(b) The case holding that a disciplinary disposition of dismissal is an abuse of the right, even if a worker who is subject to a disciplinary action due to unauthorized absence or temporary absence, is absent from work without permission and dismissal at the workplace once again and fails to wear a safety mother at the workplace, in light of various circumstances;

(b) The case holding that a disciplinary action is deemed to be an abuse of the right, even if an employee who is subject to a disciplinary action due to unauthorized absence or temporary absence, is absent from work without permission and dismissal, and fails to wear a safety mother at the workplace once again, in light of various circumstances.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

1. On the first ground for appeal

According to the records, Article 9 of the Regulations of the Personnel Committee of the Hanjin Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. to which the plaintiff belongs lists five kinds of disciplinary action, such as dismissal, reduction of pay, reduction of pay, reprimand, and warning. Article 11 of the Criteria for Disciplinary Action under Article 12(2) of the Labor Standards Act provides that a disciplinary action may be taken only when a worker is absent without permission for at least seven days. Article 26(1)1 of the collective agreement between the reorganization company and the trade union to which the worker belongs provides that "when a worker is absent without permission for at least seven days without permission without due cause" shall be referred to the disciplinary committee. In light of the fact that the dismissal is the most severe disposition during the disciplinary action and is a cause for the worker to be responsible to the extent that the employment contract can not be continued under the social norms, the "when a worker is absent without permission for at least seven days" as the grounds for disciplinary action under the Regulations of the Personnel Committee shall be interpreted as a case where the worker is absent without permission for at least seven days in total without permission.

If the plaintiff is absent from office on five occasions at the end of January 1991 and on two occasions at the end of March 192 and on seven occasions at the end of March 1, 192, the plaintiff shall not be deemed to have been absent from office on seven or more occasions within a considerable period of time to the extent that it is impossible to continue the employment relationship under the social norms, so this does not constitute a ground for dismissal of disciplinary action as prescribed by the regulations of the personnel committee.

Therefore, although the court below's reasoning is somewhat insufficient, it is just in its conclusion that the plaintiff's absence without permission does not constitute a ground for disciplinary action, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles or the order of reasons for disciplinary action under the collective agreement or the personnel committee regulations. There is no ground for argument.

2. On the second ground for appeal

In this case where absence from work without permission, absence from work, and failure to wear safety caps at work site as the grounds for disciplinary action, such as argument, even if the act of the plaintiff's failure to wear safety caps at work site constitutes grounds for disciplinary action, the court below's evidence cited by the court below and the witness testimony at the highest resolution of the court below that did not reject by the court below was most of the defendant's failure to wear safety caps at work site prior to the disciplinary action. The plaintiff did not wear safety caps at work site on January 31, 191 and February 19 of the same year before the disciplinary committee held on February 19 of the same year. Such reasons are not entirely considered as the grounds for disciplinary action in this case, and it cannot be considered as the grounds for disciplinary action at the time of the above disciplinary action. The previous disciplinary action was justified for 19 years without permission and 19 years prior to the absence from work site, and the number of times of the disciplinary action in this case's 19 years prior to 19 years and 19 years of absence from work without permission.

The judgment cited as the arguments (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 89Meu5451, Apr. 27, 1990) does not hold that the dismissal disposition, which was taken according to the grounds for disciplinary dismissal such as the rules of employment, is naturally justifiable, but that the dismissal under the provisions for disciplinary dismissal under the premise that the dismissal should be conducted in a case where an employee is responsible to the extent that the employment contract cannot be continued by social norms is justified. Thus, there is no reason to criticize the original judgment in other opinions.

3. On the third ground for appeal

The court below stated that disciplinary action against the plaintiff who was brought before September 30, 192, the election day of the president of a cooperative, and moved to be a candidate for the president of a cooperative on September 22, 1992 is one of the factors which give rise to doubt as to the legitimacy of disciplinary action in light of the period of discipline. However, the above explanation is merely an abuse of disciplinary power and added one of the other reasons which resulted in the above judgment since disciplinary action against the plaintiff was invalid, and it does not constitute an unfair labor practice. Thus, there is no ground for misunderstanding the legal principles as to unfair labor practice in the court below.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)