1. The judgment of the court below is reversed.

2. The Defendants shall be punished by imprisonment for one year.

3. However, each of the defendants is against the defendants.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. In order to establish a violation of the misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal principles (Defendant C) (i.e., Article 71 subparag. 5 and Article 59(2) of the Personal Information Protection Act, “personal information he/she became aware of in the course of his/her duties” shall be provided by “the person who manages or handled the personal information.” However, “R, S, T, and U” provided the personal information to Defendant C does not constitute “the person who manages or handled the personal information” under the Personal Information Protection Act, and the personal information he/she provided does not constitute “personal information he/she became aware of in the course of his/her duties” (hereinafter “Defendant 1’s assertion”). Shell cell phone number does not constitute “personal information”).

The sentence of the lower court on the Defendants is too unreasonable because of its excessive sentencing (the Defendants).

2. Determination

A. In light of the text and purport of Article 71 subparag. 5 of the Personal Information Protection Act as to the assertion of mistake of facts and misapprehension of the legal doctrine (Defendant C), if a person is provided with “personal information provided by a person who violated Article 59 subparag. 2,” he/she shall be deemed to have been directly punished by the “person who violated Article 59 subparag. 2,” or through another person, regardless of whether it was delivered by such person.

Therefore, the defendant's assertion disputing the status of the R, etc. that directly provided personal information to the defendant C and whether the personal information is related to the business of the personal information is without merit without any need to further examine it.

(A) According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the original court, the Defendant’s personal information provided by the person who violated Article 59 subparag. 2 is sufficiently recognized. The judgment on the second argument is based on the following information: (a) the individual’s personal information can be identified through his/her name, resident registration number, image, etc.; and (b) the relevant information alone.