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(영문) 대구지방법원 2017.1.13. 선고 2016구합1747 판결

견책처분취소

Cases

2016Guhap1747 Revocation of a disposition of revocation of reprimand

Plaintiff

A

Defendant

Head of Daegu Regional Employment and Labor Agency

Conclusion of Pleadings

December 9, 2016

Imposition of Judgment

January 13, 2017

Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim

The Defendant’s reprimand disposition against the Plaintiff on January 19, 2016 shall be revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff was appointed as an administrative assistant on February 7, 2007. From February 27, 2015 to February 27, 2015, the Plaintiff is performing the duties of fair safety management, etc. at the Defendant-affiliated Center.

B. On January 18, 2016, the Defendant Ordinary Disciplinary Committee decided on January 1, 201 pursuant to Article 78(1)1 and 3 of the State Public Officials Act on the ground that the following disciplinary action against the Plaintiff constitutes a violation of the duty to maintain dignity, and the Defendant was subject to the same disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on January 19, 2016.

On October 20, 2015, from around 19:30 to 20:00, the Plaintiff made a statement to the effect that “I will die or die if I would die if I would do not hear the ship’s horse,” at the restaurant in the same manner as D’s “I will die?” on the ground that D’s public officials affiliated with the same department made a statement to the effect that “I would die if I would die or die. I would die?” from around 20:40 on the same day to around 21:00 on the same day, the Plaintiff sold D’s kick to drinking or sweet, which was set off earlier from the stairs that I would die or die.

C. On June 1, 2016, the appeals review committee changed the Defendant’s salary reduction disposition in January 19, 2016 against the Plaintiff to reprimand (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1 to 5, Eul evidence 1 to 6 (including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The Plaintiff’s refusal of the D’s request for singing is not an act detrimental to the public official’s dignity, but an act of defending against D’s unilateral assault. Even if the Plaintiff and D’s case on October 20, 2010 were recognized as a mutual assault, the Defendant issued a reduction of salary for the Plaintiff, a reprimand against D, and a disciplinary measure against D. If the Plaintiff’s inside and outside of D, it would be against the principle of equality or the principle of self-defense. The Plaintiff agreed with D in trust of the Defendant’s statement of opinion that the Plaintiff should agree with D, and thereafter, the Defendant’s disposition of reduction of salary for the Plaintiff is against the principle of trust protection. Moreover, if the Plaintiff’s disposal of the Plaintiff’s KRW 3 million, excluding treatment expenses received from D in the name of medical treatment and agreement, and in consideration of the Plaintiff’s right to deviate from and disciplinary action against the religious organization and the religious organization, the disposition of this case was unlawful.

B. Relevant statutes

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

1) Whether the grounds for disciplinary action are applicable

The Plaintiff’s assaulted on October 20, 2015 by drinking D, etc. does not conflict between the parties, and the instant disciplinary cause is acknowledged as sufficiently facts if the evidence presented earlier was added. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

2) Determination on deviation, abuse, etc. of discretion

A) A disciplinary measure against a public official is imposed to maintain the order of the public official in the event of a violation of his duties or other misconduct, and to ensure that the public official's performance of his duties is done by taking care of his discipline, and thus, a disciplinary measure should be taken at the discretion of the person having authority to take disciplinary measures. However, a disciplinary measure is illegal if the disciplinary measure taken by the person having authority to take disciplinary measures as a result of the exercise of the authority to take disciplinary measures is deemed to abuse the discretionary power that has been placed at the discretion of the person having authority to take disciplinary measures because it considerably lacks validity under social norms. Meanwhile, according to Articles 79 and 80 of the State Public Officials Act, a disciplinary measure is classified into removal, dismissal, suspension from office, reduction in salary, and reprimand, and the reprimand is classified into a criminal offense, and thus, it is the most minor among the disciplinary measures against a public official. Thus, as long as the relevant public official's act constitutes grounds for disciplinary action, it cannot be said that a disciplinary measure has been abused with discretion (see Supreme Court Decision 98Nu25, 30, 1985.).

Therefore, even if considering the circumstances alleged by the Plaintiff, there is no error of abuse of discretionary authority in the instant disposition containing the reprimand, unless the grounds for disciplinary action are recognized as applicable to the Plaintiff.

B) Other arguments are examined. According to the evidence evidence evidence evidence evidence evidence evidence No. 5, the plaintiff was found to have been sprinked from the restaurant table in the first place, the plaintiff was sprinked from D, assaulted D again, and caused fightings between the plaintiff and D, and as stated earlier, disciplinary action against public officials is, in principle, at the discretion of the authorized person. As such, a disciplinary action against the public official was taken against the plaintiff and D in the above case, and it does not immediately go against the principle of equality or violate the principle of self-defense. In addition, there is no evidence to recognize that the defendant ordered the plaintiff to agree with D, as alleged by the plaintiff, and even if it is acknowledged as the above facts, it cannot be viewed as an administrative agency's public opinion statement about whether to punish the plaintiff and the degree of self-defense. Therefore, the principle of trust protection in this case is not an issue. Accordingly, the remaining argument of the plaintiff is without merit.

3. Conclusion

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

Judges of the presiding judge;

Judges Yellow-gu

Judges Lee Young-young

Attached Form

A person shall be appointed.