1. The Defendant’s KRW 136,866,567 as well as 5% per annum from December 31, 2009 to February 18, 2016 to the Plaintiff.

1. On December 5, 2009, the Plaintiff: (a) was diagnosed as an ex post facto ex post facto ex officio examination by means of self-marculatory image (MRI) conducted by the Defendant on the 30th of the same month; (b) on the 30th of the same month, the Plaintiff was diagnosed as an ex post facto ex post facto ex officio examination; (c) however, on the 1st of the same month, there was symptoms of de ex post facto ex post facto depression; and (d) on January 6, 2010, the Plaintiff was diagnosed as an ex post facto disorder, such as the Hamatha (Mama) and Malitha (MRI); and (e) on the 30th of the same month, the Plaintiff was diagnosed as an ex post facto ex post facto ex post facto examination by the Defendant, even after receiving the ex post facto ex post facto ex post facto removal from

(hereinafter referred to as the "accident of this case"). [Grounds for recognition] The fact that there is no dispute, entry of Gap evidence 1 through 3, entry of the "written opinion" prepared by the F of the professional examiners, the result of the court's commission of physical examination to the director of the Hospital of Chungcheongnam-do and the purport of the whole pleadings.

2. Occurrence of liability for damages;

A. In a claim for damages due to a breach of the duty of care under the basis of liability, where the injured party proves that the act based on the ordinary sense of the general public was committed in a series of medical practices, and that any other cause, other than a series of medical practices, could not exist between the act and the result, the burden of proof should be mitigated so as to allow the injured party to be liable for damages by estimating the causal relationship between the medical negligence and the result.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2009Da82275 Decided January 27, 2012, etc.). The following circumstances that can be seen by comprehensively taking account of the Plaintiff’s return to the instant case, the Plaintiff’s statement of “(Explanation) opinion” in the preparation of the F Specialized Examination Committee, and the entire purport of pleadings, namely, the Plaintiff’s “(Explanation) opinion” prepared by the F Specialized Examination Committee, appears to have been the pressure of the horse gun on the part of the surgery (see Articles 8 and 11), and where blood transfusion occurred on the part of the surgery after spine surgery, approximately 33.