2. A stock company with primary construction;

3. Large-scale Construction Co., Ltd.

2. Seoul Guarantee Insurance Co., Ltd.

1. As to the ground of appeal on the claim for advance payment deposit

A. As to the first ground for appeal

(1) 원심은 그 채택증거를 종합하여, 원고들이 공동이행방식의 공동수급체[원고 주식회사 유일엔지니어링(이하 '원고 유일'이라 한다)의 출자지분이 38%, 원고 일성건설 주식회사(이하 '원고 일성'이라 한다)의 출자지분이 37%, 원고 대진종합건설 주식회사(이하 '원고 대진'이라 한다)의 출자지분이 25%이다]를 구성하고 계약체결권한 등 공동수급체의 운영에 관련된 모든 사항을 위임받아 행사하는 공동수급체의 대표자로 원고 유일을 선정한 후 대한민국으로부터 공동도급받은 C 신축공사 중 철근콘크리트 공사를 총 공사대금 3,757,930,000원, 준공일 2013. 10. 9.로 정하되, 그 중 1차 공사(이하 '이 사건 1차 공사'라 한다)를 공사대금 2,075,260,000원, 공사기간 2010. 12. 20.부터 2011. 6. 22.까지로 정하여 주식회사 A(이하 'A'이라 한다)에 하도급하는 내용의 공사계약(이하 '이 사건 공사계약'이라 한다)을 체결한 사실, A은 피고들과 사이에 이 사건 계약보증계약과 이 사건 선급금보증계약을 체결하고 그 보증서 등을 원고들에게 교부한 사실, 원고들은 위 각 보증계약에 따른 보증서와 보증보험증권을 교부받은 후 A에게 이 사건 공사계약에 따른 선급금 1,037,630,000원을 지급한 사실, 원고 유일은 2011. 3. 18.부터 2011. 4. 21.까지 4차례에 걸쳐 A에 공문을 보내어 공사 이행을 최고하였는데 2011. 4. 21.자 공문으로 공사가 정상적으로 진행될 수 있도록 즉각적 조치를 취할 것을 독촉하면서 2011. 4.26.까지 부진공사 만회계획서의 제출을 요구한 사실, 발주처인 법무부 주관으로 원고 유일, A 및 책임감리단 관계자가 참석한 가운데 2011. 4. 27. 긴급회의가 소집되어 A이 향후 공사를 정상화하기로 협의한 사실, A은 그 이후에도 아무런 조치를 취하지 아니한 채 2011. 5. 6. 이 사건 1차 공사를 전면 중단한 사실, 이에 원고 유일은 2011. 5. 13. 및 2011. 5. 20, A에 이 사건 공사계약을 해지한다.는 내용의 통지를 한 사실, 해지통지 이후 A의 기성고를 확정하기 위한 원고 유일의 2011. 5, 20.자 채권채무 확정검사 시행통보 공문에 대하여 A은 2011. 5. 24.과 2011. 5. 25.에 걸친 확정검사 기일을 2011. 6. 1.과 2011. 6. 2.로 연기해 달라는 내용의 회신을 보냈으나 원고 유일이 시행하여 2011. 6. 3.경 마쳐진 채권채무 확정검사에는 참석하지 아니한 사실, 그 후 A은 2011. 12. 9. 원고들과 사이에 이 사건 1차 공사에 관한 A의 기성고를 175,178,978원(원고 유일이 2011. 6. 3.경 단독으로 실시한 확정 검사 내역과 일치한다)으로 합의하는 내용의 정산합의서(이하 '이 사건 정산합의서'라 한다)를 작성한 사실, 원고들은 A이 미시공한 부분에 관하여 2011. 7. 7. 주식회사 씨엠아이 건설과 사이에 이 사건 총 공사의 공사대금을 4,211,350,000원으로, 이 사건 1차 공사 나머지 부분의 공사대금을 2,365,220,000원으로 정하여 하도급계약(이하 '이 사건 후속 계약'이라 한다)을 체결한 사실 등을 인정한 다음, 이 사건 공사계약은 원고 유일의 해 지통지에 의하여 적법하게 해지되었다고 판단하였다. 이어서 원심은 이 사건 공사계약 해지 시점까지 이 사건 1차 공사의 기성고에 관하여, 제1심 감정인의 감정결과 및 각 보완감정결과, 원심의 제1심 감정인에 대한 2014. 10. 31.자 보완감정촉탁결과 등을 근거로, 제1심 감정인이 계약단가를 기준으로 기시공 · 미시공 소요. 공사비를 산정한 다음 기성고 비율을 11.58%로 정하고 이에 따른 기성고 공사대금을 240,388,452원으로, 산출한 것으로 보인다며 이 사건 1차 공사의 기성고 공사대금을 제1심 감정인의 감정결과대로 240,388,452원으로 인정하고, 이 사건 정산합의서 상의 정산금액 175,178,978원을 이 사건 1차 공사의 기성고 공사대금으로 인정하여야 한다는 원고들의 주장을 받아들이지 아니하였다.

