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The defendant's appeal is dismissed.
Reasons
1. Summary of grounds for appeal;
A. After the instant accident, the Defendant: (a) was unable to open the door of the driver’s seat; (b) was forced to leave the place of the accident; and (c) there was a fact that he left the convenience store located far away from 100 meters from the scene of the accident; (d) but the Defendant’s vehicle had a lot of goods to verify the Defendant’s personal information, such as the Defendant’s wallets; and (e) immediately after the accident, the police and the first aid unit immediately arrived; and (e) did not deem that the Defendant was the driver of the vehicle or the victims
B. In light of the legal principles, around September 22 and 10, 2013, the Defendant, at around September 22, 2013, measured the volume of 2/3 disease in front of the police officer at around 22:54, the result of the alcohol measurement by the respiratory measuring method at around 0.013%. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol at around 0.05%, which was at the time of the instant accident, around September 22, 2013.
C. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (one year of imprisonment, two years of suspended execution, 40 hours of compliance driving lecture, 120 hours of community service order) is too unreasonable.
2. Determination
A. The phrase "when the driver of an accident runs away without taking measures under Article 50 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding the victim under Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes for the Determination of misunderstanding of Facts" refers to the case where the driver of an accident leaves the scene of the accident before performing his/her duty under Article 50 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding the victim, although he/she knew of the fact that the victim was killed due to the accident, resulting in an una
(See Supreme Court Decision 2000Do2563, Jan. 5, 2001). The following circumstances revealed in the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court, i.e., the Defendant is driving at the time of having a single-specing disease on September 9, 2013.