[밀항단속법위반][집27(2)형,7;공1979.8.1.(613),11995]
Whether the accessories of a preliminary crime are punished
When the principal offender comes to a preliminary phase without the commencement of the implementation thereof, he/she shall not be punished as the principal offender unless he/she becomes the joint principal offender in the preliminary phase.
Articles 28, 32, 3(1), 3(3), and 4(1) of the Criminal Act
Defendant 1 and three others
Prosecutor
Busan District Court Decision 78No3583 delivered on January 23, 1979
The appeal is dismissed.
In a case where the public prosecutor's ground of appeal is processed at the preliminary stage that does not reach the commencement of the implementation, it shall not be punished as a final crime except when the principal offender becomes a joint principal offender (see Supreme Court Decision 75Do1549, May 25, 1976). According to the above purport of the court below, it is reasonable for the court below to have determined that the Defendants' crime of this case was processed at the preliminary stage of violation of the Stows Control Act by Defendant 1 and 2 at the court below, and it cannot be punished as an aiding and abetting. Further, it is clear that Article 4 (1) of the Stows Control Act provides for the aiding and abetting of the crimes of this case, such as aiding and abetting, and aiding and abetting, as defined in Article 3 (3) of the same Act, in light of the above provision of the same Act.
In the end, the prosecutor's ground of appeal against this is without merit, and is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.
Justices Yang Byung-ho (Presiding Justice)