(2) However, it is difficult to accept the lower court’s determination on the validity of the instant primary construction project and the cost of construction for the following reasons.

(A) In a case where a contractor has to settle the construction cost due to the termination of a construction contract with the completion of the construction work, the construction cost shall be calculated by applying the agreed construction cost to the agreed construction cost, which is calculated on the basis of the construction cost actually required or to be required for the non-construction part. The nature and ratio of the construction cost is the ratio of the construction cost incurred for the completion of the non-construction part to the total construction cost incurred for the completed part (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da2930, 29317, Jun. 9, 1995). In addition, if a contractor had a reason to return advance payment while the construction contract was terminated after the advance payment from the construction contract, barring any special circumstance, even if the contractor had a reason to return advance payment, the unpaid amount of the construction cost corresponding to the pre-determined portion shall be appropriated as advance payment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Da595197, Dec. 7, 199).

In addition, where the authenticity of a disposal document is recognized, the court shall, in principle, recognize the existence and content of the expression of intent in accordance with the language and text stated in the disposal document, unless there is any clear and acceptable reflective evidence that denies the content of the statement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da15816, Sept. 20, 2007). If a contractual party prepares in writing a disposal document, the objective meaning of the language and text is clear, barring special circumstances, the existence and content of the expression of intent must be recognized. In particular, in cases where a significant impact on the legal relationship between the parties by interpreting the language and text differently from the objective meaning of the language and text, it shall be more strictly construed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da10782, Nov. 13, 2014).

Meanwhile, barring any special circumstance, a performance guarantee contractor is liable only for the obligee’s damage caused by the obligor’s nonperformance, and the obligor’s obligation does not extend and extend by a juristic act performed by the obligor after the establishment of a guarantee agreement. Thus, even if a contract was made to increase the scope of damages for the obligor’s nonperformance by agreement after the guarantee agreement between the obligor and the obligee with respect to the scope of damages for the obligor’s nonperformance, the guarantor who did not consent thereto is not liable for the aggravated obligation by such agreement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Da50514, Jun. 29, 200; 94Da38250, Feb. 9, 196).

(B) Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveals the following facts.

1) At the first instance court, Defendant Specialized Construction Guarantee Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant Co., Ltd.”) adopted an appraisal application of “1 6, 201.6, 200 won and 20% of the construction cost which was executed by Defendant Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant Co., Ltd.”) from Plaintiff 1, 205, 200 won and 20% of the construction cost which was executed by Defendant Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “20”) and 20% of the construction cost which was executed by Defendant Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Co., Ltd.”). 5, 205, 200 won and 7% of the construction cost which was executed by Defendant Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Co., Ltd.”), 205, 200 won and 7% of the construction cost which would have been completed by Defendant Co., Ltd.’s 1, 2084 of the construction cost.

