All appeals by the defendant and the prosecutor are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant 1’s misunderstanding of facts (as to the guilty part of the judgment of the court below), the Defendant did not make a intimidation to the victim, such as the list of crimes in the judgment of the court below.

B) The sexual intercourse with the victim on February 14, 2015 (hereinafter “instant sexual intercourse”) was agreed upon by agreement.

2) The punishment of the lower court’s unfair sentencing (two years and six months of imprisonment) is too heavy.

B. Prosecutor 1) In light of the misunderstanding of the legal principles (as to the part not guilty among the judgment below), the statements of the victim and her husband, and the contents of conversation, etc., it is reasonable to see that the act of intimidation by sight of crime in the judgment below

Although the court below did not recognize habituality, it erred by misapprehending the legal principles on habituality, thereby making a judgment.

2) The sentence of the lower court’s unfair sentencing is too weak because of the misunderstanding of the aforementioned legal doctrine, the sentence imposed by habitual intimidation is not reflected.

2. Determination

A. As to the part on the Defendant’s assertion of mistake of facts, Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides for free evaluation of evidence, provides that the probative value of evidence shall be based on the free evaluation of evidence by the judge, is appropriate for the discovery of substantial truth. Therefore, a judge of the appellate court, who has a prior right to the determination of evidence, should take into account the perception obtained in the trial proceedings and the evidence investigated in the acknowledgement of facts.

In addition, the judge's decision on the probative value of evidence must be consistent with logical and empirical rules, and the degree of formation of a conviction in a criminal trial should be such that there is no reasonable doubt, but to the extent that it is not required to exclude all possible doubts, and rejection by causing doubts that there is no reasonable ground for proof that there is probative value exceeds the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, and this is reasonable in this regard.