Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part on Defendant A and C and the judgment of the court of second instance shall be reversed, respectively.

Defendant

A shall be punished by imprisonment for one year.

The summary of the grounds for appeal (defendants) is too unreasonable for sentencing [one year of imprisonment (one year of the judgment of the court of first instance), four months of imprisonment (two months of the judgment of the court of second instance), Defendant B, and D: Each imprisonment, ten months of the maximum term of imprisonment, one year of the maximum term of imprisonment, and ten months of the short term of imprisonment] of the court below.

Judgment

A. (1) The appeal case against each of the judgment below against Defendant A was consolidated when the judgment of the court below was rendered ex officio (merger). Each of the offenses listed in the judgment below is in a concurrent crime relationship under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, and should be sentenced to a single sentence within the scope of a punishment aggravated for concurrent crimes pursuant to Article 38(1) of the Criminal Act. Thus, the judgment of the court below cannot be maintained as it is.

(2) The part against Defendant C was born on October 6, 1996 and was sentenced to an irregular term of imprisonment as provided by Article 2 of the Juvenile Act at the time of the pronouncement of the lower judgment, but it is apparent that Defendant C was no longer a juvenile under the age of 19, and therefore, the lower judgment that sentenced Defendant C to an irregular term of imprisonment was no longer maintained as above.

B. As to Defendant B and D’s unfair argument of sentencing, there are extenuating circumstances, such as: (a) the above Defendants were both the time to commit the instant crime; (b) the amount of damage was paid to 18 victims; and (c) agreed with the said victims, and thus, did not want to punish the Defendants; (c) Defendant D did not have any history of criminal punishment exceeding a fine; and (d) Defendant B did not have any particular criminal history except that the suspension of indictment was imposed on 2014; and (c) the Defendants are all the ages of adult age.

However, considering these points in the lower court, it appears that the lower court set the punishment by leaving the lower limit of the recommended punishment on the sentencing criteria, and the fact that the lower court made an additional agreement with one victim in the first instance alone may change the sentencing of the lower court.