The answer was made to the appraiser of the first instance trial in accordance with the calculation formula of the "construction cost incurred in the completed portion (the construction cost incurred in the completed portion + the construction cost to be incurred in the completion of the unconstruction portion)".

Although it was commissioned to calculate A's flag and percentage applying the contractual unit price, the appraiser originally submitted a reply with the same content as the response to the request for supplementary appraisal as the response to the request for supplementary appraisal, the appraisal statement of the first instance court is calculated based on the contractual unit price, and the appraisal statement of the first instance court was submitted.

2) The settlement agreement of this case made between the plaintiffs and A (Evidence A No. 12-2) contains the name of the construction of this case, the date of the contract, the date of commencement and completion of the construction of this case, and the date of completion of the construction of this case, and the plaintiffs agreed to settle the above construction terminated during the construction with Egypt and agreed not to raise any civil or criminal problems in the future, and the two copies of this agreement shall be prepared and sealed, respectively, and the "agreement" contains a statement that "the construction cost of the first construction of this case shall be 2,075,260,000 won before the modification," and the statement of settlement and a certificate of seal impression of A corporation shall be accompanied by a statement of settlement and a certificate of seal impression attached to A. The defendants acknowledged that the representative director of this case recognized that the agreement of this case was signed and sealed by A.

(다) 이러한 사실관계를 앞서 본 법리에 비추어 살펴보면, 이 사건에서는 A에 의하여 시공되다가 계약 해지로 중단된 이 사건 1차 공사의 기성고 공사대금을 산정하여야 하므로, 원심으로서는 이 사건 1차 공사 중 A에 의한 기성 부분에 소요된 공사비뿐만 아니라 이 사건 1차 공사 중 A에 의하여 시공되지 아니한 부분을 완성하는 데 소요될 공사비까지 감정하여 그 액수를 합산한 전체 공사비 가운데 이 사건 1차 공사 중 A에 의한 기성 부분에 소요된 공사비가 차지하는 비율에 의하여 기성고 비율을 산정하고, 이 사건 공사계약에서 정한 공사대금에 그 기성고 비율을 적용한 금액을 A의 이 사건 1차 공사의 기성고 공사대금으로 인정하였어야 할 것이다. 그럼에도 이와 달리 제1심 감정인은 이 사건 1차 공사 중 A에 의한 기성 부분에 소요된 공사비만을 감정하였을 뿐 이 사건 1차 공사 중 A에 의하여 시공되지 아니한 부분을 완성하는 데 소요될 공사비를 감정하지 아니하였고, 원심의 보완감정촉탁결과 역시 이 사건 1차 공사 중 A에 의하여 시공되지 아니한 부분을 완성하는 데 소요될 공사비에 대한 별도의 감정 없이 이미 산출된 이 사건 제1공사 중 A에 의한 기성 부분에 소요된 공사비의 총 공사대금에 대한 비율을 기성고 비율로 제시한 것일 뿐임에도, 별다른 근거 없이 제1심 감정인 이 계약단가를 기준으로 기시공. 