Text
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
Reasons
1. The details of the disposition are as follows: short-term stay status visit (C-3) on December 26, 2015, the date of entry into the Republic of India of the Plaintiff (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the date of application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the date of June 15, 2016, the date of the application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “the date of the application for refugee status recognition”) and as of August 9, 2017, the decision of the Supreme Court rendered on August 15, 2017: The fact that there is no dispute as to the grounds for recognition of the rejection of the decision of September 14, 2017 as of the date of application for objection, and that there is no ground for recognition of the rejection of the decision of the decision of September 14, 20
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. The plaintiff's assertion is a national of the Republic of India (hereinafter referred to as " India").
On June 2014, the Plaintiff became a member of the B Party and participated in the election campaign. Since then, the Plaintiff was threatened by the C Party with the regime.
Accordingly, the plaintiff went to Thailand by leaving the delivery around December 2014 and has been around December 2015.
As such, the Plaintiff’s return to India is likely to threaten the C Party’s side, and thus, should be recognized as a refugee.
B. Determination 1) Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Refugee Act defines a refugee as “a foreigner who is unable to be protected or does not want to be protected by the country of nationality due to well-founded fear to recognize that he/she may be injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion, or a foreigner who is not a national who, due to such fear, is unable to return to or does not want to return to the country of nationality before entering the Republic of Korea.” 2) In full view of the aforementioned evidence and evidence as stated in Articles 3 and 4 as well as the following circumstances, which can be known by adding to the purport of the entire arguments in Articles 3 and 4, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff “a well-founded fear on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion,” and there is evidence to recognize otherwise.