(b) The case reversing the judgment of the court below which judged that the land was an administrative property as a road solely on the ground that the land is a road;

B. The case reversing the judgment of the court below on the ground that it should have examined whether the land is an administrative property not subject to acquisition by prescription, rather than immediately determining that the land is an administrative property as a road solely on the ground that its category is a road and is registered in the register of State property, but whether there was a act of designating a road in accordance with laws and regulations or administrative dispositions regarding the land, or whether the land was actually being used as a road

1. As to each land listed in the separate sheet No. 2

In light of the records of this case, the court below is justified in finding that each land listed in the annexed Table No. 2 by macroscopic evidence is a river or ditch and the category of land is determined and divided as administrative property for public use, and that the above land cannot be an object of prescriptive acquisition unless it is closed for public use.

In addition, the court below is just in its purport that the expression of intention of disuse for public use is neither explicitly nor implicitly, but there is a legitimate declaration of intention, and the fact that the administrative property is not actually used for its original purpose does not necessarily mean that there was an expression of intention of disuse, and the burden of proving the fact that the administrative property is discontinued for public use and is subject to prescriptive acquisition is against the claimant for prescriptive acquisition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Da5620, Mar. 22, 1994; 94Da12579, Sept. 13, 1994; 94Da12579, Sept. 13, 1994); and in examining the record, the court below also ruled that the court below cannot be deemed that there was an express or implied declaration of

In addition, as alleged by the Defendants in the briefs cited by the theory of lawsuit, part of each of the above lands is not currently used as a public object, and is not actually used as a public object. Thus, it cannot be deemed that a confession in court was established as to the fact that each of the above lands was actually disused.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below cannot be said to contain any error as to each of the above lands.

2. As to the land listed in the annexed Table 1 List

A. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court determined that each land listed in the separate sheet No. 1 can not be subject to prescriptive acquisition, unless the land category of each land is determined and divided as administrative property for public use as a road by macroficing evidence.

B. However, in light of the records of this case, each of the above land is registered in the cadastral record on December 30, 195 with land category as a road, but there is no evidence to prove that each of the above land was actually being used as an administrative property, and there is no fact that the above land was actually used as an administrative property. Meanwhile, according to the records of evidence No. 2-4, 5, and 6, the owner of the above land is suspected to be the state office, and the office of administration is to be the general property under the Act No. 4, 1975, and the general property under the Act No. 4, 1975, and 195, and the general property under the Act No. 94, Dec. 30, 195 (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Da18195, Feb. 24, 1995).

Therefore, the court below should have deliberated on whether the above land is an administrative property that is not subject to the acquisition by prescription, by examining whether the above land was actually being used as a road at the time when the plaintiff commenced possession of part of the above land, or whether the above land was actually being used as a road. However, according to the above Gap evidence No. 2-4, it is recognized that the management agency changed the land No. 1 from the above land to the internal department on January 4, 1986, and there is a possibility that the above land No. 1 might be an administrative property. In this case, whether the above land No. 1 was an administrative disposition designated as a road, and whether the part of the above land No. 1 among the above land No. 1 is designated as a road should also be examined.

C. Therefore, among the judgment below, there is an error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment by recognizing facts in violation of the rules of evidence while failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations on the part concerning the land in the annexed list No. 1 of the judgment, and the argument

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding the land indicated in the annexed Table 1 against the defendant Republic of Korea shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the court below. The remaining appeal against the defendant Republic of Korea and the appeal against the defendant Seongbuk-gu shall be dismissed, and the costs of appeal against the dismissal of the appeal shall be assessed against the losing party

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)