The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. At the time of committing the instant crime, the Defendant told the victim J of “the same death.”

In light of the circumstances such as the fact that police officers were at the site at the time, it is difficult to deem that the crime of intimidation is established merely because it is merely a simple expression of emotional humiliation or temporary dispersion.

In addition, even though the Defendant was suffering from illness at the time of committing the instant crime, the Defendant cannot be deemed to have threatened the victim by carrying the “hazardous things” under Article 3(1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, since the victim did not feel fear in light of the circumstances at the time.

Nevertheless, the court below found the defendant guilty of the facts charged is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to intimidation and violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (collectively weapons, etc.) which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

B. The lower court’s sentencing (one month of imprisonment, two years of suspended execution, two years of social service, 80 hours of imprisonment) against the Defendant, even if not, is unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. In a specific case where a determination of the misapprehension of the legal doctrine constitutes “hazardous goods” as prescribed by Article 3(1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, the determination should be made by whether the other party or a third party could feel any danger to the life or body of the other party when using the goods in light of social norms (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Do3520, Mar. 26, 2009). Meanwhile, in order to establish a crime of intimidation, the content of harm and injury notified should be sufficient to cause fear to the general public in light of all the circumstances before and after the act, such as the relation between the actor and the other party, the other party’s surrounding situation at the time of notification, the degree of friendship between the perpetrator and the other party, and the other party’s mutual relation, etc.