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(영문) 대법원 2014.08.28 2014도3488
위증
Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

The finding of guilt in a criminal trial shall be based on evidence with probative value, which makes it possible for a judge to have the truth that the facts charged are true beyond a reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). If there is no such proof, the conviction cannot be determined even if there is a suspicion of guilt against the defendant even if there is no such proof.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2001Do2823 Decided August 21, 2001, and Supreme Court Decision 2005Do8675 Decided March 9, 2006, etc.). Furthermore, the cooking and choice of evidence and probative value, which are based on the premise of fact finding, belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court.

(Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court, based on the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, made a false statement contrary to his memory.

The judgment of the court of first instance which found the defendant guilty of the facts charged of the instant perjury is reversed or acquitted, on the ground that it is not sufficient to view that the judge had the criminal intent to commit perjury to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt, and that there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

The allegation in the grounds of appeal is merely an error of the lower court’s judgment on the selection and probative value of evidence, which is a substantial judgment of the fact-finding court.

In addition, even if examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding perjury or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

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