beta
(영문) 대법원 1995. 10. 13. 선고 95도1761, 95감도83 판결

[특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(절도),보호감호][공1995.12.1.(1005),3847]

Main Issues

A. The admissibility of evidence of the statement made by a prosecutor or a senior judicial police officer against a person who is not the suspect and the authenticity of its establishment

(b) A case denying admissibility of a written statement made by a person who is not a suspect in preparation of a judicial police assistant;

Summary of Judgment

A. A protocol in which a prosecutor or senior judicial police officer recorded a statement of a person other than a suspect shall be admitted as evidence only when it is acknowledged to be genuine by the person making the original statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial. Here, the authenticity of the protocol refers to the formal authenticity of the protocol, such as seal, signature and seal, and the substantive authenticity that the protocol is written as stated by the person making the original statement.

B. In a case where the defendant did not agree to the written statement of a person who is not a suspect in the preparation of a judicial police assistant, and the person making the original statement was signed and sealed on the date of the first instance trial, but did not make a statement like the contents of the written statement, and the authenticity of the actual establishment of the written statement is denied, the written statement cannot be admissible as evidence, and it is admissible as evidence by the police officer who prepared the written statement, prepared the written protocol as stated by the person making the original statement on the date of the first instance trial and made the statement that the person making the statement was not a signature

The case holding that it was not a case.

[Reference Provisions]

(a)Article 313(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act;

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 90Do1474 delivered on October 16, 1990 (Gong1990, 2348) 92Do737 delivered on June 9, 1992 (Gong1992, 2175) 94Do1853 delivered on September 23, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 2907)

Defendant Saryary, Appellants

An applicant for concurrent Office of the Defendant

upper and high-ranking persons

Attorney Kim Jong-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant who is a defendant and

Judgment of the lower court

Daejeon High Court Decision 95No287, 95No18 delivered on July 7, 1995

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

55 days of detention after an appeal shall be included in the calculation of the original sentence.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal by the defendant and the respondent for defense (hereinafter referred to as the "defendant") and his state appointed defense counsel are also examined.

1. As to the part disputing admissibility of evidence

A public prosecutor or judicial police officer may use a protocol which contains a statement made by a person other than a suspect as evidence only when it is acknowledged to be genuine by the person making the original statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial. Here, the authenticity of the protocol refers to the formal authenticity of the protocol, such as seal, signature and seal, and the actual authenticity that the contents of the protocol are written as stated by the person making the original statement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Do1474, Oct. 16, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 92Do737, Jun. 9, 192). According to the records, the defendant did not agree that the statement made by the judicial police officer is admissible as evidence, and the statement made by the person making the original statement is signed and sealed on the above protocol made by the public prosecutor on the date of the first public trial, but it is impossible to deny the authenticity of the above statement made by the person making the original statement, and it is not admissible as evidence by the person making the above statement made by the police officer at the first public trial.

Nevertheless, the court below erred in admitting the admissibility of evidence of the above statement and admitting the judgment of the court of first instance that admitted it as evidence on the ground that the above new statement statement was made as above and there is no other evidence to doubt the formation of the formal and substantial authenticity of the above statement statement, but it is sufficient to recognize the criminal facts of this case only with the remaining evidence except the above statement as seen below. Thus, the illegality in the employment of evidence of the above statement does not affect the judgment, and thus, the theory of lawsuit cannot be accepted.

In addition, the protocol of interrogation of the accused prepared by the prosecutor does not appear to have been voluntarily stated in light of all the circumstances indicated in the record, such as the form and contents of the protocol, the career of the accused, and the degree of intelligence. Therefore, the court below’s decision recognizing admissibility of evidence cannot be said to be erroneous.

The argument on this point is eventually without merit.

2. As to the remainder

In light of the evidence adopted by the court of first instance as cited by the court below, such as the confession at the prosecutor's office of the defendant, the remaining evidence except the above written statement shall be compared with the records, the court below's finding the defendant guilty of the crime of this case shall be acceptable

In addition, according to the records, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that he was in a state of mental disorder under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crime of this case, but all measures that recognized habitualness are acceptable in light of the criminal records and the relation of criminal records, and it is clear that the defendant's motion wallet and male shoulder were not seized 30 minutes prior to the crime of this case, but seized near the scene of the crime of this case 10 minutes after the crime of this case.

All of the arguments disputing the above points are without merit.

3. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and part of the detention days after the appeal shall be included in the original sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-대전고등법원 1995.7.7.선고 95노287