갑 제1 내지4, 7, 8호증, 을 제1호증의 각 기재에 변론의 전취지를 종합하면, 원고는 법인등기부상 운동장(정구장)경영업 등을 영위하는 법인으로서 1968.7.8 ㅇㅇ ㅇㅇ구 ㅇㅇ동 ㅇㅇ의 4 대 6908.1평방미터(원래 같은구 ㅇㅇ동 ㅇㅇ의 35 잡종지 12,027.2평방미터가 도시구획정리사업에 따라 환지된 것임, 이하 이 사건 부동산이라고 한다)를 매수하여 같은달 18. 원고명의로 소유권이전등기를 경료한 다음 이를 과수원(배밭)으로 조성하였으나 1973.11.5. 건설부고시 제434호로 도시계획법상 운동장으로의 도시계획시설결정이 있자 1974.11.21.경 그 위에 정구장시설을 하여 타에 임대하였다가 1981.4.29.경부터는 직접 그 정구장을 운영하여 옴으로써 이 사건 부동산을 체육시설의설치이용에관한법률 및 동법시행령에서 규정한 정구장업 체육시설용 토지로 사용하고 있는 데, 토지초과이득세법 제8조 제4항 및 동법시행령 제24조 제1호의 규정에 따른 이 사건 부동산의 토지가액에 대한 1년간 수입금액의 비율이 100분의 4에 미달하는 사실, 피고는 이 사건 부동산이 토지초과이득세법 제9조 제3항 제1호, 제8조 제1항 제8호, 동법시행령 제15조 제1제2호 나목, 동법시행규칙 제11조 제6항 제1호의 규정에 의한 유휴토지로 보고 이 사건 부동산 및 원고 소유의 다른 유휴토지인 같은구 ㅇㅇ동 ㅇㅇ 대지에 관하여 1990. 1. 1. 부터 같은해 12. 31. 까지를 토지초과이득세법 제23조에 규정된 예정결정기간으로 하여 원고에 대하여 청구취지 기재 토지초과이득세(이 사건 부동산에 해당하는 그 세액은 금 420,461,500원임)부과처분을 한 사실을 인정할 수 있다.

2. Whether the instant disposition is appropriate;

A. The parties' assertion

The defendant asserted that the disposition of this case was lawful because the real estate of this case constitutes idle land subject to taxation of land excess profit tax on the grounds of the grounds of the above disposition grounds and applicable provisions of law. The plaintiff did not use the real estate of this case as a fixed place sports facility according to the determination of the above urban planning facility. In addition, in light of changes in surrounding circumstances and regional development, it was confirmed to the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor on March 4, 1981 that the cancellation of the urban planning determined as a sports facility on the real estate of this case was not possible, but the real estate of this case could not be developed as a commercial construction site after receiving a reply that the use of the real estate of this case as a commercial construction site is prohibited or restricted by the provisions of Article 8 (3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act and Article 23 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and thus, the real estate of this case does not constitute idle land subject to taxation of land excess profit as of December 31, 1990.

(b) Related statutes;

Article 23 of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act provides that the provisions of Article 23 of this Act concerning the land excess profit tax shall apply mutatis mutandis to the tax base, tax amount, etc. for the taxation of land excess profit for the period of determination. According to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 (1) and (3), the land excess profit tax shall be imposed on the idle land, etc. as of the expiration date of the taxable period, and the owner of the idle land shall be liable to pay the land excess profit tax for the land excess profit generated from such idle land. Article 9 (1) of the Enforcement Decree provides that the land owned by a corporation shall be deemed land subject to the prohibition of land excess profit tax without justifiable grounds, and Article 9 (2) 3 of the same Act provides that the business prescribed in the corporate register as one for the corporation’s unique duties, and Article 8 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that the land excess profit tax shall not be deemed the prohibited land’s use for the purpose of taxation by the Presidential Decree, and Article 8 (2) 8 of the same Act provides that the land excess profit tax shall not be used for the land.

C. Determination

As seen above, in light of the purport of the argument in the statement Nos. 5 and 6 of the Urban Planning Act with respect to the real estate acquired in this case, the plaintiff can be acknowledged that on March 4, 1981, the plaintiff filed a petition with the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor for the cancellation of the above urban planning as to the real estate in this case, which was decided as a playground facility on March 4, 1981. However, as seen above, as long as the plaintiff used the real estate in this case as a sports ground management business in corporate register at the end of the scheduled period for the above determination, as the real estate in this case was used as a proper land for a sports facility, the urban planning decision was made as a sports ground facility for the real estate acquired in this case, and even if the plaintiff was unable to develop the real estate in this case as a commercial building site because the urban planning was not cancelled despite the plaintiff's petition, the plaintiff's assertion that excess land cannot be seen as being subject to the imposition of Article 8 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Land Acquisition Tax Act and Article 18 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.

Thus, the plaintiff's claim seeking revocation is without merit since the disposition of this case was unlawful, and it is dismissed.