미시공 소요 공사비를 산정한 다음 기성고 비율을 11.58%로 정하고 이에 따른 기성고 공사대금을 240,388,452원으로 산출한 것으로 보인다는 이유를 들어 이 사건 1차 공사 중 A에 의하여 이미 시공된 부분에 소요된 공사비만을 산정하고 이를 바로 기성고 공사대금으로 인정한 감정결과를 그대로 받아들여 그 시공 부분에 소요된 공사비의 이 사건 공사계약상 이 사건 1차 공사대금에 대한 비율을 기성고 비율로 인정한 원심판단에는 공사도급계약이 해지된 경우의 기성고에 따른 공사비 산정에 관한 법리를 오해하고 필요한 심리를 다하지 아니함으로써 판결 결과에 영향을 미친 위법이 있다. 이 점을 지적하는 상고이유의 주장은 이유 있다. 또한 앞서 본 법리에 비추어 살펴보면, 이 사건 정산합의서는 원고들과 A 사이에 이 사건 1차 공사에 대한 A의 기성고 공사대금을 175,178,978원으로 합의하는 내용의 처분문서이고, 피고들도 A의 대표이사가 이 사건 정산합의서에 날인한 사실을 인정하고 있어 그 진정성립이 인정될 뿐 아니라 문언의 객관적인 의미도 명확하므로 원심으로서는 이 사건 정산합의서의 기재 내용을 부인할 만한 분명하고도 수긍할 수 있는 반증이 없는 한 원칙적으로 이에 기재되어 있는 문언대로 의사표시의 존재와 내용을 인정하였어야 할 것이다. 다만 계약 해지 시 기성고 공사대금 중 미지급액은 선급금으로 당연충당되므로 A과 원고들 사이의 이 사건 1차 공사의 기성고 공사대금에 관한 정산합의는 피고들이 원고들에 대하여 부담하는 선급금반환채무의 관점에서 보면 선급금으로 충당되는 기성고 공사대금액을 정하는 약정이 되는데, 실제 기성고 공사대금보다 적은 금액으로 이루어지는 정산합의는 피고들의 선급금반환채무를 가중시키는 약정이 되어 그에 대한 피고들의 동의가 없으면 피고들은 그 합의로 가중된 채무에 대하여 책임을 지지 아니할 것이다. 즉 이 사건 1차 공사에 대한 A의 기성고 공사대금 감정 결과 감정액이 이 사건 정산합의서의 정산액보다 적으면 피고들은 이 사건 정산합의서의 정산약정에 따라 그 정산액에 충당되고 남은 선급금을 반환할 책임을 지게 될 것이고, 그 감정액이 이 사건 정산합의서의 정산액보다 많으면 원칙적으로 피고들은 감정액에 충당되고 남은 선급금을 반환할 책임만을 질 뿐이고 이 사건 정산합의서의 정산약정에 피고들의 동의가 있어야 그 정산액에 충당되고 남은 선급금을 반환할 책임을 지게 될 것이다. 따라서 원심으로서는 이 사건 1차 공사에 대한 A의 기성고 공사대금을 제대로 감정하여 그 액수가 얼마인지 확정한 다음 그 감정액과 이 사건 정산합의서의 정산액을 비교하여 피고들의 선급금반환채무의 범위를 정하는 데에 이 사건 정산합의서의 정산액을 적용할 것인지를 판단하였어야 한다. 그럼에도 이와 달리 이 사건 정산합의서의 내용을 부인할 만한 분명하고도 수긍할 수 있는 반증이라고 보기에 부족한 판시와 같은 사정만을 들어 이 사건 정산합의서에 기재된 정산합의의 존재와 내용을 인정하지 아니한 원심판단에는 처분문서의 증명력에 관한 법리를 오해하고 필요한 심리를 다하지 아니함으로써 판결 결과에 영향을 미친 위법이 있다. 이 점을 지적하는 상고이유의 주장도 이유 있다.

B. Regarding ground of appeal No. 4

(1) In order to ensure the smooth progress of the construction work, advance payment received from the contract for the construction work is not paid to the contractor in relation to the specific period of the construction work, but paid in relation to the entire construction work. However, in light of the fact that advance payment has the nature of advance payment, if the contractor had to return the advance payment during the construction work, such as cancellation or termination of the contract after the payment of advance payment or violation of the terms and conditions of advance payment, barring any special circumstance, the unpaid amount of the construction work should be appropriated as advance payment as a matter of course, and if the advance payment remains, the unpaid amount of the construction work should be appropriated as advance payment. If the advance payment is appropriated for the unpaid construction work, and if it remains, the contractor shall have the obligation to return the advance payment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Da5519, Dec. 7, 199; 97Da5060, Dec. 12, 197; 2000Da630160, supra.

