2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The reasoning of this court's decision is as follows. The part of "D. Judgment" in Paragraph 2 of the judgment of the court of first instance is used as follows, and the plaintiff's new argument is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for adding the judgment as set forth in Paragraph 2 below to the plaintiff's new argument. Thus, it is accepted as it is in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act

"D. Determination"

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by comprehensively taking account of the facts acknowledged as above and the overall purport of the evidence and arguments, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff, not the Plaintiff purchased the instant share from the deceased, but the Plaintiff trusted the instant share to the Plaintiff. As seen earlier, a business contract was prepared around December 1996, stating that the Deceased and the Plaintiff engaged in a leasing business of the instant real estate, and the lease contract on the instant real estate was entered into between April 1, 2001, the lessor and the Plaintiff entered the lessor as the deceased and the Plaintiff, and there was evidence that the Plaintiff paid value-added tax, income tax, etc. on the rental income of the instant real estate from April 1, 201 to 2010 (this point is deemed that the ownership transfer registration for the instant share was completed in the Plaintiff’s name, and that the Plaintiff was registered as the rental business operator of the instant real estate, and there is no other evidence supporting this conclusion. Therefore, the Defendant’s disposition of this case is legitimate, and there is no reason to deem otherwise.

1) The registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Plaintiff as to the instant share and the registration of ownership transfer in the name of KimA as to one-half of the instant share out of the instant real estate was completed, and the right to claim ownership transfer in the name of the deceased was completed for each of the instant share and the shares in the name of KimA. Unlike the KimA, if the Plaintiff purchased the instant share from the deceased, the reason why the registration was completed is not easily explained.

2) Although the cause for the registration of transfer of ownership in the Plaintiff’s name as to the instant shares in the registry and the sale certificate is the sale and purchase, there is no evidence to acknowledge that, other than the above sale certificate, the actual sales contract was concluded between the deceased and the Plaintiff, or the purchase price of KRW 000 stated in the sale certificate was actually received. The Plaintiff asserted that the purchase price equivalent to the instant shares appears to have been equivalent to KRW 000 ( KRW 000 x1/2). However, it is not acceptable in that the payment of the share in the name of KimA, which is merely a title trust, is equivalent to KRW 00,000. Ultimately, the instant registration procedure cannot be deemed to have been destroyed because it is proven that there is any doubtful circumstance to deem that the registration procedure was not lawfully progress.

3) Business registration with respect to the instant real estate leasing business is under the joint name of the Plaintiff and KimA, and the Deceased held a registration right with respect to the entire real estate of this case, as well as all kinds of taxes have been paid. On the other hand, no evidence exists to deem that the Deceased distributed the above rental income to the Plaintiff.

4) In light of the Plaintiff’s opening of O on November 1, 1984, but OO was voluntarily closed on December 31, 1987, it does not seem that the Plaintiff had any surplus funds to the extent that the Plaintiff acquired the above shares at the time of the registration of transfer of ownership of the instant shares. Even if the Plaintiff had surplus funds, there is no special reason for the Plaintiff to purchase only the instant shares, not the instant real estate, from the deceased, and there is no reason for the Plaintiff to sell only the instant shares, not the instant real estate, as the deceased with considerable economic power.

5) The instant judgment was rendered and finalized, as it is, that the registration of ownership transfer in the name of KimA as to one-half portion of the instant real estate was based on a nominal trust. The judgment seems to have been rendered on the ground that the deceased had a certificate of registration right to the instant real estate until the time of death and that the deceased managed the revenue of rent for the instant building.

6) The Plaintiff asserted that approximately KRW 000 out of KRW 000, which the Deceased remitted to the Plaintiff, was refunded the portion of the instant share out of the rent for the instant real estate. The Tax Tribunal filed a request with the Director of the Gangnam District Tax Office for a trial on the imposition of KRW 000 on September 21, 2009 and decided on June 30, 2010, but the said disposition of imposition of gift tax became final and conclusive because it did not seek a revocation of the said disposition of gift tax. The said decision of rejection became final and conclusive because it did not bring a lawsuit to seek a revocation of the said disposition of gift tax. While the instant real estate was owned by the Deceased and owned by the Plaintiff, etc., regardless of the current registration title, the Plaintiff did not present any objective evidence that could be seen differently from the above facts, on the other hand, in view of the fact that the said decision was mainly based on the decision that the Plaintiff purchased the instant share from the Deceased.”

2. Additional determination

A. The plaintiff's assertion

In the instant real estate as of May 1, 2002, the right to collateral security with Hanman Bank, the maximum debt amount of KRW 000,000, and the maximum debt amount of KRW 000,000, as of June 29, 2006, are established on the instant real estate. If the instant real estate is owned by the deceased, and the shares of which are title trust with the Plaintiff, all of which are owned by the deceased, the secured debt based on the said two collateral security rights shall be the total debt inherited. Therefore, the entire

B. Determination

1) First, the statement of evidence No. 22 is insufficient to recognize that the deceased is the actual debtor of the secured obligation based on the above two collateral mortgages, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion based on the premise that the deceased is the actual debtor of the secured obligation based on the above two collateral mortgages is without merit.

2) Even if the Plaintiff’s above assertion is deemed to the effect that the obligation of the decedent as a surety’s surety is an inherited obligation, the amount of the decedent’s obligation to be deducted from the value of the inherited property refers to the obligation that the decedent is deemed to have to have to have been ultimately borne by the decedent at the time of commencement of the inheritance. As such, in cases where the decedent is liable as a surety’s surety’s obligation for a third party at the time of commencement of the inheritance, the primary obligor should not perform his obligation because the obligor is insolvent at the time of the commencement of the inheritance, and where it is deemed that there is no possibility for the obligor to receive reimbursement even if the primary obligor exercises his right to reimbursement against the primary obligor, the amount of the obligation should be deducted from the value of the inherited property. In such cases, it is not reasonable to view that the principal obligor would not have any possibility of receiving the loan as a result of the commencement of the procedures such as bankruptcy, composition, reorganization, compulsory execution, etc., or execution of punishment, and that there is no possibility that the obligor would be objectively able to recover the remaining value of inheritance (see 20.).

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance court is justifiable, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.