The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The lower court’s sentence against the Defendant on the summary of the grounds of appeal (10 months of imprisonment) is too unhued and unreasonable.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, based on the discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and there is a unique area of the first deliberation in our criminal litigation law taking the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness.

In addition, in light of these circumstances and the ex post facto in-depth nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. Although the sentence of sentencing of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, it is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the appellate court’s view (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015) by destroying the judgment of the first instance on the sole ground that the sentence of sentencing of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, but is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court determined the sentence by comprehensively taking into account all favorable and unfavorable circumstances of the Defendant, including the fact that

There is no special change in sentencing conditions that can change the sentence of the court below for the first time.

Considering the Defendant’s age, sexual conduct, environment, family relationship, criminal history, motive, means and consequence of a crime, etc., various circumstances, which form the conditions for sentencing as shown in the lower court and the pleadings after the commission of the crime, such as the circumstances after the commission of the crime, it is difficult to view the lower court’s punishment against the Defendant as being too uneasible and unfair as it goes beyond the reasonable scope of its discretion.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor's appeal of this case is without merit and Article 364 of the Criminal Procedure Act.