(2) The lower court determined that the advance payment of KRW 120,194,226 multiplied by the ratio of KRW 240,388,452 of the amount of the first construction discontinuance and the construction cost at the time of the first construction discontinuance and the ratio of KRW 240,38,452 of the instant construction contract to KRW 120,194,226, while the lower court determined that the advance payment of KRW 240,38,452, which was the full amount of the construction cost, remains remaining without being paid up until the date of termination of the instant construction contract, on the grounds stated in its reasoning, as follows.

Article 22(5) of the General Conditions for the Subcontract incorporated into the instant construction contract merely provides for the method of settling advance payments in cases of payment of the completed portion during the construction industry and the existence of a contract, and cannot be viewed as an exceptional settlement agreement for advance payments applied at the time of termination of the construction contract, so the unpaid amount of the construction cost shall be naturally appropriated for advance payments until the termination of the instant construction contract. Therefore, the lower court’s determination that the advance payments appropriated for the construction cost until the termination of the instant construction contract is limited to the amount calculated in accordance with the formula of this provision is inconsistent with the legal principles on the exceptional settlement agreement or advance payments concerning advance payments. However, the lower court’s determination that the remaining portion remains without payment at the time of termination of the instant construction contract and the total amount of the construction cost is appropriated in advance payment is justifiable except for the amount of the construction cost calculated in advance. However, the lower court’s determination that the construction cost of the first construction project was calculated in accordance with the misapprehension of the legal doctrine as to the construction cost as seen earlier.

(3) The lower court rejected the Plaintiffs’ assertion that, according to the direct payment agreement entered into with A at the time of the conclusion of the instant construction contract, the Plaintiffs paid the overdue wages directly to A’s labor officers, etc. and the construction cost corresponding to the overdue wages has expired. According to Article 24(4) of the General Conditions of the instant construction contract, the liquidated damages to be paid by A to the Plaintiffs may be deducted from the construction cost to be paid by the Plaintiffs, which constitutes the liquidated damages, and the construction cost has expired. As such, the termination of the extinguished part and the construction cost is excluded from the appropriation of the instant advance payment, the lower court rejected all the Plaintiffs’ assertion on the grounds stated in its reasoning

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the appropriation of advance payment, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal. The Supreme Court precedents, which are contrary to the grounds of appeal, relate to the case where there is an exceptional settlement agreement on advance payment, and it is not appropriate to invoke the case in this case.

(1) The lower court, based on its adopted evidence, found the facts as indicated in its reasoning, and determined as follows. The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, determined that: (a) the return of advance payment to the Plaintiffs upon termination of the instant construction contract; or (b) deposit based on each of the instant advance payment guarantee agreements by the Defendants, was reasonable to view the amount calculated by deducting the amount equivalent to value-added tax (72,476,504 won (797,241,548 won x 1/11) actually paid or to be paid by the Plaintiffs from the outstanding advance payment amount (797,241,548 won).

(2) However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

(A) In a case where value-added tax is included in advance payment received under a construction contract and the amount of value-added tax is deducted or refunded as input tax amount, such deduction or refund constitutes a refund of the amount equivalent to value-added tax out of advance payment, and thus, it is reasonable to deduct the amount equivalent to value-added tax from advance payment to be returned upon termination of a construction contract unless specific circumstances exist, such as that the amount of deduction or refund was returned differently (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da16976, Apr. 28, 2006). Meanwhile, penalty tax is a kind of administrative sanction imposed on a taxpayer who violates the tax law without justifiable grounds to facilitate the exercise of the right to taxation and the realization of a tax claim. For convenience of collection procedure, imposition of penalty tax is different in nature from that of the principal tax calculated under the relevant tax law. Thus, the imposition of penalty tax is separate from that of the principal tax (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da16976, Apr. 27, 1995).

(B) Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveals the following facts.

