). On June 5 of the date of the instant sales contract, the Plaintiff paid the Defendant the down payment of KRW 10 million on two occasions on June 12, 2006, and paid the remainder amount of KRW 290 million under the instant sales contract. On June 12, 2006, the Defendant received KRW 290 million from the remainder under the instant sales contract to the Plaintiff on June 12, 2006. In the item column of the instant sales contract (Evidence A3), the seller stated that “The Defendant takes over the remainder of KRW 290 million from the date of the instant sales contract without the right to purchase the land unit by the time of the purchase of the land unit.”

(5) After that, the Plaintiff, as Seoul Western District Court 2006Kahap1035, applied for provisional disposition against the selling right of this case by taking the debtor as the non-party 1 and the non-party 3 debtor as the EP Corporation, and received a decision to accept the provisional disposition on June 26, 2006. On June 7, 2007, the Plaintiff notified the non-party 1 of the decision that the selling right was transferred to the non-party 1 on the ground that the non-party 1 transferred the selling right before the review of the relocation measures.

C. Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, as follows.

The non-party 1, who filed an application for the relocation measures against EP, shall accept the application and only if he/she must confirm and determine himself/herself as a person subject to the relocation measures (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 92Da35783, May 24, 1994, etc.). It is reasonable to deem that the non-party 1 transferred the ownership of this case to the price of KRW 240,000,000 prior to the confirmation and decision as the condition or content of the contract performance that the sale right of this case would normally take place in the future, and the non-party 1 transferred the ownership of this case to the plaintiff without any ex post facto condition. In this regard, the defendant also transferred the ownership of this case to the plaintiff at the price of KRW 300,000,000,000 to the same purport, and in this sense, it is interpreted that the non-party 1 concluded that

Therefore, if the purpose of the instant sales contract can be achieved by selecting Nonparty 1 as a relocation measure holder and allowing a change in the name of the buyer in the future of the Plaintiff, the Defendant may be deemed to have fulfilled his/her obligation by delivering documents necessary for the change in the name of the buyer to the Plaintiff. However, in special circumstances where Nonparty 1 failed to meet the requirements for the acquisition of the right to purchase, or where it is impossible for the buyer to change the name of the buyer, the Defendant cannot be deemed to have fulfilled his/her obligation as required under the instant sales contract to the Plaintiff solely on the ground that the Defendant provided the documents for change in the name as above to the Plaintiff (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Da36671, Feb. 13, 1996; 2006Da44401, Nov. 23, 2006).

However, at the time when the Defendant transferred the instant sales right to the Plaintiff before transfer, Nonparty 1, the first transferor, violated the requirements for the selection of the relocation measures stipulated in Article 39(1) and Es. of the former Housing Act, and thus, is in a situation where the acquisition of the instant sales right could not be acquired according to the measures taken by Es.D., and this constitutes an original defect that could make it impossible after the implementation of the instant sales contract.

In light of the fact that there was an original defect at the time of the sale of this case, the Defendant entered into the sales contract of this case without notifying the Plaintiff of such fact. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff entered into the sales contract of this case with the special agreement to allow the Plaintiff to acquire the ownership of the ownership of the ownership to be incurred in the future without any event, which is different from the above agreement, and the ownership of this case became final and conclusive as the non-party 1 was excluded from the selection of the person responsible for relocation measures, and as a result, the Plaintiff cannot take over the ownership of this case. As a result, there was a cause attributable to the Defendant to the failure to perform the sales contract of this case. Accordingly, the Plaintiff may rescind the sales contract of this case on the ground that it failed to perform its obligation against the Defendant under the agreement.

Nevertheless, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s claim of this case seeking the return of the purchase price paid by the Plaintiff due to the cancellation of the instant sales contract, on the ground that, in light of the circumstances, etc. where the object of the instant sales contract is not the right to purchase but the right to purchase in the future, a kind of expectation for the right to purchase in the future is merely a kind of right to purchase in the future, and thus, the seller is sufficient to transfer the right to purchase in the future, and the seller is not responsible for the buyer’s acquisition of the right to purchase in the future, and thus the seller is fully fulfilling the obligation pursuant to the sales contract by transferring documents related to the right to purchase in the instant case received from Nonparty 1 to the buyer. The Defendant transferred the documents related to the right to purchase in the instant case received from Nonparty 1 to the Plaintiff, and even if the Defendant’s obligation pursuant to the instant sales contract was

Therefore, in so determining, the court below erred by misapprehending the interpretation of a juristic act and the legal principles on the cancellation of contract and causes attributable thereto, thereby affecting the judgment.

The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)