1) According to the instant construction contract, the Plaintiff’s due date, which is a business operator under the Value-Added Tax Act for the purpose of an engineering work, etc. includes 394,29,400 won (1,037,630,000 won X 38%) and Plaintiff’s daily value-added tax is 383,923,100 won (1,037,630,000 x 37%) and Plaintiff’s due date is 259,407,50 won (1,037,630,000 x 25%) and paid to A for the total amount of KRW 1,037,630,00,000 (1,037,630,000 won x 1,030,000 won) x 3050,000 won (250,000 won) x 1,191,394,0500 won and 394,05,01.

2) Upon the termination of the instant construction contract between the Plaintiffs and A, the tax authority did not recognize the contractual terminated portion of the input tax deducted by the Plaintiffs as the input tax amount, and imposed the Plaintiffs the additional tax on negligent tax returns and the additional tax on negligent tax payment on the grounds that the Plaintiffs did not file a revised return on the termination of the contract, and notified the Plaintiffs of the aggregate amount of the additional tax on negligent tax returns and the additional tax on negligent tax payment. The specific content of the instant construction contract is ① KRW 29,752,210, the additional tax on negligent tax payment, KRW 341,326, the additional tax on negligent tax payment, KRW 23,46,573, the additional tax on negligent tax payment, KRW 3,90,00, KRW 29,90, KRW 2405, KRW 90, and KRW 2,400, KRW 341,326, KRW 23,465, and KRW 23,4636, the additional tax on negligent tax payment.

(C) We examine these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier. The amount equivalent to the value-added tax deducted as input tax amount by the Plaintiffs due to the payment of the advance payment to A is KRW 35,845,40 per day, KRW 34,902,100 per Plaintiff Il-jin, KRW 23,582,500 per annum, and KRW 94,330,000 per annum. Since the value-added tax revised by the tax authority due to the non-deduction of input tax amount due to the termination of the construction contract with A after the fact that the amount of the advance payment was 24,009, KRW 900 per annum, KRW 23,465,736 per annum, and KRW 15,85,20 per annum, KRW 63,300 per annum, and KRW 360 per annum, the Plaintiffs’ reimbursement of the amount equivalent to the advance payment of the input tax amount should be 90,000 per annum.

2. As to the ground of appeal on claim for contract performance guarantee

A. As to the second ground for appeal

Based on its adopted evidence, the lower court, based on the following circumstances, deemed as follows: (a) on May 13, 201, when the contract for construction work could have been terminated by the contractor on May 13, 201, the date when the contract for construction work in this case was actually terminated by the Plaintiff U.S.; and (b) on the ground that the period from the time when the Plaintiffs could have terminated the contract for construction work in this case to the time when the subsequent company would normally enter into a follow-up construction contract with another construction business operator, and the appropriate construction period necessary for the remainder of the instant primary construction work is recognized as 83 days from July 7, 2011 to September 27, 2011, the lower court determined that the contract was terminated by 114 days (31 days + 83 days) from May 13, 2011 to September 4, 2011 to the time when the contract for construction work in this case could have been completed by the contractor, 2010 to the Plaintiffs 16.7.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to calculation of liquidated damages

B. Ground of appeal No. 3

The lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiffs had no choice but to conclude the follow-up contract of this case due to the nonperformance of A, and thereby, incurred damages that increased the construction cost of this case by KRW 628,598,978 compared to the total construction cost of this case.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the recognition of extended damage, the violation of the rules of evidence, the incomplete hearing, and the non-exercise of the right to explanation.

The court below rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the plaintiffs are liable for compensating the damages for delay paid by the plaintiffs to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, which is the ordering authority, due to the delay in construction work and the total of 184,831,320 won in arrears paid by the plaintiffs on behalf of Gap and the delay in construction work, while performing the first construction of this case.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of guarantee contract of this case or the scope of liquidated damages, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment below against the plaintiffs regarding the claim for the payment of advance payment deposit is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The remaining appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Sang-hoon

Justices Kim Jae-tae

Justices Park Sang-ok